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Preface
This volume constitutes the final study within the research project EUFams II: 
Facilitating Cross-Border Family Life – Towards a Common European Under-
standing and entails papers presented at the online final conference held on 
30 October 2020. EUFams II was a project on European private international 
law in family and succession matters conducted between September 2018 
and December 2020 and funded by the European Commission. The project 
built on the predecessor study Planning the future of cross-border families: 
a path through coordination (EUFam’s) initiated by the University of Milan.
The EUFams II project was coordinated by the Institute for Comparative 
Law, Conflict of Laws and International Business Law of Heidelberg Univer-
sity in cooperation with the Universities of Lund (Ulf Maunsbach and Michael 
Bogdan), Milan (Ilaria Viarengo and Francesca Villata), Osijek (Mirela Župan), 
Valencia (Rosario Espinosa Calabuig), Verona (Maria Caterina Baruffi), and 
the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regu-
latory Procedural Law (Burkhard Hess).
In my capacity as coordinator, I would like to express my gratitude to all 
the project partners and their respective research teams for the fruitful co-
operation throughout the project. I would also like to thank Katharina Boele-
Woelki, Alegría Borrás Rodríguez (†), Fausto Pocar, and Vesna Tomljenović for 
their support as members of the project’s Academic Advisory Board. My 
gratitude extends to all those having contributed to the success of EUFams II 
by participating in national and international exchange seminars, the empir-
ical study, or other project activities. A special thanks goes to the speakers, 
discussants, and participants of the online final conference which replaced 
the originally planned conference in Heidelberg.
Finally, my special gratitude goes to my staff members at the Institute for 
Comparative Law, Conflict of Laws and International Business Law, particu-
larly to my co-editors Quincy Lobach and Tobias Rapp. They did not only un-
burden me of most of the administrative work; they also provided remark-
able input in relation to the general design of the project. I would also like 
to thank Till Menke and Marcel Zühlsdorff for their contributions to the im-
plementation of the project, Christoph Blüm and Elias Krist for the organiza-
tion of the final conference as well as my assistant Ingrid Lesch for her sup-
port, which included correspondence as well as complicated book keeping 
matters. A final thanks goes to Johannes Tegel for the diligent preparation of 
the manuscript of this volume.
VI Preface
Most importantly, however, I would like to emphasize that the project 
aimed at facilitating life for cross-border families by a better coordination of 
legal systems in Europe. We should be most grateful if this project provided 
a small contribution to the efforts to achieve this important goal.
Heidelberg, 28 May 2021 Thomas Pfeiffer
Abbreviations   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX
Introduction: The EUFams II Project  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Thomas Pfeiffer, Quincy C. Lobach, and Tobias Rapp
The Notion of Habitual Residence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Thomas Pfeiffer
Party Autonomy in European Family and Succession Law   . . . . . . . . . 21
Ulf Maunsbach
Child Protection in European Family Law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Rosario Espinosa Calabuig and Laura Carballo Piñeiro
Judicial Training in European Private International Law in Family 
and Succession Matters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Mirela Župan, Ivana Kunda, and Paula Poretti
Defining Marriage and Other Unions of Persons  
in European Family Law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Ilaria Viarengo, Francesca Villata, Nicolò Nisi, and Lenka Valkova 
Diletta Danieli and Cinzia Peraro
Third Country Nationals and the Procedural Role of EU Family 
and Succession Law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Marlene Brosch and Cristina M. Mariottini
Matters Involving Third Country Nationals:  
A Comparative Analysis Concerning Personal Status Changes  
of Third Country Nationals   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Marcel Zühlsdorff






Convention of 24 October 1956 on the law applicable to mainte-




Convention of 5 October 1961 concerning the powers of authorities 
and the law applicable in respect of the protection of infants
1968 Brussels 
Convention
1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters
1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention









European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Deci-










Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children
2007 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention
Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of 
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance
2007 Hague Mainte-
nance Protocol




Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters
Brussels I Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters
Brussels I bis 
Regulation
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters
Brussels II Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on juris-
diction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for 
children of both spouses
X Abbreviations
Brussels II bis 
Regulation
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 con-
cerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000
Brussels II ter 
Regulation
Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdic-
tion, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial 




Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their 
family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and 
repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/
EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/
EEC
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
COM (2016) 411 final Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduc-
tion (recast)
Taking of Evidence 
Regulation
Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on coop-
eration between the courts of the Member States in the taking of 
evidence in civil or commercial matters
EJN European Judicial Network
EJTN European Judicial Training Network
ERA Europäische Rechtsakademie
EU European Union




Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order 
for uncontested claims
HCCH Hague Conference on Private International Law
Maintenance 
Regulation
Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on juris-
diction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations
Matrimonial Property 
Regulation
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and 
the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matri-
monial property regimes
OJ Official Journal of the European Union
Partnership Property 
Regulation
Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law 
and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the 




Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 2016 on promoting the free movement of citizens 
by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public doc-
uments in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1024/2012
Rome III Regulation Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 imple-
menting enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to 
divorce and legal separation
Succession 
Regulation
Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition 
and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of 
authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation 
of a European Certificate of Succession
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN Child Convention Convention on the Rights of the Child

Pfeiffer, Thomas/Lobach, Quincy C./Rapp, Tobias, Introduction: The EUFams II Project, in: 
Pfeiffer, Thomas/Lobach, Quincy C./Rapp, Tobias (Eds.), Facilitating Cross-Border Family Life – 
Towards a Common European Understanding. EUFams II and Beyond, Heidelberg 2021, p. 1 – 7. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.853.c11707
Introduction: The EUFams II Project
Thomas Pfeiffer, Quincy C. Lobach, and Tobias Rapp
I. Background
EUFams II was a study on European private international law in family and 
succession matters conducted between September 2018 and December 2020 
by academic institutions from various EU Member States and funded by the 
European Commission.1 The project’s objective was to assess the function-
ing and the effectiveness of the framework of international and European 
family law, detect potential problems, and propose possible improvements. 
Ultimately, it aimed at developing a common European expertise and un-
derstanding to secure the uniform, coherent, and consistent application of 
European family law, so as to facilitate the cross-border movement of per-
sons within the EU. The project built on the predecessor study “Planning the 
future of cross-border families: a path through coordination (EUFam’s)” ini-
tiated by the University of Milan.
1 The project was funded by the European Union’s Justice Programme (2014 –  2020), Grant 
no. 800780. The content of the project represents the views of the authors only and is their 
sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use 
that may be made of the information it contains.
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The EUFams II project was coordinated by the Institute for Compara-
tive Law, Conflict of Laws and International Business Law of Heidelberg 
University (Thomas Pfeiffer) in cooperation with the Universities of Lund 
(Ulf Maunsbach and Michael Bogdan), Milan (Ilaria Viarengo and Francesca 
Villata), Osijek (Mirela Župan), Valencia (Rosario Espinosa Calabuig), Verona 
(Maria Caterina Baruffi), and the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for Inter-
national, European and Regulatory Procedural Law (Burkhard Hess). It was 
supported by an Academic Advisory Board (Katharina Boele-Woelki, Alegría 
Borrás Rodríguez, Fausto Pocar, and Vesna Tomljenović).
Additional information on the EUFams II project can be found on the des-
ignated website.2
II. Objectives and methodology
The EU’s system of private international law in family and succession 
matters has rapidly extended its material scope over the last two decades. 
Of particular interest to the EUFams II research group were the following in-
struments: Brussels II bis and ter Regulation, Rome III Regulation, Mainte-
nance Regulation, 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, Property Regimes Reg-
ulations, Succession Regulation, Public Documents Regulation, 1980 Hague 
Child Abduction Convention, and 1996 Child Protection Convention. These 
instruments deal with family law matters in a fragmentary, yet intercon-
nected manner. Consequently, demarcation and the interplay of different in-
struments have become increasingly important. Potential difficulties include 
the determination of the scope of the regulations, their interplay and actual 
workability, and the application of their provisions in practice.
Against this background, the EUFams II research group was interested in 
gaining insight into the actual implementation of these instruments and ap-
plication of their provisions throughout the EU. Ultimately, the consortium 
aimed at revealing potential difficulties for, obstacles to, and problems with 
matters of free movement and cross-border family life. Insofar, the project’s 
focus was laid on translational research.
In the explorative phase, an empirical legal study on the functioning of 
European family and succession law in practice was conducted by means of a 
questionnaire. Moreover, a database collecting cases from courts across the 
EU was set up. Finally, five national exchange seminars gathering renowned 
2 www.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams (available in English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, 
Swedish, Croatian, Greek, Czech, and Slovak, last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
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academics and practitioners were hosted by the members of the consor-
tium, with the aim of identifying shortcomings and deficiencies of European 
family and succession law on the national level.
In the comparative phase, an international exchange seminar was hosted 
in Luxembourg. The seminar endeavored to foster mutual learning and the 
extrapolation of national good practices on the European level. In addition, 
the database’s contents were analyzed in a comparative study on national 
case law. In a thematic report, national implementation laws were compared 
and critically assessed.
In the final phase, which built on the totality of the explorative and com-
parative research activities and outputs, topics of a more general nature and 
with an overarching character were dealt with at the online final conference, 
culminating in this volume.
III. Research outputs
1. Empirical study
An empirical study conducted between January and March 2019 by means of 
an online questionnaire available in nine languages constituted the first stage 
of the EUFams II project. It aimed at exploring the general familiarity of var-
ious groups of (legal) professionals (e. g. judges, lawyers/attorneys, notaries, 
state officers, scholars/academics, social counsellors) with the framework of 
European family and succession law. In total, 1,394 professionals participated 
in the survey. The main findings of the survey are extensively presented from 
a European perspective in a publicly available report.3 A summarized version 
focusing on Germany has been published elsewhere.4
2. National exchange seminars
National exchange seminars were hosted by the partners in Osijek (7 and 
8 March 2019), Lund (11 April 2019), Heidelberg (17 May 2019), Verona 
(17 May 2019), and Valencia (17 May 2019). They aimed at shedding light 
on the challenges faced by national legal systems, the interplay between 
3 Lobach/Rapp, An Empirical Study on European Family and Succession Law, http://www2.
ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbe 
richt&id=2 (last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
4 Lobach/Rapp, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 2020, 83.
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national and European law, and the impact of recent decisions of the CJEU 
on the domestic legal order. The discussions and findings of the seminars 
were summarized in national reports on Croatia5, Sweden6, Germany7, Italy8, 
and Spain9. In addition, a volume containing the German conference pro-
ceedings was published separately.10
3. International exchange seminar
An international exchange seminar was hosted by the Max Planck Institute 
Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law on 
25 October 2019. On the basis of the controversial and problematic issues ad-
dressed in the national reports, the international exchange seminar aimed at 
identifying common patterns, exploring possible solutions, and sharing good 
practices with regard to the application of the EU instruments in family law. 
The conference proceedings were presented in the corresponding report.11
5 Župan/Šego/Poretti/Drventic, Report on the Croatian Exchange Seminar, http://www2.ipr.
uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht 
&id=10 (last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
6 Maunsbach, Report on the Swedish Exchange Seminar, http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.
de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=11 (last con-
sulted 14. 10.  2020).
7 Zühlsdorff, Report on the German Exchange Seminar, http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.
de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=12 (last con-
sulted 14. 10.  2020).
8 Baruffi/Danieli/Fratea/Peraro, Report on the Italian Exchange Seminar, http://www2.ipr.
uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht 
&id=9 (last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
9 Espinosa Calabuig/Quinzá Redondo, Report on the Spanish Exchange Seminar, http://
www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projekt 
bericht&id=14 (last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
10 Pfeiffer/Lobach/Rapp (eds.), Europäisches Familien- und Erbrecht – Stand und Perspek-
tiven, 2020.
11 Brosch/Mariottini, Report on the International Exchange Seminar, http://www2.ipr.uni-
heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=17 
(last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
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4. Case law database and comparative analysis
A case law database containing cases from the courts of various EU Member 
States was set up as part of the predecessor project and was optimized and 
enlarged over the course of EUFams II. Along with standardized data for each 
judgement, the database also comprises a summary of both the facts and the 
decision given by the court as well as a short critique. The database currently 
contains more than 1,100 cases and can be accessed online.12
The collected cases served as a profound foundation for the subsequent 
comparative report on national case law13 which aimed at unveiling the ap-
plication of European family and succession law as practiced by national 
courts.14 Moreover, it was observed that the effectiveness and functioning 
of European family and succession law greatly depends on the interplay be-
tween the national legal system and the European framework. Therefore, a 
report on national implementation laws was dedicated to this issue.15
IV. Online final conference and final study
The final conference of the EUFams II project was hosted online by Hei-
delberg University on 30 October 2020. The project partners presented the 
papers published in this volume which accordingly serves as the project’s 
final study. The contributors were invited to present historical developments, 
discuss the status quo, and draw the lines along which European family and 
succession law may develop in the near future. Overall, this volume en-
deavors to inspire its readership and the scientific community at large to en-
gage in further research along and across these lines.
12 http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index.php?site=entscheidungsdatenbank (last 
consulted 14. 10.  2020).
13 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, http://www2.ipr.uni-
heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=20 
(last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
14 Additional publications referring to the case law database include Župan, Utjecaj zastite 
ljudskih prava na suvremeno medunarodno privatno pravo, in: Barbić/Sikirić (eds.), Medu-
narodno privatno pravo – interakcija medunarodnih, europskih i domacih propisa, 2020, 
p. 125.
15 EUFams II Consortium, Report on National Implementation Laws, http://www2.ipr.uni-
heidelberg.de/eufams/index-Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=18 
(last consulted 14. 10.  2020).
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1. The main connecting-factors: party autonomy 
and habitual residence
Habitual residence serves as the main objective connecting-factor in Euro-
pean family and succession law. Thomas Pfeiffer investigates whether the no-
tion of habitual residence is of a unitary nature or differs throughout the 
regulations. Moreover, he addresses various selected issues, such as the rele-
vance of subjective elements for the purposes of establishing habitual resi-
dence and particularities pertaining to minors. Finally, the contribution dis-
cusses procedural aspects of the ascertainment (e. g. ex officio) of habitual 
residence.
An important paradigm shift of the last decades has been the gradual in-
troduction of party autonomy in European family and succession law. De-
spite the (initial) skepticism of some Member States, party autonomy plays 
an important role in the current instruments. Ulf Maunsbach investigates the 
historical developments in European and Swedish law alike, and the oppor-
tunities parties have under the current framework to choose the competent 
court and/or the applicable law, be it directly or indirectly. The author arrives 
at the conclusion that a trend towards increased party autonomy balanced by 
a similarly increased possibility for court discretion to take into account the 
interest of weaker parties can be observed.
2. International child protection
International child protection is characterized by a plurality of sources re-
sulting in difficulties of demarcation and interplay between the pertinent in-
struments, all of which rely on what at first glance appear to be similar con-
cepts, such as the best interest of the child, the right of the child to be heard, 
and habitual residence (of very young children). Rosario Espinosa Calabuig 
and Laura Carballo Piñeiro criticize that the legal and cultural divergencies 
between Member States cannot be sufficiently accounted for by the predomi-
nantly procedural and technical rules on international child protection.
3. Judicial training
The EUFams II project has on numerous occasions identified a lack of knowl-
edge and awareness of the legal framework amongst legal operators. This de-
ficiency is one of the most important challenges of present European family 
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and succession law. Education and training of those engaged in applying 
the law may be an important measure to close the existing knowledge gap. 
Mirela Župan, Ivana Kunda, and Paula Poretti describe and assess the various 
educational measures pertaining to European family and succession law cur-
rently offered by various institutions, both at the national as well as at the 
European level. Additionally, they analyze the benefits and downsides of spe-
cialization in the judiciary and of professional networks (e. g. liaison judges, 
EJN, IHNJ).
4. Defining marriage and other unions
The notion of marriage continues to be one of the most controversial in Euro-
pean family law and gives rise to numerous questions, ranging from personal 
status to financial aspects. In a joint contribution, Ilaria Viarengo, Francesca 
Villata, Nicolò Nisi, Lenka Valkova, Diletta Danieli, and Cinzia Peraro engage 
in a comparative analysis of the various concepts of formalized relationships 
in substantive national law as well as in private international law. They par-
ticularly focus on same-sex marriages and registered partnerships open to 
same-sex as well as opposite-sex couples against the background of EU free 
movement law, recent CJEU case law, and the respective scopes of applica-
tion of various regulations.
5. Third country nationals
Migration from third countries to the EU and vice versa, notably against 
the backdrop of the so-called refugee crisis and Brexit, have emphasized the 
need for a predictable legal framework providing practicable solutions in 
matters involving third country nationals. Against that background, Marlene 
Brosch and Cristina M. Mariottini examine the European framework and its 
implementation in national case law involving third country nationals, with 
a focus on procedural aspects. Substantive aspects such as legal concepts un-
known to domestic law, questions of personal status, and public policy in re-
lation to third country nationals are dealt with by Marcel Zühlsdorff.
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The Notion of Habitual Residence
Thomas Pfeiffer
Abstract This contribution summarizes key aspects of habitual residence 
as a connecting-factor and a basis of jurisdiction in European private inter-
national and procedural law. It addresses its significance for avoiding dis-
crimination based on nationality in the EU and its relevance for integrating 
migrants in the societies of the countries where they reside. Finally, the con-
tribution discusses some key questions of habitual residence, i. e. the fore-
seeability of its application or the appropriateness of a uniform versus a dif-
ferentiated interpretation of this term, as well as practical matters such as the 
habitual residence of children or its ex officio application by courts.
Keywords European family and succession law, habitual residence, con-
necting-factors.
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I. Introduction
European family and succession law applies to matters of personal life. As a 
consequence, private international law typically refers to personal factors as 
a means of referring to a certain legal system. Traditionally, there are three 
significant options: nationality, domicile, and residence. The instruments of 
European family and succession law, however, demonstrate a clear prefer-
ence for habitual residence, in particular compared to the traditional pref-
erence for nationality in many Member States.
II. Reasons for preferring habitual residence over nationality
There are two main reasons for preferring habitual residence over national-
ity as a connecting-factor in the EU. One has to do with the avoidance of dis-
crimination based on nationality, the other is an answer to the migration of 
workers in a more general manner.
1. Avoiding discrimination in the EU
It is a leitmotiv of European law that EU citizens must not be discriminated 
against on the basis of their nationality. This principle is closely related to 
the fundamental freedoms under the TFEU. In private international law, it is 
relevant for access to courts on a non-discriminatory basis as well as for in-
tegration into the civil society in cases where EU nationals live in another 
Member State. In other words, reference to a connecting-factor other than 
nationality is necessary for establishing a single market without establishing 
a single citizenship.
2. Migration in general
The latter aspect is relevant also for migrant workers in general.1 From the 
perspective of those Member States which formerly preferred nationality 
as the main connecting-factor in international family and succession law, 
the result was that family and succession matters of foreign nationals were 
1 For a short analysis see already Pfeiffer, IPRax 2016, 310 (311).
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predominantly governed by the law of their home country. The preference 
for nationality was initially based on the idea that nationals are subjected 
to the laws of their nation. A more modern reason, however, was that most 
people rarely change their citizenship. Referring to nationality as a connect-
ing-factor ensured a stable point of reference and thus served the goal of 
continuity in relation to questions of personal status. Moreover, nationality 
is easy to determine, and – unlike residence and domicile – difficult to ma-
nipulate. All in all, it served the purpose of legal certainty. Moreover, nation-
ality was supposed to reflect the country with which a person’s long-term 
life interests were associated. Especially in international family and succes-
sion law, these long-term life interests are at the same time interwoven with 
a person’s cultural background. The legitimate expectations of those sub-
ject to the law are often that their personal lives will be governed by rules 
that correspond to their own cultural identity. On the other hand, the link to 
residence and domicile stands more for the aspects of integration and adap-
tation.
In recent decades, the effects of the principle of citizenship should be 
seen against the background of the broad European migratory flows. In prac-
tice, the principle of nationality has led above all to the fact that the family 
and inheritance relationships of foreign nationals have often been judged 
not according to the laws of the country where they live, but according to 
their home country’s law. Behind this was a concept that for a long time 
shaped the typical view on migrant workers. Traditionally, many Member 
States did not see themselves as countries of immigration. The workers who 
were called from abroad were addressed as “guest workers”. The general ex-
pectation was that these “guests” would work in their host country for a 
few years or sometimes a bit more, but then eventually return to their home 
countries. The principle of citizenship in private international law was a re-
flection of this idea. Migrants were not considered a permanent part of the 
society of their host State; the focus of their long-term life interests was 
seen to lie in their home countries. The principle of nationality was intended 
to respect not only these long-term life interests, but also their lasting cul-
tural roots in their country of origin. At the same time, it was ensured that 
their family and succession matters were judged according to the same rules 
as in their home countries. This was intended to realize another important 
goal of private international law, namely the avoidance of so-called limping 
legal relationships, i. e. a situation in which, for example, a person is consid-
ered divorced in one country while still married in the other. The applica-
tion of the principle of nationality was thus both an expression of respect 
for the native culture of foreigners and an expression of a policy aiming at 
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the non-integration of migrant workers into the societies of their host State. 
This was intended to maintain the ties of foreigners to their home countries 
as much as possible, to not impair their opportunities to return, but rather 
to promote their willingness to return. Today, this conception of legal policy 
has given way to a more integration-oriented approach which is reflected by 
an application of the laws of the country where persons habitually reside. It 
is a part of the personal integration of migrants, also of non-discrimination, 
that their family relations are governed by the rules of their country of resi-
dence.
3. The necessity of contractual options
Today’s world is characterized by the coexistence of very different concepts 
of life. Migration of workers may in many cases result in the permanent resi-
dence in the host country, and in other cases a return to the home country, 
or in a move to yet another country. If migrant workers stay permanently in 
their host country, this will typically affect the next generation as well. This 
is very different in the case of the migration of retired persons, who may 
simply prefer living in a more pleasant or warmer area of Europe for the last 
period of their lives. This pluralism is the reason why a “one size fits all”-so-
lution is not acceptable in private international law anymore. Applying ha-
bitual residence as the most significant connecting-factor in European pri-
vate international law is acceptable only because the relevant instruments 
also offer the possibility to choose other options.
III. Short survey of EU provisions
1. Jurisdiction
Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, habitual residence is referred to in Art. 3 
Brussels II bis Regulation for matters relating to divorce or similar issues and 
Art. 8 Brussels II bis Regulation in relation to parental responsibility. Art. 3 
Brussels II bis Regulation provides for several alternatives, partly based on 
the present or past habitual residence of the spouses or, with certain modifi-
cations, to the habitual residence of one of the spouses. Art. 8 Brussels II bis 
Regulation refers to the habitual residence of the child, not the parents. In 
the Maintenance Regulation, Art. 3 offers a choice between the habitual resi-
dence of the creditor and the defendant as a basis for jurisdiction. Art. 4 
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Succession Regulation refers to the habitual residence of the deceased at the 
time of death. The Matrimonial Property Regulation indirectly refers to ha-
bitual residence in case of the death of a spouse (Art. 4) and in cases of di-
vorce or a similar issue (Art. 5). In other cases, there is a direct reference 
to the habitual residence of the spouses or their last habitual residence or 
the habitual residence of the respondent (Art. 6 Matrimonial Property Reg-
ulation). A jurisdictional reference to the place of habitual residence of the 
partners is also provided for in Art. 6 Partnership Property Regulation. Prior 
to the enactment of the Maintenance Regulation, the habitual residence of 
the person entitled to maintenance was referred to as a basis for jurisdiction 
in the original version of the Brussels Convention, and still is in Art. 5 no. 2 
of the 2007 Lugano Convention.
2. Applicable law
It seems fair to say that, in European family and succession law, habitual 
residence has become the most significant statutory connecting-factor. For 
divorces, this can be derived from Art. 8 (a) – (c) Rome III Regulation. In re-
lation to matrimonial property, Art. 26 (1) Matrimonial Property Regulation 
refers to the first common habitual residence of the spouses after their mar-
riage. In addition, Art. 26 (3) (a) Maintenance Regulation refers to a previous 
longer common habitual residence as a possible ground for deviating from 
the reference to the first common habitual residence. Furthermore, the habit-
ual residence of the spouses (or either spouse) is an option for a contractual 
choice of law under Art. 22 (1) Matrimonial Property Regulation. The situ-
ation is slightly different with regard to the Partnership Property Regulation, 
which – for political reasons – mainly refers to the law of the State of regis-
tration; however, even with regard to the cases covered by this instrument, 
habitual residence serves as a connecting-factor in exceptional cases under 
Art. 26 (2). Art. 21 (1) Succession Regulation, like the jurisdictional rule in its 
Art. 4, refers to the habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death. 
In cases under the Maintenance Regulation, a reference to the habitual resi-




Questions of habitual residence have been discussed intensively and exten-
sively in private international law in general and European private inter-
national law in particular.2 It is not the purpose of this contribution to repeat 
this discussion, but rather to point out those aspects of these discussions 
which cause the most significant practical problems.
1. Foreseeability – habitual residence as a general clause
The first and probably most significant problem is foreseeability. From a 
methodological perspective, the term “habitual residence” is a general clause 
and not a sharply defined notion. The theoretical as well as the practical an-
swer to this problem seem to be identical: It is highly desirable to determine 
foreseeable, adequate criteria that define habitual residence. It can be seen 
from the national reports within the EUFams II project that national courts 
have understood and accepted this necessity.3 However, defining criteria for 
determining a person’s habitual residence is only a first step. It is typical for 
legal arguments that the relevance of certain facts may differ, depending on 
the presence or absence of other factors. This is particularly true for deter-
mining habitual residence. The workplace may be relevant for determining 
the habitual residence of a person who works full-time, but it will probably 
be less relevant in case of a student travelling around on a work-and-travel 
basis. The relevance of arguments also oscillates between form and sub-
stance. If a person’s life is very stable and deeply rooted in a certain environ-
ment, it will, in many instances, suffice to find out this person’s domicile in 
order to determine the habitual residence; considering a specific intent may 
be unnecessary if the objective factors are sufficiently clear.4 The situation 
is much more complicated in cases of a more volatile lifestyle where all fac-
tors indicating personal, economic, and social integration may be relevant. 
It may even be that under Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation (choice of court 
2 Most thoroughly Rentsch, Der gewöhnliche Aufenthalt im System des Europäischen Kolli-
sionsrechts.
3 See e. g. EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, parts C.III.3 and 
D.III.1.a.
4 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, part D.III.1.a.
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agreement in the best interest of a child), factors other than the child’s actual 
residence are accepted as being more important.5
In this context, a common feature of all general clauses is that their inter-
pretation may be influenced by “fore-structured” understandings. To a cer-
tain extent, the project indicates that this is also the case in relation to habit-
ual residence. From a bird’s eye perspective, in hard cases, habitual residence 
as a connecting-factor serves the purpose of determining whether a person 
is part of this or of that society. French courts seem to include a person’s na-
tionality in the list of relevant criteria6, which may have to do with the fact 
that nation on the one hand, and society on the other, are very closely related 
to each other in French legal and political thinking. By contrast, the German 
legal discussion would rather look at a person’s intent in these situations in 
order to determine whether a person will, in the long run, rather be a part 
of this or that society.7 However, a German argument would probably take 
into account a person’s nationality indirectly, i. e. as a circumstance that may 
indicate a person’s long-term plans and interest.
While these observations are not meant as a comprehensive methodo-
logical analysis of the problems raised by referring to habitual residence as 
a connecting-factor, they indicate the significance of legal thinking. Making 
use of general concepts such as habitual residence in European private inter-
national law results in a higher significance of different fore-structured legal 
understandings. Such different understandings may exist as a result of differ-
ences in legal, political, philosophical, cultural, economic or social thinking 
in different Member States, which is not per se a bad thing. To some extent, 
this situation will be mitigated by CJEU case law, which is available already8 
and will grow over time. However, in order to achieve greater and better har-
monization, concepts such as habitual residence require more exchange and 
more common legal education.
A more difficult issue is whether rules of thumb9 would be helpful. That 
may be the case if they really fit the purpose and are generally accepted 
5 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, part B.III.2; see also part 
F.III.10.
6 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, part C.III.3.
7 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, part D.III.1.a.
8 See in particular CJEU 29. 11.  2007, C-68/07 (Sundelind Lopez/Lopez Lizazo); CJEU, 02. 04.  
2009, C-523/07 (A); CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-497/10 (Mercredi/Chaffe); CJEU, 09. 10.  2014, 
C-376/14 PPU (C/M ); CJEU, 15. 02.  2017, C-499/15 (W and V/X ); CJEU, 08. 06.  2017, C-111/17 
PPU (OL/PQ); CJEU, 28. 06.  2018, C-512/17 (HR); CJEU, 17. 10.  2018, C-393/18 PPU (UD/XB); 
CJEU, 16. 07.  2020, C-80/19 (EE).
9 For an example, see EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, 
part D.III.1.b.bb.
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throughout the Member States. The latter would usually require that these 
rules of thumb are backed by some European authority (CJEU case law; state-
ments of the Commission or similar). Rules of thumb developed by national 
courts will help only where they are advocated in cross-border exchanges or 
legal writing and well-received in a majority of Member States. Experience 
indicates that this simply does not happen at all or, without intervention by 
the legislator, happens only in very rare cases.
2. Uniform or differentiated interpretation
Another standard question, namely whether a uniform or differentiated in-
terpretation of habitual residence applies, has also been discussed within the 
Project, e. g. at the final conference.
To answer this question, one should have in mind that the reference to 
habitual residence is, by itself, made in a different manner in different Euro-
pean instruments. In particular, there are differences with regard to the per-
sons concerned and with regard to time. A very good example is the Succes-
sion Regulation which refers to the habitual residence of the deceased (who 
will certainly not be a party to any proceedings relating to the estate under 
this instrument) at the time of death. By contrast, the Matrimonial Property 
Regulation refers to the spouses, i. e. the parties to the legal relationship gov-
erned by this Regulation. Moreover, it refers to the first common habitual 
residence after their marriage, so that the relevant habitual residence may be 
determined more easily.
As a consequence, the factors (or rather the weight of the various fac-
tors) relevant for determining habitual residence will, in any event, vary ac-
cording to the differences in relation to the relevant persons or moment in 
time. Against this backdrop, the question of whether a uniform or differenti-
ated concept of habitual residence should apply, depends on the level of ab-
straction. In the very specific normative settings of the various references to 
habitual residence, the relevance of criteria may differ. The overall duration 
of residence will be more relevant when persons travel back and forth be-
tween two different abodes10 than in a case where the first habitual residence 
needs to be determined for purposes of the Matrimonial Property Regulation. 
The intent of an adult may be more relevant than the personal intent of a 
minor, whose residence is generally determined by persons having custody.11 
10 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, part C.III.3.
11 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, parts D.III.1.a and b.
The Notion of Habitual Residence 17
Moreover, since the habitual residence depends on a broad variety of factual 
elements, establishing the relevant facts will result in very specific problems 
with regard to different instruments. In relation to the Matrimonial Property 
Regulation, e. g. the determination of a couple’s first common habitual resi-
dence may relate to events that occurred a long time ago12; the reference to 
the habitual residence of the deceased raises the problem that the most im-
portant source of information for its determination, i. e. the deceased himself, 
is not available anymore in case of any controversy.
3. Habitual residence of children
The most controversial specific issue seems to be determining the habitual 
residence in cases involving divorce, separation or custody. Firstly, this may 
have to do with the highly emotional and, sometimes, extremely controver-
sial character of custody matters between parents in the course of their sep-
aration or divorce. Secondly, children typically do not decide themselves 
where they live, but depend on the decisions of others. As a consequence, it 
is more difficult to determine their long-term plans and interest; courts can-
not and do not rely on the child’s plans and intentions.13 Thirdly, the habit-
ual nature of a child’s residence and its long-term perspective is influenced 
by its best interest, so that any decision on habitual residence seems to in-
clude substantive best-interest aspects.14 Fourthly, in relation to children, the 
legal framework is more complicated than in other cases because of the rele-
vance of further international instruments, such as the Hague Child Abduc-
tion Convention.
In general, however, it seems fair to say that these complications may be 
seen as a mere consequence of the general complexity of determining ha-
bitual residence. One of the answers to these problems is the option for a 
prorogation agreement in Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation and, as of 1 Au-
gust 2022, Art. 10 Brussels II ter Regulation; it may be worthwhile discussing 
whether these options may be extended in the future.
12 Baruffi/Danieli/Fratela/Peraro, Report on the Italian Exchange Seminar, part F.III.
13 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, parts C.III.3 and 
D.III.1.b.aa.
14 E. g. EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, parts F.III.2 and 
G.III.3.
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4. Ex officio scrutiny of jurisdiction
The rules of European family law provide for a scrutiny of the jurisdiction 
of the court seized ex officio (Art. 17 Brussels II bis Regulation, Art. 10 Main-
tenance Regulation, Art. 15 Property Regimes Regulations). A different rule, 
however, is stated by Art. 9 Succession Regulation, which provides for juris-
diction based on appearance.
This difference is a consequence of third party interests involved in 
family law cases. Yet, the Comparative Report indicates that some courts 
seem to abstain from an ex officio scrutiny of their jurisdiction in cases where 
no party has raised any objections against the proceedings.15 This certainly 
has to do with the circumstance that the existence of third party interests, in-
cluding public interest aspects, is an abstract possibility; relevant third party 
interests do not necessarily exist in all cases. Therefore, these cases raise the 
question whether the underlying approach should be legalized, i. e. to enact 
a rule that a court may base its jurisdiction on an appearance without objec-
tion, if it is manifest that no relevant third party rights are at stake.
V. Conclusions
Very significant policy reasons underline that, for reasons of European in-
tegration and as an answer to problems of immigration, habitual residence is 
and should be the most significant connecting-factor in European family and 
succession law, as long as it is accompanied by contractual choice of law op-
tions. Most problems relating to habitual residence stem from its nature as a 
general clause; foreseeability and application will certainly be improved over 
time by CJEU case law. However, international exchange and the further de-
velopment of a common European understanding are important factors as 
well. It may also be discussed whether the role of agreements between the 
parties should be enhanced in the future.
15 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, parts B.III.4 and G.III.1.
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Ulf Maunsbach*
Abstract In this contribution, party autonomy is discussed in relation to 
European family and succession law. The topic is briefly introduced, followed 
by a survey covering the main EU-instruments with particular emphasis on 
the parties’ possibility to influence choice of court and law by agreements. 
Thus, autonomy as described in this contribution embraces both prorogation 
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and choice of law. The contribution also includes a brief comparison with the 
development of party autonomy in Sweden and some general conclusions 
are presented. It is observed that party autonomy in European family and 
succession law can be described as an area characterized by a number of di-
viding interests and that we can see a trend towards increased party auton-
omy balanced by a similarly increased possibility for court discretion to take 
into account the interest of weaker parties. This fosters a development to-
wards incomprehensible rules and legal instruments that leads to the con-
clusion that complexity is the new black.
Keywords party autonomy, European family and succession law, Swedish 
international family law, Nordic international family law.
I. Introduction
Over the last decades, European family and succession law has seen a grad-
ual implementation of party autonomy. Irrespective of potential skepticism, 
party autonomy plays an important role in the current European instruments 
and it seems likely that this is an on-going development, and that the impor-
tance of party autonomy will increase rather than decrease. However, the 
fact that party autonomy exists and is generally acclaimed, does not mean 
that the recent development is impervious to criticism. There might well be 
reasons to examine ways to improve and enhance the current system. This 
contribution aims at creating grounds for such discussions.
Before party autonomy can actually be analyzed and discussed, it is nec-
essary to agree on a definition. In this contribution, I have chosen a rather 
broad definition and will use the concept of party autonomy in relation to 
parties’ mutual choice of both law as well as court.1 Unilateral dispositions 
will thus not be directly covered, but the inclusion of unilateral options will 
be touched upon when necessary in order to convey the bigger and more 
complete picture.
This study will focus primarily on the developments within the EU and 
use European instruments as examples and objects. In addition, the national 
developments of party autonomy in family and succession law in Sweden 
1 For a discussion about different definitions of party autonomy, see Mills, Party Autonomy 
in Private International Law, p. 14 –  24.
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(and to some extent the Nordic countries) will be provided as a comparative 
example.
II. The development of party autonomy in family 
and succession law – history and justification
Traditionally, party autonomy has not played a significant role in family 
law, most likely due to the public interests involved.2 From the outset, party 
autonomy in general has been regarded as somewhat controversial and sur-
rounded by opposing interests. Party autonomy may be regarded as part of 
personal freedom – a vested right conferred directly on individuals and as 
such closely related to human rights and individual freedom and fairness. 
However, party autonomy can also be described as a privilege granted by the 
State regarding interests (jurisdiction, application of law, and recognition 
and enforcement) which are indispensably connected to the State.3
Much could be said regarding different justifications for party autonomy 
and I will not develop these discussions thoroughly. Obvious opposing in-
terests are the ones described above – individual freedom versus State sov-
ereignty – and the inclusion of party autonomy in this regard is usually jus-
tified with utilitarian and/or liberal arguments.4
Another way to view party autonomy would be to discuss this version 
of individual freedom as part of the realm of contractual freedom in general, 
but due to its special nature, party autonomy can be described as a separate 
entity – an agreement of its own kind (sui generis) – and thus an agreement 
that must be treated according to its own conditions.5
The early examples of party autonomy are to be found in the area of 
commercial law.6 In family and succession law, the resistance to party auton-
omy was more persistent. Both family and succession law are more sensitive 
areas, fenced by protectable interests of the weaker parties, and it is log-
ical that the State should be more involved (i. e. wielding more influence and 
greater control) in these areas than in relation to commercial transactions. 
2 Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law, p. 444.
3 Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law, p. 6, 8.
4 Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law, p. 29 –  90; Basedow, The Law of Open 
Societies: Private Ordering and Public Regulation in the Conflict of Laws, p. 149 –  152; 
Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts, p. 258.
5 Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law, p. 21.
6 E. g. the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the Law Applicable to International Sales of 
Goods.
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But the need for foreseeability and individual freedom also exists in relation 
to family and succession law, and it may actually be stated that party auton-
omy as a form of exercising human rights is a claim that can be said to be 
strongest in relation to family law.7 Hence, it is logical that that there has 
been a trend towards party autonomy in family and succession law, but it is 
also natural that the freedom that this creates is connected to special protec-
tion mechanisms. In contrast to the principal rule in commercial law, where 
party autonomy usually is provided in an open-ended fashion (i. e. with more 
or less complete freedom to choose), the principal rule in family law is rather 
limited (occasionally described as indirect) autonomy.8
Limited party autonomy is usually designed in relation to different objec-
tive connecting-factors and autonomy in this context means that the parties 
are allowed to choose between a number of given options, usually selected 
in view of their strong connection to the dispute at hand. Hereinafter, I will 
use the term limited autonomy to denote this situation and I will use the 
term indirect autonomy for situations where parties can influence choice 
of court and law by means other than an agreement. One such example is 
when jurisdiction is conferred to a court by the appearance of the defendant. 
Another example is when a number of different options focusing on objec-
tive connecting-factors are expressed directly in law, providing the plaintiff 
with an individual possibility to choose (among the different alternatives). 
This kind of freedom is indeed individual, but it does not really encompass 
party autonomy, as these choices are unilateral acts and not agreements be-
tween the parties.
As regards the recent developments in family law, it can first of all be 
concluded that modern families do not fit the traditional and conservative 
framework, which indicates that family law (including its international di-
mension) needs to adapt. This adaption is, as will be further developed below, 
on-going. As indicated above, the usual way to address party autonomy in 
this area of law is to provide the parties with means to choose between dif-
ferent forms of objective criteria. There may also be additional choices, e. g. 
due to multicultural identity providing room for a choice between different 
forms of personal identities that can be transferred into different objective 
criteria, but such elaborate choices will not be included in the presentation 
that follows.9
7 Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law, p. 72.
8 Mills, Party Autonomy in Private International Law, p. 14.
9 Multicultural identity and its effects on autonomy are discussed by Mills, Party Auton-
Party Autonomy in European Family and Succession Law 25
III. Party autonomy in European family and succession law
1. Introductory remarks
Although this contribution deals with family and succession law, it may be 
relevant to remember that party autonomy was an integral part of the origi-
nal Brussels Convention of 1968. It may thus be stated that party autonomy 
has been a living concept since the beginning of the development of Euro-
pean private international law.10
It will therefore be no surprise that party autonomy was also considered 
in relation to the first instrument in family law – the Brussels II regulation – 
that was negotiated during the 1990s and adopted in 2000. From the outset, it 
can be concluded that the EU version of party autonomy in family and suc-
cession law is primarily designed as limited.
In this section, the different European instruments will be covered in 
chronological order and a specific focus will be put on different provisions 
that provide for (limited) party autonomy. Indirect autonomy is treated in a 
more synoptical manner. A comparison with the development of party au-
tonomy in Sweden will follow in section IV, and further analysis in section V 
and VI.
2. The Brussels II Regulations
a. Past
The Brussels II Regulation was inspired by the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention and thus the first version of the Regulation is – in important 
aspects – similar to the Convention. There are no express provisions regard-
ing party autonomy in the Brussels II Regulation, but the Regulation allows 
for different types of choices. As regards divorce proceedings, the choice 
is comprised of the possibility for the parties to choose among the juris-
dictional rules that are present in the Regulation (Art. 3 –  6). All choices are 
based on a strong connection to the forum and in principle (not least due to 
the express wording of Art. 7), imply that there are no additional possibilities 
omy in Private International Law, p. 445. Related problems are discussed in CJEU, 02. 10.  
2003, C-148/02 (Garcia Avello/Belgium), where the CJEU is providing guidelines for han-
dling dual nationality issues which opens the way for indirect choices.
10 See further Jenard Report, p. 36 –  38.
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to prorogate jurisdiction, and that there is no possibility to derogate jurisdic-
tion in the sense that it is not possible to enter into an agreement in order to 
prevent a court that bases its jurisdiction on the rules in Art. 2 –  6 from hear-
ing a case.11 As regards divorce jurisdiction, the only provision that provides 
for party autonomy would be Art. 2 (a) indent 4, where the parties have a 
possibility to actively promote the competence of a specific court by a joint 
application.
As regards parental responsibilities, the Brussels II Regulation is (almost) 
silent when it comes to party autonomy. However, a sign of potential party 
autonomy is visible in Art. 3 (2), which provides that courts of a Member 
State exercising divorce jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction in a matter relat-
ing to parental responsibility over a child of both spouses also in some situ-
ations where the child is not habitually resident in that Member State. A pre-
condition is that at least one of the spouses has parental responsibility in 
relation to the child and that the jurisdiction of the court has been accepted 
by the spouses and is in the best interests of the child.
The provision speaks of acceptance in relation to jurisdiction and it is, 
if anything, similar to the tacit choice of jurisdiction that may be found in 
Art. 26 Brussels I bis Regulation. This is not an express choice of court pro-
vision, but it is an indirect possibility for parties to actively give competence 
to a court (in addition to the divorce competence that is provided for by the 
Regulation).
b. Present
When the Brussels II Regulation was amended and transformed into the 
present Brussels II bis Regulation, the rules on party autonomy were further 
developed, particularly in relation to parental responsibility.
The Brussels II bis Regulation still provides limited options for autonomy 
in relation to divorce proceedings. The old Art. 2 (a) indent 4 is now to be 
found in Art. 3 (a) indent 4, and there is no change of wording. As regards 
parental responsibility, the old Art. 3 (2) has been extensively developed and 
amended and there is now an expressed, open-ended (albeit limited) pro-
vision regarding “real” party autonomy that is to be found in Art. 12 (3). 
The old provision in Art. 3 (2) has been transferred into a slightly amended 
version in the new Art. 12 (1). This provision still deals with the possible 
11 Magnus/Mankowski, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Brussels II bis Regulation, Introduction note 
129 et seq.
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extension of jurisdiction for divorce courts to also handle questions regard-
ing parental responsibility. The difference is that the old “acceptance” re-
quirement has been enhanced insofar as the jurisdiction is to be accepted, 
expressly or otherwise, in an unequivocal manner by the spouses and by the 
holders of parental responsibility. The provision still provides room for the 
court’s discretion in the sense that it is mandatory that the jurisdiction is in 
the best interest of the child.12 In this regard, it is relevant to note that the 
possibility to prorogate jurisdiction is mentioned as an exception to the prin-
ciple rule that competence should reside with the court where the child has 
its habitual residence and that the Regulation is shaped in order to secure the 
best interest of the child.13
The real novelty (as regards party autonomy) in the Brussels II bis Regu-
lation is Art. 12 (3), which provides for a choice of court possibility for cases 
regarding parental responsibility irrespective of the divorce jurisdiction of 
the court. Art. 12 (3) states that courts of a Member State shall also have ju-
risdiction (in addition to the possibilities mentioned in Art. 12 (1) about ex-
tension of the competence for divorce courts) in relation to parental respon-
sibility if the child has a substantial connection with that Member State and 
the jurisdiction of the courts has been accepted, expressly or otherwise, in an 
unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings. Also, in relation 
to this provision, there exists room for discretion built on the fact that the 
seized court shall take into account the best interest of the child.
As regards the close connection criteria, it is mentioned that such a con-
nection can be created by the fact that one of the holders of parental respon-
sibility is habitually resident in that Member State or that the child is a na-
tional of that Member State (Art. 12 (3) (a) Brussels II bis Regulation).
When it comes to the application of the Brussels II bis Regulation, there 
are some CJEU cases. In case C-436/13 (E/B), some issues regarding Art. 12 (3) 
were discussed, namely temporal aspects with regard to the competence that 
may be established through this provision.14 It was argued that a court, once 
competent under Art. 12 (3), should remain competent in “similar issues” 
even after the case was finally decided. The CJEU however, firmly declined 
12 It may be noted that the English version of Art. 12 uses different expressions in Art. 12 (3) 
– best interest of the child – and Art. 12 (1) (b) – superior interest of the child. It seems, 
however, that this difference it not supposed to impose a different meaning. See Pataut, 
in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation note 51 et seq. and 55. The con-
clusion is further confirmed by other language versions (e. g. the Swedish version) where 
the same wording applies in both provisions.
13 Recital 12 Brussels II bis Regulation.
14 CJEU, 01. 10.  2014, C-436/13 (E/B).
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this proposition and clarified that the jurisdiction of a court in matters of 
parental responsibility must be verified and established in each specific case 
where a court is seized, which implies that it does not continue after pending 
proceedings have been brought to a close.15
In case C-656/13 (L/M ), there were two questions regarding Art. 12 (3).16 
The first question dealt with the scope of application, with the CJEU confirm-
ing that this provision must be interpreted as allowing, for the purposes of 
proceedings in matters of parental responsibility, the jurisdiction of a court 
of a Member State which is not that of the child’s habitual residence, to be 
established even where no other proceedings are pending before the court 
chosen.17 The second question regarded the expression “accepted expressly 
or otherwise in an unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings”. 
The CJEU concluded that it cannot be considered that the jurisdiction of the 
court seized by one party has been “accepted expressly or otherwise in an 
unequivocal manner by all the parties to the proceedings” within the mean-
ing of that provision where the defendant in those first proceedings sub-
sequently brings a second set of proceedings before the same court and, on 
taking the first step required in the first proceedings, pleads the lack of juris-
diction of that court.18
In case C-215/15 (Gogova/Iliev), it was clarified that an absent defendant 
on whom the document instituting proceedings had not been served and 
who was unaware that proceedings had commenced, cannot in any event be 
regarded as accepting that jurisdiction.19 Thus, the requirements in Art. 12 (3) 
that prorogation shall be “accepted expressly or otherwise in an unequivocal 
manner by all the parties to the proceedings” is not fulfilled solely because 
the legal representative of the defendant, appointed in view of the impossi-
bility of serving the document instituting proceedings on the defendant, has 
not pleaded the lack of jurisdiction before the court that is to take a decision 
on its competence.20
Finally, in case C-565/16 (Saponaro/Xylina), it is clarified that the joint 
lodging of proceedings by the parents of the child before the court of their 
choice is an unequivocal acceptance by them of the competence of that 
court.21 It is further established that a prosecutor who, according to the law of 
15 CJEU, 01. 10.  2014, C-436/13 (E/B), note 45 –  50.
16 CJEU, 12. 11.  2014, C-656/13 (L/M ).
17 CJEU, 12. 11.  2014, C-656/13 (L/M ), note 52.
18 CJEU, 12. 11.  2014, C-656/13 (L/M ), note 59.
19 CJEU, 21. 10.  2015, C-215/15 (Gogova/Ilev).
20 CJEU, 21. 10.  2015, C-215/15 (Gogova/Ilev), note 47.
21 CJEU, 19. 04.  2018, C-565/16 (Saponaro and Xylina).
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the forum State, has the capacity of a party to the proceedings commenced by 
the parents, is a party to the proceedings within the meaning of Art. 12 (3) (b). 
In the capacity of party to the proceedings, it is possible to preclude juris-
diction by opposition, but the lack of such opposition may be regarded as an 
implicit agreement, meaning that the condition of the unequivocal accept-
ance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceedings may 
be held to be satisfied.22
In summary, it can be concluded that the Brussels II bis Regulation pro-
vides a limited version of party autonomy with choices that are based on ex-
isting strong objective connections to the forum. It can also be noted that the 
Regulation provides for plenty of room for court discretion (usually based of 
the best interest of the child) and for a specific provision on forum non con-
veniens (Art. 15).
In this regard, it can be stated that the Regulation does not really contain 
an expression of party autonomy, but is rather an expression of efficiency in 
relation to proceedings, with some options.23
c. Future
The Brussels II ter Regulation does not entail any substantive amendments 
as regards party autonomy. The question of party autonomy is furthermore 
not directly commented on in the discussions that preceded the new Regu-
lation.24 One observation is that the title of Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation 
(which will be Art. 10 in the Recast) is amended from prorogation of juris-
diction to choice of court. In an earlier version of the now adopted Regula-
tion, it was suggested that this title should be “Choice of court for ancillary 
and autonomous proceedings” which, in a sense, would be a better descrip-
tion inasmuch as it indicates that this provision does not really entail any 
freedom of choice for the parties, but rather some limited options for specific 
situations.25 Nevertheless, it can be concluded that party autonomy exists (al-
beit in in a limited fashion) in relation to jurisdiction regarding divorce and 
parental responsibility proceedings, but the principal rule is still that juris-
diction should be based on the express rules in the Regulation and all posi-
bilities to find a competent court are based on a true and strong connection 
to the forum. Hence, the novelty in the Brussels II ter Regulation is not the 
22 CJEU, 19. 04.  2018, C-565/16 (Saponaro and Xylina), note 40.
23 Pataut, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation note 1 –  9.
24 COM (2016) 411 final.
25 COM (2016) 411 final, p. 37.
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introduction of party autonomy, but rather the introduction of a far reaching 
discretion for courts to take into account the best interest of the child and an 
express forum non conveniens provision that allows a court to deny its com-
pentence in favor of a more suitable court.
In light of the fact that the Brussels II ter Regulation was adopted in 
2019, it is not likely that there will be a development towards enhanced party 
autonomy in the fields covered by the Regulation in the near future.26
A potential development of a new form of party autonomy would be the 
strengthened position for children affected by disputes, by the fact that they 
are to be heard to a greater extent than before. Such hearings have a potential 
influence on jurisdiction and may thus be developed as an expression of indi-
rect party autonomy, with the twist that children in these circumstances are 
to be regarded as third parties. Irrespective of this, it is not unlikely that there 
will be a development where spouses with parental responsibility will try to 
affect the issue of competence by influencing their children. Such a devel-
opment is likely inevitable when the child’s voice becomes more influential, 
but it is a development that needs to be closely monitored in order to make 
sure that it is the interest of the child that is in focus and not the indirect in-
terest of parents – trying to influence the court’s decision regarding its own 
competence by exercising influence over their children.
3. Maintenance
a. Introductory remarks
As regards maintenance, the EU has chosen a two-pronged solution. Ques-
tions regarding jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement are covered by 
the Maintenance Regulation and questions regarding choice of law are an-
swered by the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol. This latter instrument was 
adopted by the EU as a member of the HCCH and thereby became applicable 
in the EU Member States. Instead of turning the Protocol into a regulation 
(e. g. by including rules on choice of law directly into the Maintenance Regu-
lation), it was decided that the Protocol should be directly applicable in the 
Member States. In this section, aspects regarding party autonomy will be dis-
cussed first in relation to the Regulation and thereafter to the Protocol.
26 The Brussels II ter Regulation was adopted on 25. 06.  2019, but it will not be applied until 
01. 06.  2022 (cf. Art. 100 (1) Brussels II ter Regulation).
Party Autonomy in European Family and Succession Law 31
b. The Maintenance Regulation
The Maintenance Regulation contains a specific provision in Art. 4 regard-
ing choice of court. This is a concrete expression of party autonomy, but it is 
still an autonomy with limitations. The recitals clarify that party autonomy 
in this regard exists in order to increase legal certainty, but it is also empha-
sized that such autonomy should not be allowed in the case of maintenance 
obligations towards a child under the age of 18.27
The options that are available for choice of court agreements are all 
forums with an established strong connection to the dispute, making it pos-
sible for the parties to agree on a court of a Member State in which one of 
the parties is habitually resident or of which one of the parties has the na-
tionality. In addition, spouses or former spouses may also choose the court 
which has jurisdiction to settle their dispute in matrimonial matters or the 
court of the Member State of the spouses’ last common habitual residence for 
a period of at least one year (Art. 4 (1)).
The jurisdiction conferred by an agreement shall be exclusive unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise; additionally, the agreement shall be in writ-
ing (Art. 4 (1) and (2) Maintenance Regulation). It is also to be observed that 
the choice of court agreements discussed in Art. 4 are not applicable in rela-
tion to a child under the age of 18 (Art. 4 (3)). The Regulation also provides an 
indirect autonomy inasmuch as it allows “tacit” agreements (Art. 5).
As regards the application of the Regulation, there is no case law that 
specifically deals with the rules on party autonomy in Art. 4. In order to find 
a case that actually addresses aspects of autonomy in relation to mainte-
nance, we need to look at Art. 5 and its rule regarding jurisdiction based on 
the appearance of the defendant. In this regard one case that may be of in-
terest is C-468/18 (R/P).28
The case regards a complicated, but not unusual, situation with three 
heads of claims: divorce, parental responsibility, and maintenance. The Ro-
manian court seized was competent regarding the application for divorce, 
but not for the parental responsibility claim. The question regarding the com-
petence to hear the maintenance claim was addressed to the CJEU, among 
other things, regarding the fact that the defendant had appeared without 
contesting the court’s competence. Thus, the application of Art. 5 was dis-
cussed and the CJEU concluded that the Romanian court was to be regarded 
27 Recital 19 Maintenance Regulation.
28 CJEU, 05. 09.  2019, C-468/18 (R/P).
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as competent if the defendant, in accordance with Art. 5, had appeared be-
fore that court.
c. The 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol
As regards choice of law, the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol is the central 
instrument. The Protocol entails a rather strict regulation in favor of the law 
of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor (Art. 3).
Regarding autonomy, there are several relevant provisions. To begin 
with, the Protocol leaves some room for indirect autonomy. One such exam-
ple is that the creditor will, by seizing a competent court or other authority, 
influence the choice by making the law of the forum applicable. This is not 
real party autonomy though, and the influence is limited by safeguards in the 
situation where the creditor is unable, by virtue of the law of the forum, to 
obtain maintenance from the debtor, allowing a court to apply e. g. the law of 
the State of the habitual residence of the creditor (Art. 4 of the 2007 Hague 
Maintenance Protocol).
In addition, there is a specific rule regarding spouses that allows the 
parties to object against the application of Art. 3 and 4 of the Protocol, and 
thereby compel the court to apply a law to which the marriage has a closer 
connection. This would typically be the State of the spouses’ last common 
habitual residence (Art. 5).
In addition, there are express rules in favor of party autonomy. In Art. 7, 
it is provided that the maintenance creditor and the debtor, for the purpose 
only of a particular proceeding (e. g. an on-going divorce proceeding or a 
proceeding regarding parental responsibility), in a given State may expressly 
designate the law of that State as applicable to a maintenance obligation.
Furthermore, Art. 8 provides that the maintenance creditor and the 
debtor may at any time designate one of the following laws as applicable to 
a maintenance obligation: a) the law of any State of which either party is a 
national at the time of the designation; b) the law of the State of the habitual 
residence of either party at the time of designation; c) the law designated by 
the parties as applicable or the law in fact applied to their property regime; 
d) the law designated by the parties as applicable, or the law in fact applied 
to their divorce or legal separation.
But there are still certain safeguards. To begin with, choice of law agree-
ments under Art. 8 are not applicable in respect of a person under the age 
of 18 or of an adult who, by reason of an impairment or insufficiency of his 
or her personal faculties, is not in a position to protect his or her interest 
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(Art. 8 (3)). Another safeguard deals specifically with questions of renounce-
ment in relation to which the law of the State of the habitual residence of the 
creditor at the time of the renouncement shall be applied, irrespective of po-
tential choice of law agreements.
Finally, Art. 8 (5) provides room for court discretion inasmuch as it allows 
the court to refuse to apply the law designated by the parties where the ap-
plication of that law would lead to manifestly unfair or unreasonable con-
sequences for any of the parties.
Thus, it can be concluded that the Protocol provides an open-ended party 
autonomy rule, but it is still a rule that is embedded in a safe environment 
and there is still plenty of room for discretion. As regards the application 
of the Protocol, there are no decisions from the CJEU dealing with party 
autonomy.
4. The Rome III Regulation
In order to complement the Brussel II bis Regulation it was discussed to es-
tablish another regulation on conflict of laws in relation to divorce proceed-
ings. This, however, appeared to be a mission impossible if all Member States 
were to agree on a joint wording. Thus, some Member States decided to pur-
sue the project in line with the existing possibilities of enhanced cooperation 
and this made the Rome III Regulation possible. The Regulation, however, is 
not applicable in Sweden which had strong dissenting opinions in the nego-
tiations.
In relation to this Regulation, it is emphasized that the increased mobil-
ity among EU citizens calls for flexibility and legal certainty and, in order 
to pursue these objectives, party autonomy should be enhanced.29 Auton-
omy, however, should be limited to the laws of the countries with which 
the spouses have a special connection. Moreover, their choice should be in-
formed in order to ensure that the two spouses are aware of the legal impli-
cations of the choice of law agreement that they have concluded.30
The provision on party autonomy in Art. 5 Rome III Regulation provides 
the spouses with a possibility to choose among four explicit options: the law 
of the State where the spouses are habitually resident, the law of the State 
where the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still 
29 Recital 15 Rome III Regulation.
30 Recital 16 and 18 Rome III Regulation.
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resides there at the time the agreement is concluded, the law of the State of 
nationality of either spouse or the law of the forum (Art. 5 (1)).
The choice of law provision in Art. 5 is prompted by a specific rule re-
garding consent, providing that a spouse that wants to establish that he or 
she did not consent to the agreement, may rely upon the law of the country 
in which he or she is habitually resident at the time the court is seized. Pro-
vided that it appears from the circumstances that it would not be reasonable 
to determine the effect of the consent in accordance with the law otherwise 
applicable according to the Regulation (Art. 6).
As regards the Rome III Regulation, it can be observed that discussions 
about party autonomy are more elaborate in the recitals compared to prior 
instruments. This might be an indication that party autonomy is also increas-
ingly accepted in relation to “sensitive issues”. Another observation is that 
the Regulation introduces a concept of consent (i. e. informed agreements). 
It may be argued that such prerequisites are implied in relation to all agree-
ments, but the fact that this is made explicit in the Rome III Regulation un-
derlines that the freedom to choose in this area of the law is to be handled 
with caution. It further underlines that courts in this field retain control over 
the adjudication of justice by a wide-reaching discretion.
As regards the application of the Regulation, there are no decisions from 
the CJEU that deal with the different provisions regarding party autonomy.
5. The Succession Regulation
Rules regarding succession are to be found in the Succession Regulation. 
One of the objectives of this Regulation is to enable citizens to know in ad-
vance which law will apply to their succession. Such legal certainty should 
be achieved with harmonized conflict of law rules and the applicable law 
should – as a principal rule – govern the succession as a whole.31 Further-
more, it is stated that citizens should have the possibility to organize their 
succession in advance by choosing the law applicable to their succession. 
That choice, however, is not open-ended but limited to the law of a State of 
their nationality in order to ensure a connection between the deceased and 
the law chosen.32
This indicates that there is party autonomy as regards choice of law, but 
the recitals are quiet as regards prorogation. Still, there are some possibilities 
31 Recital 37 Succession Regulation.
32 Recital 38 Succession Regulation.
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to choose a court in addition to the limited options to choose the appli-
cable law.
The Regulation actually introduces a dual system which enables a choice 
of court in the Member State whose law has been chosen by the deceased 
to govern the succession (Art. 5). Irrespective of an explicit choice of court 
agreement, a court of the Member State whose law has been chosen may 
have jurisdiction if the parties to the proceedings have expressly accepted 
the jurisdiction of the court seized (Art. 7 (c)).
In addition to the limited versions of party autonomy that are provided, 
there is also a possibility to base jurisdiction on appearance, under specific 
circumstances (Art. 9 Succession Regulation).
The overall impression is that the rules governing jurisdiction are rather 
technical and that it is difficult to foresee to what extent party autonomy will 
actually thrive in this environment. Either way, it is clear that the central 
provision regarding party autonomy in the Regulation is the rule in Art. 22 
regarding choice of law.
The choice of law provision in the Regulation is, in contrast to the in-
tertwined rule about jurisdiction, rather straightforward.33 According to 
Art. 22, a person may, as the law to govern his or her succession as a whole, 
opt for the law of the State whose nationality he or she possesses at the time 
of making the choice or at the time of death (Art. 22 (1)). The choice shall be 
made expressly and the substantive validity of the act whereby the choice 
of law was made shall be governed by the chosen law (Art. 22 (2) and (3)). 
A specific possibility is provided for persons with multiple nationalities, as 
they may choose the law of any of the States whose nationality they possess 
(Art. 22 (1)).
As regards the application of the Regulation, there are so far no deci-
sions from the CJEU that deal with the different provisions regarding party 
autonomy.
6. The Property Regimes Regulations
There are two mirroring EU-instruments dealing with property regimes. The 
first concerns matrimonial property regimes (Matrimonial Property Reg-
ulation) and the second matters of property consequences of registered 
33 It may be relevant to note that similar provisions are included in Art. 5 of the Hague Con-
vention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased 
Persons.
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partnerships (Partnership Property Regulation). The two instruments are in 
important aspects identical and will be covered together in the following sec-
tion, based on the provisions that are to be found in the Matrimonial Prop-
erty Regulation.
The two Regulations that form part of the enhanced cooperation within 
the EU leave room for party autonomy in relation to both jurisdiction as 
well as choice of law.34 In the recitals, it is emphasized that party autonomy 
is important in order to make sure that the spouses are able to manage their 
property, but it is also highlighted that it is important that such agreements 
should be properly notified and that a choice should be informed and that the 
parties actually have expressed their clear consent to the agreement.35
The provisions in the Property Regimes Regulations are well-aligned 
with rules on party autonomy in other European instruments. The Regula-
tions establish party autonomy within limits, allowing for choices between 
forums and laws of Member States with an established connection to the dis-
pute at hand.
As regards jurisdiction, the Regulation makes two distinctions. The first 
situation relates to situations where a court of a Member State is seized to 
rule on an application for divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment 
pursuant to the Brussels II bis Regulation. Such a court shall also have juris-
diction to rule on matters of matrimonial property arising in connection with 
that application (Art. 5 (1) Matrimonial Property Regulation). In relation to 
these kinds of situations, there is room for party autonomy for the spouses 
to agree on jurisdiction and this autonomy comprises a possibility to choose 
from the courts that are potentially competent according to the Brussels II 
bis Regulation (Art. 5 (2) Matrimonial Property Regulation).
The second situation relates to other disputes (e. g. disputes not covered 
by the Brussels II bis Regulation). In these other cases, jurisdiction for matters 
of matrimonial property shall lie with the courts of a specific Member State 
according to a hierarchy of exclusive options starting with a court in the 
Member State in which the spouses are habitually resident, or failing that, 
where the spouses where last habitually resident or, failing that, where the 
respondent is habitually resident or, failing that, the court of the Member 
State of the spouses’ common nationality (Art. 6 Matrimonial Property Regu-
lation).
34 The fact that there is room for party autonomy in this area of the law was already es-
tablished in 1978 when the Hague Convention on Matrimonial Property Regimes was 
enacted, but the Convention only covers choice of law aspects.
35 Recital 45, 46, and 47 Matrimonial Property Regimes Regulation.
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According to Art. 7, there exists party autonomy inasmuch as it is pos-
sible for the parties to choose the forum in connection with their choice of 
law, i. e. if a valid choice of law exists, the parties may also agree that the 
courts in the country of the chosen law should be competent.
Hence, the choice of law agreement may have an influence on jurisdic-
tion. Choice of law is covered by Art. 22, and it is stated that spouses or 
future spouses may choose between the law of the State where the spouses 
or future spouses, or one of them, is habitually resident or the law of a State 
of nationality of either spouse or future spouse.
The agreement shall be expressed in writing and a certain safeguard ex-
ists to make sure that a spouse is able to object that she or he did not consent 
to the choice of law agreement (Art. 23 and 24 Matrimonial Property Regu-
lation).
As regards the application of the Regulation, there are so far no deci-
sions from the CJEU that deal with the different provisions regarding party 
autonomy.
IV. Party autonomy in Sweden (and the Nordic countries)
1. Introductory remarks
As regards the development of party autonomy in Sweden, it should be 
stated, from the outset, that there are only a few examples of party auton-
omy in family and succession law. In older Swedish legal history, the ele-
ments of private international law are sparse. It was not until around 1900 
that private international law was actually regulated in Sweden.36 Never-
theless, there have been discussions about private international law, e. g. in 
relation to the status of the principle of nationality and the principle of resi-
dence, and the dilemma of different countries applying the different prin-
ciples. Primarily, the discussions have focused on which principle should 
36 The sources referred to in this section are commissions of inquiry (SOU), a statement 
of opinion from a parliamentary committee (LOU, indicating that this statement is from 
the Law Committee) and Government bills (Prop.), e. g. the Government’s proposals for 
new legislation. The documents are available in Swedish only. Most of the documents 
can be found on the homepage of the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen): https://riksdagen.
se/en/. Further information on preparatory acts in Sweden can also be found in English. 
For a more comprehensive discussions regarding the development of party autonomy 
in Sweden, see Jänterä-Jareborg, Partsautonomi och efterlevande makes rättsställning, 
p. 272 –  352.
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prevail, rather than how the principles should be applied or how to bridge 
conflicts between countries that apply the different principles.37
The first major legal codification in the area of private international law 
is a general regulation regarding international marriages, but this rather 
comprehensive regulation does not contain any specific provisions regard-
ing party autonomy.38
In contemporary Swedish private international law, there are only three 
examples of express rules that provide room for party autonomy within the 
field of family and succession law. The first to mention is the Ordinance 
(1931:429) on Certain International Legal Relations Concerning Marriage, 
Adoption and Guardianship, and the second is Act (1990:272) on Certain In-
ternational Legal Relationships Concerning the Property Effects of Marriage 
and Co-habitation. A third (and final) example is a recently adopted Act com-
plementing the Property Regimes Regulations.39 It is a third example, but a 
more appropriate description would probably be that it is an example derived 
from the second, as the 1990 Act was revoked by the new 2019 Act. However, 
considering the fact that the Regulations only apply in relation to marriages 
and partnerships entered into on or after 29 January 2019, the old revoked 
Act will be relevant for a long time to come. Hence, both the old and new Act 
will be discussed below.
2. Ordinance (1931:429) on Certain International Legal Relations 
Concerning Marriage, Adoption and Guardianship
During the Nordic legislative co-operation in the field of substantive family 
law during the 1910s and 1920s, requests were made for a treaty regulat-
ing certain international family law issues in the relationship between the 
Nordic countries. This was, however, complicated by the fact that Sweden 
and Finland applied the principle of nationality, while Denmark, Iceland and 
Norway applied the principle of residence.
After some initial hesitation, it was considered possible to accept an ar-
rangement which meant that a citizen of one of the Nordic countries, who 
37 SOU 1969:60, p. 33.
38 Act (1904:26) on Certain International Aspects Regarding Marriage and Custodianship 
(Lag (1904:26) om vissa internationella rättsförhållanden rörande äktenskap och förmyn-
derskap).
39 Act (2019:234) on Certain International Aspects Regarding Spouses’ and Co-Habitants’ 
Property Regimes (Lag (2019:234) om makars och sambors förmögenhetsförhållanden i 
internationella situationer).
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was domiciled in one of the others, would in the areas unified by the joint 
legislative work be considered to fall under the authority of that country. On 
the few points where important differences remained between the substan-
tive rules of the different countries, it was instead considered appropriate to 
apply the principle of nationality. After agreeing on these main issues, a con-
vention was concluded on 6 February 1931 between Sweden, Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, and Norway containing private international law provisions 
on marriage, adoption and guardianship, which resulted in the 1931 Ordi-
nance (1931:429).40 In the original text from 1931, there was no mention of 
party autonomy. Instead, party autonomy in this context became an issue al-
most 80 years after the entry into force of the original text.
In March 2007, the Swedish government proposed an amendment to the 
1931 Ordinance stating that Sweden should approve and accede to the agree-
ment of 26 January 2006 between the Nordic countries amending the Con-
vention of 1931.41 The provisions of the Nordic Marriage Convention on the 
law applicable to spouses’ property relations had not been amended since 
the Convention entered into force in 1931. The substantive rules on the 
spouses’ property relations were well coordinated at that time, but in all 
the years that had passed, the rules became increasingly different between 
the countries, mainly due to new legislation, but also through a somewhat 
separated development in case law. After 75 years without a single change, it 
was considered necessary to update and modernize the legal text.
The purpose of the submitted amendment was thus to adapt the Nordic 
legislation to other regulations in the field, especially the Law (1990:272) on 
Certain International Legal Relations Concerning the Legal Effects of Mar-
riage (hereinafter: 1990 Act). Unlike the Nordic Convention, the conflict of 
law rules in the 1990 Act allowed spouses or prospective spouses to agree on 
applicable law.
When the Swedish parliament decided to adopt the amendments on 
7 June 2007, party autonomy was (finally) introduced into the ordinance 
through a new wording in Section 3.42 This provision is, as indicated above, 
modelled on the similar provision in the 1990 Act and it is a clear exam-
ple of limited party autonomy, as it provides options that have a close re-
lation to the spouses. It addresses the possibility to agree on the law of a 
40 SOU 1969:60, p. 33.
41 Prop. 2006/07:60, p. 1.
42 Act (2007:522) Amending the Ordinance (1931:429) on Certain International Legal Rela-
tions Concerning Marriage, Adoption and Guardianship (Lag (2007:522) om ändring i för-
ordningen (1931:429) om vissa internationella rättsförhållanden rörande).
40 Ulf Maunsbach
specific country to govern the spouses’ property regimes. Such an agree-
ment is, under certain preconditions, valid if it relates to either the law of the 
country of which either spouse is a national or the country in which either 
spouse has his/her habitual residence. A third option, available when one 
or both spouses establish a new habitual residence after marriage, is to des-
ignate the law in the contracting State where both spouses had their last ha-
bitual residence.
The new provision entered into force on 1 December 2008 and it has not 
given rise to any particular problems. It is a rather straightforward rule that 
closely follows established principles regarding party autonomy in relation 
to property regimes and it thus – at least according to the drafters of the pro-
vision – provides for a more appropriate regulation with enhanced predict-
ability for spouses in inter-Nordic relationships regarding applicable law.43
3. Act (1990:272) on Certain International Legal Relationships 
Concerning the Property Effects of Marriage and Co-Habitation
As already indicated, one of the main inspirations for the introduction of 
party autonomy in the Nordic ordinance was the already existing Swedish 
regulation regarding property regimes in international marriages. In this 
area – property regimes between spouses – party autonomy has played a 
more influential role.
The first time party autonomy was mentioned was in Justice Wallin’s 
comment on the Parental Code in 1952, in which he spoke in favor of a 
mixed system. He also emphasized that a principle, that seemed well justi-
fied, was that different issues in a family law relationship did not all need to 
be assessed according to the law of one and the same country. There should 
be freedom to make a decision according to what was natural for each par-
ticular group of issues. In some cases, it could possibly be thought of as a so-
lution of necessity that a party was given the right to choose between differ-
ent personal statutes.44 This reasoning is not developed further, and it does 
not lead to any specific provisions. The discussion, however, suggests that a 
seed has been planted, from which future provisions regarding party auton-
omy may grow.
It took some time for that seed to develop, but eventually in SOU 1987:18 
on international family law issues and in the Law Committee’s report 
43 Prop. 2006/07:60, p. 10.
44 SOU 1969:60, p. 41 et seq.
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1989/90:LOU32 to the Government Bill 1989/90:87 on certain international 
issues concerning spouses’ property relations, the discussions about the in-
troduction of party autonomy gained momentum. Reference was made to the 
work on the 1978 Hague Matrimonial Property Convention, in which the im-
portance of party autonomy was emphasized as a solution to bridge the dif-
ferences between countries that apply the principle of nationality and those 
applying the principle of habitual residence. The Convention provided the 
opportunity for spouses to enter into agreements both before and during a 
marriage. By reaching an agreement on which law is to be applied to their 
property relationship, spouses could remove any ambiguities and submit to 
an arrangement that they found objectively appropriate.45
Although the arguments for introducing party autonomy into Swedish 
law were taken from the work on the 1978 Hague Matrimonial Property 
Convention, it was never intended to ratify it. While discussing this in the 
governmental report that preceded the final Swedish legislation, the family 
law experts recommended not acceding to the Convention. The assessment 
was based, among other things, on the fact that it was unlikely that a large 
number of States would do so (at the time of submission of the final re-
port, only five States had signed and not a single State had ratified the Con-
vention).46
On 1 July 1990, party autonomy was introduced for the first time into 
Swedish international family law, when the Act (1990:272) replaced the Act 
(1912:69).
The provision regarding party autonomy is included in Section 3. This 
provision entails a clear example of limited party autonomy as it provides 
options that have a close relation to the spouses. It allows them to agree, in 
writing, that the law of a specific country should be applicable as regards 
the spouses’ property regimes. Such an agreement is, under certain precon-
ditions, valid if it designates either the law of the country of which either 
spouse is a national or the country in which either spouse has his habitual 
residence. The provision also provides a similar possibility for a surviving 
spouse to enter into agreements with the heirs of the deceased.
Compared with the text of the 1978 Hague Convention, that in a way 
may be regarded as a model for the Swedish Act, it may be noted that the 
Swedish version is somewhat different. The Convention is generally much 
more elaborate in its regulations and it establishes a third alternative (besides 
nationality and domicile) in Art. 3 (3), i. e. the law of the first State where one 
45 SOU 1987:18, p. 95.
46 SOU 1987:18, p. 189 et seq.
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of the spouses establishes a new habitual residence after marriage. The Con-
vention also expressly deals with immovables and states that it is possible to 
designate, with respect to all or some of the immovables, the law of the place 
where these immovables are situated (Art. 3 (3)). In contrast, the Convention 
has no provision that allows for a surviving spouse to enter into agreements 
with the heirs of the deceased.
This difference in wording between the Swedish Act and the 1978 Hague 
Convention is not specifically discussed in the Swedish preparatory acts.
4. Act (2019:234) on Certain International Aspects 
Regarding Spouses’ and Co-Habitants’ Property Regimes
In relation to the enactment of the Property Regimes Regulations, Sweden 
adopted a new legislative act, with the ambition to complement the Regula-
tions and to simplify and update other related Swedish Acts in the field of 
property regimes in international family law. As described above, the new 
Act revokes the 1990 Act and relevant provisions regarding property regimes 
in the 1931 Ordinance are transferred into the new Act (among other things 
sections 3, that was presented and described above). It is thus relevant to dis-
cuss the rules regarding party autonomy in the 2019 Act.
The 2019 Act is divided into different chapters. In addition to the rules 
that complement the Property Regimes Regulations (chapter 2), there are 
special rules regarding Nordic relations (chapter 3), other international rela-
tions (chapter 4), and co-habitants (chapter 5). This is not the place to present 
the new Act in detail, but in the following section, I will provide a brief 
overview.
From the outset, it is interesting to note that party autonomy is an in-
tegral part of the 2019 Act and that party autonomy exists as a possibility 
in all the abovementioned situations. Party autonomy is not specifically dis-
cussed in the preparatory works, but treated as a natural and integral part in 
the legislative process.47 The 2019 Act only refers to existing rules on party 
autonomy in the Regulations. But, as regards both Nordic as well as other in-
ternational regulations, there are specific rules in the 2019 Act. To a large ex-
tent, the rules in question are derived from and similar to the rules presented 
above (IV.2. and IV.3.) but they are generally more elaborate.
As regards Nordic relations, rules on party autonomy are to be found 
in Chapter 3 Section 8 to 11. The principal rule (section 8) is still that the 
47 Prop. 2018/19:50.
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spouses may choose either the law of the Nordic country of which either 
spouse is a national or the Nordic country in which either spouse has his/
her habitual residence. A third option, available when one or both spouses 
establish a new habitual residence after marriage, is to designate the law in 
the contracting State where both spouses had their last habitual residence. 
A novelty in the 2019 Act is a specific rule (section 11) regarding immovable 
property, stating that the law of the Nordic country in which the property is 
situated shall be applied.
As regards other international relations, there are no specific rules re-
garding party autonomy, whereas the rules in the Property Regimes Regu-
lations regarding choice of law are of a universal nature. Hence, we have a 
situation similar to the one described above, where the European regulations 
are to be applied in relation to marriages and partnerships entered into on or 
after 29 January 2019, and the old revoked 1990 Act will be applied in relation 
to older relations, also “other international” relations (e. g. such relations that 
are not EU or Nordic relations).
Finally, it may be of interest to note that the 2019 Act contains specific 
rules regarding co-habitants, also allowing for party autonomy. For co-habi-
tants, the 2019 Act provides a possibility to choose the applicable law and it 
is the “traditional” choice that is available, e. g. a possibility to choose either 
the law of the country of which either party is a national or the country in 
which either party has his/her habitual residence. Such an agreement is valid 
if it is in compliance with other provisions (e. g. some specific rules regarding 
the distribution of estate) in Chapter 5 of the 2019 Act.
A brief concluding comment regarding the development in Sweden 
would be that party autonomy in Swedish international family law is a 
rather novel activity which, up-until recently, was disregarded, but now, it 
seems, is included as a natural and integral part of new legislation in the 
field. It seems likely that this rather dramatic – in terms of the limited time-
frame – shift in perception is an obvious example of parallel development 
within the EU having a manifest influence on the mind-set of the national 
legislator.
V. Assessment of the benefits and risks of party autonomy
As has been discussed in the introductory section, party autonomy is a rather 
controversial issue that has, throughout history, been placed in the midst 
of the struggle between State sovereignty and individual (contractual) free-
dom. After having consulted present EU instruments, it may be concluded 
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that it seems to be individual freedom that has the upper hand and that it 
is the libertarian arguments that prevail, indicating a trend towards accept-
ance of contractual freedom. In parallel, however, it may also be concluded 
that more space is created for court discretion and that disputes are more 
frequently allowed to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The increased pos-
sibility for parties to choose, which would usually indicate a development 
towards enhanced foreseeability, is effectively opposed by the increase in 
discretion. In the following section, I will identify some areas which illus-
trate the development as regards party autonomy and I will focus on four 
different divides, and finally address potential risks that this development 
may imply.
A first divide regards the realm of contract as opposed to other areas of 
the law and the fact that party autonomy for obvious reasons is closely re-
lated to contractual situations. One initial observation is that the ability to 
choose means that you, in a sense, take on the role of the legislator. This, 
however, is a statement that depends on the clarifications of the clauses. 
These can be regarded as part of the contract (e. g. included in the realm 
of contractual freedom) or as sui generis clauses that should be treated ac-
cording to a different standard. Either way, it may be concluded that party 
autonomy thrives more in a contractual environment. Disputes relating to 
contracts are more accustomed to the idea of party autonomy, whereas in 
non-contractual obligations a different kind of justification is required. This 
divide originally established in relation to “obligations” is equally relevant in 
family and succession law. Hence, disputes in family and succession law may 
be divided according to this standard, meaning that issues that include con-
tracts (wills, prenuptial agreements, and maintenance agreements) are more 
likely to be relevant in relation to party autonomy than issues of a non-con-
tractual nature.
Another (second) divide would be the apprehension that some disputes 
should be regarded as mandatory, whereas others are to be regarded as non-
mandatory, e. g. disputes that allow for out of court settlements. A typical ex-
ample of a mandatory dispute are disputes regarding parental responsibility, 
disputes regarding parenthood, and disputes regarding divorce, while a typ-
ical example of non-mandatory disputes would be disputes regarding main-
tenance. According to this divide, party autonomy – regarded as a derivate of 
the party’s freedom of choice – is only possible in relation to the latter group 
but not in relation to the former group.
A third divide is the one between man and money, between soft and hard 
cases. Family and succession law, on a general note, may be characterized 
as an area of law that deals with people – real people and people’s lives and 
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families. Such issues and disputes are of a quite sensitive character. In con-
trast, issues that deal with money and/or property – hard cases – are less 
sensitive and thus more appropriate to contract on.
A fourth divide is that between private international law and the proce-
dural law of the forum State. Party autonomy in private international law has 
a number of connotations that directly or indirectly relate to the procedural 
law that applies in the country of the court in which the dispute at hand is 
adjudicated. This has major implications regarding the possible strands of de-
velopment for party autonomy. Private international law may be regarded as 
one of the areas in substantive EU law that is most manifestly harmonized, 
whereas procedural law has still to be regarded as a highly national area of 
law. It can be regarded as self-evident that this may pose problems, and that 
classification becomes crucial. When it comes to private international law, 
party autonomy will be an issue that is directly under the auspices of the 
CJEU. However, when the issue is classified as procedural it will be governed 
by national law and as such, an issue tackled by national courts applying the 
lex fori with no obligations to find solutions that would be workable outside 
of the national jurisdiction.
All the divides influence the development of party autonomy. To begin 
with, it is of crucial importance whether or not one takes as a starting point 
a libertarian approach – promoting freedom of choice – or if one takes a 
state sovereignty approach, upholding the idea that freedom to choose law 
and jurisdiction means that the parties assume the role of the legislator. In 
addition, it is important to note that there are national cultural differences. 
Some issues may be regarded as mandatory in some countries, whereas they 
are regarded as non-mandatory in others. There may also be differences in 
relation to how mixed conflicts are to be divided, e. g. a conflict dealing with 
both mandatory and non-mandatory issues or disputes regarding both man 
and money – hard and soft.
In this regard it needs to be observed that some issues are “vested” into 
State law and should never be open for the parties’ freedom. One obvious ex-
ample would be issues that involve children (not the least in their capacity as 
third parties in parental responsibility cases), that need the protection of the 
State in order to prevent potential abuse of freedom by the parents. Other is-
sues are less sensitive and hence more readily available for a development of 
increased autonomy.
From a Swedish perspective – being representative of a liberal approach 
to divorce – it seems likely that we could foresee a cultural development 
that opens up to the possibility that the EU could agree on harmonized rules 
that allow spouses to divorce by private contract. This however, it not likely 
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in the near future and it is highly dependent on the cultural environment in 
which the mentioned development takes place.
In relation to the above, there are risks. An overly liberal approach may 
lead to a situation where the interests of the weaker party are being threat-
ened, and a restrictive approach – purporting to follow strict State interests – 
may lead to inefficiency.
In this context, it needs to be acknowledged that legislators have a sur-
mountable problem in order to find solutions that are able to balance all dif-
ferent interests involved. When trying to find legislative solutions that man-
age to balance a variety of interests there are obvious risks. One identifiable 
risk is that the development continues to be fragmented in contrast to an 
improved foreseeability. Another risk relates to regulatory design, i. e. the 
way in which new legislation is structured and constructed. It can be con-
cluded that the development in private international law in this regard has 
not really enhanced foreseeability. With today’s instruments, it is difficult to 
gain an overview over all options and much is provided in a hidden, indirect 
way, driving the development towards rules that are incomprehensible and 
almost impossible to understand and apply. The increased discretion (with 
the possibility to take into account “the best interest of the child”, overriding 
mandatory rules, etc.) adds additional fuel for the conclusion that complexity 
is the new black.
Related to the risk of complexity, it may be noted that the acceptance of 
enhanced cooperation, where some but not all Member States advance with 
new legislation, entails the risk that harmonization within the EU will de-
velop at different paces.
VI. Party autonomy and potential future developments
As regards the future of party autonomy, a first observation is that we are 
in the middle of an ongoing cultural shift, where the concept of family is 
under great pressure. This needs to be acknowledged and monitored. It is a 
matter of cultural awareness to observe as to the contemporary ways of liv-
ing: people are more mobile; are less inclined to marry; live in co-habitant re-
lations; are more willing to live in different forms of mixed relations. The law 
needs to relate to this development. And this development is – from a histori-
cal perspective – increasingly rapid. My impression is that this development 
is continuing, and that we can foresee a development whereby mandatory is-
sues are transformed into non-mandatory issues, expanding the realm of po-
tential issues that may be contracted on. Divorce could be one such example.
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Another trend that may enhance party autonomy is the development of 
harmonized rules regarding recognition and enforcement. If free movement 
of court decisions is a principal rule, we indirectly give effect to foreign rules. 
If that is the case, why not apply foreign law directly in the first place? This 
indicates a form of hidden liberalization through the strict mechanism of rec-
ognition (among other things in the Brussel II bis Regulation), and it is likely 
that this development may be framed as a strong argument for further party 
autonomy in the future.48
The development of alternative forums for dispute resolution, also in the 
field of family law, adds to the “trend” that the State has a diminished in-
fluence over family law matters, indicating that parties might as well choose 
from the beginning.
Another observation that may indicate a future trend is the development 
within the EU towards including informed consent as a prerequisite for dif-
ferent types of choices (e. g. Art. 5 Rome III Regulation), establishing further 
options to complicate the adjudication of disputes and creating more elab-
orate possibilities for discretion. In addition, we can identify an enhanced 
focus on the best interest of the child. I am not criticizing this development, 
but I acknowledge that it may pose problems as it is a dual development that 
strengthens the position of weaker parties whilst simultaneously diminish-
ing foreseeability. It is likely that this development will continue. Whether 
or not it guarantees justice will be seen in the future, but the development 
needs to be monitored. The complexity risk is a real threat and a precondition 
for efficient party autonomy is that it is possible to comprehend and assess 
available options.
At the end of the day, party autonomy is about society and it needs to 
be assessed in a contemporary context. The introduction of party autonomy 
into private international law is a relatively new phenomenon, so we have 
most likely only seen the (early) beginning of the development. For lawyers 
interested in party autonomy, it will be an exciting time to come.
48 The idea that mutual recognition, especially within the frame of instruments like the Brus-
sels II bis regulation that lack common choice of law rules, fosters a form of hidden liberal-
ization is further developed by Meeusen, Eur. J. Migr. L. 9 (2007), 287 (304).
48 Ulf Maunsbach
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Child Protection in European Family Law
Rosario Espinosa Calabuig and Laura Carballo Piñeiro
Abstract This contribution questions the effectiveness in practice of the 
plurality of sources applicable to child protection and aims to highlight some 
essential concepts that guide the application of the relevant instruments, 
namely the best interest of the child, the right to be heard, parental responsi-
bility, and habitual residence. In general, child protection in European family 
law mainly relies on procedural rules that benefit from the mutual trust prin-
ciple in the EU area of justice, but avoid addressing the legal divergence 
among Member States in these matters. While being apparently neutral, the 
reality is that these cultural conflicts reappear at the time of their applica-
tion, as international child abduction cases illustrate.
Keywords parental responsibility, best interest of the child, international 
child abduction, Brussels II ter Regulation.
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I. Introduction
Child protection in European family law is mainly provided by rules on in-
ternational jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions, and coop-
eration between authorities that take advantage of the mutual trust principle 
enshrined in the EU treaties. Conflict rules are dealt with by reference to the 
relevant Hague conventions seeking to avoid duplication and ensuring at 
the same time the exclusive competence of the EU in private international 
law matters. This approach is in line with the weight put on procedure on 
grounds of the best interest of the child principle, and thus on an almost 
case-by-case approach when it comes to protecting children. It also has the 
advantage of setting aside the divergence between EU Member States when 
it comes to family matters.
With respect to said approach, this contribution focuses on EU rules on 
parental responsibility that are procedural in content with a particular em-
phasis on the Brussels II ter Regulation of 25 June 2019. The main point is, 
nevertheless, that this instrument is not exhaustive, firstly, because mainte-
nance matters are excluded from its scope of application, and secondly, be-
cause it coexists with other international and national instruments that have 
an impact on the family life of the child. Coordination of all these sources is 
not always a given, and even when it is, their fragmentation increases the 
difficulties in their application, especially for practitioners. This issue needs 
further attention regarding the extent to which the benefits of well-balanced 
rules might be lost if wrongly applied.
In order to provide some clarity, section III highlights some concepts that 
are key in law-making and decision-making in these matters. The UN Child 
Convention,1 essential in shifting the legal status of the child from object to 
subject of rights, enshrines the best interest of the child as the cornerstone 
of child protection. In doing so, it also provides a voice to the child, elevat-
ing its right to be heard to the rank of a fundamental right. EU rules pay 
due respect to these rights that have a relation to all parental responsibility 
matters, a concept that was first developed by the HCCH, but now is part of 
the EU acquis. The same applies for the role of the habitual residence of the 
child in setting-up its protection. The next sections of this contribution dis-
cuss in which manner these key concepts have been embedded in the pro-
visions on jurisdiction, child abduction, and recognition and enforcement of 
the Brussels II ter Regulation.
1 Espinosa Calabuig, Custodia y visita de menores en el espacio judicial europeo, p. 15; Kil-
kelly/Lundy, Child & Fam. L. Quart. 18 (2006), 331 –  350.
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The examination of conflict rules on child protection has not been under-
taken to the extent that EU law continues to make reference in these matters 
to the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention. In doing so, the EU does not 
address the legal divergence in family matters among Member States that re-
mains hidden behind the apparent neutrality of procedural rules. However, 
cultural conflicts reappear at the time of their application, as international 
child abduction cases illustrate. They will be mentioned during the examina-
tion of this issue in section V.
More specifically, it would have been interesting to examine surrogate 
motherhood, a phenomenon that convenes interests that are not easy to 
combine: the interest of becoming a father or a mother, the interest of the 
surrogate mother, and of course, the interest of the child.2 In view of woman 
and child protection, the European Parliament condemned this reproductive 
practice in any of its commercial forms in 2016.3 However, procreative tour-
ism is a fact and the essential issue is whether the lack of international regu-
lation provides sufficient protection to the child born out of a surrogacy ar-
rangement and the mother that gives birth.4
In fact, the EU institutions have not been exempted from discussing the 
effects of cross-border surrogacy, at least from a child protection perspec-
tive. The CJEU issued two judgments in 2014 addressing the social rights 
of intended parents who have sought maternity leave or adoptive leave by 
ways of analogy.5 The main issue was whether their situation was covered 
by directives dealing with parents and their occupational health and safety.6 
2 See Coester-Waltjen, in: Muir Watt et al., Global Private International Law – Adjudication 
without Frontiers, p. 504 –  509; Espinosa Calabuig, Freedom, Security & Justice: European 
Legal Studies 2019, 36 –  57.
3 European Parliament, Report on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in 
the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter (2015/2229(INI)). In the 
2015 report, the European Parliament “[c]ondemns the practice of surrogacy, which un-
dermines the human dignity of the woman since her body and its reproductive functions 
are used as a commodity; considers that the practice of gestational surrogacy which in-
volves reproductive exploitation and use of the human body for financial or other gain, in 
particular in the case of vulnerable women in developing countries, shall be prohibited and 
treated as a matter of urgency in human rights instruments” (note 114).
4 About the different legal solutions see Trimmings/Beaumont, International Surrogacy Ar-
rangements, p. 20. See also Guzmán Zapater, AEDIPr 10 (2010), p. 731.
5 CJEU, 18. 03.  2014, C-363/12 (Z/A Government department, The Board of management of a 
community school); CJEU, 18. 03.  2014, C-167/12 (C. D./S. T.).
6 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 05. 07.  2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation, or Council Directive 2000/78/EC 
of 27. 11.  2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
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The CJEU answered in the negative and highlighted that a refusal to pro-
vide paid leave in these situations does not constitute either discrimination 
on grounds of sex or disability, or in general an infringement of the equality 
principle as they are not within the scope of these directives. Accordingly, it 
falls within the Member States’ competence to decide on social rights of in-
tended parents.
In 2016, the Council of Europe made an attempt to regulate the matter, 
but the recommendation drafted by the Committee on Social Affairs, Health 
and Sustainable Development of the Parliamentary Assembly was not ap-
proved by the latter.7 The intention was to provide guidelines to safeguard 
children’s rights regarding surrogacy arrangements and collaborate with 
the HCCH on the ongoing works on surrogacy.8 The different approach to 
the abovementioned conflict of interests, taken by the parties to the Coun-
cil of Europe, has stopped further regulatory attempts but has not prevented 
the ECtHR from taking a stance on the effects of a surrogacy arrangement 
in light of the child’s rights to protection of private life enshrined in Art. 8 
ECHR.9 For the time being, the issue seems to have reached an impasse, as a 
number of destination countries are implementing measures to put an end to 
procreative tourism,10 alerted by the abuses inherent to these arrangements.
This contribution does not go into these matters in any depth, as the 
issues raised in terms of child protection by surrogate motherhood go be-
yond the narrow framework of the Brussels II ter Regulation. Nevertheless, 
it points out the need for a holistic approach to child protection which for 
the time being is spread over several different instruments. While legal di-
vergence among States is a deterrent in this endeavor, international coop-
eration provides a way forward that nevertheless seems to have important 
occupation; Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19. 10.  1992 on the introduction of measures 
to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and 
workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive 
within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC).
7 The draft recommendation is available on the Council of Europe’s website: https://as-
sembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23015&lang=en (last con-
sulted 01. 10.  2020).
8 See https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy (last con-
sulted 01. 10.  2020).
9 ECtHR, 26. 06.  2014, no. 65192/11 (Mennesson/France). The ECtHR has also condemned 
France for an infringement of Art. 8 ECHR in ECtHR, 26. 06.  2014, no. 65941/11 (Labas-
see/France); ECtHR, 19. 01.  2017, no. 44024/13 (Laborie/France); and ECtHR, 21. 07.  2016, 
no. 9063/14 and 10410/14 (Foulon and Bouvet/France). A similar stance was taken against 
Italy by ECtHR, 24. 01.  2017, no. 25358/12 (Paradiso and Campanelli/Italy).
10 See Nishitani, Recueil des Cours 401 (2019), p. 136 (385).
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shortcomings. The Covid-19 pandemic has served to highlight these, as travel 
restrictions have closed borders, revamped the nationality principle, and put 
a halt to the exercise of fundamental rights such as family reunification or 
access rights. The exceptionality of this situation does not minimize the ev-
idence confirming how fragile cross-border situations are.
II. Plurality of legal sources in European family law
Child protection is an area where States find it easy to reach compromises at 
an international level. At least, this seems to be a reasonable explanation for 
the many international instruments that govern the rights of the child, and 
whose co-existence leads to a new set of problems requiring coordination. 
EU Member States are a case in point.
Child protection is marked by a significant number of international in-
struments acknowledging their rights, among which are the ECHR, the 1959 
UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and the UN Child Convention. The 
latter enumerates the rights of the child, the obligation to prioritize its best 
interests (Art. 3),11 the shared responsibility of parents in regards to its de-
velopment (Art. 18), as well as measures to fight against wrongful removals 
or retentions in foreign countries (Art. 11). Despite some criticism, all these 
international instruments represent a significant achievement in child pro-
tection and have inspired EU and State legislation.12
At the EU level, child protection is primarily ensured by the Brussels II 
bis Regulation that will be fully replaced on 1 August 2022 by the Brus-
sels II ter Regulation. In addition to the latter, all or some EU Member States 
have ratified, among others, the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, 
the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention, the 2007 Hague Maintenance 
Convention, or the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol. Moreover, each EU 
Member State has domestic private international law rules in the field that 
add further layers of difficulty to establishing the applicable set of rules on 
child protection.
Each of the abovementioned instruments has its own limitations, defi-
ciencies, and interpretative problems that are aggravated by the need for 
coordination with other instruments.13 The fragmentation that is a feature 
of the international legal framework in family matters contrasts with the 
11 See Rodríguez Mateos, REDI 44 (1992), 465 –  498.
12 Moya Escudero, Aspectos Internacionales del Derecho de Visita de los Menores, p. 4.
13 For the relationship between instruments in the context of the HCCH Judgments Project 
see Noodt Taquela/Ruiz Abu-Nigm, YPIL 19 (2017/2018), p. 449 –  474
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domestic practice of family law, where issues such as marriage, divorce, 
maintenance, and parental responsibility tend to be intertwined in a sin-
gle case scenario, meaning that they are all usually dealt with jointly in the 
same proceedings. At the international level, a different set of sources is ap-
plicable to each legal issue (jurisdiction, conflicts of laws, or recognition and 
enforcement of judgments), and to each matter (marriage, divorce, mainte-
nance, or parental responsibility). Hence, in order to deal with international 
family litigation, including child protection, several issues should be clarified 
before addressing the merits of the case, such as: (1) the legal framework, 
either international, European, or national; (2) the status of the States in-
volved, i. e. whether EU Member States are participating in the relevant reg-
ulation, as may be the case for the Rome III Regulation,14 or whether third 
States are bound, for instance, by the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol; and 
(3) the scope of application of the relevant instruments, for example, to iden-
tify whether there are issues not covered by or excluded from the EU regula-
tions which in turn makes necessary the application of the forum’s national 
private international law rules.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to learn that legal practitioners 
do often not possess the necessary expertise and professionalism when fac-
ing complex cases.15 It is essential for the best operation of all these instru-
ments to have rules of coordination between private international law rules 
on matrimonial and parental responsibility issues as well as other family 
matters regulated by other instruments. Resorting to the expression coined 
by Erik Jayme, a “dialogue of sources” is a matter of necessity in order to in-
crease the efficacy and effectiveness of the existing instruments.
14 The Rome III as well as the Property Regimes Regulations had to be adopted in the en-
hanced cooperation procedure provided for by Art. 20 TEU and Art. 326 –  334 TFEU. See in 
general Boele-Woelki, YPIL 12 (2010), p. 17 (21 –  25); Espinosa Calabuig, in: Queirolo/Bene-
detti/Carpaneto, Le nuove famiglie tra globalizzazione e identità statuali, p. 211; Pocar, 
RDIPP 2011, 297; Fiorini, in: Corneloup, Droit européen du divorce, p. 701; Palao Moreno, 
REDI 71 (2019), 89.
15 See Espinosa Calabuig, in: Ruiz Abu-Nigm/Noodt Taquela, Diversity and Integration in 
Private International Law, p. 65 –  82.
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III. Relevant concepts
Child protection in the EU is based on a variety of family models that have 
been evolving across the world,16 and pays primary attention to the child’s 
basic rights in a number of situations.17 In line with the UN Child Conven-
tion, both the Brussels II bis as well as the Brussels II ter Regulation take 
the best interest of the child as the cornerstone of their rules on parental re-
sponsibility, including international child abduction.18 The principle requires 
some attention because of its trifold function, as a right, a principle, and a 
rule of procedure, and will be addressed in the following sections. The same 
applies for the child’s right to be heard, closely related to the aforementioned 
principle. The concepts of parental responsibility and habitual residence are 
instrumental to both and will be considered due to their inter-sectoral ap-
plication.
1. The best interest of the child
The Committee of the Rights of the Child highlights that the best interest 
of the child is a complex concept: first, it is a substantive right by which the 
child has the right that its best interest is considered primarily over other in-
terests at stake; second, there is a fundamental legal principle that drives any 
interpretation towards the outcome that best serves the child’s interest; and 
third, there exists a rule of procedure to the extent that the decision-making 
process has to include an assessment of the possible impact on the child, by 
explicitly considering the rights of the child, explaining the criteria upon 
which the decision has been taken, and explaining how its interest has been 
weighed against any other considerations.19
Accordingly, the best interest of the child is an axiological principle that 
guides both interpretation and application of private international law rules 
16 The conservative tendency of the EU legislator in family law has been observed on several 
occasions. See for example Ancel/Muir Watt, Rev. crit. DIP 2001, 403 (408).
17 See Peleg, in: Kilkelly/Ton, International Human Rights of Children, p. 135; Smyth, in: Kil-
kelly/Ton, International Human Rights of Children, p. 421.
18 See Bradley, in: Boele-Woelki, Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of 
Family Law in Europe, p. 65 (97); Nelson, J. Marriage Fam. 68 (2006), 781; Sarkisian, J. Mar-
riage Fam. 68 (2006), 804.
19 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 14 (2013) on the 
right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (Art. 3, 
para. 1), 29. 05.  2013, CRC/C/GC/14, https://www.refworld.org/docid/51a84b5e4.html (last 
consulted 13. 10.  2020).
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in child-related matters.20 As indicated by Art. 24 (2) EU Charter, “[i]n all ac-
tions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private in-
stitutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration”. While 
the mandate already applies to the Brussels II bis Regulation, the update 
made in the Brussels II ter Regulation has made clear the significance of this 
principle in parental responsibility matters.21
However, the principle itself is far from clear as can be learnt from the 
use that the judiciary has made of it, with decisions that can sometimes be 
labelled as arbitrary, in particular in cases of child removal or retention in 
a country other than the one of its habitual residence.22 The reason for this 
contentious approach seems to lie in the fact that the meaning of the prin-
ciple is dependent upon the legal tradition where it is applied.23 An overview 
of academic theories and case law trends in different countries can serve 
the better understanding of the principle of the best interest of the child in 
the international and European framework.
a. The best interest of the child from a historical perspective
The best interest of the child has been preceded by other criteria. For ex-
ample, common law countries have made use of doctrines, such as those of 
“tender years” or “gender wars”, to allocate custody. In fact, they are still 
used along with the best interest of the child and other doctrines such as the 
best interest of the family, a welfare test, a harm test of the child, etc.24
As to the tender years doctrine, its origin is dependent on the historical 
context, where the father supported the family and was thus obliged to pro-
vide for the child’s welfare. English courts – followed by US courts – reacted 
accordingly by establishing a rule that systematically allocated the child’s 
custody to the father. After the industrial revolution and the democratization 
of societies, this doctrine raised strong criticism that led to the tender years 
doctrine, according to which it is the mother who can better represent the 
child interests in its tender years. This doctrine was nevertheless questioned 
20 Borrás Rodríguez, El “interés del menor” como factor de progreso y unificación del Derecho 
internacional privado.
21 See Recital 19 Brussels II ter Regulation.
22 See Sergio, Dir. Fam. Pers. 2001, 637 (639 –  644).
23 Durán Ayago, in: Calvo-Caravaca/Castellanos Ruíz, El Derecho de Familia ante el Si-
glo XXI, p. 295 (307 et seq.).
24 See in general Guralnick, Interstate Child Custody Litigation, p. 4; Bennett Woodhouse, 
Fam. L. Quart. 33 (1999), 815 (817); Boulanger, Les Rapports juridiques entre parents et 
enfants, p. 14 et seq.; Klaff, Cal. L. Rev. 70 (1982), 335.
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in the 1960s and 1970s,25 especially in some parts of the US where egalitar-
ian criteria are preferred. Others still apply the said doctrine as a default rule 
when the child is younger than seven years.
The abovementioned doctrines have in common that they focus on par-
ents and not on children, but not as much as the gender wars doctrine. This 
heavily criticized doctrine gets its name from the fact that it focuses on the 
essential differences between men and women in relation to their role in 
the child’s life.26 In general, women are considered better suited than men 
to raise very young children, while men are preferred when the child grows 
older due to their social and economic power.27 These doctrines have not 
survived as they infringe the equality principle and the prohibition of dis-
crimination on grounds of sex. The next step is the acceptance of the best 
interest of the child which got traction at the beginning of the 20th century 
and ended up being considered first and foremost in every custody decision-
making process.28 Internationally promoted by the UN Child Convention, 
this principle has been considered a factor of progress and harmonization in 
the field of private international law.29
Despite its universal application, the content of the best interest of the 
child is not universally accepted, meaning that it is determined on a case-by-
case basis.30 The diverse criteria to be considered include: mental health, per-
sonality, and behavior of the parents; the child’s wishes in relation to school, 
home, or community where it wants to live; and circumstances as a whole or 
primarily economic considerations, including those of third parties related 
to the chosen parent, and of those who may contribute to the child’s mainte-
nance.31 In view of this divergence, some courts have chosen other criteria to 
support their custody decisions, such as the permanent welfare of the child, 
i. e. focusing on issues such as health, safety, welfare, or moral education.32 
All these factors are, nevertheless, very similar, confirming that the final 
25 With paradigmatic cases such as United States Supreme Court, 22. 11.  1971 (Reed/Reed), 404 
U. S. 71 (1971) and United States Supreme Court, 05. 03.  1979 (Orr/Orr), 440 U. S. 268 (1979).
26 Siegel, Harvard L. Rev. 115 (2002), 947 (948); Espinosa Calabuig, Custodia y visita de me-
nores en el espacio judicial europeo, p. 30 –  40.
27 Guralnick, Interstate Child Custody Litigation, p. 4; Bennett Woodhouse, Fam. L. Quart. 33 
(1999), 815 (816); Gordon, Canadian Fam. L. Quart. 2001, 88 et seq.
28 Hayes, Child & Fam. L. Quart. 18 (2006), 351 –  372; Worwood, Family Law 35 (2005), 621 –  
627.
29 Definition proposed by Borrás Rodríguez, RJC, p. 17.
30 Bennett Woodhouse, Fam. L. Quart. 33 (1999), 815 (825 et seq.).
31 See in general Espinosa Calabuig, Custodia y visita de menores en el espacio judicial euro-
peo, p. 20 –  30.
32 Guralnick, Interstate Child Custody Litigation, p. 4 et seq.
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decision is usually taken on a case-by-case basis. For example, in cases of in-
ternational child abduction, the best interest of the child is not being moved 
to another country but rather staying within its usual living environment.33
Criticism of the principle also comes from the fact that it places the inter-
est of the child above the interests of other members of the family, thus not 
taking into account the collective interest of the family.34 However, the main 
point is the legal uncertainty that surrounds it and that might be actually 
damaging for the child itself.35 In the end, the child’s fate depends on the case 
and the seized court, including its cultural views on the matter.
The abovementioned criticism lies at the core of the shared custody move-
ment that had started by the end of the 1970s. The movement obviously seeks 
to put an end to the binary approach to custody and makes both parents re-
sponsible for the child’s welfare.36 By requiring cooperation, shared custody 
puts both parents on an equal footing. However, it is not exempt from criti-
cism,37 and difficulties in its application present courts with the challenge of 
deciding on a case-by-case basis. That applies to situations in which the cus-
todian wants to change habitual residence and thus jurisdiction. The trend 
is for the seized court to assess factors such as the child’s opinion and con-
sequences for its private and family life with regard to each parent.38 Against 
this backdrop, the court has to highlight the significance of the principle by 
providing the child with a genuine and effective opportunity to express its 
views, as foreseen by international and European instruments, including the 
Brussels II ter Regulation.
b. CJEU and ECtHR: Two different approaches
The discrepancies in relation to the best interest of the child have been re-
flected in case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR dealing with international 
child abduction cases that occurred between EU Member States almost 
33 See Álvarez González, Derecho Privado y Constitución 16 (2002), 41 (45).
34 Bennett Woodhouse, Fam L. Quart. 33 (1999), 815 (821 et seq.).
35 Mnookin, L. and Contemp. Prob. 39 (1975), 226; Chambers, Mich. L. Rev. 83 (1984), 477.
36 Sephard, Tex. L. Rev. 64 (1985), 687.
37 Surprisingly, it has been argued that the problem of this shared custody approach is ac-
tually ensuring that the child is raised by both parents. See Bennett Woodhouse, Fam. L. 
Quart. 33 (1999), 815 (824 et seq.).
38 See Hayes, Child & Fam. L. Quart. 18 (2006), 351 (371); Worwood, Family Law 35 (2005), 
621 –  627. About the works of the International Law Association (ILA) see Bennett Wood-
house, Fam. L. Quart. 33 (1999), 815 (829); Schneider, Mich. L. Rev. 89 (1991), 2215; Ross, 
Fordham L. Rev. 64 (1996), 1571.
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simultaneously. While the ECtHR pays attention to the substance of the case 
in interpreting the best interest of the child, the CJEU has chosen a formal 
interpretation based on the mutual recognition principle. In fact, these dif-
ferent approaches show the tension between systems that favored the quasi-
automatic return of the child and those that pay careful attention to the best 
interest of the child concerned.
This tension has been increased by the rules laid down in the Brussels II 
bis Regulation that allocate the ultimate jurisdiction to decide on the child’s 
return to the country from where the child has been removed, even in those 
cases in which the State where the child is present has decided not to return 
it in accordance with the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. More-
over, this jurisdiction rule is reinforced by making the return decision im-
mediately enforceable in any EU Member State, without leaving any room 
for refusal of recognition and enforcement. However, the mutual recognition 
principle has not been welcomed by national courts who have refused to 
comply with this modus operandi.39
In contrast, the ECtHR examines whether return decisions have in-
fringed the right to a personal and family life enshrined in Art. 8 ECHR,40 i. e. 
whether the non-return of the child amounts to its best interest, regardless 
of compliance with the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. Neulinger 
and Shuruk/Switzerland41 is a landmark case in which the ECtHR highlighted 
that the seized court has to examine whether in this particular case the re-
turn can indeed be ordered because it is in the best interest of the child; 
otherwise, the decision constitutes an infringement of Art. 8 ECHR as later 
indicated in Raban/Romania.42 The ECtHR thus chooses a substantive ap-
proach that prioritizes the interest of the child in concreto over the procedu-
ral approach taken by the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and that 
attends to the interest of the child in abstracto.43 The problem is, of course, 
that this case law pits the Convention against Art. 8 ECHR leading to difficult 
interpretation issues.44 In view of the fact that the regulations seek to play 
a complementary role to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, the 
conflict seems to be inevitable.
39 Beaumont/Walker/Holliday, Int. Fam. L. J. 4 (2016), 307 –  318.
40 Herranz Ballesteros, REDE 44 (2012), 41 (42).
41 ECtHR, 06. 07.  2010, no. 41615/07 (Neulinger and Shuruk/Suiza).
42 ECtHR, 09. 09.  2010, no. 25437/08 (Raban/Romania).
43 See López Guerra, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional 39 (2017), 163 (185).
44 González Marimón, in: García Garnica/Marchal Escalona, Aproximación interdisciplinar a 
los retos actuales de protección de la infancia dentro y fuera de la familia, p. 637 –  658.
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In M. R and M. L/Estonia,45 the ECtHR aligned, however, its case law with 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention by not upholding the claim 
brought by the mother that removed the child, highlighting that the national 
authorities have simply complied with the said convention. Therefore, the 
return decision did not infringe Art. 8 ECHR. Remarkably, the ECtHR does 
not even consider that the mother and caregiver of the child cannot herself 
return to the country of the child’s habitual residence. In the case X/Lat-
via,46 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR addressed the relationship between 
the ECHR and the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention by asserting 
that the doctrine in Neulinger and Shuruk/Switzerland is not an obligation di-
rected towards national courts on how to apply the 1980 Hague Convention, 
but a reminder of their obligation to hear all admissible grounds for refusal 
of the child’s return, in particular in cases of serious risk for its wellbeing.47
More specifically, the ECtHR indicates that the courts in the country of 
enforcement have to take into consideration all factors that may lead to an 
exception to a return and, once assessed, take a sufficiently motivated deci-
sion.48 Such a decision cannot only be based on the general objection of a 
grave risk of psychological or physical harm to the child. In other words, an 
infringement of Art. 8 ECHR in these cases will arise not only out of disre-
garding grounds for refusal, but also from the lack of sufficient motivation.49 
If the return is found to be in the best interest of the child, there must be as-
surances that the country of the child’s habitual residence will take appro-
priate protection measures.50
All in all, the ECtHR provides guidelines for the 1980 Hague Child Ab-
duction Convention, which some authors perceive as an attempt to mini-
mize its formalistic application.51 In line with this approach, the Brussels II 
ter Regulation has also moved from an automatic application of the mutual 
recognition principle to a more nuanced approach.
45 ECtHR, 15. 05.  2012, no. 13420/12 (M. R. and M. L./Estonia).
46 ECtHR, 26. 11.  2013, no. 27853/09 (X/Latvia).
47 See López Guerra, Teoría y Realidad Constitucional 39 (2017), 163 (186).
48 See ECtHR, 26. 11.  2013, no. 27853/09 (X/Latvia), note 106.
49 See Practice Guide for the application of the Brussels IIa Regulation, p. 73 et seq., https://
op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f7d39509-3f10-4ae2-b993-53ac6b9f93ed 
(last consulted 05. 10.  2020).
50 See González Marimón, in: Martín Rodríguez/García Alvarez, El mercado único en la Unión 
europea, p. 81 (86 –  90); González Marimón, in: García Garnica/Marchal Escalona, Aproxi-
mación interdisciplinar a los retos actuales de protección de la infancia dentro y fuera de 
la familia, p. 637 (642 –  648).
51 See Forcada Miranda, Bitácora Millennium DIPr 2016, 33.
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2. The hearing of the child
By perceiving the child as a subject of rights, the UN Child Convention also 
provides the child with a voice. The child’s right to be heard is enshrined in 
Art. 12 thereof and is also featured prominently in Art. 24 (1) EU Charter. The 
1980 European Custody Convention refers to the practical impossibility of 
hearing the child depending on its age and incapacity of discernment,52 and 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention gives a fundamental role to this 
right in children abduction cases, in particular by granting the child the pos-
sibility to object to a return to the country of origin (Art. 13).
The operation of the right is, nevertheless, a matter of procedure that is 
addressed in a divergent manner by domestic laws. Issues such as the mini-
mum age for the child to be heard, whether the hearing should be conducted 
by a judge or another professional, the methods and means to hear the child 
in court, the form of representation of the child in court, whether to desig-
nate a guardian ad litem, and the role and powers of the latter are left open 
in the international instruments. Such legal divergence leads to conflicts re-
garding the understanding of the situations in which the child’s right has 
been violated, including cases in which it has been clearly disregarded, as 
happened in the Aguirre Zagarra case.53 While the child voiced her refusal to 
be returned to Spain (the country where she had had her habitual residence 
before being retained by the mother in Germany) before the German court 
competent for the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention proceedings, the 
Spanish court with competence to decide on the merits of the case in ac-
cordance with the Brussels II bis Regulation decided on her return despite 
not having granted her the opportunity to express her views in a genuine 
and effective manner. Remarkably, the Spanish court ordered the hearing of 
the child, but it did not permit it to be undertaken via video conference once 
the mother refused to bring the child to Spain. Finally, the conflict was set-
tled by a formalistic approach to the rules on recognition and enforcement 
of return decisions provided by the Brussels II bis Regulation, which do not 
allow for any grounds of refusal on the side of the Member State of enforce-
ment, including the breach of the child’s fundamental rights.54
52 See Art. 15 (1) 1980 European Custody Convention.
53 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-491/10 PPU (Aguirre Zarraga/Pelz), note 75.
54 According to the CJEU in CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-491/10 PPU (Aguirre Zarraga/Pelz), note 75, 
“the Court with jurisdiction in the Member State of enforcement cannot oppose the en-
forcement of a certified judgment ordering the return of a child who has been wrongfully 
removed on the ground that the Court of the Member State of origin which handed down 
that judgment may have infringed art. 42 of the Regulation, interpreted in accordance to 
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Nevertheless, the CJEU in the Aguirre Zagarra judgment did remind that 
“it is a requirement of Art. 24 (1) of the Charter that children should be able 
to express their views freely and that the views expressed should be taken 
into consideration on matters which concern the children, solely ‘in accord-
ance with their age and maturity’, and of Art. 24 (2) of the Charter that, 
in all actions relating to children, account be taken of the best interests of 
the child, since those interests may then justify a decision not to hear the 
child”.55 In fact, the Brussels II bis Regulation has the merit of specifically re-
quiring the hearing of the child in a number of situations (Art. 11 (2), 23 (b), 
42 (2) (a) Brussels II bis Regulation), but it specifically indicates that “it is 
not intended to modify national procedures applicable”.56 Hence, it applies 
the mutual trust principle to accommodate legal divergence in these matters 
within the EU area of justice, leading to a scenario in which the child’s rights 
are not sufficiently taken into account, eroding the legitimacy of the system 
and thus mutual trust.57
In order to adequately address the impact of legal divergence in this field, 
several comparative studies have been carried out.58 These have found sig-
nificant differences among countries when it comes to the issues indicated 
above. For example, while the main criteria for deciding whether a child 
should be heard are the child’s age and maturity, as highlighted by the in-
ternational framework, in practice, countries approach this issue in a differ-
ent manner. Some, such as Croatia and Poland, do not establish a minimum 
art. 24 of the Charter of fundamental Rights of the EU, since the assessment of whether 
there is such an infringement falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member State of origin”.
55 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-491/10 PPU (Aguirre Zarraga/Pelz), note 63.
56 Recital 19 Brussels II bis Regulation.
57 See in particular the empirical study by Beaumont/Walker/Holliday, JPIL 12 (2016), 211 –  
260. Building upon these findings, see Ubertazzi, JPIL 13 (2017), 568 –  601.
58 Reich Sjögren, Protection of Children in Proceedings. Other studies are: Academy of Euro-
pean Law on behalf of the European Commission, DG Justice, p. 51 et seq.; European Com-
mission, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 and the policy options 
for its amendment, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/924728ec-91 
48-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1 (last consulted 15. 10.  2020); Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) Children’s Unit, Protect Children on the Move, 4th Expert Meeting, Transnational 
child protection: The role of judges, social services and central authorities, 2014, p. 10 
et seq., http://childcentre.info/public/PROTECT/4th_Expert_Meeting_Riga_November_20 
14_Full_Meeting_Report.pdf (last consulted 15. 10.  2020); European Union Agency for Fun-
damental Rights, Child-friendly justice. Perspectives and experiences of professionals on 
children’s participation in civil and criminal judicial proceedings in 10 EU Member States, 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2015-child-friendly-justice-professionals_en.pdf 
(last consulted: 15. 10.  2020); and Heckendorn Urscheler/Pretelli, Cross-border parental child 
abduction in the EU.
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age while others do, but differ as regards minimum age, which is 10 years in 
Bulgaria and Romania, but 14 years in Spain and 15 years in Finland. Never-
theless, the court’s discretion plays a role in the decision to hear the child in 
all States,59 the main problem being the assessment of the child’s maturity 
as it is not addressed in most national laws and will also have an impact on 
the consideration of the views provided by the child in the decision. In view 
of these difficulties, most legislations provide for the child to be accompa-
nied by professionals other than the judge when being heard. However, the 
methods and means used to hear the child vary from one country to another, 
including whether they deliver their views to the judge or other professional, 
and whether training of these professionals is required or not.
The abovementioned case law triggered an alarm on the impact that the 
said divergence might have on the rights of the child within the EU area of 
justice. The recast of the Brussels II bis Regulation was intended to address 
this issue, among others, and Art. 21 Brussels II ter Regulation deals specifi-
cally with the right of the child to express its views in an effective and gen-
uine manner, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate 
body, with the obligation of the court to give due weight to those views in 
accordance with the child’s age and maturity.
However, the new Regulation does not seek to harmonize national sub-
stantive and procedural rules on this matter and only indicates in the recitals 
that the different national approaches are all acceptable, although “while re-
maining a right of the child, hearing the child cannot constitute an absolute 
obligation, but must be assessed taking into account the best interests of the 
child, for example, in cases involving agreements between the parties”.60 Re-
cital 39 Brussels II ter Regulation also indicates that international coopera-
tion should be put in motion to ensure the child’s right to be heard through, 
in particular, the Taking of Evidence Regulation. In general, this implies that 
Member States cannot resort to public policy grounds when there is a diver-
gence between laws of procedure, provided that the standards for the hear-
ing of the child laid down in Art. 21 Brussels II ter Regulation have been re-
spected.61
59 See the case law cited by Espinosa Calabuig, Custodia y visita de menores en el espacio 
judicial europeo, p. 120.
60 Recital 39 Brussels II ter Regulation.
61 As a result of the contrast between German law and others with a more lenient approach 
to the child’s right to be heard. See Espinosa Calabuig, in: Ruiz Abou-Nigm/Noodt Taquela, 
Diversity and Integration in Private International Law, p. 65 (70); González Beilfuss, in: 
Álvarez González et al., Relaciones transfronterizas, globalización y derecho, p. 383 et seq. 
and p. 391 et seq.; Völker, in: Fulchiron/Nourissat, Le nouveau droit communautaire du 
divorce et de la responsabilité parentale, p. 293 –  302.
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3. Parental responsibility
Parental responsibility only entered into EU law with the Brussels II Regu-
lation, although it was already enshrined in other international instruments, 
in particular the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention and national leg-
islation, such as the English Children Act of 1989. A 1986 Resolution of the 
European Parliament on co-parental responsibility already mentioned the 
concept of shared parental responsibility. This concept would encompass a 
number of rights and obligations related to the care, education, legal repre-
sentation, asset administration, and habitual residence determination of the 
child.62 Parental responsibility in EU law encompasses “all rights and duties 
relating to the person or the property of a child which are given to a natural 
or legal person by a decision, by operation of law or by an agreement having 
legal effect, including rights of custody and rights of access” (Art. 2 (7) Brus-
sels II bis Regulation and Art. 2 (2) no. 7 Brussels II ter Regulation).
As to the relevant authorities in these matters, EU law lays down a broad 
concept of court that refers to “any authority in any Member State with ju-
risdiction in the matters falling within the scope of this Regulation” (Art. 2 
Brussels II bis Regulation and Art. 2 (2) no. 1 Brussels II ter Regulation.), 
i. e. with power either to adopt measures or to enforce them. The only re-
quirement is that the domestic legislation allocates the jurisdiction to that 
court.63
All these provisions apply to children born out of the same or different 
marriages, of non-married couples, or raised by only one parent. Against this 
backdrop, the question is whether there is a concept of child, an issue that 
is not uniformly addressed by the international framework. While the Brus-
sels II bis Regulation is silent on this issue, Art. 2 (2) no. 6 Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation lays down that a child is any person below the age of 18 years “even 
in cases where they have acquired capacity before that age under the law 
governing their personal status, for example through emancipation by rea-
son of marriage”.64 In the case of children below the age of 16 years, the 1980 
Hague Child Abduction Convention remains applicable along with Chap-
ter III of the Brussels II ter Regulation specifically dealing with international 
62 See Select Committee on The European Communities, Brussels II: The Draft Convention 
on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, Ses-
sion 1997 –  1998, 5th Report, London, House of Lords, 22. 06.  1997, p. 6 (note 3). See also 
Boulanger, Les Rapports juridiques entre parents et enfants, p. 3 et seq.
63 Recital 14 Brussels II ter Regulation.
64 Recital 17 Brussels II ter Regulation.
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child abduction. Hence, EU law supplements the 1980 Hague Convention in 
its application within EU Member States.65
Maintenance obligations are, however, excluded from the parental re-
sponsibility concept.66 The patrimonial and diverse nature of child mainte-
nance obligations as well as the notion of debtors and creditors seem to have 
justified a specific instrument, i. e. the Maintenance Regulation and their ex-
clusion from the Brussels II ter Regulation,67 as is already the case in the 
Brussels II bis Regulation. However, the Maintenance Regulation does not 
define the concept of maintenance obligations resulting in inconsistencies 
between the instruments, which are to the detriment of child protection.68
The possibility of reaching agreements between the parties on mainte-
nance obligations has generally been regulated as a means of increasing legal 
certainty, predictability, and autonomy of the parties, as explained in the Pre-
amble of the Maintenance Regulation. However, party autonomy has been 
excluded with respect to children under the age of 18 years “to protect the 
weaker party”. Nevertheless, it has not been made apparent in which way 
party autonomy may jeopardize child protection and payment by the debtor. 
Furthermore, the Brussels II ter Regulation – like the Brussels II bis Regu-
lation – already takes into consideration party autonomy in cases in which 
maintenance of a child below 16 years is related to parental responsibility 
litigation, to the extent that this regulation specifically included a head of 
jurisdiction for these cases. In particular, this would happen when the judge 
who decides custody and access rights according to the choice of court rule 
now embedded in Art. 10 Brussels II ter Regulation also resolves the child 
maintenance dispute in accordance with Art. 3 (d) Maintenance Regulation.
4. Habitual residence
The establishment of the child’s habitual residence as the main connecting-
factor in private international law can be traced back to the HCCH,69 start-
ing with the 1956 Hague Maintenance Convention. It has now been firmly 
65 Recital 17 Brussels II ter Regulation.
66 Recital 13 Brussels II ter Regulation.
67 See Recital 13 Brussels II ter Regulation.
68 See in general Espinosa Calabuig, in: Baruffi/Caffari Panico, Le nuove competenze comuni-
tarie, p. 51.
69 See Espinosa Calabuig, Custodia y visita de menores en el espacio judicial europeo, p. 125 
et seq.; Thorpe, Int. Fam. L. J. (2018), 39 (40 –  44); Azcárraga Monzonís/Quinzá Redondo, 
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consolidated in all Hague conventions, including the 1996 Hague Child Pro-
tection Convention, where it is mainly used in jurisdiction rules. Both the 
Brussels II bis as well as the Brussels II ter Regulation also based their pro-
visions on the child’s habitual residence. The first and most important rea-
son to support this choice is the proximity principle, in that this factor indi-
cates the closest and most immediate jurisdiction to the child, also in terms 
of assessing the child’s circumstances, gathering evidence and ensuring the 
child’s right to be heard. The second reason relies on the fact that it provides 
the parents with a legal system that is neutral to their interests, but it is se-
lected as catering to the child’s best interests.70
Despite the significance of habitual residence, neither the Hague con-
ventions nor the EU regulations attempt to define this factual concept. The 
opportunity of this definition was discussed during the 1996 Hague Child 
Protection Convention’s negotiations, following a suggestion made by the 
International Union of Latin Notaries. However, it was against the Confer-
ence’s tradition and rejected for fear that it could influence the interpreta-
tion of other conventions that use the same factor, as well as for problems in 
its construction. An alternative proposal put forward by the US seeking to 
define situations that do not imply a change of habitual residence was also 
rejected, but some elements found agreement. In particular, it was accepted 
that “the temporary absence of the child from the place of his or her habit-
ual residence for reasons of vacation, of school attendance or of the exercise 
of access rights, for example, did not modify in principle the child’s habitual 
residence”.71 Accordingly, this section does not seek to provide a definition 
of habitual residence, but to gather elements with which habitual residence 
of the child can be established.72
The child’s habitual residence is meant to reveal a close and stable con-
nection with the relevant State. In determining that country, all relevant fac-
tual elements should be considered, in particular duration and regularity of 
the child’s presence, as well as the conditions and reasons for that presence 
CDT 10 (2018), 795 –  801; Pérez Martín, CDT 12 (2020), 1119 –  1127; Palao Moreno, REDI 71 
(2019), 89 (101 –  104). From a socio-historical perspective, see Bucher, Recueil des Cours 283 
(2000), p. 9 (24 –  49).
70 See Recital 20 Brussels II ter Regulation, and Pérez Martín, in: Guzmán Zapater/Herranz 
Ballesteros, Crisis matrimoniales internacionales y sus efectos, p. 927 (930 –  940); Palao 
Moreno, REEI 2018, 9 (12 –  13).
71 See Lagarde report, note 40.
72 See with this approach Carballo Piñeiro, Rev. Mex. Der. int. pr. 30 (2012), 131 –  154. In this 
sense, there are interesting proposals for a concept of habitual residence. See Pérez Martín, 
AEDIPr 18 (2018), p. 469 –  494.
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in the country.73 Nevertheless, an exact duration is not required, meaning 
that a new habitual residence might be immediately acquired by the child, 
without the need for a certain lapse of time, provided that the change is not 
wrongful.74 The relevant interpretative element is that the habitual residence 
indicates the child’s effective vital center,75 which is not only different from 
its domicile as a legal concept, but also from the mere physical presence. 
While regularity is important, as it seems necessary to highlight the child’s 
integration within a social and familiar environment, the physical presence 
in a country for an important period of time does not suffice, however, to 
qualify it as the child’s habitual residence if integration is missing.76 In this 
vein, the conditions and reasons for the child’s presence in the country are 
thus relevant, i. e. whether the child is on holiday,77 or whether it is the coun-
try chosen by the mother following its birth.78 By the same token, the pro-
cess of establishing a habitual residence cannot occur in violation of funda-
mental rights.79
All in all, it is important to acknowledge that the social and family envi-
ronment of the child depends on different elements that vary according to the 
age of the child, i. e. the elements to consider in the case of a child of school 
age differ from those of a child who has left school, but also differ from those 
relevant to an infant.80 Be that as it may, the determination of the child’s ha-
bitual residence is, in any instance, to be geared by its best interests.81
73 See the enumeration in Recital 23 Succession Regulation. The CJEU has also recorded these 
elements. In its judgment CJEU, 02. 04.  2009, C-523/07 (A), note 44, it concludes that “the 
concept of ‘habitual residence’ under Article 8 (1) of the Regulation must be interpreted as 
meaning that it corresponds to the place which reflects some degree of integration by the 
child in a social and family environment. To that end, in particular the duration, regularity, 
conditions and reasons for the stay on the territory of a Member State and the family’s 
move to that State, the child’s nationality, the place and conditions of attendance at school, 
linguistic knowledge and the family and social relationships of the child in that State must 
be taken into consideration. It is for the national court to establish the habitual residence 
of the child, taking account of all the circumstances specific to each individual case”. Also 
CJEU, 15. 02.  2017, C-499/15 (W and V/X ).
74 See Lagarde report, note 41. The same can be learnt from Art. 8 Brussels II ter Regulation.
75 See de Steiger Report, p. 14.
76 See Franchi, Protezione dei minori e diritto internazionale privato, p. 23 –  27.
77 As it happened in Case C-523/07 (A).
78 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-497/10 PPU (Mercredi/Chaffe).
79 See CJEU, 17. 10.  2018, C-393/18 PPU (UD/XB) and critical comments by Pérez Martín, La 
Ley UE 66 (2019), 1.
80 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-497/10 PPU (Mercredi/Chaffe), note 53.
81 For example, the Spanish Constitutional Court has indicated the relevance of the inte-
gration of the child into its new environment. It has thus been understood that this is an 
essential factor in light of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. See Spanish Con-
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IV. Rules on jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters
Cases involving children are problematic per se and reluctance to relinquish 
jurisdiction can be identified, e. g. in the Purrucker case82, but also in cases in-
volving third country jurisdictions, such as in the infamous Carrascosa case83 
and in other case law84. This reluctance may lead to a race to court, which in 
situations that should consider the best interest of the child should actually 
be avoided.
The EU regulations address this issue in line with the 1996 Hague Child 
Protection Convention and take the habitual residence of the child as the gen-
eral rule of international jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters, pro-
vided that it is located in an EU Member State at the time the court is seized 
stitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional), 01. 02.  2016, STC 16/2016. Against this back-
drop, the judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) 20. 10.  2014, STS 
536/2014 has to be highlighted, establishing the criteria to be considered by the judiciary 
in deciding whether to authorize the transfer of the child’s habitual residence in case 
of one parent’s opposition. In the case at hand, the Spanish father did not authorize the 
transfer of the child to Brazil along with his Brazilian mother and the court of appeal did 
not authorize it, mainly on grounds of the Spanish nationality of both father and child. 
However, the Supreme Court did not uphold this judgment highlighting that it did not take 
into account the best interests of the child, it was against the best interests of the child, 
and failed to acknowledge a reality more and more common in Spain, i. e. that of mixed 
marriages.
82 CJEU, 15. 07.  2010, C-256/09 (Purrucker/Vallés Pérez); CJEU, 09. 11.  2010, C-296/10 (Pur-
rucker/Vallés Pérez).
83 Superior Court of New Jersey, 03. 04.  2007, 391 N. J. Super. 453, 918 A.2d 686 (Innes/Carra-
scosa). After illegally relocating the child to Spain, the Spanish mother obtained full cus-
tody from a court in Valencia. Later on, she was held in contempt of court in the United 
States and spent several years in prison while the American father never got to see the 
child again. The Brussels II bis Regulation and 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention 
might have changed this approach.
84 See in general, case law in EUFams II, Comparative Report on third country nationals, 
18. 09.  2019, http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index.php?site=entscheidungsda 
tenbank. For example, in Spain as to parental responsibility issues, the Audiencia Pro-
vincial of Girona was deemed not competent since the minor was residing in Peru (Au-
diencia Provincial Girona, 28. 03.  2019, 57/2019, ESS20190328). Also regarding a divorce of 
a Spanish couple with children, the judgment of the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona 
400/2018 of 31. 05.  2018, ESS20180531 can be mentioned. The mother went to India with the 
minors. In the divorce claim, the court did not resolve the rest of the measures requested 
in the application, namely custody of the two minor children. The plaintiff appealed. The 
Spanish courts had jurisdiction, but not according to Art. 8 Brussels II bis Regulation since 
the minors did not have their habitual residence in Spain but in India. Art. 12 was accord-
ingly inapplicable. See the comments by Pérez Martín, CDT 12 (2020), 657 –  672. See also 
Herranz Ballesteros, RGDE 52 (2020), 1 (4 –  9).
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(Art. 7 Brussels II ter Regulation).85 Along with the best interest of child, the 
principle of proximity plays a significant role in this choice that, neverthe-
less, is subject to exceptions in specific circumstances. Cases that allow for 
departure from the habitual residence rule are: modification of access rights 
by the court of the previous habitual residence during a three-month period 
(Art. 8 Brussels II ter Regulation); jurisdiction in cases of wrongful removal 
or retention of the child (Art. 9 Brussels II ter Regulation); prorogation of 
jurisdiction (Art. 10 Brussels II ter Regulation); and transfer of jurisdiction 
(Art. 12 Brussels II ter Regulation).
The Brussels II ter Regulation has laid down the aforementioned rule and 
exceptions, although there are some adjustments, especially to better accom-
modate party autonomy. In this vein, it has reformulated the rule in Art. 12 
Brussels II bis Regulation that established the possibility of a joinder in a 
parental responsibility claim and claims pertaining to marriage annulment, 
legal separation, and divorce. However, this prorogation of jurisdiction was 
only feasible under certain circumstances, namely that one of the spouses 
has parental responsibility over the child, or the child has a close connection 
to the Member State where the proceedings are started. In any case, juris-
diction has to have been accepted, expressly or otherwise, in an unequivocal 
manner by all the parties to the proceedings at that time and has to be in 
the best interest of the child. Framed in this vein, there are party autonomy 
elements in the rule, but with limitations that require the interpretation by 
the CJEU.86
According to the CJEU, the appearance in court of all the parties to the 
proceedings is enough to sustain jurisdiction on parental responsibility, pro-
vided that it is in the best interest of the child and there are no proceedings 
pending elsewhere. In the Saponaro case, the parents brought a request for 
court authorization to repudiate a succession in favor of the child before the 
courts where the main asset in the estate was located; the latter has jurisdic-
tion on the basis that, “in the absence of such opposition, the agreement of 
that party may be regarded as implicit and the condition of the unequivocal 
acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the proceed-
ings at the date on which that court was seized may be held to be satisfied”.87 
By the same token, the condition of acceptance is not met in those cases in 
85 In lack of a habitual residence, the criterion of the presence of the child will be applied. See 
Art. 11 Brussels II ter Regulation. In view of the increase of migrant and unaccompanied 
minors, the latter is becoming a relevant head of jurisdiction.
86 See Quinzá Redondo, in: Forner Delaygua/Santos, Coherence of the scope of application. 
EU Private International Legal instruments, p. 253 (254 –  259).
87 CJEU, 19. 04.  2018, C-565/16 (Saponaro and Xylina).
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which the court is seized only by one of the parties to the proceedings and 
the defendant intervenes to plead the lack of jurisdiction of this court, even if 
he had instituted another set of proceedings before the same court.88 In short, 
the CJEU’s case law allows for an establishment of jurisdiction on the basis 
of tacit acceptance, i. e. in cases of appearance of all parties without challen-
ging the jurisdiction.89
While the former Regulation did not expressly mention choice of court as 
an option to establish jurisdiction in parental responsibility matters, Art. 10 
Brussels II ter Regulation allows for both express as well as tacit choices of 
court, provided that the child has a substantial connection with the chosen 
court, either because it is the habitual residence of one of the holders of pa-
rental responsibility or the country of the child’s former habitual residence 
or that of its nationality. In any event, the exercise of jurisdiction has to be 
in the best interest of the child. In this vein, the provision manages to over-
come the uncertain wording of Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation, where it 
was not clear in which cases the parties to the proceedings have accepted 
jurisdiction. This issue is now solved by requiring express acceptance during 
the proceedings according to the formalities indicated in the provision, and 
only after the court informs all the parties of the right not to accept jurisdic-
tion. Tacit acceptance is also admitted as a basis for establishing jurisdiction 
if occurring “at the latest at the time the court is seised” (Art. 10 (1) (b) (i) 
Brussels II ter Regulation), being the abovementioned case law applicable to 
its understanding.
The forum non conveniens rule can now be found in Art. 12 Brussels II ter 
Regulation in similar terms as in the Brussels II bis Regulation. The transfer 
of the case from the court originally competent to another court will be done 
only exceptionally when the child has a “particular connection” to another 
Member State.90 Under these exceptional circumstances, this new court will 
be considered as “better placed to assess the best interests of the child in the 
particular case”. This rule corresponds to those included in the 1996 Hague 
Child Protection Convention dealing with forum non conveniens on the one 
hand, and with forum conveniens on the other. While with the first rule, a 
transfer of jurisdiction will take place from the court first seized to another 
court better placed, the second rule entails the situation where a claim is 
brought to the latter and leave is asked from the court that was originally 
88 CJEU, 12. 11.  2014, C-656/13 (L/M ).
89 See Espinosa Calabuig/Quinzá Redondo, Report on the Spanish Exchange Seminar, p. 12.
90 This connection guarantees that the court which will resolve the case actually is compe-
tent, avoiding the risk of fraudulent forum shopping.
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competent.91 Art. 12 (1) Brussels II ter Regulation seems to combine both 
concepts in just one provision.92
V. Rules on international child abduction
A brief perusal of the International Child Abduction Database (INCADAT)93 
is sufficient to confirm that child abduction94 is a problem that is far from 
diminishing but rather increases worldwide. This factor, aggravated by the 
length of the proceedings and an outdated legal framework, especially in 
some Member States, along with sociological factors that have changed the 
background against which the international instruments operate,95 has sig-
naled the interest of the EU in amending the Brussels II bis Regulation on 
this matter. In this vein, the Brussels II ter Regulation includes a mechanism 
apparently better suited to protect the best interests of the child than its 
predecessor.96 It also seeks to better align itself with the 1996 Hague Child 
91 Picone, RDIPP (1996), 705 (715 –  718). The forum non conveniens doctrine would be reflected 
in Art. 8 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention and the forum conveniens in its 
Art. 9, working only as an exception to the general rule based on the habitual residence of 
the child.
92 The CJEU has traditionally rejected the efficacy of the forum non conveniens doctrine, not-
withstanding its defense by the English doctrine. See Font i Segura, REDI 56 (2004), 273. 
The debate was opened for example in the case CJEU, 13. 07.  2000, C-412/98 (Group Josi 
Reinsurance Company SA/Universal General Insurance Company (UGIC)).
93 International Child Abduction Database, available at: www.incadat.com (last consulted 
13. 10.  2020).
94 The terminology used in this field differs depending on the countries. For example, in 
Latin America, the term secuestro is used, whereas in Spain, sustracción is preferred (en-
lévement and abduction, according to the official translations of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention). This shows the habitual problems derived from the translation of 
the Conventions. See Fernández Arroyo, R. Inf. legisl. Brasília 1991, 139 (155, fn. 58). Art. 2 
(10) Brussels II ter Regulation refers in particular to the appropriate concept of wrongful 
removal or retention.
95 In particular, there has been an increase in cases of wrongful removal of the child carried 
out by the holder of the custody rights, as well as for reasons of gender-based violence 
by the abused parent in order to distance the child from the abuser. See Kaye, Int. J. L. Pol. 
Fam. 13 (1999), 191.
96 See van Loon, in: Cross-border Activities in the EU, p. 178. See also the interesting pro-
posals by Beaumont/Walker/Holliday, JPIL 12 (2016), 211 –  260. Some of these proposals for 
the future regulation focus on: (1) concentration of jurisdiction for child abduction cases; 
(2) limiting appeals and making the whole process timely; (3) reversal of CJEU, 01. 07.  2010, 
C-211/10 PPU (Povse/Alpago); (4) hearing the child; (5) protective measures and links to the 
1996 Hague Child Protection Convention; and (6) Central Authorities. Very interesting are 
also the reflections made by Rodríguez Pineau, REDI 69 (2017), 139 –  166.
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Protection Convention, with the aim of harmonizing child protection within 
the EU and in relation with third States that are parties to the Convention.
In line with the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the ob-
jective of ensuring the immediate return of the child after a wrongful re-
moval or retention committed by one of the “holders of parental responsi-
bility”,97 the Brussels II bis Regulation contains provisions on international 
child abduction that have been criticized for their formalistic approach to 
this complex topic.98 These provisions do not aim at substituting the 1980 
Hague Child Abduction Convention, but at supplementing it and thus en-
hancing its performance. One key feature that is retained by the Brussels II 
ter Regulation is that the country of the child’s habitual residence prior to 
its removal or retention maintains jurisdiction to decide on parental respon-
sibility matters and on the child’s habitual residence. This jurisdiction rule 
is reinforced by a special recognition and enforcement regime for return 
decisions issued by the court where the child’s habitual residence is located, 
that prevail over a non-return decision issued by the court in charge of the 
1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention proceedings. This approach has re-
ceived the unrestrained support of the CJEU, but it has put in jeopardy the 
best interests of the child as illustrated by the CJEU in Povse/Alpago99 and in 
Aguirre Zagarra100. As mentioned above, the immediate return of the child 
does not always coincide with its best interests. Thus, the Brussels II ter Reg-
ulation seeks for a better balance between the interests at stake by amending 
Art. 11 (8) Brussels II bis Regulation.
The said case law has also served to highlight that the relationship be-
tween the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the Brussels II bis 
Regulation is far from clear. Art. 22 and 96 Brussels II ter Regulation clarify 
this issue by indicating that Chapters III and IV thereof are complementary 
to the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. While the latter prevails,101 
return decisions pursuant to this Convention issued by an EU Member State 
that must be recognized and enforced in another EU Member State will be 
97 Using the terminology of the Brussels II bis as well as of the Brussels II ter Regulation, the 
Hague Convention has focused on cases of wrongful removal by the holder of the access 
rights.
98 For a critical analysis of the Brussels II bis Regulation in this regard, in particular Art. 11 
(8), see Espinosa Calabuig, in: Carbone/Queirolo, Diritto di familia e Unione Europea, 
p. 283; Beaumont/Walker/Holliday, JPIL 12 (2016), 211 –  260.
99 CJEU, 01. 07.  2010, C-211/10 PPU (Povse/Alpago). For detail see Lazić, in: Paulussen et al., 
Fundamental Rights in International and European Law, p. 161 –  183.
100 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-491/10 PPU (Aguirre Zarraga/Pelz), note 75.
101 According to Art. 22 in fine, Art. 23 to 29, and Chapter VI Brussels II ter Regulation, the 
Regulation “shall apply and complement the 1980 Hague Convention”.
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covered by Chapter IV Brussels II ter Regulation. It is nevertheless worth 
noting that some participants in the EUFams II Spanish Exchange Seminar 
hosted in Valencia in May 2019 stated that this provision entails a step back, 
because Art. 11 and 42 Brussels II bis Regulation seemed to have preference 
over those in the Convention instead of merely having a complementary role 
as in the Brussels II ter Regulation.102
In general, the Brussels II ter Regulation seeks to strike a better balance 
than its predecessor between the protection of the best interest of the child 
and the mutual recognition and mutual trust principles used to strengthen 
the EU area of justice. Key features of the new Regulation are: return pro-
ceedings are better streamlined; the clarified possibility of resorting to me-
diation during the whole proceedings; the encouragement of judicial and 
administrative cooperation; and room for weighing the best interests of the 
child when it comes to recognizing and enforcing decisions.103
In line with the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, Art. 11 (3) 
Brussels II bis Regulation requires courts seized to act expeditiously and 
solve the return proceedings no later than six weeks after the application is 
lodged. Being more realistic, the new provisions allocate six weeks to each 
stage of the proceedings, i. e. six weeks to decide on the return in the first 
instance, six weeks to decide appeals,104 and presumably six weeks to en-
force the decision. As to the duration of the pre-proceedings, the regulation 
is silent, although it also requires the expeditiousness of the central author-
ities involved.105 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the farewell to the 
maximum six-week period mentioned in the Convention should have been 
carefully considered to the extent that, although not realistic, in practice this 
period puts pressure on courts to finalize the proceeding as soon as possible, 
102 See Espinosa Calabuig/Quinzá Redondo, Report on the Spanish Exchange Seminar, 19. 05.  
2019, p. 12.
103 See in general Baruffi, Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies 2017, 2 –  25; 
Honorati, RDIPP 53 (2017), 247; González Marimón, in: Martín Rodríguez/García Alvarez, 
El mercado único en la Unión europea, p. 81 (86 –  90); Kruger, Nederlands internationaal 
privaatrecht 35 (2017), 462; Kruger/Samyn, JPIL 12 (2016), 132.
104 See Art. 24 Brussels II ter Regulation. According to COM (2016) 411 final, p. 13, the aver-
age duration of a 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention proceeding was 165 days, i. e. 
around 23 weeks.
105 See Art. 23 Brussels II ter Regulation. Art. 63 of the Proposal for a Brussels IIa Recast did 
establish a six-week period for the Central Authorities to receive and process the return 
application. About the benefits of this time limitation, see González Beilfuss, in: Álvarez 
González et al., Relaciones transfronterizas, globalización y derecho, p. 383 (393); de Sousa 
Gonçalves, AEDIPr 18 (2018), p. 351 (364); Herranz Ballesteros, in: Cebrián Salvat/Lorente 
Martínez, Protección de menores y Derecho Internacional Privado, p. 171 (185 –  189).
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and the new time limits risk putting an end to that pressure.106 Be that as 
it may, the adherence to deadlines for the return of the child seems to de-
pend heavily on a strong inter-State cooperation framework, including di-
rect communications among authorities and courts of different countries.107
More specifically, the speeding up of such proceedings requires the as-
sistance of the Central Authorities to the court seized,108 reliance on existing 
networks of judicial cooperation, and possibly involvement of members of 
the International Hague Network of Judges and liaison judges. This would 
probably be enhanced by the concentration of jurisdiction upon a few judges, 
as suggested in Recital 41 Brussels II ter Regulation. This cooperation is the 
only way to reduce the manipulation inherent in time limits in cases of child 
abduction, as happened with the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention 
and the interpretation of its Art. 12.109 Nevertheless, the enhancement of co-
operation among authorities is very challenging, even within the EU area of 
justice. In this vein, court concentration and time limits may help to achieve 
the objectives of return proceedings. By the same token, it would have been 
desirable to also set up a time limit for the proceedings deciding on the child’s 
custody, as this decision might imply its return and be taken extemporarily 
in respect of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention proceedings.110
Invited by the court and, where appropriate, with the assistance of Cen-
tral Authorities, the parties are encouraged to resort to mediation or other 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods as soon as possible and at 
any stage of the proceedings, “unless this is contrary to the best interests of 
the child, it is not appropriate in the particular case or would unduly delay 
the proceedings” (Art. 25 Brussels II ter Regulation). This provision takes into 
consideration the role that mediation already has in the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention, that has been enhanced by the issuance of a Guide to 
106 These opinions were manifested by some judges and lawyers during the EuFams Spanish 
Exchange Seminar in Valencia in October 2016. See these comments in Espinosa Calabuig/
Carballo Piñeiro, Report on the Spanish Good Practices, p. 13
107 On the importance of direct communications and the role of judges see Goicoechea/van 
Loon, in: Ruiz Abou-Nigm/Noodt Taquela, Diversity and Integration in Private Inter-
national Law, p. 295.
108 The essential function of the Central Authorities has been highlighted for a long time 
in relation to The Hague Conventions. See Bonomi, RDIPP 1995, 607 (654) and Franchi, 
Protezione dei minori e Diritto internazionale privato, p. 19, who refer to the role of the 
Central Authorities in the framework of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention as 
a way of promoting cooperation between Member States. In the same way Picone, RDIPP 
1996, 705; Borrás Rodríguez, REDI 45 (1993), 63.
109 Espinosa Calabuig, REDI 68 (2018), 347.
110 See González Beilfuss, in: Álvarez González et al., Relaciones transfronterizas, globaliza-
ción y derecho, p. 383 (395).
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Good Practice whose Part V is devoted to mediation.111 Yet, and linked to the 
fact that the pre-proceedings stage before the Central Authorities does not 
have a time limit, ADR methods might be used to delay a quick solution.112 
For that reason, emphasis should be put on authorities’ adequate training, in-
cluding the ability to detect delaying tactics. If an agreement is reached via 
ADR methods, the parties should also be able to agree on submitting their 
approval to the court seized under the Convention by removing the juris-
diction from the natural judge of the child, that of its habitual residence.113
The abovementioned Guide to Good Practice to the 1980 Hague Child Ab-
duction Convention provides in Part VI guidelines for applying Art. 13 (1) (b) 
of the Convention, which allows for refusal of the child’s return in the event 
that this would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychologi-
cal harm, or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. Framed in 
these terms, this exception (or any other in the Convention, including the 
provision on infringement of fundamental rights in Art. 20) does not spe-
cifically account for domestic violence that the abducting parent might be 
suffering, because the focus is on the child. However, socio-legal studies il-
lustrate that the child is also a victim in these cases, which account for a 
significant number of the totality of international child abduction cases.114 
The main issue is how to address these cases in the framework of a Conven-
tion that does not provide any mechanism for accommodating the interests 
at stake, including those of the abused parent. The Brussels II ter Regula-
tion does not address this conflict either, but it does mention that mediation 
might not be appropriate in these situations.115
Regarding the return proceedings, Art. 27 Brussels II ter Regulation fol-
lows the lines of Art. 11 Brussels II bis Regulation, including the limitation 
to refuse return based on Art. 13 (1) (b) of the 1980 Hague Child Abduc-
tion Convention, provided that sufficient evidence or adequate arrangements 
have been made to secure the protection of the child after its return. There 
111 The Guide to Good Practice Child Abduction Convention: Part V – Mediation.
112 See Gandía Sellens, AEDIPr 17 (2017), p. 799 (812); Azcárraga Monzonís, in: Azcárraga Mon-
zonís/Quinzá Redondo, Tratado de mediación, Vol. 3, p. 17 (20 –  38).
113 See Recital 43 Brussels II ter Regulation.
114 See Lowe/Stephens, A statistical analysis of applications made in 2015 under the Hague 
Convention 1980 on the civil aspects of international child abduction – Global report. 
See also the analysis made by Bruch, Fam. L. Quart. 38 (2004), 529 –  545; Hale, Current 
Legal Problems 70 (2017), 3 –  16; Kaye, Int. J. L. Pol. Fam. 13 (1999), 191 –  212; Requejo Isidro, 
AEDIPr 6 (2006), p. 179 –  194; Rodríguez Pineau, REEI 35 (2018), 1 –  31; Weiner, Fordham L. 
Rev. 69 (2000), 593 –  706; Pérez Martín, in: Bastante Granell/López San Luis, La protección 
del menor. Situación y cuestiones actuales, p. 73 –  88.
115 See Recital 43 Brussels II ter Regulation.
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are, nevertheless, significant developments in terms of: first, prominently 
placing the child’s right to be heard;116 second, encouraging contact between 
the child and the person seeking its return, provided that it is in its best inter-
ests; and third, entitling the seized court in the 1980 Hague Convention pro-
ceedings to adopt protective measures that can be recognized and enforced 
in the country of the child’s habitual residence. This was already advanced 
by a judgment of the CJEU in 2018,117 changing former case law that terri-
torially restricted provisional measures adopted by a court other than the 
one with jurisdiction on the merits. This entitlement may also serve to tackle 
domestic violence situations by, for example, requiring the abducting parent 
and the child to be placed in a secured home in the country from where it 
was removed. To this end, direct communications between courts as well as 
the resort to Central Authorities are encouraged. The extent to which these 
measures may help to adequately consider the grave risk that domestic vio-
lence situations imply for the child is, nevertheless, subject to great contro-
versy if the child’s best interest is to be given proper weight.118
In general, the measures laid down in the Brussels II ter Regulation could 
improve the effectiveness of the return mechanism. Several features could 
contribute to that effectiveness, namely: the establishment of additional 
deadlines; the clarification of the subject of each deadline; the extension of 
the deadline; the limitation of appeals, and the unification of this issue in all 
Member States. Together with these items, the requirement of cooperation 
between authorities of EU Member States and the specialization of jurisdic-
tion will probably advance the rules on the return of child.119
116 See Art. 26 Brussels II ter Regulation.
117 CJEU, 19. 09.  2018, C-325/18 PPU and C-375/18 PPU (Hampshire County Council/C. E. and 
N. E.), that concludes that the Regulation must be “interpreted as not precluding a court of 
one Member State from adopting protective measures in the form of an injunction directed 
at a public body of another Member State, preventing that body from commencing or 
continuing, before the courts of that other Member State, proceedings for the adoption of 
children who are residing there”.
118 See an overview of criticism regarding the Guide to Good Practice Child Abduction Con-
vention: Part VI – Article 13(1)(b) in this respect, that also applies to the Brussels II ter 
Regulation in Rodríguez Pineau, REEI 35 (2018), 1 (23 –  31).
119 Baruffi, JPIL 14 (2018), 385 –  420. The author makes a reference to the works of the HCCH 
Special Commission on the practical operation of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Con-
vention and the 1996 Child Protection Convention. In this regard, see Int. Fam. Law (2018), 
39 –  44. Also interesting are the proposals of the HCCH Experts Group on cross-border 
recognition and enforcement of agreements in family matters involving children. See also 
de Sousa Gonçalves, AEDIPr 18 (2018), p. 351.
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VI. Rules of recognition and enforcement
In line with the Brussels II bis Regulation, the Brussels II ter Regulation pro-
vides two different regimes in order to enforce a decision on parental re-
sponsibility matters, namely, a generally applicable recognition and enforce-
ment regime and a regime only suitable for certain privileged decisions that 
benefit from a further limitation on the grounds for refusal of enforceabil-
ity. In addition to a better procedural alignment of both regimes, with some 
concessions on the application of the country of origin principle, the main 
development in the new Regulation is the recognition and enforcement of 
authentic instruments and agreements, now with a dedicated Section in 
Chapter IV.
Art. 2 (1) Brussels II ter Regulation provides a definition of “decision” for 
the purposes of Chapter IV. This definition specifically includes a return deci-
sion pursuant to the 1980 Hague Convention and provisional measures as 
long as the defendant had been summoned in the proceeding adopting them. 
Remarkably, provisional measures issued by a court other than the one with 
jurisdiction on the merits can be also recognized, provided that the measure 
is taken to protect the child from a grave risk as defined by Art. 13 (1) of the 
1980 Hague Convention.120 The latter marks a sharp contrast with its pred-
ecessor where there was no room for recognition of provisional, including 
protective, measures taken by courts other than the competent court for the 
substance of the matter, which is a principle that was asserted by the CJEU.121 
The same provision lays down the definitions of “authentic instrument” and 
“agreement”, both requiring the intervention of a public authority for the ap-
plicability of the recognition and enforcement rules in Chapter IV.
The new Regulation provides for three types of recognition and enforce-
ment proceedings, namely: recognition without a formal proceeding; via in-
cidental question; and a formal proceeding to apply for a decision that there 
are no grounds for refusal of recognition. However, the major development is 
the abolition of exequatur by granting immediate effects, including enforce-
ability, to the decision taken in the Member State of origin in the Member 
120 The principle is kept that these protective measures adopted by a court other than the one 
with jurisdiction on the substance of the matter remain in force only until the latter takes 
the measures it considers appropriate. The reminder that the court adopting the measure 
should inform the court of the child’s habitual residence, directly or through the Central 
Authorities, laid down in Recital 30, is in line with the gap identified by CJEU, 27. 11.  2007, 
C-435/06 (C).
121 See Recital 59 Brussels II ter Regulation.
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State of destination, whose recognition and enforcement might neverthe-
less be challenged before the courts of the latter following a proceeding laid 
down in Art. 59 –  62, Section 5 of Chapter IV and Chapter VI thereof.
As to the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement, Art. 39 
Brussels II ter Regulation is in line with Art. 23 Brussels II bis Regulation, al-
though the child’s right to be heard in parental responsibility proceedings is 
protected better in the new instrument, in accordance with the principle set 
up in its Art. 21.122 While the former was formulated in such terms that the 
examination requires focus on whether there had been a violation of fun-
damental principles of procedure in the Member State in which recognition 
is sought due to the failure to provide for a hearing of the child, the latter 
rightly examines whether there has been a violation of the child’s right to 
be heard.123 However, two exceptions for compliance with this right are es-
tablished. The first is parallel to the previous Regulation and considers con-
current serious grounds that prevented the hearing, including the urgency 
of the case. The second is restricted to proceedings concerning the property 
of the child, where the opportunity to be heard is not given in view of the 
subject-matter of the proceeding. These specifications are welcome and in 
line with the CJEU’s case law.124 The use of open concepts in both exceptions 
will nevertheless call for the CJEU’s interpretation, although some clarifica-
tions are made in Recital 57, at least as to the meaning of “serious grounds” 
preventing the hearing in case of “imminent danger for the child’s physical 
and psychological integrity or life and any further delay might bear the risk 
that this risk materialises”.
Decisions granting access to a child and its return benefit from a spe-
cial regime, as they do in the Brussels II bis Regulation. While they can be 
recognized and enforced following the abovementioned general regime, the 
special regime simplifies the proceeding in situations where the rights of 
the child as stated in Art. 9 of the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child, are, or might be, compromised. Art. 42 Brussels II ter Regulation refers 
to decisions that ensure the right of the child who is separated from one or 
both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with them 
122 The same applies to the ECtHR that has already provided some guidance on the applica-
tion of the child’s right to be heard in ECtHR, 08. 07.  2003, no. 30943/96 (Sahin/Germany), 
note 73 et seq.; ECtHR, 22. 06.  2004, no. 78028/01 and 78030/01 (Pini et al./Romania), note 
164; ECtHR, 13. 07.  2000, no. 25735/94 (Elsholz/Germany); ECtHR, 02. 02.  2016, no. 71776/12 
(N. TS. et al./Georgia), note 73 et seq. and ECtHR, 11. 10.  2016 no. 23298/12 (Iglesias Casarru-
bios and Cantalapiedra Iglesias/Spain), note 42. See Ubertazzi, JPIL 13 (2017), 568 –  601.
123 See Ubertazzi, JPIL 13 (2017), 568 (585).
124 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-491/10 PPU (Aguirre Zarraga/Pelz).
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on a regular basis. That is the case for judgments granting rights of access, 
but in particular for those decisions that order the return of the child within 
the framework of the proceeding set up in the 1980 Hague Child Abduction 
Convention as supplemented by Chapter III of the Brussels II ter Regulation. 
The latter follows the path already initiated by the Brussels II bis Regulation 
and rules the case where the country of the child’s physical presence denies 
the return on grounds of Art. 13 (1) and (2) of the Hague Convention, i. e. be-
cause whoever was exercising the custody of the child at the time of removal 
was not effectively doing it or have consented or acquiesced in the removal, 
or because of grave risk for the child in physical or psychological terms if 
returned, respectively. While the country of the child’s habitual residence 
needs to adequately ponder this non-return decision in addressing custody 
matters, Art. 29 (6) Brussels II ter Regulation lays down that its judgment fi-
nally ordering the return prevails over that of the non-return judgment. In 
this vein, these decisions become enforceable in another Member State once 
they are certified in accordance with the requirements laid down in Art. 47 
of the Regulation.
Unlike in the Brussels II bis Regulation, the certificate is only issued upon 
request of a party by the court that has rendered the judgment granting ac-
cess rights to the child or its return, provided that all parties, including the 
child, where appropriate, were given an opportunity to be heard and ser-
vice of notice was provided or parties in default have otherwise unequivo-
cally accepted the decision. Based on the principle of mutual trust, the ab-
olition of exequatur relies on the Member State of origin attesting that these 
basic rights have been respected during the proceeding and denying juris-
diction to undertake this examination to the courts of the Member State of 
destination. However, the Aguirre Zagarra case has signaled the difficulties 
of this approach, since the courts of the Member State of origin certify com-
pliance with the child’s right to be heard even when that hearing has not 
taken place.125 This has prompted close attention to the circumstances upon 
which the hearing of the child should take place, and it has been found that 
there are significant divergences across the Member States. In view of this 
situation, the development of an autonomous approach to this right dur-
ing the recast of Brussels II bis Regulation has been strongly suggested to 
avoid the erosion of the mutual trust principle, but in particular to ensure 
the child’s rights.126 As already indicated, the new Regulation has acknowl-
edged in Art. 21 the substance of the right, but has refused to harmonize the 
125 CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-491/10 PPU (Aguirre Zarraga/Pelz), note 72.
126 Ubertazzi, JPIL 13 (2017), 586 –  601.
80 Rosario Espinosa Calabuig and Laura Carballo Piñeiro
substantive and procedural aspects, such as the minimum age to hear the 
child or who should be conducting the hearing, either the judge or another 
professional.
Nevertheless, and with respect to the Aguirre Zagarra case and simi-
lar, on the one hand, all relevant forms of certificates contained in the An-
nexes to the Brussels II ter Regulation require the authority issuing it to at-
test whether the child has been given a “genuine and effective” opportunity 
to express his or her views in accordance with Art. 21 of the Regulation. The 
latter is intended to raise the already low figure of cases in which the child 
has been effectively heard.127 On the other hand, Art. 21 (1) indicates that 
the hearing can take place either before the court seized or through a rep-
resentative or an appropriate body. More specifically, Recital 53 presents a 
reminder that a hearing through video conference or by means of any other 
communication technology might be considered unless it would infringe the 
fair conduct of the proceedings on account of the particular circumstances of 
the case, if it is not possible to hear a child in person.128
In addition to the abovementioned requirements and in the case of a re-
turn decision, the court seized will only issue the certificate if “in giving 
its decision, the court has taken into account the reasons for and the facts 
underlying the prior decision given in another Member State pursuant 
to point (b) of Art. 13 (1), or Art. 13 (2), of the 1980 Hague Convention” 
(Art. 47 (4) Brussels II ter Regulation). In line with the amendments made to 
Art. 11 (8) Brussels II bis Regulation, the new Regulation partially overturns 
the Povse/Alpago case where the CJEU held that interim return orders could 
be enforced via the special regime for privileged decisions.129 Hence, only 
final return decisions made in the best interests of the child can now benefit 
from this regime. In this vein, the Regulation would be in alignment with the 
ECtHR case law, in particular Neulinger130 and Kampanella.131
127 Beaumont/Walker/Holliday, Int. Fam. L. J. 4 (2016) 310 (318), found that only 20 % of children 
involved in Art. 11 (8) Brussels II bis Regulation have been heard.
128 These methods and means available to judges to hear the child were already indicated 
in the EU Commission’s Practice Guide for the Application of the Brussels IIa Regula-
tion (2014), 76 –  80, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f7d39509-3f10-
4ae2-b993-53ac6b9f93ed (last consulted 02. 10.  2020). This guidance in the regulation is still 
an advancement compared to the previous situation as indicated by Carpaneto, RDIPP 
2018, 944 (969).
129 CJEU, 01. 07.  2010, C-211/10 PPU (Povse/Alpago).
130 ECtHR, 06. 07.  2010, no. 41615/07 (Neulinger and Shuruk/Switzerland). See with this remark 
Carpaneto, RDIPP 2018, 944 (973 et seq.); Honorati, RDIPP 53 (2017), 247 (264 et seq.).
131 ECtHR, 12. 07.  2011, no. 14737/09 (Šneersone and Kampanella/Italy).
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The abovementioned requirements differentiate between the certificates 
pursuant to Art. 47 and 36 Brussels II ter Regulation. The reason for this di-
vergence lies in the fact that the former cannot be challenged on the grounds 
laid down in Art. 39, but only by those set out in Art. 50, along with the situ-
ation described in Art. 56 (6), because it applies to all instances of enforce-
ment. In other words, in addition to the abolition of exequatur, the special 
regime for privileged decisions shifts the examination of grounds for refusal 
of recognition and enforcement from the country of destination to the coun-
try of origin. The exceptions are: (1) those cases where the certified decision 
is irreconcilable with a later decision in the Member State of recognition, or 
in another Member State or the non-Member State of the child’s habitual 
residence provided that they comply with the requirements for recognition 
and enforcement in the latter State (Art. 50); and (2) the certificate pursuant 
to Art. 47 is rectified because there is a material discrepancy between the 
decision and the certificate (Art. 48 and 49). The Aguirre Zagarra case also 
accounts for the latter ground for refusal of enforcement to the extent that it 
permits to correct assertions, such as the one that the child has been heard, 
if necessary.
Regardless of the chosen regime to recognize and enforce a decision, 
the new Regulation also sets up grounds for suspension and refusal of en-
forcement. Art. 56 lists the cases in which the court seized can stay the en-
forcement of a decision, either on its own motion or upon application of the 
person against whom enforcement is sought or the child concerned. Those 
situations include the case in which the “enforcement would expose the child 
to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm due to temporary imped-
iments which have arisen after the decision was given, or by virtue of any 
other significant change of circumstances” (Art 56 (4) Brussels II ter Regu-
lation), that can lead to a refusal of enforcement if those impediments or 
circumstances are of a lasting nature (Art. 56 (6) Brussels II ter Regulation). 
Recital 69 sheds light on this ground which was addressed in the Povse and 
Povse/Austria case,132 where the father visited the child in the country of ab-
duction but stopped doing so shortly afterwards. By the time of enforcement, 
four years had already passed and the child had forgotten the common lan-
guage with the father and become a stranger. Nonetheless, the return was 
insisted upon by the Italian side without undertaking any previous measure 
to re-establish the contact between the child and the father. Nevertheless, the 
Deticek case sends a different message by reminding us that this type of as-
sessment corresponds to the court of the child’s habitual residence, for which 
132 ECtHR, 18. 06.  2013, no. 3890/11 (Povse and Povse/Austria).
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reason the child’s integration in the country of destination might lead to stay 
of enforcement, but not to refusal.133
Recital 69 of the Brussels II ter Regulation presents as an example of 
an impediment of the abovementioned sort, the “manifest objection of the 
child voiced only after the decision was given which is so strong that, if dis-
regarded, it would amount to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm 
for the child”. Although the same Recital insists on the resumption of en-
forcement as soon as the said grave risk ceases to exist, adopting measures in 
accordance with national law and procedure, such as seeking the assistance 
of professionals, such as social workers or child psychologists, to try to over-
come those objections, the concern has also been raised that this provision 
will only serve to prolong the dispute.134 Other examples might be circum-
stances that concern one of the parents, such as a new child, a serious ill-
ness that renders the custodian unable to take care, detention, or expulsion 
to another country.135
In general, and as stated in Recital 67, a relevant change of circumstances, 
such as challenges against the decision in the country of origin or its loss of 
enforceability, as well as obstacles or emergency situations, including the 
ones mentioned in Art. 56 (4) and (6) Brussels II ter Regulation that have 
arisen out at the enforcement stage, should be immediately addressed by 
the authorities competent for enforcement. Hence, Art. 56 and 57 deal with 
suspension and refusal of enforcement, including on the grounds laid down 
in national legislation that are not incompatible with Art. 41, 50 and 56. In 
this vein, Recital 63 provides for clarification on these grounds that “could 
include, for example, challenges based on formal errors under national law 
in an act of enforcement or on the assertion that the action required by the 
decision has already been performed or has become impossible, for instance, 
in case of force majeure, serious illness of the person to whom the child is 
to be handed over, the imprisonment or death of that person, the fact that 
the Member State to which the child is to be returned has turned into a war 
zone after the decision was given, or the refusal of enforcement of a decision 
which under the law of the Member State where enforcement is sought does 
not have any enforceable content and cannot be adjusted to this effect”.
Section 4 of Chapter IV is devoted to recognition and enforcement of 
authentic documents and includes a more exhaustive regulation than the 
133 CJEU, 23. 12.  2009, C-403/09 PPU (Deticek/Sgueglia).
134 See González Beilfuss, in: Álvarez González et al., Relaciones transfronterizas, globaliza-
ción y derecho, p. 383 (397 et seq.); Rodríguez Pineau, REEI 35 (2018), 1 (30).
135 See Honorati, RDIPP 53 (2017), 247 (267 et seq.).
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one in the succinct Art. 46 Brussels II bis Regulation. Like its predecessor, 
the Brussels II ter Regulation provides for the circulation of authentic in-
struments and agreements in matters of parental responsibility which have 
binding legal effect and are enforceable in the Member State of origin. To this 
end, not only the general provisions provided for in the previous sections of 
Chapter IV apply, but a specific certificate is issued in order to facilitate such 
circulation, that it is also subject to the abolition of exequatur. In this vein, 
the certificate can only be issued if: (1) the authentic instrument has been 
formally drawn up or registered, and the agreement has been registered, in a 
Member State assuming jurisdiction under Chapter II; (2) either of them has 
binding legal effect in that State; and (3) their content is not contrary to the 
best interest of the child (Art. 66 Brussels II ter Regulation.).
Although the proceedings are laid down in Art. 59 to 62, Section 5 of 
Chapter IV and Chapter VI, this Section provides for the grounds for refu-
sal of recognition and enforcement that follow the path of Art. 39. However, 
these grounds have been adjusted to the elaboration of authentic instru-
ments and agreements in this matter. In a similar vein, and in a manner high-
lighting its significance, the mandatory hearing of the child’s views, where 
appropriate, has been laid down in a separate paragraph (3), from the other 
grounds established in Art. 68 (2).
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Abstract The reality of the administration of justice has changed over the 
last few decades through massive intervention of international and supra-
national actors within national judicial systems. Though state-centrism 
has progressively been eroded, the national State remains the “master of 
the game” in adjudication. A proper application of European private inter-
national law is the cornerstone of civil justice. It goes without saying that 
judicial training (in a wider sense, including the training of judges, prac-
titioners, and other stakeholders) is important in order to achieve an ad-
equate and unified application of European private international family and 
succession law. The EUFams II findings further highlight that education 
and training of professionals in this area of law are of paramount importance 
when it comes to fostering predictability and legal certainty.
This contribution commences by explaining EU policy on judicial train-
ing and presenting the main training facilities and their features. The contri-
bution then turns to methodological aspects of the transfer of knowledge in 
legal discourse. The second part of the contribution presents the EUFams II 
project results relevant to judicial training. It seeks to establish a direct link 
with EU justice policy objectives, methodologies, performance of judicial 
training at European training centers and national training academies that 
serve the system of justice in European family and succession law. Quanti-
tative and qualitative analyses lead to conclusions and proposals in respect 
of future training policy and its desired performance in cross-border family 
and succession matters. Several methodological approaches are combined 
and presented in the contribution. The attempt to conceptualize pro futuro 
the judicial and legal professionals’ training in European family and succes-
sion law relies on all case law and legal instruments researched within the 
EUFams II Project, different questionnaires, published studies, evaluations 
and communications, and various scholarly contributions primarily in the 
fields of law and education. It has yielded the following ten practice-oriented 
and hands-on recommendations (rather than commandments) addressed to 
the EU and Member States alike.
Summary of theses: 1. Training needs to continue being guided at the 
EU level. 2. Judicial training should be made a priority. 3. A study of training 
needs should be conducted in general, for each Member State, and for each 
legal instrument. 4. A model curriculum should be adopted at the EU level. 
5. The training curriculum should be designed on several levels and ranked 
based on EU criteria. 6. Training should be based on modern teaching meth-
odology. 7. EU funded material should follow an open access policy and re-
main available on a single webpage administered by the EU, even after the 
expiry of the respective project. 8. Training should be delivered to specific 
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target groups. 9. Access to high quality training should be made available to 
all eligible judges. 10. International and national training should be kept in 
balance.
Keywords judicial training, European family and succession law, EJTN, 
ERA, EIPA, IHNJ.
I. Introduction
Transnationalization of life leads to an ever increasing transnationalization 
of law-making and law enforcement. Mobility of individuals and families 
within the EU has comparable effects; intensive Europeanization of life leads 
to Europeanization of law. European family and succession law have devel-
oped at a considerable pace and its complexity is constantly increasing.1 Nor-
mative pluralism is expanding as the creation, implementation, application, 
and monitoring of laws are no longer confined to territorial and functional 
boundaries. These trends are accordingly reflected in European family and 
succession law. A mosaic of interconnected legal sources deriving from dif-
ferent origins results in a multi-layered and fragmented framework.2 The 
reality of the administration of justice has changed over the last few dec-
ades through massive intervention of international and supranational actors 
within national judicial systems.3 The interpretation and application of this 
legal corpus equally gets lifted to a higher level, with the uniform interpre-
tation of law placed at the forefront. A proper application of European pri-
vate international law is the cornerstone of civil justice. Though state-cen-
trism has progressively been eroded, the national State remains the “master 
of the game” in adjudication.4
The EUFams II project combines different methodological approaches to 
address the issues of application and interpretation of European and interna-
tional instruments on family and succession matters before national courts 
of various Member States. Against that background, a number of project 
1 van Calster, European Private International Law, p. 3 et seq.; Corneloup et al., Children 
on the Move, p. 9; Rass-Masson, YPIL 20 (2018/2019), p. 521 –  536; Franzina/Viarengo, in: 
Viarengo/Franzina, The EU Regulations on the Property Regimes of International Couples, 
p. 1 –  13; Mansel/Thorn/Wagner, IPRax 2020, 97 –  126.
2 Župan, in: Honorati, Jurisdiction in matrimonial matters, p. 1 (5).
3 Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe, p. 1.
4 Arroyo, YPIL 20 (2018/2019), p. 31 –  46.
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activities were implemented: Relevant national case law was collected, elab-
orated and uploaded to the EUFams II database;5 national reports were de-
livered highlighting specific aspects of the application of EUFams II subject 
matter regulations and Hague conventions in the project partners’ Member 
States (Croatia, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden). The thematic EUFams II 
consortium reports were drafted to provide an account of national imple-
mentation legislation,6 as well as specific aspects relating to third country 
nationals.7
Data collected by the EUFams II consortium as part of the project allows 
for several important conclusions. When comparing case law of different 
Member States, the research revealed a lack of uniformity and consistency in 
the interpretation and application of the relevant acquis. When case law re-
lated to a specific legal instrument is compared horizontally throughout the 
EU, project findings show that the scrutinized regulations and conventions 
have been correctly applied only to a limited extent. As a consequence, there 
is a risk that citizens in the EU may be deprived of the full enjoyment of the 
benefits within the EU judicial area. The purpose of this contribution is to 
use these analyses and results as a basis for designing feasible pathways for 
system improvements with a focus on judicial training.
It goes without saying that judicial training is important in order to 
achieve an adequate and unified application of European family and succes-
sion law. The EUFams II findings further highlight the fact that the education 
and training of professionals in this area of law are of paramount importance 
when it comes to fostering predictability and legal certainty. Judicial training 
does not only include the judiciary, but also other authorities that serve the 
system of justice in respect of these matters in Member States, in particular 
notaries. In a wider sense, it encompasses the training of practitioners and 
other stakeholders involved in the system.
This contribution commences by explaining EU policy on judicial train-
ing and presenting the main training facilities and their features. It then 
turns to methodological aspects of the transfer of knowledge in legal dis-
course. The second part of the contribution presents the EUFams II project 
results relevant to judicial training. It seeks to establish a direct link with EU 
justice policy objectives, methodologies, performance of judicial training at 
European training centers and national training academies that serve the 
5 See http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index.php?site=entscheidungsdatenbank 
(last consulted 16. 10.  2020).
6 See http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index.php?site=projektberichte (last con-
sulted 16. 10.  2020).
7 See Brosch/Mariottini and Zühlsdorff, in this volume.
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system of justice in European family and succession law. Quantitative and 
qualitative analyses lead to conclusions and proposals in respect of future 
training policy and its desired performance in cross-border family and suc-
cession matters.
Several methodological approaches are combined and presented in the 
contribution. The authors opted for desk research on relevant writings and 
analyses of reports, journals, and other legal publications, as well as policy 
papers available online. Additionally, the authors took advantage of the pre-
vious assessment conducted within the EUFams II Project. In addition to the 
online judicial training survey conducted among training participants (here-
inafter: the online judicial training survey),8 training networks and acad-
emies have been addressed with an additional questionnaire (hereinafter: the 
online questionnaire).9 The survey and the questionnaire have allowed for a 
content analysis as well as a quantitative analysis of the data collected.
II. European judicial training – policy considerations
1. Development of the European judicial training strategy
The year 2020 marks the end of the first period of strategic training of legal 
practitioners on European law. A systematic training policy was introduced 
in the “2011 –  2020 European judicial training strategy”, titled “Building Trust 
in EU-wide Justice – A new dimension to European judicial training”10 (here-
inafter: the 2011 –  2020 European judicial strategy), which set very specific 
objectives for the training of justice professionals. However, the first steps 
towards creating training policy at the European level were actually taken 
as early as 2006.
8 The online judicial training survey addressed experts in cross-border family and succes-
sion matters. It targeted the EUFams Network of practitioners and was accessible via a 
link to an anonymous Google survey. In total, 129 responses were recorded, mainly from 
lawyers (39.5 %), judges (25.6 %), state officers (11.6 %), public notaries (7.8 %), and others ac-
tively working with the relevant regulations and conventions from 17 Member States and 
4 other countries.
9 Responses to the online judicial training survey questionnaire were delivered by ERA, 
EIPA, and the German, Swedish and Croatian judicial academies.
10 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Building Trust 
in EU-Wide Justice – A New Dimension to European Judicial Training, COM (2011) 551 
final.
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In 2006, in its “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on judicial training in the European Union”11 
(hereinafter: the EC Communication on judicial training in the EU 2006), 
the European Commission identified judicial training as a major issue in the 
light of two developments: First, the adoption of a corpus of legislation that 
has become substantial and must be implemented by justice practitioners in 
the Member States; and second, the development of the mutual recognition 
principle which rests primarily on a high degree of mutual confidence be-
tween the Member States’ judicial systems.12 At that point, the operation of 
legal training in Member States was only considered in the context of the 
training of judges and prosecutors.13 However, the training of lawyers who 
are not part of the respective Member States’ judiciaries was also included in 
the analysis provided in the document.14
The EC Communication on judicial training in the EU 2006 revealed that 
the duration of the training varied in the Member States. Furthermore, it ex-
posed major inequalities among judges, prosecutors and lawyers in terms of 
access to training. In budgetary terms, the training of judges and prosecu-
tors is usually publicly financed, whereas the training of lawyers is financed 
by professional organizations. Interestingly, in 2006, the European Commis-
sion seems to have been inclined towards a centralized approach to judicial 
training by devoting an important part of its resources to finance a fully-
fledged “European” offer of training for judges and prosecutors.15 Accord-
ing to the EC Communication on judicial training in the EU 2006, there are 
three key areas for improvement in the judicial profession: language skills, 
familiarity with EU law, and familiarity with law in other Member States.16 
These findings were supported by additional evaluation reports, and they en-
couraged the introduction of further measures by way of the “Resolution of 
the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM 
(2006) 356 final.
12 COM (2006) 356 final, note 2.
13 As regards judges and prosecutors, depending on the Member State, judicial training is 
organized by the Ministry of Justice, the Higher Council of the Judiciary or Justice, or, 
where appropriate, by the Prosecutor-General (where there is strict separation between 
judges and prosecutors), or by specialized establishments. In several Member States, a 
single institution is responsible for the training of judges and prosecutors. See COM (2006) 
356 final, note 8.
14 Training of lawyers is often organized by bar associations, in many cases in cooperation 
with universities. See COM (2006) 356 final, note 8.
15 Piana, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 1 (2009), 30 (39).
16 COM (2006) 356 final, note 24 –  27.
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States meeting within the Council on the training of judges, prosecutors 
and judicial staff in the European Union”.17 However, the training of lawyers 
was not within the scope of the said document because in the majority of 
Member States, these professions are responsible themselves for organizing 
their training.18
With the measures aimed at organizing the training of judges, prosecu-
tors and judicial staff at the national level, Member States were to a certain 
extent prepared for the developments which followed the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, and provided a legal basis for an EU competence 
to create a European strategy for judicial training.19 In line with the Stock-
holm Programme,20 European judicial training is both a priority in terms 
of enhancing judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters, as well 
as a prerequisite for improving the operation of the internal market21 and 
making it easier for citizens to exercise their rights. A pursuit towards a 
joint European judicial culture22 was reflected in the aforementioned 2011 –  
2020 European judicial training strategy, which emphasized the importance 
of training for all legal practitioners, primarily judges and prosecutors, but 
also for court staff. The inclusion of legal practitioners in private profes-
sions, such as lawyers, was also considered important in order to provide 
legal certainty as well as legal assistance, service, and expert knowledge in 
European law to EU citizens taking advantage of the right to free move-
ment. In order to reach the designated goals, several recommendations were 
made based on research findings and stakeholder consultations.23 The start-
17 Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council on the training of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff 
in the European Union (2008/C 299/01), OJ C 299, 22. 11.  2008.
18 Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council on the training of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff 
in the European Union (2008/C 299/01), OJ C 299, 22. 11.  2008, recital 18.
19 Evaluation of the 2011 –  2020 European judicial training strategy, SWD (2019) 380 final, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/5_en_document_travail_service_part1_v2.pdf 
(last consulted 27. 10.  2020), para 2.
20 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Delivering an 
area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens – Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme, COM (2010) 171 final.
21 See Monti, A new strategy for the Single Market.
22 COM (2011) 551 final, para 1: “The creation of a European judicial culture that fully re-
spects subsidiarity and judicial independence is central to the efficient functioning of a 
European judicial area. Judicial training is a crucial element of this process as it enhances 
mutual confidence between Member States, practitioners and citizens.”.
23 Preliminary statistical data; European Parliament study “Judicial training in the EU 
Member States”, COM (2011) 551 final, p. 4.
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ing point was to support both initial as well as continuous training in envi-
ronmental law, civil, contract, family and commercial law, competition law, 
intellectual property rights, fundamental rights, and data protection. Short-
term exchanges should be available for judges and prosecutors, especially 
newly appointed ones during the initial training.24
Since European judicial training is a shared competence that requires 
action by justice professionals, Member States and the EU,25 reaching the 
2011 –  2020 European judicial training strategy goals is not going to be an 
easy task. The goals set were to be accomplished by focusing on the follow-
ing objectives: a) legal practitioners should have a good knowledge of EU 
law, of EU judicial cooperation instruments and of the laws of other Member 
States; b) legal practitioners should trust each other in cross-border judicial 
proceedings; and c) citizens and businesses across the EU should benefit from 
their rights deriving from EU law.26
In quantitative terms, these objectives would translate to the following 
goals: a) half of all EU legal practitioners should have taken part in training 
on EU law; b) EU financing should support training on EU law for at least 
20,000 legal practitioners annually; c) the EJTN should organize no less than 
1,200 exchanges for (experienced) judges and prosecutors; d) all new judges 
and prosecutors should have taken part in an exchange program; and e) all 
legal practitioners should have had at least one week of training on EU law 
during their career.27
The implementation of the pilot project on European judicial training28 
in 2012 revealed a change in the European Parliament’s approach towards 
European judicial training and a sharp turn towards more respect for the 
principle of subsidiarity and judicial independence within the Member 
States.29 The aims of the project were: a) to identify best practices in the 
training of judges, prosecutors and justice professionals on national legal 
systems and traditions as well as on European law; b) to identify the most 
effective ways of delivering training in EU law and national legal systems to 
24 COM (2011) 551 final, p. 5.
25 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy and preparation of the future 
strategy Analysis of the responses received to the targeted consultation, 2018, https://
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018_targeted_consultation-european_judicial_training-
analysis_of_replies.pdf (last consulted 07. 08.  2020), p. 3.
26 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy, p. 5.
27 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy, p. 7.
28 European Parliament resolution on judicial training, 14. 03.  2012, 2012/2575(RSP), https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0079+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
29 Benvenuti, International Journal for Court Administration 7 (2015), 59 –  67.
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judges, prosecutors and justice professionals at the local level, and to pro-
mote dialogue and coordination between European judges and prosecutors; 
c) to encourage EU judicial training providers to share ideas on best practice 
and disseminate them across the EU; and d) to improve cooperation between 
the EJTN and national judicial training institutions.30
The final important development in the period was the adoption of nine 
judicial training principles of the EJTN. They serve as a foundation for the 
judiciary to manage their training needs and as a framework for the training 
providers to plan and deliver training to judges and prosecutors. The prin-
ciples address issues such as a right to judicial training during working time, 
a responsibility to provide the necessary resources, compulsory initial train-
ing at the beginning of one’s career, the use of modern training methods and 
techniques, and non-legal issues among the training topics.31
2. Evaluation of the European judicial strategy
As part of the commitment to support the training of legal practitioners in 
EU law, each year (2011 –  2018), the European Commission reports on the 
participation of legal practitioners in training on European law in the EU.32 
In addition, in 2013 –  2014, the “Implementation of the Pilot Project – Euro-
pean Judicial Training – Lot 1 – Study on Best Practices in training of judges 
and prosecutors”, was undertaken, which helped to identify best practices in 
training legal practitioners in EU law.33
The implementation of the judicial training strategy has recently been 
assessed and the results were published in the Evaluation of the 2011 –  2020 
European judicial training strategy, which covers the period from 2011 to 
2017. The overall impression in the Evaluation of 2011 –  2020 is that the Eu-
ropean judicial training strategy was successful in reaching its goals. The 
30 The European judicial training policy: Working together to improve European judicial 
training, available at the European e-Justice Portal: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_
the_european_judicial_training_policy-121-en.do (last consulted: 21. 10.  2020).
31 https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_the_european_judicial_training_policy-121-en.do 
(last consulted: 21. 10.  2020).
32 See the reports on European judicial training (2011 –  2018), available at https://e-justice.eu 
ropa.eu/content_the_european_judicial_training_policy-121-en.do (last consulted: 21. 10.  
2020).
33 European Commission, Tender JUST/2012/JUTR/PR/0064/A4 – Implementation of the 
Pilot Project – European Judicial Training, Lot 1: “Study on Best Practices in training of 
judges and prosecutors”, Final report, 2014, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/
publication/37e40065-e0bc-4f53-9ea2-983fc1a17f8e (last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
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contribution of the EU to increasing the commitment of both the EU as well 
as national bodies, by providing necessary financial support and creating a 
policy framework was deemed crucial to its success.
The target of training half of all legal practitioners on EU law, i. e. 1,200 
judicial exchanges per year, and almost doubling the total funds made avail-
able to train legal practitioners through EU programs and improve the capac-
ity of networks, was reached ahead of time.34 In contrast, the targets of impro-
ving the national regulatory frameworks and increasing support for training 
on legal terminology in foreign languages were only partly reached.35 Sev-
eral aspects of these programs will need to be addressed better in the future. 
One area identified as in need of improvement was the training section of 
the European e-Justice Portal. In addition, it was noted that training legal 
practitioners, such as lawyers and court staff as well as bailiffs, should be 
given more attention. Increased training of staff at the end of the judicial 
chain, i. e. prison and probation officers, on EU-specific issues such as anti-
radicalization and the EU Charter should be included in the future working 
plans.36 Even prior to the coronavirus-related crisis, the European Commis-
sion noticed the underused potential of e-learning and the limited aware-
ness of the European e-Justice Portal.37 During the period of specific circum-
stances caused by the pandemic, these needs became even more apparent, 
inducing the appreciation of e-learning.
In the period from 2011 to 2017, the 2011 –  2020 European judicial training 
strategy enabled the EJTN to establish itself as a leading provider of high-
quality, cross-border training offered to judges and prosecutors in the EU. 
The EJTN’s nine “judicial training principles” became a reference point in the 
judicial world for creating a joint European judicial training culture. Impor-
tant work of other EU-level training providers (e. g. ERA, EIPA-Luxembourg) 
and networks, such as the CNUE (notaries public) and the CCBE (lawyers), 
was also acknowledged.38
34 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 73.
35 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 73.
36 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 73.
37 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 73.
38 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 73.
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III. Judicial training networks and institutions in the EU
Around the globe, continuous judicial education emerged in the early 1960s.39 
Since the early 1990s there has been a growing appreciation of the value of 
judicial education in both developed and developing countries.40 However, 
judicial training has been perceived for a long time as a matter for the na-
tional judiciary.41 Reshaping the balance of powers between international, 
EU and national competences has enhanced a new path for judicial train-
ing aims, methods and practices. Europeanisation of law fosters cross-bor-
der judicial cooperation. As a cornerstone of the area of freedom, security 
and justice, the free movement of judgments relies to a high degree on mu-
tual trust among authorities of the Member States.42 The fact that the EU 
lacks hard power in the field of judicial policies was addressed earlier. Due to 
this limitation, the EU has adopted soft leverage methods, exerting influence 
based on socialization and training. Judicial and practitioners’ networks have 
become “a sustainable operational tool”43 whose function is to “ensure better 
coordination beyond and besides harmonization”.44
“Judicial networks can be described as groups, conferences, commissions 
or organizations of legal experts, judges and academics (coming from dif-
ferent countries) established at transnational level in an autonomous way 
or under the wing of international organizations”.45 Judicial networks sup-
port the diffusion of best practices in the administration of justice in an ad-
vanced democracy. Socialization by transnational networks triggers a cul-
tural change in judicial behavior. Networking contributes to mobility and 
social learning in the international arena, leading to self-awareness of a 
judge in becoming a multinational judge.46 In the end, although formal rules 
that govern the judiciary remain untouched, institutional change occurs.
Networks are established in global and European legal milieus by means 
of several pathways. They may be founded merely by EU rules, the most 
prominent example being the supranational EJN in civil and commercial 
matters, which aims to ensure the functioning of the judicial system created 
39 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. 1.
40 Goodman/Louw-Potgieter, African Journal of Legal Studies 5 (2012), 181 (182).
41 For a global overview, see Armytage, Educating Judges, p. XVI et seq.
42 See further Lenaerts, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 59 (2010), 255.
43 Toniatti/Magrassi, Magistratura, giurisdizione ed equilibri istituzionali, p. 10.
44 Cafaggi/Muir Watt, Making European Private Law, p. 338.
45 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 41.
46 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 110.
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by EU rules.47 Another pathway is the creation of a network at the initiative 
of national institutions or judicial authorities, aimed at increasing horizon-
tal collaboration with their counterparts in other Member States. Member-
ship in such “bottom-up networks” is nationally based.48 In respect of the 
latter, the EJTN is of particular importance for networking and training in 
regulations and conventions in cross-border family and succession matters. 
At the global level, the International Hague Network of Judges (IHNJ) is 
equally relevant to the EUFams II Project’s subject matter. Created by the 
HCCH, it brings together nominated judges specialized in cross-border child 
protection.49 A dialogue between the EU and the IHNJ is developing as the 
cross-border family rules are consolidated,50 though not fully employed in 
practice.51
IV. EU and national training facilities
Continuous education of professionals is set as a policy at the European and 
national level alike. Judicial training in the EU follows several pathways. It is 
by default performed by specialized training institutions, i. e. major European 
judicial schools and national training centers (for judges, notaries public, 
and attorneys). In addition, training is also organized by various initiatives 
funded by the EU. Most frequently, these are consortiums of law faculties, 
law institutes, and/or NGOs.
The EJTN is a bottom-up network established by the 2000 Bordeaux 
Charter.52 This non-profit international association was set up to promote 
“a training programme with a genuine European dimension for members 
of the European judiciary”. The EJTN’s participating institutions are 40 na-
tional judicial training bodies, with the European Commission as a partner. 
The main activities of the EJTN are coordinating actions among network 
members, sharing best practices, and developing common curricula and train-
ing sessions. There are several EJTN working groups as well as a “Programs” 
47 Council Decision of 28 May 2001 establishing a European Judicial Network in civil and 
commercial matters (2001/470/EC), OJ L 174, 27. 06.  2001, p. 25 –  31.
48 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 47.
49 See https://assets.hcch.net/docs/665b2d56-6236-4125-9352-c22bb65bc375.pdf (last consult-
ed 21. 10.  2020).
50 Scherpe, European Family Law, p. 158 –  160.
51 Viarengo/Marchetti, in: Viarengo/Villata, Planning the Future of Cross Border Families, 
p. 799 (810).
52 Benvenuti, International Journal for Court Administration 7 (2015), 59 (60).
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working group, which deals with all training activities in addition to ex-
change.53 It includes five sub-working groups of experts and trainers from 
different Member States, focusing on civil, criminal, and administrative law, 
the training of trainers and linguistics. The “Catalogue+ programme” entails 
courses organized autonomously by network members, which are open to 
foreign magistrates, and additional training activities, such as the training 
of trainers, THEMIS competitions, e-learning programs, elaboration of train-
ing curricula and modules, and the selection of best practices for training 
institutions. The AIAKOS Exchange Programme for judges and magistrates 
has been in operation since 2014.54 The central role or, so to speak, the “mo-
nopoly position” of the EJTN in judicial training was confirmed by the 2013 
operational grant for the period from 2014 to 2020.55 As one of the most 
relevant training institution in EU law, the EJTN does not generally focus 
solely on family and successions matters, although its training sessions are 
regularly dedicated to these topics as well. Out of all the events hosted by 
the EJTN in 2015,56 five were devoted to these topics. In 2016,57 201758 and 
2018,59 there were seven events each year, while in 2019,60 the number of 
training sessions related to European family and succession law reached 13. 
In comparison with the total number of events organized by the EJTN, Euro-
pean family and succession law related training has been on the rise. Within 
the Linguistics Programme and Civil Law Seminars, the proportion of these 
training events has increased from approximately a fifth in the period from 
2015 to 2018 to a third in 2019.
The ERA was established in 1992, following the 1990 recommendation 
from the European Parliament to the Commission to invest in a center ded-
icated to training lawyers. The foundation is headquartered in Trier, Ger-
many, with a transparent governing body structure consisting of repre-
sentatives of each Member State, the CJEU, and the European Parliament.61 
Regulations and conventions on family and succession law are regularly put 
on the agenda of ERA events. In 2015, 2016, 2018 and 2019, the instruments 
53 See http://www.ejtn.eu/ (last consulted 21. 10.  2020).
54 Benvenuti, International Journal for Court Administration 7 (2015), 59 (62 et seq.).
55 Regulation (EU) No 1382/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 De-
cember 2013 establishing a Justice Programme for the period 2014 to 2020, OJ L 354, 28. 12.  
2013, p. 73 –  83.
56 EJTN, Annual Report 2015.
57 EJTN, Annual Report 2016.
58 EJTN, Annual Report 2017.
59 EJTN, Annual Report 2018.
60 EJTN, Annual Report 2019.
61 See https://www.era.int (last consulted 21. 10.  2020).
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covered by the EUFams II project were addressed in at least one ERA event 
per year, with the exception of the Brussels II bis Regulation, which was 
taught on average four times each year.62 A significantly higher number 
was registered in 2017, when the relevant regulations (Brussels II bis Regu-
lation, Maintenance Regulation, Succession Regulation and Rome III Regula-
tion) were taught on average 13.5 times. Among the Hague conventions, the 
1980 and the 1996 conventions were taught on average 3 times annually in 
2015, 2016, 2018 and 2019, while the 2007 Maintenance Convention and the 
Protocol were covered only once in 2018. An exception is again the training 
practice of 2017, when each of the conventions (1980, 1996, 2007) and the 
2007 Protocol was presented 15 times.
The European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) was founded in 
1981 on the occasion of the first European Council held in Maastricht. Its 
main objective is to serve officials in national and regional public adminis-
trations in Member States, in the European Commission itself, and in other 
EU institutions.63 Hence, in addition to judges, EIPA focuses on the training 
of other professionals in European private international law. The relevant in-
struments in European family and succession law were taught systematically 
in the period from 2015 to 2019. The Brussels II bis Regulation, Maintenance 
Regulation, Rome III Regulation, and Succession Regulation were annually 
taught on average 8, 7, 4, and 2 times, respectively. Matrimonial property in-
struments were taught only twice a year in 2018 and 2019. Other regulations 
and conventions were not covered at all.64
Due to a national specific division of tasks within each respective judi-
cial system, European family and succession law is in some Member States 
adjudicated by a notary public. In that respect, as an official body represent-
ing the notarial profession in dealings with the European institutions, the 
Council of the Notariats of the European Union (CNUE) may also be relevant 
when it comes to supporting training activities.65
At the national level, training sessions are offered by national training 
schools. Available data for judicial training indicates differences in perform-
ance among national judicial academies. For the purpose of comparison, in 
the period from 2015 to 2019, the Brussels II bis, Rome III and Succession Reg-
ulation were taught at the Croatian Judicial Academy 5, 3, and 2 times a year, 
respectively. The Property Regimes Regulations were covered only in 2019 
62 Responses to the online judicial training questionnaire by the ERA.
63 See https://www.eipa.eu/ (last consulted 21. 10.  2020).
64 Responses to the online judicial training questionnaire by the EIPA.
65 See http://www.notaries-of-europe.eu/ (last consulted 21. 10.  2020).
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on 5 occasions. When it comes to the relevant Hague conventions, the 1980 
Child Abduction Convention was taught on average 3 times a year, while 
the 1996 Child Protection Convention was taught only in 2018 and 2019, on 
average 4 times each year. The 2007 Maintenance Convention and the 2007 
Protocol were not covered at all. The Swedish Judicial Academy organized 
training on private international law on family and succession matters once 
a year in the period from 2015 to 2017. In 2018 and 2019, no event related to 
the pertinent instruments was hosted.
Since in the legal orders of some Member States certain judicial functions 
are ex lege performed by a notary public or a lawyer, training is equally per-
formed by a notary public academy or a bar association/chamber academy. 
National academies give their contribution to judicial training either by or-
ganizing training on the basis of an annual plan, or by working in collab-
oration with other actors such as large training schools and universities. 
Without a doubt, academia plays a significant role in the organization and 
performance of judicial training.66
V. Importance of training in European family 
and succession matters
Judicial training is inseparably connected with the rise of professionalism 
and rule of law promotion through education, exchange of good practice, 
and skill development. In general terms, it assumes different qualities and 
skills besides intellectual capacity to become a judge.67 The quality of justice 
is assured by universally valued principles, such as fair trial and impartiality. 
An institutional mechanism has to be set to assure competence and the ac-
countability of judges to a legal norm, entailing high standards of effective-
ness and efficiency in management of courts and judicial procedures.68
A well-functioning judicial system in the EU entails justice based on pro-
fessionals capable of performing sophisticated tasks, court management en-
suring the high quality of appointed judges, lifelong learning, and advanced 
judicial training schemes.69 Judicial training in the European judicial arena 
66 Within the framework of projects developed under the DG Justice Grants, some are spe-
cialized in family matters, see e. g. http://www.brussels2family.eu/the-project/ (last con-
sulted 21. 10.  2020); https://sites.les.univr.it/class4eu/ (last consulted 21. 10.  2020).
67 Turenne, in: Schauer/Verschraegen, General Reports of the XIXth Congress of the Inter-
national Academy of Comparative Law, p. 1 (7).
68 Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe, p. 5.
69 Corkin, Europeanization of Judicial Review, p. 175 et seq.
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plays a particularly important role and has added value in terms of enhanced 
effectiveness and legal certainty. Training aims at advancing legal expert-
ise beyond mere application of law. Absorption, implementation and inter-
pretation of supranational EU principles and fundamental rights, as well as 
uniform interpretation and conformity with developed supranational courts 
jurisprudence, are targeted.70 Hence, the procedure-oriented legitimacy of a 
judicial decision is superseded by its performance-oriented legitimacy. This 
entails judicial decisions having legitimacy if they comply with standards 
of efficiency and effectiveness. The founder of performative theory, John 
Langshaw Austin, advocates that a verbal act is transformed into reality 
with substantial consequences. Speech, performance, and deliverables (here 
meaning a judgement, and its reasoning also containing the interpretation) 
define the world instead of merely reflecting it.71 In a performative approach, 
setting judicial training gives legitimacy to a judicial decision.72
High demands for serving the system of justice in European private in-
ternational law have to be looked at in the context of competences of the EU 
in terms of judicial policy. However, management of the judiciary remains a 
national competence. It has no bearing that the system of justice in European 
family and succession law is performed at the national level by the same 
national authorities that adjudicate domestic cases. Consequently, every 
national judge is equally a European judge. In most Member States, jurisdic-
tion is neither concentrated, nor are the judges specialized.73 On the practical 
side, cross-border cases do not occur equally often in each jurisdiction and 
they are unequally distributed within certain jurisdictions (concentrated in 
urban areas, with significantly less number of such cases in rural areas).
Management of the judiciary and specialization or concentration of juris-
diction, are not part of an EU-driven policy, nor is the nomination of national 
judges and other authorities. This remains a competence of the Member 
States. Criteria for appointing a judge reflect what society expects them to 
do, with a number of models employed.74 A variety of criteria in the EU may 
explain a variety of approaches and the application of European private in-
ternational law by different judicial systems of Member States.75 In many 
Member States the judge is still perceived as a bouche de la loi, hence their 
70 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 87.
71 Peternai, Učinci književnosti, p. 17.
72 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 4.
73 Župan/Poretti, in: Duić/Petrašević, EU and Member States – Legal and Economic Issues, 
p. 297 –  323.
74 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. 60.
75 Turenne, in: Turenne, Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems, p. 1 (14).
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independence is not sufficiently promoted.76 In many Central and Eastern 
European Member States, judicial appointment was traditionally based on 
“the myth that deciding and judging cases is a clear-cut analytical exercise of 
mechanical matching of facts with the applicable law”.77 Consequently, the 
recruitment of quality judges, the promotion of standards for higher judicial 
instances, and the models of teaching professional and generic skills in pri-
mary and lifelong education are determining factors when it comes to serv-
ing the system of justice in the cross-border arena.78
Judicial activity has been changing under the pressure of an increasing 
number of cases with a cross-border element. Established case law, practice 
and interpretation represent a departure from the traditional service of jus-
tice.79 This is even more apparent in Members States of the major 2004 and 
subsequent 2008 and 2013 enlargements. Judges may face constraints per-
taining to the legal culture in which they were brought up. In Member States 
which joined the EU more recently, a majority of acting judges have gained 
their legal education before the general course in EU law was taught as a 
part of a mandatory curriculum,80 let alone specific courses on European pri-
vate international law. This is especially true for senior judges, even though 
with the passing of time, the ratio between judges who had and those who 
did not have university training in European private international law grad-
ually changes in favor of those who had. This is important because Euro-
pean private international law is characterized by a high level of flexibility 
for the national judge and thus requires profound understanding of its con-
cepts, techniques, and background in European law in general. In compar-
ison to dealing with descriptive legal rules and their mechanical application 
in pre-accession regimes, this entails different approaches to teaching law.81 
Just as the lack of knowledge and experience of national judges may impact 
the access to remedies of those involved, lawyers experienced in EU law may 
instigate different concerns due to their ability to employ litigation tactics 
to circumvent undesired results and turn legal nuances into advantages for 
their clients.82
These developments are reflected in an EU long-term policy towards judi-
cial training in general, and more specifically, its significance in institutional 
76 Bell, Judiciaries within Europe, p. 13 et seq.
77 Bobek, in: Turenne, Fair Reflection of Society in Judicial Systems, p. 121 (122).
78 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, p. 709.
79 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 40.
80 Župan et al., Report on the Croatian Exchange Seminar, p. 6.
81 See section VII.
82 Danov, in: Beaumont et al., Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, p. 475 (489).
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and legal adaptation of candidate countries for full EU membership. The 
European Commission’s pre-accession judicial training strategy was estab-
lished in 1997, initially for the re-socialization of the Eastern enlargement. 
EU enlargement policy retains this focus on candidate countries, as may be 
confirmed, inter alia by a study on judicial training in the Western Balkans83, 
as well as recent open calls for judicial training, where funding is open for 
partnerships with Montenegro or Albania.
A European judicial culture is not yet fully embedded in new Member 
States and may have to be strengthened and enhanced if it has been for-
gotten in old Member States.84 References for preliminary rulings reveal that 
judges may struggle when called upon to interpret basic notions and rules of 
European family and succession law.85 While the questions mostly point to 
details and sophisticated issues, they also concern issues already dealt with 
in CJEU rulings, and straightforward issues or issues of a technical nature. 
The CJEU rather often renders an “order” upon preliminary questions of the 
Member States. Pursuant to Art. 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, a 
question referred to the court for a preliminary ruling may be answered in 
a simplified procedure in the following three cases: a) if the reply to such 
question may be clearly deduced from existing case-law; b) where a question 
is identical to a question on which the court has already ruled; and c) where 
the answer to the question admits no reasonable doubt.86 Several CJEU cases 
are illustrative. Although law in the books is straightforward when it comes 
to the interpretation of habitual residence in child abduction cases, it does 
not seem to be transferred into “law in action” before many national courts 
of Member States.87 It is notable that though foreign law is applied ex offi-
cio in Romania, its courts doubted if Italian rules on legal separation are ap-
plicable to a divorce of two Romanian nationals living in Italy, in particular 
since the law of the forum does not lay down any procedural rules in relation 
to legal separation. The CJEU clearly indicates that despite the inconsistency 
between foreign substantive law and procedural law of the forum, the Roma-
nian court has to find a way to fully obey the Rome III Regulation.88
83 Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Study on the existing systems of judicial training in 
the Western Balkans, 2017, http://www.rcc.int/ (last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
84 Dallara/Piana, Networking the Rule of Law, p. 87 –  89.
85 See e. g. CJEU, 03. 10.  2019, C-759/18 (OF/PG); CJEU, 16. 01.  2018, C-604/17 (PM/AH ); CJEU, 
14. 06.  2017, C-67/17 (Iliev/Ilieva).
86 Petrašević, Prethodni postupak pred Sudom EU, p. 40 et seq.
87 Viarengo/Villata, Planning the Future of Cross Border Families: A Path Through Coordina-
tion, Final Study, p. 82, 85 et seq.; CJEU, 10. 04.  2018, C-85/18 PPU (CV/DU ).
88 See CJEU, 16. 07.  2020, C-249/19 (JE/KF ).
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The above analysis confirms that legal professionals in cross-border 
family and succession matters are under constant pressure to remain up to 
date. Against this background, European judicial training in family and suc-
cession matters requires further attention and a planned and detailed ap-
proach.
VI. Servicing the system of justice in EU cross-border family and 
succession matters – what training is needed?
Potential obstacles to an adequate completion of adjudication tasks in the EU 
cross-border arena in general, and in family and succession matters in par-
ticular, are frequently noted in scholarly writings.89 Many such issues are ad-
dressed, identified and confirmed by the EUFams I and its successor, the EU-
Fams II project. The EUFams II project started with the hypothesis that there 
is a lack of familiarity with private international law in general, and with 
many EU regulations in the field of family and succession law in particular. 
This may often result in no, false or improper application of the legal regime 
and/or a non-unified interpretation throughout Member States.
Familiarity with the European family and succession law has been made 
part of the major EUFams II 2019 survey. Although the questionnaire was 
distributed to professionals active in the field of family and succession law, 
the Lobach/Rapp-report found a fairly poor overall familiarity with the per-
tinent instruments.90 A striking disparity in the understanding of relevant 
regulations has also been established by the Lobach/Rapp-report.91 Case law 
collected within the EUFams II database shows this uneven familiarity with, 
and understanding of, the relevant regulations, but also identifies concrete 
misapplications. EUFams II database cases from different jurisdictions illus-
trate effectively the magnitude of the problem.
89 Viarengo/Villata, Planning the Future of Cross Border Families; Beaumont et al., Cross-
Border Litigation in Europe.
90 The report was based on a survey conducted among 1394 respondents (699 of whom com-
pleted the questionnaire), who are professionals in EU family and succession matters. See 
Lobach/Rapp-report, p. 33.
91 Respondents themselves indicated the field(s) of their professional activities. Hence, they 
only answered questions on their familiarity with the pertinent regulation(s). Notably, on 
a four-increment scale, the first two answer options (i. e. not acquainted and basic under-
standing) are indicative of non-existing or merely rudimentary familiarity, Lobach/Rapp-
report, p. 6.
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The relationship between the CJEU and national courts as well as na-
tional judges and EU law “is not per se smooth and bright”.92 It appears that 
national courts have difficulties to keep up to date, in particular with the de-
velopment of the CJEU practice.93 The principle of continuous interpretation 
of the regime becomes particularly relevant with changes brought by the 
Brussels II ter Regulation in comparison to its predecessor, the Brussels II bis 
Regulation.
The “evolutive” or “dynamic” interpretation applied by the ECtHR may 
become relevant for reading European private international law instru-
ments.94 The practice of the ECtHR may equally cause hardship as, by sub-
ject matter, European private international law in family and succession 
matters intersects with the protection of fundamental rights, most directly 
with gender issues. A combined interpretation of these legal sources is not 
an easy task, as the EUFams II database may well confirm.95 Hence, the in-
tersection of these topics has to be made a regular part of the training,96 as 
has been recently acknowledged by the Council of Europe97 and the EJTN98.
Further difficulty with the application of European private international 
law in family and succession matters is attributed to the fact that they are 
inseparably linked to national substantive and procedural law.99 EUFams I 
findings show that a national concept of examining jurisdiction may affect 
92 Jaremba, in: Goudappel/Hirsch Ballin, Democracy and Rule of Law in the European Union, 
p. 49 (58 et seq.).
93 EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case Law, p. 48.
94 Brosch/Mariottini, Report on the International Exchange Seminar, p. 9.
95 The Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske, 29. 03.  2018, U-III-5232/2017, 
HRC20180329) took into consideration relevant practice of the ECtHR considering the 
notion of the best interest of the child (ECtHR, 26. 11.  2013, no. 27853/09 (X/Latvia); ECtHR, 
06. 12.  2007, no. 39388/05 (Maumousseau and Washington/France)), but in the explanation of 
the decision it did not refer to the Brussels II bis Regulation, which was applied in lower 
instance proceedings.
96 Schultz, in: Schultz/Dawson/Shaw, Gender and Judicial Education, p. 91 (102).
97 Kyiv Recommendations on the Content and Methodology of Judicial Training on the Im-
plementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, case-law and execution of 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have been informally adopted on inter-
national conference: Protection of human rights through Judicial education: best practices 
and improvement of standards, 9 –  10 December 2019 Kyiv.
98 EJTN-ECtHR Training on Human Rights for EU Judicial Trainers (HFR/2019/05), http://
www.ejtn.eu/Catalogue/EJTN-funded-activities-2019/EJTN-ECtHR-Training-on-Human-
Rights-for-EU-Judicial-Trainers-HFR201905/ (last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
99 Hess/Kramer, From common rules to best practices in European Civil Procedure; Poretti, 
LeXonomica, 8 (2016), 13 –  28; Fitchen, in: Beaumont et al., Cross-Border Litigation in Eu-
rope, p. 55 –  75.
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the perception of the lis pendens rule of the regulations.100 A legal framework 
of Member States contains procedural obstacles that may impede proper ap-
plication of EU law.101
The legal environment, in which operations management is constantly 
struggling with an overflow of cases, forces national judges to work on a 
daily basis with mainly national cases. Hence, the homeward trend appears 
to be the most convenient way to deal with work overload.102 Judges do not 
have enough time to examine and apply all the fine elements of European 
private international law properly. While the CJEU is pushing for a uniform 
interpretation that departs from national legal cultures, judges are not al-
ways keen on interpreting law proactively.
The major problem is that judges may not be fully aware of the impli-
cations of improper application of European private international law in 
family and succession matters,103 as can also be deduced from CJEU case 
law.104 Free circulation of judgements is at the forefront of EU civil justice. 
Hence, if a judge wrongfully assumed jurisdiction and rendered an order, 
that order would be very likely inspected by a judge of a Member State that 
actually had jurisdiction. Although such a ruling would in principle retain 
every effect, it raises concern and hinders mutual trust.105 As has been wisely 
pointed out, the mutual trust is not a blind trust.106 To make and keep the 
fragile fabric of mutual trust, a lot of effort has to be invested in improving 
professional competences of national judges and building a true European 
judicial culture.
The need for the networking and training of professionals was stressed 
in EUFams II deliverables as well. National reports address the issues of 
building the capacities of professionals, particularly the ones from Spain107 
and Croatia108. The German report highlights that functioning of the sys-
tem should be fostered further by judicial networks, whereas work and the 
100 Župan/Drventić, in: Viarengo/Villata, Planning the Future of Cross Border Families, p. 203 
(210 –  216).
101 Hess et al., An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their 
impact on the free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the 
procedural protection of consumers under EU consumer law.
102 The homeward trend has been highlighted by academics and confirmed by data. See Lo-
bach/Rapp-report, p. 19.
103 Beaumont et al., in: Beaumont et al., Cross-Border Litigation in Europe, p. 819 (826).
104 CJEU, 06. 10.  2015, C-489/14 (A/B); CJEU, 15. 02.  2017, C-499/15 (W and V/X ).
105 Re S (A Child) [2014] EWHC 4643 (Fam); CJEU, 19. 11.  2015, C 455/15 PPU (P/Q).
106 Prechal, European Papers 2 (2017), 75 (85).
107 Espinosa Calabuig/Quinzá Redondo, Report on the Spanish Exchange Seminar, p. 4.
108 Župan et al., Report on the Croatian Exchange Seminar, p. 23.
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position of liaison judges must be elaborated upon.109 EUFams II deliverables 
advocate that in parallel to the training of professionals, information cam-
paigns should address general public awareness, to enable citizens to make 
informed decisions in a timely manner and with respect to their property 
regimes.110
The EUFams findings expose the complexity of adjudication in cross-bor-
der family and succession matters, highlight the most problematic areas, and 
confirm the need for judicial training. Thus, the judicial training on Europe 
private international law has to be tailored, both to the recipients (judges 
and other legal professionals), and to the specific nature of the legal instru-
ments at stake. To do so, it is necessary to evaluate an appropriate methodol-
ogy for lifelong legal education.
VII. Lifelong legal education
1. Legal education in the EU
After gaining insight into EU policy considerations regarding legal train-
ing in European private international law, especially in the field of family 
and succession law, in the area of cooperation in civil matters, this section 
focuses on some of the essential traits of legal education in the EU. As post- 
academic legal training has to build efficiently on the previously obtained 
law degrees, it is important to consider to what extent legal education has 
prepared judges for lifelong learning. Understanding which knowledge, skills 
and competences have been transferred to law students is a prerequisite for 
designing appropriate and useful training programs.
a. Contemporary legal education put into context
Legal education today is inextricably linked to universities. This is true not 
only for Europe, but also for most parts of the world. Appearing originally 
at the end of the High Medieval Period, universities were certainly not the 
first format in which law was thought of. Various forms of higher education 
which left their imprint on today’s legal teaching and research owed much 
109 Zühlsdorff, Report on the German Exchange Seminar, p. 2, 22.
110 Espinosa Calabuig/Quinzá Redondo: Report on the Spanish Exchange Seminar, p. 14; 
Brosch/Mariottini, Report on the International Exchange Seminar, p. 36.
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to the intellectual momentum of ancient civilizations. Important milestones 
in the development of the universities were the rise of the French Napoleonic 
model and the German Humboldtian model111 in the 19th century, the latter 
lying at the heart of the development of modern European universities.
The essential properties of the Humboldtian model, i. e. the unity of re-
search and teaching, academic freedoms to learn and teach (Lernfreiheit and 
Lehrfreiheit), education (Bildung) rather than training, the community of stu-
dents and academic staff (universitas magistrorum et scholarium)112, still per-
tain to the universities of today. However, their philosophies and structures 
have become permeable to ideas from other higher education traditions. One 
such idea is that the educational function of a university is primarily aimed 
at responding to the needs of the ever-specializing labor market, not merely 
by taking account of the economic development and demand for certain 
professions, but also by tailoring its curriculum to transform students into 
trained professionals. Using commercial language,113 the universities are to 
manufacture educational products which are ready-to-use by the employers 
from the moment students enter the labor market onwards. While “[t]he In-
dustrial era thus built a massive education super highway”,114 the Informa-
tion Age is tending to take us even further.
On a more general level, under the pressure of the global competition 
phenomenon, the architecture of higher education is currently being rede-
signed.115 In a rapidly changing world, the universities are competing 
globally to take their place in the “audit society”116 based on university rank-
ings, quantitative bibliometric and bibliographic indicators, funds generated 
from public-funded projects or business partnerships, quantitative measur-
ing of internationalization, etc. Many of these indicators have been advanced 
and depend on the criteria set by autonomous globally operating entities, 
often with an economic interest in its furtherance. Against this quantitative 
background, the quality of genuine (Humboldtian) freedoms and independ-
ence of academic activities should be questioned. While Rüegg astutely ob-
served that “[n]o other European institution has spread over the entire world 
111 The Humboldtian model owes a lot to developments both before and after the period of 
Humboldt’s influence. For more details see Anderson, European Universities from the En-
lightenment to 1914.
112 Östling, Humboldt and the Modern German University, p. xiii.
113 The use of such metaphorical expressions is common among critics of the market model 
universities. See Liessmann, Theorie der Unbildung, p. 42 et seq.
114 Waks, The Evolution and Evaluation of Massive Open Online Courses, p. 17.
115 Rust/Kim, WSE 13 (2012), 5 et seq.
116 For more details on the concept see Power, The Audit Society.
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in the way in which the traditional form of the European university has 
done”,117 Liessmann has professed that the true European idea of the univer-
sity has been forsaken for economic efficiency.118 Whereas detailed aspects 
of the tension between the Humboldtian model and the market model are 
beyond the scope of this paper, the above observations have sufficiently con-
textualised further investigation into the basic elements of contemporary 
legal education.
b. Legal education today
Since the inception of universities at the end of the eleventh century, law has 
been one of the fundamental areas of study.119 Thus, the history of legal edu-
cation may indeed be our magistra vitae academicae. It has provided us with 
many useful methods and tools which we still employ today, for instance, the 
rules of logic and argumentation, the Socratic method, and rhetoric skills.
Different methodologies and approaches are used nowadays at different 
levels of legal education. The core legal education is the one which results 
in a degree that qualifies a person for a legal profession, such as the one 
of judge, attorney, public prosecutor, and notary, usually with a further re-
quirement of a general and/or specialized professional exam. Under the Bo-
logna system, a Bachelor of Laws (LL. B.) degree usually takes three to four 
years to earn, while another one or two years are necessary for a Master of 
Laws (LL. M.) degree. A postgraduate doctoral degree (Ph. D. or S. J. D.) re-
quires another three or four years of mentored individual research. One ac-
ademic year typically carries 60 ECTS credits, which corresponds to 1,500 to 
1,800 hours of study. Although all EU Member States are signatories to the 
1999 Bologna Declaration120, the implementation varies among them because 
it envisages voluntary rather than mandatory harmonization.
Law curricula may also differ among universities, yet given the highly 
regulated character of legal professions, they tend to be generally aligned at 
least within a particular Member State. Law curricula in different Member 
States are comparable when it comes to core courses with an international 
117 Rüegg, in: Rüegg/de Ridder-Symoens, A History of the University in Europe, p. xix.
118 Liessmann, Theorie der Unbildung, p. 104.
119 This does not mean that legal professionals have always necessarily earned legal qual-
ifications. See e. g. Gower, MLR 13 (1950), 137 (139 et seq.).
120 Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of Education convened in Bologna on 19 June 
1999, http://www.ehea.info/media.ehea.info/file/Ministerial_conferences/02/8/1999_Bolo 
gna_Declaration_English_553028.pdf (last consulted 27. 10.  2020).
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and a European content. However, they may vary considerably in their na-
tional contents. This being said, they expose a common trait in the growing 
share of the curricula dedicated to practical training in addition to classi-
cal teaching.121 The integration of the training component into the curricula 
takes both vertical as well as horizontal routes. It is manifested not only in 
the insertion of practice-oriented formats of education as new courses, such 
as moot courts and legal clinics,122 but also in adding a stronger methodo-
logical reliance on hypothetical or real-life case studies and project-solving 
assignments in traditionally organized courses. Regardless of this tendency, 
legal education in EU Member States is still focused to a lesser degree on 
training and more on a classical idea of learning theoretical aspects of law. 
This being said, the educational culture of Member States are also different 
and they leave an imprint on students affecting their openness towards in-
teractive and engaged training later in their lives. These are sources of ad-
ditional challenges when conceiving learner-centered training for judges.
2. Lifelong learning for judges
Nearly in parallel with an increase in the training-based courses which are 
part of the core legal education, lifelong learning programs have developed 
to support legal practitioners in updating their knowledge. Initial national 
attempts to introduce continuous legal training for judges were rejected with 
the argument that it might undermine judicial independence. This argument 
is nonetheless easily discarded if judicial training is regarded as part of their 
function of providing a public service and is seen as a means of receiving in-
structions on the methods of reaching decisions, without interfering with 
their decision-making in concreto.123 Moreover, judges may be reassured as 
to the independence of their function by being involved in the system of con-
tinuous training as (co-)creators of the training plans, or as (co-)trainers.124 
121 See e. g. Wilson, in: Halvorsen Rønning/Hammerslev, Outsourcing Legal Aid in the Nordic 
Welfare States, p. 263 (275 et seq.).
122 See e. g. Bartoli, Legal clinics in Europe; Blengino/Gascón-Cuenca, Epistemic Communities 
at the Boundaries of Law.
123 Malleson, MLR 60 (1997), 655 (657, 667).
124 This is occasionally the rule employed by the Croatian Judicial Academy, for instance, 
in the case of the 2019 training on the Property Regimes Regulations, the training ma-
terial prepared by a judge and two academics: Kokić/Kunda/Župan, Prekogranična pitanja 
bračnoimovinskih režima i režima imovine registriranih partnera, where the training was 
conducted in the two-member teams, each consisting of one judge and one academic. The 
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Additional benefits of such involvement are focused on the actual problems 
experienced by judges and the easing of communication with trainees.
At the EU level, there are currently several initiatives related to continu-
ous training in European private international law, the most prominent ones 
being the pan-European programs under the umbrella of the EJTN discussed 
above in more detail.125 Other lines of financing include different training 
formats, such as the EU Justice Programme. Large funds are allocated for 
these purposes,126 given that attaining freedom, security and justice is highly 
dependent on mutual trust among Member States and their judiciaries in 
the proper application of EU law.127 The national judges standing at the fore-
front in terms of applying EU law are capable of assuring its correct appli-
cation, provided they have a good understanding of its concepts and under-
lying policies, as well as any interaction with other legal sources. They also 
have to be able to identify and find relevant resources, in particular, legal in-
struments and CJEU and national courts’ case law, which may guide them 
in applying European private international law. The European Commission 
is, however, confident that its strategies have been effective and that mutual 
trust has in fact increased partially due to intensive training with cross-bor-
der implications, consequent knowledge increase, networking, and the shar-
ing of experience and best practice.128 As much as this might in fact be true, 
there is still room for improvement, as is apparent from the abovementioned 
recent examples of a lack of application or misapplication of the pertinent 
instruments.129
Besides knowledge of European private international law, the emphasis 
in these training events has also been recently placed on building the legal 
vocabulary and knowledge of the English language in general.130 This is done 
“with a view to fostering a common legal and judicial culture”,131 fostering 
the understanding of foreign law, legal reasoning and arguments,132 and be-
evaluations from the attendees were excellent, which may also be attributed to the com-
bined judge-academic approach.
125 See section IV.
126 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 42.
127 CJEU, 18. 12.  2014, Opinion 2/13, note 168, 191.
128 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 38 et seq.
129 See section VI.
130 See Holmsten, ERA Forum 17 (2016), 141 (142).
131 Annex to Regulation (EU) No 1382/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 December 2013 establishing a Justice Programme for the period 2014 to 2020, OJ L 354, 
28. 12.  2013, p. 83.
132 Pretelli, in: Schauer/Verschraegen, General Reports of the XIXth Congress of the Inter-
national Academy of Comparative Law, p. 607 (609).
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cause the efficient use of the English language is seen as a “precondition 
to effective contacts across Member States, which are in turn the corner-
stone for judicial cooperation”.133 Such communication is envisaged by sev-
eral legal instruments.134
The aforementioned notes lead to the following chain of connections that 
the European Commission is convinced connects the functioning of the in-
ternal market on the one hand and its strategy in terms of judicial training 
on the other: the first connection entails that the functioning of the EU inter-
nal market, and especially the creation of the area of freedom, security and 
justice, to a large extent depends on the existence of mutual trust among the 
Member States, including their judges; the second connection links mutual 
trust among the national judges from different Member States to their two-
fold capacity: the judges have to demonstrate that they are able to correctly 
apply EU law, including European private international law, and they have 
to possess the ability to directly communicate to each other in the spirit of 
close judicial cooperation; the third connection reveals that legal and lan-
guage capacities of national judges are critically dependent on their contin-
uous education aimed at strengthening and updating their knowledge and 
competences related to EU law and the English language.
3. Learning theories and teaching methods for European private 
international law
Irrespective of the type of training program, the question of the methodol-
ogy to be used in teaching has many possible answers. Relying on educa-
tional psychology, prevalent modern pedagogy states that teaching methods 
are necessarily grounded in learning theories, because the latter explains the 
ways learners receive, process, and integrate knowledge and information in-
tended to be transferred in the course of learning.135 Among various learning 
theories, constructivism and developmental theory might be of special im-
portance for the designers of judicial training programs. The former learning 
theory emphasizes previous knowledge and understanding as the basis for 
the future ability to learn, while the latter focuses on the way one’s learn-
ing skills and abilities change as one gets older. In order to choose and apply 
the methods effectively, it is important to understand the principles behind 
133 COM (2011) 551 final, p. 5 et seq.
134 See e. g. Art. 29 Brussels I bis Regulation; Recital 2 and 8 Taking of Evidence Regulation.
135 Friedland, Seattle U. L. Rev. 20 (1996), 1 (4).
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those methods136 as well as to have a clear idea of the overall goals and the 
intended learning outcomes that judicial training should achieve.
Furthermore, when contemplating a teaching methodology to be applied 
in judicial training, it is necessary to take account of the typical properties 
a judge has owing to his or her profession: They are adult persons, with a 
strong sense of professional independence, certain life and professional ex-
perience, a developed ability to make up their own mind, and a professional 
predisposition to take the role of authority in a given situation. For these rea-
sons it seems particularly apposite to pay heed to adult learning theory, the 
foundations of which are as follows: Adults need to know the reasons why 
they learn something; they will be motivated to learn if there is an instant 
opportunity to use what is learnt;137 they take the perspective of a real-life 
situation, so learning should be functionally organized to respond to the sit-
uation, not by the subject matter; they enter the learning process rich in ex-
perience which they need to analyze in the process; they are self- directed and 
accept collaborative two-way learning models much better than a trainer-to-
trainee one; and they are motivated by internal rather than external incen-
tives.138 Due to these reasons, adult learners, such as judges, are not likely to 
benefit from conventional learning methods, such as an old-style textbook 
lecture. What learning methods should be used instead? Theories of learning, 
coupled with the basic principles of andragogy, ought to inform methodolog-
ical choices as to judicial training of national judges in the EU. Some of the 
preferred learning methods include case studies, experimental methods, and 
discussions.
It is beyond doubt that the European Commission, which sets the stage 
for efficient training of national judges,139 is interested in developing a deep 
understanding of EU law in order to assure its correct and uniform applica-
tion throughout the EU.140 However, when compared to the past and exist-
ing national codifications, the EU rules in the area of family and succession 
law with cross-border implications are much more extensive and complex. 
The complexity arises due to the variety of legal instruments in the field and 
136 Art. 10 Declaration of Judicial Training Principles, International Organisation for Judicial 
Training, 08. 11.  2017, https://www.unodc.org/res/ji/import/international_standards/dec 
laration_of_judicial_training_principles/declaration_of_judicial_training_principles.pdf 
(last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
137 This is confirmed by the above presented data on no inclination of judges to proactively 
take on lifelong learning. See section IV.
138 For more details, see Knowles/Holton III/Swanson, The Adult Learner.
139 See section VII.2.
140 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 38 et seq.
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absence of their synchronization.141 As such, their understanding requires a 
certain level of awareness of the differences in the Member States’ national 
laws, profound appreciation of the general structure and logic inherent in 
private international law, and a firm grasp of hierarchy and overall relations 
between international, European and national layers of legal instruments. In 
addition, when applying EU law, national judges need to be well versed in 
the discipline of fundamental rights, as it may be necessary to apply them 
directly to the case at hand.142 Fundamental rights have to be constantly on 
the judges’ mind, because they make up part of the European constitutional 
identity.143 Only then may national judges be expected to swim well in the 
vast, deep, and wavy waters of European private international law. An ef-
fective way to achieve this is through case studies combined with compara-
tive legal methodology, because “[o]nly through comparison do we become 
aware of certain features of whatever we are studying.”144 On the basis of a 
hypothetical or actual case, judges may be asked to compare the outcomes 
under their national law and EU law. If this process is structured as group 
learning in a transitional training program which is considered advanta-
geous in the EU context,145 the comparison could be made among several 
national laws and EU law. By doing so, judges can learn about different na-
tional laws of the Member States, notice both sharp contrasts as well as fine 
nuances between the compared laws, discern points of convergence, and, 
most importantly, get an insight into the rationale underlying different rules. 
This will help them realize which elements of their previously acquired legal 
knowledge and competences related to national law may be directly useful, 
and which elements should be set aside in terms of applying EU law.
With the understanding of law there comes the development of hands-
on skills and competences employable in practice. This entails the ability of 
judges to grasp and recognize deeper patterns, even when they are concealed 
under different layers and surfaces. Such a transfer of learning explains how 
previous experience may help in resolving new problems, provided there is 
a deep understanding of the underlying pattern. The best way to gain these 
141 Hellner, in: von Hein/Kieninger/Rühl, How European is European Private International 
Law?, p. 205 (208); Župan, in: Honorati, Jurisdiction in Matrimonial Matters, Parental Re-
sponsibility and International Abduction, p. 1 (5 et seq.).
142 Frąckowiak-Adamska, in: von Hein/Kieninger/Rühl, How European is European Private 
International Law?, p. 185 (195 et seq.).
143 This has been confirmed in the rebuttable presumption created by the ECtHR in Bosphorus: 
It is presumed that the application of EU law implies protection of fundamental rights, see 
ECtHR, 30. 06.  2005, no. 45036/98 (Bosphorus Airways/Ireland).
144 Sacco, AJCL 39 (1991), 1 (5).
145 Implementation of the Pilot Project, p. 116.
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abilities is by actually doing something, rather than simply listening to it or 
watching others do it. Learning by doing thus helps to close the undesirable 
gaps between the law in the books and the law in action.146 Methods that 
may support this aim are the case study method and experimental method. 
The case study method seems to be particularly apt to study EU law, given 
the authority of the interpretations by the CJEU. Its rulings are often phrased 
in terms of the actual facts of the case, where the applicability of the earlier 
decision may be confirmed or denied based on the presence or absence of 
distinguishing facts. Thus, stimulating and resourceful case studies may con-
sist of the basic description and as many variations thereof as needed to dem-
onstrate the elements which bring about different outcomes. Additionally, 
through simulation exercises, such as a small-scale moot court and a mock 
trial or interview, judges also learn by solving the problem, improving at 
the same time the argumentation skills of the opposing sides in the dispute, 
and improving their oral or written expression in their mother tongue or 
in another language. Experimental methodologies need not necessarily be 
simulation-based, but may also occasionally involve real-life cases and situ-
ations which judges may observe and train for. Because the physical presence 
of judges who are trainees in a given training event is not usually possible 
in such situations and cases due to various reasons, such as a hearing from 
which the public is excluded, or simply because the hearing is taking place 
during working hours when judges are dealing with their own cases, audio-
video recording technology can be used to enable subsequent and repeated 
viewing, for instance by recording an actual interview or a court hearing. 
Problem-based learning is very beneficial in terms of, inter alia, retention of 
learned material, interest in the subject matter and building self-confidence.
Another important goal intended to be achieved by EU law training is 
critical thinking,147 which comes on top of the abilities aimed at gaining 
a deep understanding and solving practical problems. In developing such 
thinking, judges have to feel confident in their knowledge and understand-
ing of the subject matter as well as the underlying policies. On this premise, 
they will be able to act as socially conscious persons and engage in discus-
sions by asking the right questions, commenting, agreeing with or criticizing 
not only the positions of others, but also certain legislation and court rul-
ing or reasoning. To increase the level of trainees’ engagement and position 
them as stakeholders in the learning process, trainers can use a Socratic dia-
logue and class or small group discussions. Discussions may be organized 
146 Perelman, RIEJ 72 (2014), 133 (136).
147 See Grimes, in: Strevens/Grimes/Phillips, Legal education, p. 1 (3).
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as an independent method or may be combined with some of the above, but 
judges who are trainees need to be kept in a safe environment where they 
can open up and speak freely without fear of being called out for the opinion 
they express.148 Discussions often develop in the course of a case study. In 
such situations, judges may talk about their previous experience in handling 
similar cases, which opens up the opportunity for a trainer to integrate ef-
fectively these real-life cases into the discussion and provide feedback to the 
judges.
The methods of training should also accommodate the need of judges to 
obtain competences other than in law. For the national judges in EU Member 
States, this is primarily a command of the English language, which serves 
multiple purposes, including direct communication with judges in other 
Member States and keeping up-to-date with legal developments in legisla-
tion, case law and the literature.149 Furthermore, judges need to be fully ap-
preciative of the contemporary social environment, thus training should also 
involve non-legal knowledge, skills, the social and economic context, and 
values and ethics in today’s society.150
Regardless of the method used, the learning process of an adult trainee 
will benefit him or her by being an active participant rather than a passive 
recipient.151 Nevertheless, it is not always easy or possible to achieve ac-
tive participation, because the educational culture in different Member States 
may range from open, student-centered and intensely engaging, to conser-
vative one-way, teacher-to-student learning. The educational pattern learnt 
as a law student is transmitted to later stages of life and may hinder judges 
from taking a more active role in judicial training and the judicial profession 
in general. Furthermore, psychological pressure caused by the fear of mak-
ing a mistake may work towards the same end and is likely to increase with 
age. Hence, geographically and generationally based asymmetries are real-
ities and might require adjustments to the methodologies depending on the 
profile of trainees. As much as this is true regarding the teaching methods, it 
is also true with respect to the use of technology.
148 See Art. 10 Declaration of Judicial Training Principles.
149 The scarcity of legal literature on EU private international law in official languages of some 
Member States has been noted by Hellner, in: von Hein/Kieninger/Rühl, How European is 
European Private International Law?, p. 205 (206).
150 Art. 8 Declaration of Judicial Training Principles; Implementation of the Pilot Project, 
p. 112 et seq.
151 Implementation of the Pilot Project, p. 5.
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4. Use of new technologies
Considerable challenges in designing judicial training may be overcome by 
an informed and tailored use of available methodologies and training for-
mats, while electronic tools and new technologies may provide additional 
support in attaining efficiency and/or accessibility of training. Stakeholders 
have declared that judicial training should make optimal use of new technol-
ogies, distance/online learning (complementary when appropriate), and elec-
tronic media.152 What are these technologies and how to assess what consti-
tutes their optimal use?
The technologies used for this purpose are primarily information and 
communication technologies (ICT), which are characterized by integration 
of telecommunications, computing, and audio-visual systems that enable in-
formation processing, such as access, storage or transmission. The use of 
state-of-the-art ICT is not always possible, but over time it has become more 
available, affordable and known to a wider audience. Ever since the internet 
and ICT in general entered our private and professional spheres in the 1990s, 
and the Web 2.0 made its appearance in 2004, technological options have 
been expanding. There now exist various distance training formats, such as 
online training or e-learning (extranet or open), in the form of video confer-
encing, “live case” online teaching, online podcasting, online texts, exercises 
and materials, discussion forums, social networks, etc., and any combina-
tions thereof.153
ICT-supported training is attractive from the perspective of all parties 
involved, i. e. funding institutions, organizing entities, trainers and trainees, 
since it is time-saving and cost-effective, flexible, and allows for expanded 
participation. Those are the reasons for its intensified use in a certain number 
of Member States,154 while others are catching up at a slower pace, often 
owing to the lack of skills on the part of either trainees or trainers or both. 
The use of technology does not necessarily involve communication at a dis-
152 Art. 10 Declaration of Judicial Training Principles; Implementation of the Pilot Project, 
114. At the same time, the EU legal instruments provide for the use of ICT in particular 
circumstances, such as in direct communication between judges (see VII.3.), service of doc-
uments or taking of evidence. See Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of 
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, OJ L 324, 10. 12.  2007, p. 79 –  120; 
Taking of Evidence Regulation.
153 Implementation of the Pilot Project, p. 67 –  68.
154 See the experience from Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Romania, and the 
respective different tools. Implementation of the Pilot Project, p. 67 –  74.
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tance, but also includes various ways in which information technology is 
employed in the context of face-to-face learning, particularly in designing 
the learning modules. A case in point is filming the performance of judges 
to provide feedback.155 Showing textual and photographic material, play-
ing audio and/or video material or engaging judges in interactive e-learning 
modules may also be useful tools in judicial training.
The second question relates to the test of “optimal use”. It is argued here 
that the use of ICT and its potential and advantages should be considered 
in each training design when it comes to the achievement of set learning 
outcomes. If the learning outcomes may be achieved better, equally well or 
with only minor concessions by means of technology rather than by ana-
logue means, the test is passed and technology may replace its alternative. If 
technology would compromise the attainment of the learning outcomes, for 
whatever reason, it should be avoided as non-optimal. In applying the “opti-
mal use” test, factors that need to enter into the equation include in particu-
lar the learning outcomes deriving from the previous needs assessment, the 
potential of the chosen ICT tool to sufficiently contribute to the attainment 
of the learning outcomes, and a target group profile, especially in regard to 
their ability and willingness to use ICT tools.
In this assessment of likelihood to complete the learning outcomes, learn-
ing theories may be helpful, e. g. online learning seems to fit squarely the 
andragogy perspective because it supports individualized and self-directed 
learning, as trainees normally receive less supervision in an online environ-
ment. It is expected that over time, more and more situations will provide an 
optimal use of technology. Other circumstances may also play an important 
role in determining optimal use of ICT in a given situation, such as exces-
sive funds which could be saved and the practical impossibility for the target 
group to physically attend an event. The latter became particularly evident 
in the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, when, due to movement restric-
tions, it became impossible to travel and physically attend the scheduled 
training sessions. This resulted in the massive postponement or cancellation 
of the planned face-to-face training events. However, an uncertain duration 
of these restrictive measures may facilitate conversion of the planned face-
to-face sessions into highly ICT-supported events, and rightly so under the 
optimal test.
To optimize the use of technology in particular circumstances, either for 
the purpose of compensating for the disadvantages of its use or availing one-
self of the advantages of its use, the option of hybrid training may be an 
155 Implementation of the Pilot Project, p. 113.
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opportune choice. Such hybrid training models include distance learning and 
face-to-face learning in whatever combination. Although for the time being, 
face-to-face training remains the principal method of judicial training due to 
its general benefits or those related to particular situations (special or confi-
dential expertise related to the right of the child to present its opinion, train-
ing-the-trainers events, networking effects, conversational language com-
petences),156 distant learning will, in view of its potential to save time and 
financial resources, increasingly become the sole or hybrid choice of various 
training institutions and will gradually be more welcomed by judges who 
are trainees.
Modalities of training in European private international law, and more 
specifically in European family and succession law, are further elaborated 
below to establish a clear link between practical needs and desirable prac-
tices pro futuro.
VIII. Training in European family and succession law – 
selected figures
1. Organization and types of training
Data collected by the questionnaire addressing the training networks and 
schools indicate that multiple actors cooperate in the organization of judi-
cial training, confirming that networking is en vogue in European govern-
ance.157 In the period from 2014 to 2020, approximately half of the training 
events have been organized by only one institution, while the other half have 
been organized in cooperation with multiple judicial centers, national acad-
emies, ministries or law schools.158 Training types range from conferences 
and lectures to interactive workshops and seminars involving the solving 
of practical case studies. The EJTN strives to achieve training at all stages 
of professional activity, distinguishing between initial training (before or 
upon appointment) and continuous training in a subspecialized group.159 The 
ERA has organized most training events by topic, offering additional high-
level conferences on European family law on an annual basis. Within the 
156 Implementation of the Pilot Project, p. 67.
157 Visser/Claes, in: Vauchez/De Witte, Lawyering Europe, p. 75.
158 ERA organized 40 % of events by itself and 60 % in cooperation with other institutions; at 
EIPA, this ratio is 50:50 (Responses to the online judicial training survey questionnaire).
159 EJTN, Annual Report 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 http://www.ejtn.eu/Documents/About 
%20EJTN/EJTN%20Documentation/EJTN-Annual-Report2018_Web.pdf.
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framework of this project, events are also offered at different levels (basic and 
advanced), thus targeting legal practitioners with different levels of knowl-
edge/experience in the area of law at hand. Different levels of courses are 
fully justified and necessary, as cognitive psychology establishes that in edu-
cation, prior level of knowledge would be determinative for the proper un-
derstanding of the given course.160
Although most training events were previously organized in the facilities 
of institutions, distance learning has also become a more established mode of 
judicial training. The most frequently employed online training methods are 
online courses taught in real time, lectures or seminars recorded in advance, 
interactive exercises on a platform, materials distributed on a platform, and 
others.161
A majority of 65 % of online judicial training survey respondents find 
modern technology advantageous for training (interactive books, recorded 
lectures, learning tools requiring active participation and action, webinars, 
etc.). Although respondents advocate modern technologies and training in-
stitutions indicate they offer such programs, the majority of online judicial 
training survey respondents never took part in webinars. In comparison to 
US models, European training institutions do not fully practice synchronous 
(real-time) or asynchronous (on-demand) webinars or webcasts as a matter 
of routine. Modern technologies imply peer-based learning with “electronic 
white boards, virtual chat rooms, blended learning applications that inte-
grate distance with in-person learning.”162
The rise of distance training facilities may be attributed to the recent 
COVID-19 crisis. An inspection of offers available online indicates that, un-
fortunately, topics in the field of European family and succession law are cur-
rently scarcely represented.163
160 Shuell, Review of Educational Research 56 (1986), 411 –  436.
161 Regularly employed by EJTN and EIPA, as of 2020 by ERA, also used by Croatian, German 
and Swedish national judicial academies (Responses to the online judicial training survey 
questionnaire).
162 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. LIII.
163 http://www.ejtn.eu/Methodologies--Resources/; https://era-comm.eu/moodle/ (both last 
consulted 22. 10.  2020).
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2. Methodology, curricula and teaching materials
Regardless of the type of training, participants most frequently approve of 
interactive learning methods and exchanges between practitioners.164 Team-
work is supported by online judicial training survey participants and almost 
80 % actively participate in such a training. Other participants in teamwork 
exercises remain passive, either due to a language barrier or because they 
prefer individual over interactive work.
Training curricula are developed on the basis of individual assessment 
of each institution offering training. For example, at the ERA, lawyers or 
project teams are responsible for this, whereas at the EIPA, faculty members 
(in the case of internal projects), and scientific committees (in the case of col-
laborative training) are responsible. In joint projects funded by EU grants, 
curricula are obviously determined by the nature of the grant in question. 
Grants are most frequently awarded by DG Justice. In national judicial acad-
emies, curricula may be determined either exclusively by the judicial train-
ing academy, as is the case in Croatia and Sweden, or by the State and the 
federal government(s), as in Sweden. However, designing curricula is surely 
affected by the EU funding policy and topics targeted by such calls.
The vast majority of training events organized by institutions inspected 
here were purely law-oriented. Judicial training theory, however, emphasizes 
that besides building competence in law, training should improve the overall 
level of general knowledge and skills. The online judicial training survey re-
spondents endorse this attitude, as 85 % of them advocate specialized holistic 
education, in which training in law will be carried out in combination with 
other relevant social sciences and humanities. Psychology, ethics, sociology 
and social work are indicated by the respondents as fields to be included in 
legal training. Approximately 40 % of the respondents find content-oriented 
164 The European Commission launched a public consultation and a targeted consultation 
from 02. 02.  2018 to 26. 04.  2018 to re-examine the findings of the 2011 Study and set a 
future strategy. Responses to the European Commission’s 2018 judicial training evaluation 
had to address the needs of justice professionals in EU law. These findings correspond to 
a large extent to the judicial training survey, where participants expressed the wish to 
take part in the design of future training topics. They want to be able to actively affect 
the chosen training topic indicating their wish to ensure that training meets their needs. 
This corresponds to the 2018 responses, where a large majority amounting to more than 
70 % of respondents considered that the objectives of the future European judicial training 
strategy should differentiate between judicial professions. Responses to the 2018 strategy 
indicated that the needs and capacities of different Member States should be differentiated. 
Other respondents suggested broadening the geographic scope e. g. by including relevant 
third countries.
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training in law accompanied with training on ICT useful (e. g. e-tools for 
cross-border civil cooperation). The survey indicates that training partici-
pants have a preference for the approach which enables them to influence 
the future training curricula. Hence, they should be given a more active role 
in the process of designing future training curricula.
There are basically two models for the development of training materials. 
They are in most cases developed in training centers by the trainer of each 
course. More than 80 % of the online judicial training survey participants indi-
cate a preference for that model. The other model is to have renowned (legal) 
experts develop standardized training materials (case studies, language man-
uals), which will be used later by other trainers as well. Such a model is par-
ticularly common within the framework of projects.165 The Croatian Judicial 
Academy tends to use this model by default.166 Materials are in general dis-
tributed to participants electronically, in paperback, or as a combination of 
the two. Importantly, 80 % of the online judicial training survey participants 
opted for an electronic copy.
Depending on the type of funding, materials are only distributed to the 
participants, in some instances also to the general public. At ERA, if train-
ing is conducted within the framework of a project, materials are uploaded 
to websites and made publicly available and downloadable for free. In some 
national training centers, materials are also downloadable without access re-
strictions.167 Some national training academies make them available when 
requested by email. However, as many as 80 % of the survey participants ex-
perienced materials reaching only participants in training events rather than 
other practitioners.
3. Trainers and participants
Trainers are, as a rule, academics, judges or practitioners. All three cate-
gories are rated very highly (“very good”) by the training participants.168 The 
online judicial training survey reveals that a judge is the preferred trainer in 
Sweden.
165 Responses to the judicial training questionnaire by ERA.
166 Responses to the judicial training questionnaire by the Croatian Judicial Academy.
167 Responses to the judicial training questionnaire by the Croatian Judicial Academy; the ma-
terials are available at https://www.pak.hr/clanak/obrazovni-materijali-41554.html (last 
consulted 22. 10.  2020).
168 Responses to the judicial training questionnaire by ERA, EIPA, and national judicial train-
ing schools.
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Participants in judicial training activities receive information on the 
available training mainly from their superiors and to a lesser extent by fol-
lowing social networks or communicating with their colleagues.169 Major 
training institutions use ICT to foster training promotion, i. e. websites, so-
cial media profiles (LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter) or direct emails.170 None of 
the major training centers employs a virtual assistant or testimonials to at-
tract trainees.
The willingness of participants to take part in the training depends on 
various factors. Training is perceived as the most efficient way of knowledge 
transfer by the majority of the online judicial training survey participants. 
Some of the participants would rather read the relevant literature or would 
prefer to enroll in a specialist/master study program. The Evaluation of the 
2011 European Judicial Training Strategy indicates that participation of jus-
tice professionals in training activities depends on the quality and relevance 
of the training offered. Particularly valued are practice-oriented training and 
the connection with the reality of the participants’ professional focus. This 
entails not only training on EU law developments, but also on “the reality of 
the participants: interplay of legal orders”.171 Accessibility in terms of time 
and budget should be ensured, especially with respect to an uncomplicated 
and transparent mechanism for cost reimbursement. It is important to ensure 
that there is an EU added value, for example by ensuring that trainers and 
participants come from different Member States.172
Approximately 50 % of the survey participants stated that there is a reg-
ulated obligation to take part in training, whereas for almost 30 % of them it 
was relevant for their careers and potential promotions.
In respect of participation in national or international training, figures 
reveal different habits and needs of survey respondents. Most online judi-
cial training survey participants (21 respondents) had attended ten national 
training events in the last five years. Turning to international training, most 
survey participants (25 respondents) had attended two international training 
events in the last five years.
Survey participants indicated that the benefits of training conducted in 
an international environment are excellent lecturers, learning from other 
Member States’ practices and experiences, and networking with peers from 
other Member States. However, a high number of participants point out as 
169 Online judicial training survey.
170 Responses to the judicial training questionnaire by ERA, EIPA, and national judicial train-
ing schools.
171 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy, p. 7.
172 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy, p. 8.
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disadvantages of international training events that their content is too gen-
eral, because either they are not tailor-made for their jurisdiction, or they 
are difficult to follow because participants’ language proficiency is too poor, 
and that they are overly intensive. These findings correspond to responses 
received by training networks and national academies. In addition, ERA par-
ticipants endorse the opportunity to meet colleagues from all over Europe, 
the exchange of experiences and knowledge, the high level of organization, 
trainer/speaker profiles, interactivity of events, and case studies. Shortcom-
ings of training addressed by participants in training centers relate to limited 
time of training events (ERA/EIPA), and the venue which is difficult to reach 
(ERA, which apparently relates to Trier, Germany; being aware of that, the 
ERA tries to respond by offering project-funded training in other Member 
States in co-organization usually with national judicial academies).
Participation in training is to a certain extent dependent on the costs. 
Participants in national training events have no costs or organizational bur-
den as they are entirely organized and funded by the national training in-
stitution. In the case of ERA, costs depend on the type of training. If an event 
is offered solely by ERA, the costs are usually borne by the participants. If 
an event is held within the framework of a fully or co-financed project, the 
costs are usually covered by various actors (European Commission, ERA or 
partners).
The EJTN generally carries out two types of training activities, i. e. EJTN-
funded activities, where participating costs are borne by the Network, and 
the Catalogue of Members’ Activities with varying funding arrangements.173 
The EJTN events are free of charge for the judges, but very often they have 
to organize their travel and accommodation and cover all these costs them-
selves which are later reimbursed. Participants in ERA- or EJTN-funded train-
ing are usually recruited through national judicial schools. In Germany and 
Sweden, there is no particular participation schedule for individual judges, 
as any judge can apply and participate irrespective of their previous training. 
The Croatian Judicial Academy keeps records of the participation of Croatian 
judges in international training activities, including the activities offered by 
ERA and the EJTN. When they apply for international training, the Academy 
checks the relevance of the training for the participants’ work and prior par-
ticipations. For instance, if a criminal law judge applies for a civil law semi-
nar, he/she is not selected. Applicants with no or with a smaller number of 
international participations are given priority in the selection process. When 
173 EJTN annual reports.
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asked about their willingness to share training costs, more than 60 % of the 
online judicial training survey respondents declined a cost-sharing system.
The selection of trainee candidates has also been addressed by the online 
judicial training survey. Approximately half of the survey participants indi-
cate that no selection criteria were employed for participation in national 
training. Nonetheless, previous training on the same topic might put them 
low on the priority list. In addition, only candidates assigned to adjudicate on 
the training subject matter may be accepted. However, almost 35 % of the re-
spondents have experienced acceptance to the same training multiple times, 
though they might not have been a priority. In respect of the possible selec-
tion of participants on the basis of prior knowledge, half of the online judicial 
training survey participants said that prior knowledge was not mentioned as 
an application condition. Only 31 % experienced that attendance at introduc-
tory level is a condition for advanced level training.
Focusing only on training of judges at the EJTN, 63 % of the online judi-
cial training survey participants experienced that some selection criteria 
were employed, relating to either professional occupation or previous par-
ticipation in training on the same topic.
4. Language
The working language at training centers is primarily English, but French 
and German are also used. Simultaneous translation of training sessions is 
rarely provided. However, if the training partner is a national institution, 
they often use their national language for such an event. Researchers have 
already indicated that despite the fact that most judges speak foreign lan-
guages, only a small proportion would be keen to take part in a training in a 
foreign language.174 This corresponds to our research findings, where a ma-
jority of 63 % of the online judicial training survey participants prefer training 
to be conducted in their national language. Only 18 % would prefer training 
to be conducted in a foreign language while 19 % prefer both. Despite these 
personal preferences, training in a foreign language should be promoted 
for many professional reasons. Language skills facilitate direct contact with 
judicial authorities, create possibilities to learn about legal traditions and 
practice of other Member States, and enable participation in exchange pro-
grams abroad.
174 Coughlan et al., Judicial training in the European Union Member States, p. 6.
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5. Miscellaneous
The data collected reveal great overall satisfaction of the participants with 
training on European family and succession law.175 There is generally pos-
itive feedback of participants in ERA events, where the highest grades are 
given to the content and selected training methodology, knowledge, and 
speaker profiles. Over 95 % of the participants would recommend ERA events 
to their colleagues.
A large part of the 2018 EU survey on judicial training indicates that 
the appreciation for the training activity depends on the quality of speakers 
(79.3 %), interaction with speakers (69 %), interaction among participants 
(66.7 %), the material distributed (58.6 %), and the size of the group (50.6 %). 
Training quality may additionally depend on the participation of peers from 
other Member States, the language, and the duration of the training.176
The motivation of participants to take part in training has already been 
addressed. General willingness to take part in training indicates that pro-
fessionals are aware of the need to enhance their competences. Adults have 
goal-oriented reasons for learning, such as improving their track record, pro-
motion, career change, or a change in employment. The “learning styles in-
ventory” theory by Kolb emphasizes that learning is a lifestyle, a continuous 
process of developing experience rather than its outcome.177
As to the knowledge assessment of the training participants, training pro-
viders adopt different approaches.178 The figures of the online judicial train-
ing survey indicate that professionals are not actually keen on knowledge 
assessment. As indicated by the survey, only a third of trainees prefer knowl-
edge assessment at both the beginning as well as the end of the training. It 
is slightly worrying that less than a third of the participants sees the benefit 
of knowledge assessment at training events, while a fifth would completely 
abolish any knowledge assessment. This may indicate that the training par-
ticipants are unwilling to reveal their potential lack of specific (or even gen-
eral) knowledge. This probably correlates with the perception of their posi-
tion as professionals (judges, notaries, attorneys, etc.) with a high level of 
competence and with their role and reputation in society. Nevertheless, they 
175 Responses to the online judicial training questionnaire by ERA and EIPA.
176 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy, p. 6 et seq.
177 Kolb, Experiential Learning, p. 28.
178 Participants’ knowledge is not assessed in the majority of ERA training events. For events 
organized by the EJTN, assessment is conducted both at the beginning and at the end 
of the training. EIPA assesses the participants’ knowledge only at the beginning of the 
training.
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need to be made aware of the value of self-assessment for purposeful and 
successful training. Besides, participants need to be aware of the objective 
level of their knowledge, so as to be able to apply for training programs at 
the corresponding level. Bearing in mind the cognitive theory that learning 
is cumulative and relies on prior knowledge, as well as the number of con-
siderations warranting self-assessment,179 the assessment should be done be-
fore each training. Training providers should attach equal importance to this 
aspect.
The competence of a judge is a highly debated notion. A humanistic con-
cept of competence is globally accepted, as it promotes high-level values of 
judicial excellence that contribute to public trust and improve the quality 
of justice.180 The accountability imperative is reflected in European family 
and succession law by the fact that a judge is concerned with the effective 
administration of justice. Socialization improves the judge’s understanding 
of community needs, which is particularly relevant in sensitive family cases 
involving children.
IX. The way forward in judicial training in European family 
and succession law
1. EU judicial training policy 2020 – 2027 – Thoughts and remarks 
on future action
Going back to the initial stage of training policy development, which identi-
fied language skills, familiarity with EU law, and familiarity with the law in 
other Member States as areas in need of improvement in the judicial profes-
sion, makes it obvious that in their universality, these are areas still equally 
relevant today. The Roadmap to the European Judicial Training Strategy 
2019 –  2025181, that builds on the results of the Evaluation of the 2011 –  2020 
European judicial training strategy, draws attention to the lack of knowledge 
of EU law and of EU judicial cooperation instruments, such as the European 
Arrest Warrant. It also stresses the need for improvement of mutual trust in 
cross-border proceedings. Legal foreign language proficiency, which is key 
179 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. 28, 128.
180 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. 7 –  10.
181 The Roadmap to the European Judicial Training Strategy 2019 –  2025, https://ec.europa.
eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/1176-European-Judicial-Training-
Strategy-2019-2025 (last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
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to participation in cross-border activities, and smooth cross-border judicial 
proceedings and cooperation are also emphasized.182
With this in mind, one has to wonder about the true impact and reach 
of the implemented 2011 –  2020 European judicial training strategy. Which 
results stand out? According to the Evaluation of the 2011 –  2020 European 
judicial training strategy, the strategy achieved its objectives efficiently and 
at reasonable cost. It complemented national policies in a relevant and co-
herent manner in full respect of the subsidiarity principle and added lasting 
value that Member States would not otherwise have been able to achieve.183 
This should be understood as a clear statement that the European judicial 
training policy is only a supplement to the national judicial training policies 
and it does not serve as its replacement. However, the EU is a crucial pro-
vider of support to training justice professionals on EU law. How realistic 
and accurate is this interpretation?
The discussion about the division of competences between the EU and 
Member States to provide judicial training is still topical in the legal litera-
ture. The European Commission refers to the Lisbon Treaty184 as the legal 
basis for the EU’s competence to “support the training of the judiciary and of 
judicial staff” in matters related to judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
law. It also invokes the Europe 2020 Strategy185, the Stockholm Programme 
Action Plan186, and the EU citizenship report 2010187. Referring to these doc-
uments, the European Commission announced the creation of a strong and 
legitimate framework for training on the EU acquis, since there is a need for 
a step change in the way European judicial training is organized in the EU 
in terms of both concept and scale.188 However, it seems that the action nec-
essary to achieve these goals would require a far more engaged involvement 
of the European Commission. The announcement of a “strong framework” 
could be interpreted as a clear sign of the European Commission’s growing 
influence, which could be expected to gradually result in uniformity of Euro-
pean judicial training. By what means is this uniformity to be attained? The 
chosen approach seems to be a top-down process, which is typical for the EU 
strategy of applying political pressure in order to achieve harmonious devel-
opment in certain areas.
182 The Roadmap to the European Judicial Training Strategy 2019 –  2025, p. 1.
183 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 72.
184 Art. 81 (2) (h) and 82 (1) (c) TFEU.
185 COM (2010) 2020 final.
186 COM (2010) 171 final.
187 COM (2010) 603 final.
188 The 2011 –  2020 European judicial training strategy, p. 3.
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Since 2011, the EU has systematically planned, monitored, and directed 
the implementation of the European judicial training strategy at the EU level. 
At the same time, it has generously financed training providers of its own 
preference, which it helped to establish in the first place. As has been crit-
icized in the legal literature, the establishment of the EJTN reflects a top-
down attempt by the European Parliament to institutionalize a training 
structure within the EU institutional framework.189 It is also argued that the 
European Commission uses EU judicial networks as tools for soft harmoni-
zation of judicial training in the EU.190 The EU helps the EJTN formulate aims 
and goals for the training provided, which are not necessarily coordinated 
with those of particular Member States. This is obvious, since the views and 
positions on how the training policy on EU law should be developed differs 
between Member States, often reflecting the specific features of their own 
legal systems, traditions of judicial training, and understanding of EU law. 
Not all Member States have requirements for “initial” training. Even where 
training activities are foreseen, there are differences in their organization.191
Who will take the leading role in providing training? Although the rele-
vant framework suggests this should continue to be the Member States, it is 
nevertheless uncertain to what extent Member States can remain independ-
ent. First, with the European Commission’s funding and the main training 
providers operating on a large scale, is there still an incentive for Member 
States to organize and provide (any) additional training on EU law? The cost 
of training is significant. As experienced, due to a lack of national budget al-
locations for training activities, Member States were unable to provide cer-
tain training activities (especially transnational ones) without EU funding.192 
Moreover, in the past, additional national seminars on EU topics were organ-
ized mainly with the aid of EU financial assistance.193
189 Benvenuti, International Journal for Court Administration 7 (2015), 59 (61).
190 van Harten, Review of European Administrative Law 5 (2012), 131 (149).
191 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 11.
192 Practical limitations refer to a large-scale and centralized approach. They are not just of 
a financial nature (training is indeed very expensive and only a minority of magistrates 
would be able to participate in truly European training activities). Other problems concern 
time and workload, as well as language (many magistrates do not speak any foreign lan-
guage in the context of judicial work) and cultural constraints of the authorizing bodies. 
The 2014 –  2020 Justice Programme partially addresses these problems, see Benvenuti, Inter-
national Journal for Court Administration 7 (2015), 59 (65).
193 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 26; Minutes of the Expert Group held on 18 December 2017, p. 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc 
&docid=10448.
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Supportive of the EU organized training is the equivalent level of train-
ing provided to judges and legal professionals. Under the present conditions, 
equal development of training in all Member States cannot be guaranteed, 
not only in terms of older and newer, bigger and smaller, more and less de-
veloped Member States, but also in terms of different national legal cultures 
and pre-existing training traditions.
In 2011, participation in EU law training activities by judges and prose-
cutors depended on the age of practitioners: younger practitioners attended 
more training activities on EU law than senior ones. The level of participa-
tion differed among Member States and newer Member States offered more 
training on EU law. However, training in other fields of law was generally 
more common than training on EU law.194 These results need to be contex-
tualized. Namely, institutionalized initial and continuous judicial training is 
traditionally offered in some Member States (France, Spain, and Germany). 
The tradition of new Central and Eastern European Member States regard-
ing judicial independence and judicial education and training was different, 
but some authors suggest that a shift has become evident in the past years.195 
There is also the issue of systematic differences stemming from the organiza-
tion of the judiciary and the relevance given to acquiring legal knowledge for 
legal practitioners in Member States. A potential for inequality in the level of 
participation also lies in the different types of motivation of judges for par-
ticipating in the training, i. e. merely advancing their careers or actually im-
proving their legal knowledge and skills.
Against this background, not all Member States approached the imple-
mentation of the EU judicial training strategy in the same way. In Belgium, 
France, and Germany, concrete action was taken to ensure that the national 
strategy was aligned with the European strategy (either top-down as an ini-
tiative from the government or a bottom-up initiative by stakeholders active 
in the field). The Netherlands and Sweden have carried out activities which 
have contributed to the implementation, but these were not necessarily ar-
ranged for that particular purpose. The UK and Ireland considered the exist-
ing level of training on EU law offered under national training to be sufficient 
and have not undertaken any additional action.196
Upon close examination, this overview reveals that, whether justified 
or not,197 the European Commission’s action is changing judicial training 
194 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 11 et seq.
195 Knežević Bojović/Purić, Strani pravni život 62/4 (2018), 73 (76).
196 SWD (2019) 380 final, p. 29 et seq.
197 With respect to all the noble efforts of the Commission in this field, the question arises as 
to whether a new specific competence in Art. 81 (2) (h) and 82 (1) (c) TFEU in support of 
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and legal education in Member States by using it as leverage to make legal 
cultures converge toward a common standard.198 By offering a standardized 
model of legal training, the European Commission is suggesting what the 
required knowledge and skills of a preferred model of a legal practitioner 
should be.199
As to the substance of training, according to the roadmap document, 
European judicial training should promote the rule of law and the independ-
ence of the judiciary and ensure more respect for the basic principles that the 
EU is founded on.200 Being intertwined with both international and national 
law, EU law is not simply supranational law. In relation to the national law 
of Members States, its nature should be seen as more integrative. The appli-
cation of EU law does not consist in the mere interpretation of Europeanized 
national legal sources and EU documents which apply directly, but also in 
the interpretation of national law to the extent necessary for the effective-
ness of EU law. It also requires compliance with the doctrines of primacy 
and direct effect of EU law, harmonious interpretation and effectiveness as 
well as ensuring access to justice according to the procedural standards of 
EU law.201
Some authors argue that a fully-fledged approach, a new dimension to 
European judicial training, suggests that the European Commission will 
exert (further) influence on the Europeanization of national judiciaries and 
their organization step by step.202 Slow infiltration of specific (EJTN’s) com-
mon principles into training practices in Member States203 could be seen as a 
step in that direction.
the training of the judiciary and judicial staff in civil and criminal matters provides a 
proper legal basis for such an objective. It is at least questionable. It seems that this newly 
gained EU competence is very broadly used. See van Harten, Review of European Admin-
istrative Law 5 (2012), 113 (143).
198 Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe, p. 176.
199 Knežević Bojović/Purić, Strani pravni život 62/4 (2018), 73 (74).
200 The Roadmap to the European Judicial Training Strategy 2019 –  2025.
201 Mišćenić, in: Meškić, Balkan Yearbook of European and International Law, p. 129 (131 et 
seq.); Knežević Bojović/Purić, Strani pravni život 62/4 (2018), 73 (77).
202 van Harten, Review of European Administrative Law 5 (2012), 131 (148).
203 On 28. 06.  2016, the General Assembly of the European Judicial Training Network adopted 
nine principles of judicial training. The principles establish key statements relating to the 
nature of judicial training, the importance of initial training, the right to regular continu-
ous training and the integral nature of training in daily work. The principles also address 
the scope of competences of national training institutions regarding the content and deliv-
ery of training, clarify who should deliver training and stress the need for modern training 
techniques. Moreover, the principles underscore the need for funding of judicial train-
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As the Evaluation of the EU judicial training strategy shows, the number 
of Member States and types of legal professions participating in the train-
ing is changing in structure and volume over time. Whether this entails a 
coherent level of knowledge among legal practitioners about EU law is not 
clear. The Evaluation of the 2011 –  2020 European judicial training strategy 
considers only quantitative results on judicial training when evaluating its 
success. This is connected to the main goals set in the 2011 –  2020 European 
judicial strategy, which are also quantitative in nature (including to train half 
of all legal practitioners on EU law between 2011 and 2020; double the total 
funding; annual 5 % target of trained practitioners per profession; the objec-
tive of 1,200 judicial exchanges per year, etc.). Such an approach, typical for 
the bureaucratic accountable structures subject to regular reviews, fails to 
consider the different needs of judicial training in Member States, lacks flex-
ibility to offer training tailored according to specific characteristics of na-
tional legal systems and is unable to respond to the systematic gaps created 
in the course of its own implementation. Consequently, far more important 
than being fit for purpose is the question whether the chosen approach has 
the capacity to bring about substantial change, which will be decisive for the 
future of training policy at the EU level.
2. Recommendations for training in European family 
and succession law
The attempt to conceptualize pro futuro the judicial and legal professionals’ 
training in European family and succession law relies on all abovementioned 
case law and legal instruments researched within the EUFams II Project, dif-
ferent questionnaires, published studies, evaluations and communications, 
and various scholarly contributions primarily in the fields of law and edu-
cation.204 It has yielded the following ten practice-oriented and hands-on 
recommendations (rather than commandments) addressed to the EU and 
Member States alike.
ing and support commitments from authorities. See Knežević Bojović/Purić, Strani pravni 
život 62/4 (2018), 73 (76).
204 This contribution and its conclusions and recommendations cannot address the possibly 
required reforms related to issues other than training, such as the organizational man-
agement of the judiciary and individual courts or the concentration of jurisdiction.
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1. Training needs to continue being guided at the EU level.
The harmonized and uniform application of European family and succes-
sion law is a cornerstone of the free circulation of judgments. It is a continu-
ous challenge to maintain a level of uniformity in the EU. The Lobach/Rapp- 
report identifies in particular a lack of familiarity with the legal framework 
of European family and succession law.205 Insufficient primary legal educa-
tion on the topics and/or inadequate lifelong learning are potentially some of 
the reasons for this situation.
A shift of powers to enact legal rules at the supranational level blurred the 
physical and cultural borders of legal systems, strengthened the rule of law, 
and emphasized the significance of uniform application throughout the EU. 
The promotion and development of specific methodological approaches and 
the overall advancement of judicial training quality are recognized among 
practitioners and academics in EU judicial policy to be of crucial importance 
for efficiency in the application of EU law. Europeanized judicial training 
has equally expanded, as expertise in judicial training has been consolidated 
within the EU in the last two decades.
Since the EU lacks hard power in the field of judicial policies, it has 
adopted soft leverage of influence based on socialization and training. It 
has complemented national training programs with supranational networks, 
aiming at standardized curricula, socialization and skills development. Policy 
instruments are used to improve judicial training, to Europeanize its con-
tent and encourage extensive programs of EU law lifelong learning. Judicial 
training enhances mutual trust, as it builds the capacity of judges to apply 
EU law206 and together with networking overcomes cultural and institutional 
differences. Cooperation among professionals is indeed fostered by training. 
Nonetheless, other additional activities should be envisaged, such as pub-
lications by trainers who are judges. The Judges’ Newsletter on International 
Child Protection of the HCCH207 presents an excellent model of dissemina-
tion of best practice and promotion of mutual trust.
We are currently facing the emergence of various patterns of judicial co-
operation among judicial schools. Figures referring to specific training needs 
of judges from recent Member States have been presented. A shift from 
“mechanical” application of law towards an open-concept, wide interpreta-
tion, and uniform application is advocated in Europeanized training. Train-
ing promotes competence development and a reform of the methodology 
205 Lobach/Rapp-report, p. 38 et seq.
206 Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe, p. 176.
207 https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/publications2/judges-newsletter (last 
consulted 22. 10.  2020).
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of adjudicating cross-border family and succession disputes by “judge-led 
change”.208 All this can only be sufficiently taken into account and assured as 
an outcome if guided at the EU level.
2. Judicial training should be made a priority.
Judicial training in European family and succession law should be made a 
priority, as the number of cross-border cases is increasing and therefore in-
volves most courts. This is further corroborated by the data collected for this 
contribution which indicate that the number of training events in the field 
of European family and succession law has been rising in recent years.209 
Despite the importance of training, judges addressed by the 2018 European 
Commission survey indicated that they did not have time to take part in 
training (65.8 %) or that there were no substitutes for them when they took 
part in training (39.2 %).210 As long as the competence for court management 
is retained by Member States, specific tools have to be employed to target 
judicial training groups and achieve training results. One such specific tool 
may be mandatory training. As every national judge is equally a European 
judge, training has to empower each judge to deal with cross-border family 
and succession cases on an equal footing with his/her peers in other Member 
States.
3. A study of training needs should be conducted in general, for each Member 
State, and for each legal instrument.
Figures presented earlier indicate that professionals are not fully familiar 
with instruments, particularly ones that have only recently become appli-
cable. They are likely neither to proactively prepare themselves for new 
instruments, nor do they receive the necessary support for training in ad-
vance. The EU should perform an overall study on training needs to develop 
a tailored approach to training in the field.211 The study should follow both 
horizontal and vertical approaches to determine the training needs in each 
Member State and with respect to individual legal instruments. The results 
could be used to group the Member States in training categories, provided, 
that would provide necessary efficiency in the training performance. The re-
208 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. 10.
209 See section IV.
210 Evaluation of the 2011 European Judicial Training Strategy, p. 17.
211 It could be based on the model of the Study on judges’ training needs in the field of Euro-
pean competition law by ERA – Academy of European Law/EJTN – European Judicial 
Training Network/Ecorys, 2016, http://www.ejtn.eu/PageFiles/15046/Study_Judges_Train 
ing_Needs_summary_EN.pdf (last consulted 22. 10.  2020).
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sults should also indicate which topics could be dealt with for all Member 
States together, so that networking is also facilitated.
4. A model curriculum should be adopted at the EU level.
In order to attain uniformity throughout the EU, part of the guidance at the 
EU level could be manifested in a model curriculum for EU lifelong education 
in European family and succession law (and possibly for other areas of Euro-
pean private international law as well), which would be designed at the EU 
level. Drafters of the curriculum should be both judges as well as academics. 
While training is perceived much better by the trainees if they themselves 
(or their peers) have been involved in its design, academics may provide nec-
essary emphasis on and understanding of particular (“technical”) concepts. 
Such model curricula would also follow the soft law approach, but could be 
a useful tool in the hands of different training providers. Amendments and 
improvements to the basic structure thereof could be promoted and encour-
aged through additional funding provided to training institutions when or-
ganizing training.
5. The training curriculum should be designed on several levels and ranked 
based on EU criteria.
The level of knowledge among judges and legal practitioners may vary 
among and within Member States, among different legal professions, and 
between generations. For this purpose, the abovementioned model curric-
ula and all other curricula developed by the training providers or other in-
stitutions should consist of several levels. The levels would depend on the 
results of the study on the training needs. For instance, the levels could be 
basic, intermediary, and advanced. Levels would be distinguished and rec-
ognized based on the accompanying list of learning outcomes. In addition, 
levels would be identified by some sort of letter and/or number scheme,212 
which should also be aligned with the ECTS in case the training provider is 
a higher education institution.
6. Training should be based on modern teaching methodology.
Conventional methods of teaching law and teaching without taking into ac-
count that trainees are self-directed adults, are both outdated and not bene-
ficial. Teaching methods for lifelong education in European family and suc-
cession law should be based on the nature of the legal sources and legal 
212 This could be modelled upon the very successful EU language classification scheme which 
ranges from A1 to C2.
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issues concerned, and adult learning theories which explain the ways adult 
trainees receive, process, and integrate knowledge. The framework of Euro-
pean family and succession law is characterized by multi-layered, inter-
twined, complex, and extensive legislation accompanied by equally charac-
terized CJEU and national case law, and sometimes also the case law of the 
ECtHR. Thus, the teaching methods should refocus from substance-based 
“hard topics” to skills, values, and “soft topics”. The judge is not merely per-
ceived as a professional, but also as a person with a need for a holistic life-
long learning approach.213 Content-based methods of transferring legal theo-
retical and practical knowledge improve technical competence.214 However, 
in the EU, professional excellence in cross-border dispute resolution process 
should equally be advanced by training. To be able to establish cross-border 
cooperation, a holistic approach to professional excellence should address 
ICT and language skills. Besides legal knowledge, a basic understanding of 
psychology and sociology should empower judges to better understand the 
cross-border lifestyles of society. Advanced knowledge of ethics should not 
be omitted either.215
On the other hand, adults need to know the reasons for learning some-
thing; they are motivated by the immediate chance to use what they have 
learnt; they learn better when the focus is on situations (real-life or hypothe-
tical cases) rather than the subject matter (legal instruments), and when the 
focus is on collaborative two-way learning rather than the trainer-to-trainee 
model; their previous experience may also affect the learning process. Due 
to these reasons, adult learners are not likely to benefit from conventional 
learning methods, such as an old-style textbook lecture. Instead, training 
should be developed along the lines of case studies, experimental methods, 
discussions, and be designed on the problem-based learning model with op-
timal use of ICT.216 Thus, it would encourage critical thinking and promote 
the active participation of trainees.
Despite an evident development of distance training tools, the instru-
ments covered by the EUFams II project remain underrepresented. Training 
institutions could solve that by introducing special online modules dealing 
with European family and succession law. This could be supported by direct-
ing more funds towards the development of distance learning courses, inter-
active materials designed for adult learning, and tailor-made ICT tools.
213 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. XXXIV.
214 Armytage, Educating Judges, p. 230.
215 Gromek-Broc, in: Grimes, Re-thinking Legal Education under the Civil and Common Law, 
p. 245.
216 See more in section VII.3. and VII.4.
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7. EU funded material should follow an open access policy and remain avail-
able on a single webpage administered by the EU even after the expiry of the 
respective project.
Instead of being limited to the selected course participants by restricting on-
line access, as is often the case, EU funding policy should ensure that any tool 
or course developed with EU support should be openly accessible and usable 
free of charge. Due to the number of EU-funded projects which have created 
online learning tools, with few of these tools remaining available after the 
conclusion and assessment of the project (perhaps because the domain name 
for the project or the hosting of the project webpage are no longer funded), 
a lot of effort and funding is lost and cannot be used for educational pur-
poses. There should be a common openly accessible repository for all project 
deliverables administered by the EU.217
8. Training should be delivered to specific target groups.
An important concern is whether the selection of training participants has 
been conducted carefully enough to reach the target group.218 Online judi-
cial training survey participants indicate that they could often apply for and 
attend training irrespective of their previous knowledge level. It is of the ut-
most importance to assure that the “right people” (who deal with the train-
ing subject matter in everyday practice) are trained at appropriate levels and 
use adequate methods at a few central training events that are organized an-
nually. Trainees are more likely to accumulate knowledge in areas they deal 
with in practice on a regular basis. Training should thus respond to such 
needs and improve the understanding and awareness of European private 
international law for daily practice. Because training should be organized at 
different levels of competence, the knowledge of the participants should be 
self-evaluated by an anonymous method prior to training. The aims of tar-
geted training could be attained by mandatory training for certain levels.
9. Access to high quality training should be made available to all eligible judges.
The online judicial training survey results indicate that judges and prac-
titioners are generally aware of the need to be trained and accept it, though 
they may be driven by a wide range of motives. However, approximately half 
of the professionals dealing specifically with European family and succession 
217 Some might be problematic if outdated or alike, while others might be subject to copyright 
or other rights.
218 Setting the target groups is crucial because the data reveal discrepancies in the level of 
trainees’ competences. See section VII.
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matters would be willing to contribute to the training costs only if they are 
sure that the best trainers are involved. This can be understood in different 
ways. First of all, it probably indicates that participants appreciate the differ-
ence between low- and high-level trainers and that in fact there is high- and 
low-quality training on offer. Therefore, training providers need to be en-
couraged to provide for higher levels of training, such as by exchanging data 
on the excellently rated trainers for specific topics or at least by making the 
future engagement of a trainer dependent on previous evaluations by train-
ing participants. There could also be an evaluation system for training in-
stitutions and/or recognition systems for the best individual trainers and the 
best training institutions. Furthermore, the unwillingness to participate in 
training may also point to the problems with self-funding for training, espe-
cially when it comes to the judiciary. In some Member States, judges believe 
that it is the duty of the State to provide for optimal training and cover all the 
costs. This may be connected to the judicial culture or the fact that earnings 
in some Member States are not high enough. Only to a minor extent could 
the unwillingness to attend training be understood as an indication of the 
low importance they attribute to professional training.219
10. International and national training should be kept in balance.
International training has all the benefits of networking and building mu-
tual trust among peers, advancing language competence, and learning about 
foreign laws and practices. On the other hand, national training should also 
be linked to EU actions and further developed. The fact that the application 
of European family and succession law relies on national procedural law 
and consequently creates discrepancies, leads to the conclusion that national 
training should be combined with national substantive and procedural law. 
EU law does not operate in a vacuum, and hence it should also be taught 
based on a functional approach in combination with the national laws which 
complement or intersect with it.
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Abstract This contribution focuses on the notions of marriage and other 
unions of persons for the purposes of the application of the regulations in 
European family law concerning the personal status as well as the financial 
aspects of maintenance and property regimes. Prior to this analysis, a com-
parative overview of the national legal models available to couples and con-
siderations on the broader framework of EU free movement law are also pro-
vided in order to set the background against which the subsequent private 
international law assessment is carried out.
Keywords marriages, partnerships, unions, personal status, maintenance, 
property regimes.
I. Introduction
This contribution addresses a fundamental question in European family law: 
the definition of marriage and other unions of persons. It is indeed a pre-
liminary aspect upon which the applicability of the relevant European reg-
ulations depends and which is heavily influenced by the Member States’ 
legal traditions and the societal changes affecting the recognition of different 
family models.
After a brief comparative overview of the national substantive laws (sec-
tion II.) and an analysis of the relations between the CJEU’s case law on free 
movement rights and the recognition of legal situations (section III.), this 
contribution will be divided into two parts. The first part will address the 
aspects relating to personal status, focusing on the notion of marriage (and 
spouse) underlying the Brussels II bis and the Rome III Regulations and ques-
tioning the possibility of applying them to same-sex marriages as well as 
marriages involving a person of third/neutral gender (sections IV.1. –  IV.3.). 
Non-marital unions will subsequently be taken into account and their pos-
sible inclusion within the material scopes of these Regulations will be dis-
cussed (section IV.4.). The second part of the contribution will focus on the 
financial aspect and will address the same topic with regard to the Mainte-
nance Regulation (section V.1.) as well as the recent Property Regimes Regu-
lations (section V.2.).
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II. A comparative perspective on the legal framework 
for couples in Europe*
National legal systems generally provide two different types of marriages: 
civil marriages and traditional or religious marriages. The former are con-
tracted under State laws setting out the conditions that must be met for a 
marriage to be valid (e. g. minimum age, formal requirements, maintenance 
and parental obligations, and property regimes). In particular, civil marriages 
vary from one jurisdiction to another depending on the cultural, traditional, 
religious, and historical experiences of a country and can imply recognition 
of a diversity of marriages – including some (limited) effects of polygamous 
marriages celebrated abroad.1 Traditional or religious marriages, on the con-
trary, are contracted in accordance with specific customary practices or reli-
gious rites, respectively, and their effects are recognized under State laws if 
civil law conditions are complied with.2
At the same time, legal alternatives to marriage, such as registered part-
nerships, have become more widespread and national legislation has changed 
to confer more rights on unmarried couples.3 The first country to provide for 
registered partnerships was Denmark in 1989 in favor of same-sex couples. 
Since then, many other jurisdictions around the world have followed suit, 
with some countries also opening such registration schemes to different-sex 
couples.
Non-marital partnerships are generally created by formal acts of regis-
tration and have been categorized in many ways, depending on whether they 
result in marriage-like rights and obligations or, in contrast, whether they 
only give access to a limited selection thereof.4 These evolutions are not only 
supported by the development on the EU level concerning the free move-
ment of persons (including same-sex couples), which has a significant impact 
* This section is to be attributed to Nicolò Nisi.
1 Despite the fact that polygamy is illegal in the EU, in some cases the status of “spouse” 
acquired in result of a polygamous marriage has been recognized in some Member States 
in line with the ECtHR’s case law (for instance in matters of succession law or in matters 
of family reunifications under Council Directive 2003/86/EC, within the limits set forth 
by Art. 4 thereof). On this matter, see Baruffi, in: Cagnazzo/Preite, Il riconoscimento degli 
status familiari acquisiti all’estero, p. 73 et seq. with a focus on the evolution of the Italian 
case law.
2 See e. g. the concordat marriage (matrimonio concordatario) in Italy, first regulated by the 
Lateran Pacts (Patti Lateranensi) of 1929.
3 Dethloff, ERA Forum 12 (2011), 89.
4 In the literature, these statuses have been referred to as “quasi-marriage” and “semi-mar-
riage”. See Waaldijk, ELR 38 (2004), 569.
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on priority issues such as family reunifications,5 but they are also linked to 
the strong impact of the general human rights discourse in Europe (notably, 
the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination, and respect for private 
and family life).6
In addition to marriages and registered partnerships, some countries also 
recognize informal or de facto unions, i. e. arrangements between two per-
sons cohabiting over a period of time without formalizing their relationship, 
which are increasing in popularity in all European countries.7 Such unions 
may be useful to settle certain practical or legal aspects, such as social se-
curity, maintenance, or taxes and housing, especially for same-sex couples 
living in a country that does not allow them to get married or register their 
partnership in any way.8
In general terms, as a consequence of the profound change to the land-
scape of family law over the last decades, what can be observed today is the 
development of a variety of options for the recognition of family relation-
ships in the wake of a truly pluralistic approach.9
1. Marriage: from tradition to same-sex couples
The traditional conception of marriage dates back to Roman-Canonical 
sources. The jurist Modestinus provided the following definition of marriage, 
which was contained in the Digest: “the union of man and woman, a life-
long community, a communion of human and divine law”10. This definition, 
albeit elementary, makes it evident that marriage has been long considered 
as the typical social framework for procreation and nurturing children as 
5 See recently CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman), where the CJEU ruled that that the term 
“spouse” for the purpose of family reunification rights under EU free movement law in-
cludes the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen who has moved between Member States. On 
the evolution of the discussion in this matter, see section III.1.
6 Sörgjerd, in: Scherpe, European Family Law Vol. III, p. 3 et seq. An in-depth illustration of 
ECtHR case law in this regard may be found in the Guide on Art. 8 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights – Right to respect for private and family life, 31. 08.  2020, https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf (last consulted 07. 10.  2020).
7 See Boele-Woelki/Mol/van Gelder, European Family Law in Action. Volume V: Informal 
Relationships.
8 Homosexuality is still controversial in some Member States, which do not provide any in-
stitution for same-sex couples (e. g. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria).
9 Such pluralism is inextricably linked to the increasing privatization of family law. See 
Fulli-Lemaire, MPI Research Paper No. 16/28.
10 Digest 23, 2, 1: “Nuptiae sunt coniunctio maris et feminae et consortium omnis vitae, divini 
et humani iuris communicatio”.
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well as the typical legal framework for the relationship between a man and a 
woman. In numerous countries, family, children, and parenting are all linked 
together in the Constitution.11
Things have radically changed in the last decades and the idea that mar-
riage is more about a couple’s affair rather than the founding act of a family 
gained momentum.12 The traditional institutional marriage based on fixed 
gender-biased roles has given way to marriage based on companionship or 
even personal fulfilment. While some requirements, such as the prohibition 
of incest or the aim for unlimited duration, have essentially remained, the 
relationship between marriage and procreation changed significantly so that 
nowadays, non-marital and same-sex relationships are also viewed positively 
in society.13 The equivalence between children born in and out of wedlock 
represents a clear sign of the dissociation between marriage and filiation.14
11 In a landmark decision dated 15. 04.  2010, No 138, https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/ac 
tionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2010&numero=138 (last consulted 02. 11.  2020), the Italian 
Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale della Repubblica Italiana) stated that «la giusta 
e doverosa tutela, garantita ai figli naturali, nulla toglie al rilievo costituzionale attribuito 
alla famiglia legittima ed alla (potenziale) finalità procreativa del matrimonio che vale 
a differenziarlo dall’unione omosessuale» (translation by the author: the necessary and 
fair protection guaranteed to biological children does not undermine the constitutional 
significance attributed to the legitimate family and the (potential) creative purpose of mar-
riage which distinguishes it from homosexual unions). Moreover, the court explained that 
«la normativa medesima non dà luogo ad una irragionevole discriminazione, in quanto 
le unioni omosessuali non possono essere ritenute omogenee al matrimonio» (trans-
lation by the author: the legislation itself does not result in unreasonable discrimination, 
since homosexual unions cannot be regarded as homogenous with marriage). Similarly, 
the French Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel 28. 01.  2011, no. 2010 –  92 
QPC, https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2011/201092QPC.htm (last con-
sulted 02. 11.  2020)) held that « la différence de situation entre les couples de même sexe et 
les couples composés d’un homme et d’une femme peut justifier une différence de traite-
ment quant aux règles du droit de la famille » (translation by the author: the difference in 
situation between couples of the same sex and couples composed of a man and a woman 
can warrant a difference in treatment in regards to the rule of family law). The lack of 
any positive obligation of full equivalence of rules provided for opposite-sex marriage to 
same-sex unions was also upheld by the ECtHR in case 30141/04 (Schalk and Kopf/Austria), 
24. 06.  2010, note 108.
12 Schwenzer, EJLR 3 (2001), 199 (200). This evolution is well-illustrated by Fulli-Lemaire, in: 
Laurent-Bonne/Pose/Simon, Les piliers du droit civil, p. 61 et seq.
13 A recent analysis among the population of 24 Member States shows that institutional 
marriage, although considered by many to be already obsolete in the 1970s, is still the 
prevailing ideal regarding marriage or long-term relationships in Europe: Camarero, Euro-
pean Societies 16 (2014), 443.
14 The case of Sweden is illustrative: The 2009 reform that opened marriage to same-sex 
couples removed all references to procreation from the secular marriage ceremony. See 
Sörgjerd, Reconstructing Marriage, p. 323.
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This shift of paradigm was also due to the growing disaffection for mar-
riage among heterosexual persons (called by an author “demarriage”15). The 
first signs of this development emerged in the 1960s in Scandinavia with a 
decline in the number of marriages among young couples, before becoming 
more widespread in all of Europe, until the present situation where mar-
riages are considerably less frequent (with an ever-increasing number of 
births occurring outside marriage), occur at later ages and are more likely to 
end in divorce.16
Irrespective of the evolution of marriage in response to the changing dy-
namics of heterosexual couples, the rules for legal recognition of same-sex 
couples have been modeled on marriage. Currently, 15 of the 27 Member 
States regulate same-sex marriages,17 along with many non-EU countries 
around the world.18 However, same-sex spouses have not automatically been 
granted all rights attached to heterosexual marriage, with differential treat-
ments especially in matters of adoption and presumption of paternity, which 
in general does not apply to the female spouse of a woman who gives birth 
to a child.19
It is, however, worth mentioning that, even today, a vast number of coun-
tries expressly limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, with the consequence 
that difficulties may arise in the recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad. Indeed, characterization of the couple’s relationship may prove diffi-
cult when recognition is sought in a country which allows same-sex couples 
only to establish civil unions.20
15 Théry, Le démariage.
16 Festy, Population 61 (2006), 493 (517).
17 In 2001, the Netherlands was the first country in the world to open up civil marriage 
to same-sex couples, followed by Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), Sweden (2009), Portugal 
(2010), Denmark (2012), France (2013), Ireland (2015), Luxembourg (2015), Malta (2017), 
Germany (2017), Finland (2017), and Austria (2019).
18 Outside the EU, countries like Canada, South Africa, Norway, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
New Zealand, the great majority of states of the United States, and some states of Mexico 
also recognize same-sex marriages.
19 Saez, JGSPL 19 (2011), 1.
20 Biagioni, in: Gallo/Paladini/Pustorino, Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational 
and International Jurisdictions, p. 359 et seq. In this regard, see the discussion in sec-
tion III.2 of this contribution.
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2. Registered partnerships: monistic versus dualistic 
versus pluralistic models
As mentioned above, the first country to introduce the institution of a reg-
istered partnership was Denmark in 1989, whose example was followed by 
Sweden in 1994.21 In most respects, both countries modeled the legal con-
sequences of a registered partnership on those of a marriage, whose substan-
tive rules are repeatedly referred to. Differing from the Scandinavian model, 
other countries, such as the Netherlands in 1998, opened up the possibility 
of entering into a registered partnership for both same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples.22
This distinction reveals the adoption of different approaches by national 
legislators with regard to partnerships: the first approach, the so-called dual-
istic model, permits only same-sex couples to register their non-marital reg-
istered relationship, while different-sex couples are only able to get mar-
ried (e. g. Italy, Slovenia, Czech Republic); the second approach, the so-called 
pluralistic model, opens registered relationship schemes to both different-
sex and same-sex couples (e. g. Cyprus, Estonia, Greece), a step that is gen-
erally followed by the opening-up of civil marriage to couples of the same 
sex (e. g. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain).23 A third possible 
approach is adopted by Ireland, Germany, Sweden, and Finland and could be 
classified as monistic, whereby only a single, formalized institution, i. e. mar-
riage, is open both to same-sex and opposite-sex couples.24
21 As of June 2020, the following countries have regulated registered partnerships for same-
sex couples: Austria (2018), Belgium (1998), Croatia (2014), Cyprus (2015), Czech Republic 
(2006), Denmark (1989), Estonia (2014), Finland (2001, but expired in 2017), France (1999) 
Germany (2001, but expired in 2017), Greece (2015), Hungary (2015), Ireland (2010), Italy 
(2016), Luxembourg (2004), Malta (2016), the Netherlands (1997), Slovenia (2017), Spain 
(2005), and Sweden (1994, but expired in 2009).
22 Abundantly referring to the substantive rules applicable to civil marriage: Art. 1:31 –  42 of 
the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), which are analogously applicable by virtue of 
Art. 1:80a (6) of the Dutch Civil Code.
23 Curry-Sumner, Uniform Trends in Non-Marital Registered Relationships. This latter clas-
sification is based on a core element, which, however, does not overshadow other signif-
icant differences; it is indeed possible to individuate a sub-distinction of systems where 
marriage and registered partnership have virtually identical regimes (e. g. the Netherlands) 
and systems where the registered partnership is endowed with only a fraction of the ef-
fects of marriage (e. g. France and Belgium).
24 In 2015, Ireland was the first country to legalize same-sex marriage by popular vote, at the 
same time closing civil partnerships to new entrants while leaving partnerships entered 
into beforehand unaffected. See Tobin, Int. J. L. Pol. Fam. 30 (2016), 115. This is the current 
framework also in Sweden and Finland, after same-sex couples gained access to mar-
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Despite the differences among EU national systems, some common pat-
terns have been identified from a comparative perspective, in particular con-
cerning exclusivity25 and consent26. However, the legal effects stemming 
from such registered partnerships still reveal the existence of substantial dif-
ferences between national systems. Some countries have extended all the 
rights and duties granted to married couples to those involved in same-sex 
equivalents, while others have chosen to use an enumeration method to ex-
tend rights and benefits, explicitly stating each right, benefit, duty, and re-
sponsibility that is granted to same-sex registered couples. Key differences, 
always to the detriment of registered partners, generally relate to the protec-
tion they are afforded upon dissolution of the partnerships, the possibility to 
adopt as a couple, and inheritance rights.
In this regard, one may also see that countries which initially adopted 
weak forms of registered partnerships have then witnessed an evolution 
where the two institutions are growing closer, as the weight of public inter-
ests in marriage is slowly being reduced while the partnerships are increas-
ingly becoming more “matrimonial”.27 In some cases, countries decided at 
a later stage to move towards marriage. An example is provided by France, 
which in 1999 enacted a model of partnership with much more limited ef-
fects than marriage (the so-called PACS – pact civil de solidarité)28, while in 
2013 – after two legislative developments – it legalized same-sex marriage 
with the law mariage pour tous.
riage in 2009 and 2017 respectively. In Germany, since 2017, same-sex couples only have 
access to marriage.
25 In the sense that partnerships are restricted to two people and that there is not any rec-
ognition of polygamous non-marital registered relationships. The other facet is that the 
existence of a marriage prohibits either of the parties from celebrating a non-marital regis-
tered relationship, while the existence of a non-marital registered relationship prevents 
either of the parties from celebrating a marriage. In some countries (e. g. Belgium and 
France), however, the existence of a non-marital registered relationship does not form a 
prohibition to celebrating a marriage, but if a non-marital relationship has already been 
registered, it will be automatically terminated upon the celebration of a marriage. See 
Art. 1476 (2) of the Belgian Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) and Art. 515 –  7 of the French 
Civil Code (Code Civil).
26 Also in the case of partnerships, both parties must validly consent to the registration and 
must be eligible according to domestic substantive law. Generally, the same rules on mar-
riage are applicable.
27 See e. g. the evolution in Luxembourg, which introduced partnerships in 2004 and en-
hanced its effects in 2010. See Swennen, in: Scherpe, European Family Law Vol. II, p. 5 et 
seq.
28 For instance, PACS did not create reciprocal rights of inheritance between partners or the 
legal right to take the name of one’s partner.
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3. Informal relationships
Beside marriage and registered partnerships, Europe is witnessing an increas-
ing number of informal relationships, with or without cohabitation (thus also 
including couples living apart together),29 with a significant number of coun-
tries that did not regulate such relationships as lex specialis in family law, but 
did confer some rights and duties in various areas of the law (e. g. property, 
maintenance, shared household, inheritance), usually subject to the certain 
minimum duration requirements.30
Such informal relationships generally encompass same-sex couples also 
in absence of a general definition of couples (e. g. Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands). In some cases, this inclusion is required by a legislative def-
inition thereof (e. g. France)31, while in other cases it is the result of judicial 
interpretation (e. g. Austria)32.
In some jurisdictions, however, a legal framework exists, not only de-
fining the recognized informal relationship but also attaching legal conse-
quences to the relationships concerning family law.33 The reasons for such 
legislation are essentially the acknowledgement of a new social reality, the 
financial protection of a vulnerable party after dissolution of the shared 
household upon the death of the partner (e. g. property of cohabitants, use 
of common dwelling), and the protection of the common children, in some 
cases also providing extensive rights and duties in matters of guardianship 
and adoption.34
29 Generally, the expressions “de facto relationships”, “informal relationships”, and “unregis-
tered relationships” are used interchangeably to characterize couples that have not regis-
tered their union, so as to include both couples that live together and couples that do not. 
On the challenges posed by the latter category, see Navas Navarro, RIDC 68 (2016), 425.
30 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and the Netherlands. In this regard, see the comparative report in Boele-Woelki/
Mol/van Gelder, Informal Relationships, p. 461 et seq.
31 See for instance the definition of “concubinage” provided by Art. 515 –  8 of the French Civil 
Code: « Le concubinage est une union de fait, caractérisée par une vie commune présen-
tant un caractère de stabilité et de continuité, entre deux personnes, de sexe différent ou de 
même sexe, qui vivent en couple » (translation by the author: a union in fact, characterized 
by a life in common offering a character of stability and continuity, between two persons, 
of different sexes or of the same sex, who live as a couple).
32 In Austria, for instance, the courts’ refusal to extend to same-sex cohabitants the benefit of 
the right to succeed to a tenancy was challenged before the ECtHR and deemed a violation 
of Art. 8 and 14 ECHR. See ECtHR, 24. 07.  2003, no. 40016/98 (Karner/Austria).
33 Sweden, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Catalonia, Portugal, Scotland, Ireland, and Finland. 
In these nine jurisdictions, with the exception of Slovenia, the regulation of informal rela-
tionship includes both opposite-sex and same-sex couples.
34 Mol, ULR 12 (2016), 98 (105 –  112).
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III. The EU free movement framework and the mutual recognition 
of personal and family status*
The sectoral character of the harmonized rules laid down in European family 
law, reflected in the boundaries construed in their scopes of application, as 
well as the absence of any EU competence in civil status matters, clearly 
affect the realization of one of the fundamental goals of European integra-
tion, namely the free movement of persons. Indeed, it is only natural that 
EU citizens are willing to fully exercise their free movement rights when 
they are able to retain the personal status or family relationship obtained in 
the Member State of origin. Consequently, free movement – a right deriving 
from EU citizenship that constitutes the “fundamental status of nationals of 
Member States”35 – is interpreted as giving rise to a right to cross-border 
continuity (or portability) of personal and family status.
Such a right, which would impose on Member States an obligation of 
mutual recognition of a legal situation lawfully established in the Member 
State of origin36, has been deemed to rest upon a number of fundamental pro-
visions of the Treaties: not only the rules on Union citizenship and the corol-
lary freedom of movement (Art. 20 and 21 TFEU), of which the right in ques-
tion is a condition for effectiveness, but also the prohibition of discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality (Art. 18 TFEU) and the principle of sincere co-
operation between Member States (Art. 4 (3) TEU)37. Being created by deriva-
tion of the home State principle and the mechanism of mutual recognition in 
EU internal market law, the subject of recognition in the case of personal and 
family status would, however, be the national private laws governing the es-
tablishment, modification, and termination of that status. More precisely, the 
host Member State (which, from a private international law perspective, is 
the State of the forum) would be required to accept the status as established 
in the Member State of origin, in application of the so-called method of refer-
ring to the competent foreign legal order (which is the State of nationality of 
the person) and even in waiver of the relevant conflict of laws rules.
* This section is to be attributed to Diletta Danieli.
35 According to the well-known wording first used in CJEU, 20. 09.  2001, C-184/99 (Grzelczyk/
Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve), note 31, and consistently reiter-
ated in the subsequent case law on EU citizenship rights.
36 For a theoretical framework, see further e. g. Baratta, IPRax 2007, 4; Fallon, in: Meeusen et 
al., International Family Law for the European Union, p. 149; Tomasi, La tutela degli status 
familiari nel diritto dell’Unione europea, p. 95 et seq.; even earlier, it was identified by 
Cafari Panico, RDIPP 38 (2002), 5 (16 –  18). More recently, Deana, DPCE Online 40 (2019), 
1979.
37 In this latter regard, see especially Baratta, IPRax 2007, 4 (8 et seq.).
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1. The evolution of the CJEU’s case law on the continuity 
of personal and family status*
The existence of the right to cross-border continuity of personal and family 
status has been developed by the CJEU in a string of cases that first dealt 
with aspects of personal identity, namely civil status records and the de-
termination of names. As regards the former, the CJEU has ruled that the 
administrative and judicial authorities of the host Member State “must ac-
cept certificates and analogous documents relative to personal status”38 is-
sued by the State of nationality of the person in question, otherwise the ex-
ercise of the rights deriving from the freedom of movement, for which the 
production of those document is a condition, would be hindered.39 In sub-
sequent case law on the freedom of movement of a name, in turn, the duty 
of recognition upon the host Member State inherently regarded the personal 
status of Union citizens, namely the surname as attributed in the Member 
State of origin, and was derived from the right to non-discrimination on the 
ground of nationality that was applied to the rules governing the surname.40 
The authorities of the host Member State in any case retained the possibility 
to justify their refusal to recognize the name of an EU citizen by invoking 
fundamental constitutional objectives that were interpreted as a reliance on 
public policy considerations, but only insofar as “there [was] a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society”41. This jus-
* This section is to be attributed to Diletta Danieli.
38 CJEU, 02. 12.  1997, C-336/94 (Dafeki/Landesversicherungsanstalt Württemberg), note 19. The 
opinion of Advocate General La Pergola was actually more explicit in drawing broader 
conclusions from the case at hand by identifying the aforementioned principle of continu-
ity of status as follows: “the immutability of status – whenever, of course, it constitutes an 
element of or prerequisite for a right of the individual – derives from the necessity to guar-
antee in a uniform manner the actual form of subjective legal positions under Community 
law and their protection” (Advocate General La Pergola 03. 12.  1996, C-336/94 (Dafeki/Lan-
desversicherungsanstalt Württemberg), note 6).
39 In the literature on civil status in the EU, also with regard to the initiatives of the EU in-
stitutions, see Lagarde, YPIL 15 (2013/2014), p. 1; Kohler, YPIL 15 (2013/2014), p. 13.
40 In this regard CJEU, 30. 03.  1993, C-168/91 (Konstantinidis/Stadt Altensteig and Landrats-
amt Calw); CJEU, 02. 10.  2003, C-148/02 (Garcia Avello/Belgian State); CJEU, 14. 10.  2008, 
C-353/06 (Grunkin and Paul); CJEU, 12. 05.  2011, C-391/09 (Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn); 
CJEU, 08. 06.  2017, C-541/15 (Freitag). On the first judgments in this line of cases, see Hono-
rati, DUE 14 (2009), 379.
41 As further clarified in CJEU, 22. 12.  2010, C-208/09 (Sayn-Wittgenstein/Landeshauptmann 
von Wien), note 86; CJEU, 02. 06.  2016, C-438/14 (Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff ), note 67. 
This approach has been criticized in the literature not only because it tends to conflate the 
justifications of national identity (enshrined in the constitutional principles) and of public 
policy, but also because it does not adequately consider the safeguard of national diver-
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tification follows the typical reasoning adopted in relation to obstacles to 
free movement rights, but it seems to leave open the more general question 
as to whether the protection of fundamental rights, deriving from domes-
tic constitutional principles and respected at the EU level through the na-
tional identities clause (Art. 4 (2) TEU), may prevail on the free movement 
provisions and, from a private international law perspective, amount to a 
ground for non-recognition of the status lawfully established in the home 
Member State.42
Most recently, the CJEU has addressed the right to continuity of personal 
and family status in a case directly relevant to the topic of this contribution, 
namely that of a same-sex marriage between a third country national and 
an EU citizen lawfully contracted under the law of another Member State.43 
According to the court, it follows from Art. 21 (1) TFEU that the authorities 
of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national cannot refuse 
to grant a derived right of residence to that third country national on the 
ground that same-sex marriages are not recognized in the domestic legal 
order44. The court first pointed out that the interpretation to be given to the 
notion of spouse as a family member for the purposes of Art. 2 (2) (a) Cit-
izens’ Rights Directive should be “gender-neutral and may therefore cover 
the same-sex spouse of the Union citizen concerned”45. The relevance of the 
judgment, however, does not lie so much in this statement, but rather in 
the considerations with regard to the obligation to recognize family status 
sities laid down in Art. 4 (2) TEU. See Cafari Panico, in: Di Stasi, Cittadinanza, cittadinanze 
e nuovi status: profili internazionalprivatistici ed europei e sviluppi nazionali, p. 215 (227).
42 See further Cafari Panico, in: Di Stasi, Cittadinanza, cittadinanze e nuovi status: profili in-
ternazionalprivatistici ed europei e sviluppi nazionali, p. 215 (229 et seq.), citing the exam-
ple of surrogacy as particularly illustrative in this regard due to lack of consensus among 
EU Member States on the regulation of the issue that necessarily affects the recognition of 
the underlying family status.
43 CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman). The judgment has attracted the attention of many 
commentators. See e. g. Lang, GenIUS 2/2018, 138; Rossolillo, Quaderni di SIDIBlog 4/5 
(2017/2018), 430; Kochenov/Belavusau, EUI Working Papers 3/2019, 1; Tryfonidou, ELR 44 
(2019), 663; Werner, ZEuP 2019, 802.
44 The CJEU preliminarily clarified that under the Citizens’ Rights Directive, the derived 
right of residence could not be granted to the third country national spouse in his capacity 
as family member of the Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a na-
tional, but this could be conferred on the basis of Art. 21 (1) TFEU. The questions referred 
for preliminary ruling were accordingly assessed from this perspective.
45 CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman), note 35. In this regard, the approach taken by the 
CJEU appears to move away from the opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, in which 
the concept of spouse was given “an autonomous definition independent of sexual orien-
tation”, thus embracing the all-inclusive EU-autonomous interpretation that will be dis-
cussed in section IV.1 (Advocate General Wathelet 11. 01.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman), note 77).
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(i. e., the status of spouse acquired in accordance with the law of another 
Member State) whenever that status is a condition for the exercise of the 
rights conferred by EU law (i. e., a derived right of residence to a third coun-
try national married to a Union citizen of the same sex).46 This indeed con-
firms the possibility of non-application of the relevant private international 
law rules of the host Member State on the ground that they would “lead to a 
non-recognition result”47 and, thus, amount to an obstacle to free movement 
guaranteed by the Treaties.
Also, in this case, the CJEU acknowledged the existence of possible jus-
tifications to the restriction of the freedom of movement for persons, reiter-
ating that it must be based on objective public interest considerations and 
proportional to a legitimate objective pursued by national law. However, the 
obligation to recognize a same-sex marriage for the sole purpose of the en-
joyment of a derived right of residence was meant not to “undermine the 
national identity or pose a threat to the public policy”48 of the host Member 
State, because in no way did it require that Member State to provide for 
same-sex marriages in its legal order. As a result, it should be noted that the 
institution of marriage as a union between man and woman, despite having 
constitutional status in a given Member State, cannot be afforded protection 
at the EU level under the national identities clause of Art. 4 (2) TEU and, ac-
cordingly, be given priority over the application of the free movement provi-
sions.49 This judgment thus seems to provide an answer, at least with regard 
to the case at hand, to the general question concerning possible justifications 
for restrictions to free movement based on domestic constitutional principles 
that were left unresolved in earlier case law.
46 The family status not falling within the list provided in Art. 2 of the Citizens’s Rights 
Directive may nonetheless be covered by Art. 3 of the same Directive, but the host Member 
State would only be obliged to “facilitate entry and residence” of those family members of 
the Union citizen.
47 As already clarified by Baratta, IPRax 2007, 4 (9).
48 CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman), note 46.
49 Even before the Coman case, this conclusion was already proposed in the literature. See 
Rijpma/Koffeman, in: Gallo/Paladini/Pustorino, Same-Sex Couples before National, Supra-
national and International Jurisdictions, p. 455 (482), holding that “the definition of mar-
riage as a union between two people from the opposite sex in a Member State’s con-
stitution would not per se qualify as part of the constitutional core making up national 
identity”; also Tryfonidou, Colum. J. Eur. L. 21 (2015), 195.
164 I. Viarengo, F. Villata, N. Nisi, L. Valkova, D. Danieli, and C. Peraro
2. The method of recognition of legal situations: 
the case of downgrade recognition*
The principle of cross-border continuity of personal and family status seems 
to possess a close resemblance to the method of recognition of legal situ-
ations established abroad50, as both refer to the law of the State of origin in 
order to allow such recognition. The latter, however, operates as a private 
international law rule of coordination between legal orders based on uni-
lateral conflict of law provisions, whereas the mutual recognition at the EU 
level, as clarified in CJEU case law analyzed above, is subject to the follow-
ing conditions: the application of rules other than those of the Member State 
of origin, as determined by the domestic private international law, which 
lead to the non-recognition of status, and the ensuing restriction on the free 
movement rights granted to Union citizens.51
As a further step, it has been proposed to introduce at the EU level a more 
general “principle of origin”, inspired by the method of recognition of legal 
situations, in certain status matters, such as the celebration of marriage and 
the establishment of registered partnerships, in order to allow simplification, 
also when they are dealt with as preliminary questions for the application of 
European private international law instruments.52 In this regard, it should be 
noted that this private international law technique has already been adopted 
in the legislation of certain Member States,53 for example in Italy by means of 
Art. 32-bis of the Italian PIL Act54. This provision, which pursues an anti-elu-
sive rationale, stipulates that a marriage celebrated abroad between an Ital-
ian national and a person of the same sex has the effects (in Italy) of a regis-
tered partnership (unione civile) governed by the Italian substantive law55. As 
* This section is to be attributed to Cinzia Peraro.
50 On the theoretical aspects of this method, see amplius e. g. Baratta, Recueil des Cours 
348 (2011), p. 253; Lagarde, La Reconnaissance de situations en droit international privé; 
Lagarde, Recueil des Cours 371 (2015), p. 9; Davì, in: Campiglio, Un nuovo diritto inter-
nazionale privato, p. 29; Salerno, Recueil des Cours 395 (2019), p. 21.
51 See amplius the clear comparison carried out by Grassi, RDIPP 55 (2019), 739 (761 –  764).
52 Martiny, in: Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, p. 69 (72).
53 Davì, in: Campiglio, Un nuovo diritto internazionale privato, p. 29 (37).
54 Law No. 218 of 31. 05.  1995 (Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, Riforma del sistema italiano di 
diritto internazionale privato, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 128 del 3 giu-
gno 1995, suppl. ord.). The mentioned Art. 32-bis was introduced in the Italian PIL Act 
by the Legislative Decree No. 7 of 19. 01.  2017 (decreto legislativo 19 gennaio 2017, n. 7, 
Modifiche e riordino delle norme di diritto internazionale privato per la regolamentazione 
delle unioni civili, ai sensi dell’articolo 1, comma 28, lettera b), della legge 20 maggio 2016, 
n. 76, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 22 del 27 gennaio 2017).
55 In particular, by the Law No. 76 of 20. 05.  2016 (Legge 20 maggio 2016 n. 76, Regolamenta-
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a result, it allows for the recognition in the Italian legal order of the status 
acquired abroad without referring to any conflict of laws rule, but it estab-
lishes a re-characterization of that status by downgrading its effects to those 
associated with the domestic institution of registered partnership.
The personal scope of application of Art. 32-bis of the Italian PIL Act has 
been subject to extensive debate in the literature, given that its wording does 
not take into account the case of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad be-
tween foreign nationals, either Union citizens or third country nationals. The 
leading opinion seems to consider these foreign marriages as falling outside 
the downgrade recognition imposed by Art. 32-bis56, with the consequence 
that they would retain their characterization as marriages and be subject to 
the relevant private international law rules, in particular Art. 26 –  30 of the 
Italian PIL Act as well as the Brussels II bis and the Rome III Regulations, 
according to the respective scopes of application. However, it has also been 
held that different considerations may lead to an opposite view,57 which in-
cludes same-sex marriages in the category of legal institutions unknown to 
the domestic legal order58 and equally requires the re-characterization as reg-
istered partnerships of those unions between foreign nationals. In particular, 
this should be based on the explicit choice made by the Italian legislator pro-
viding for the regulation of (only) same-sex registered partnerships and may 
avoid the reverse discrimination that would otherwise arise between foreign 
couples and couples in which one of the spouses is an Italian national, also 
in relation to other aspects of family life such as the adoption of children. 
Additionally, the characterization of foreign same-sex marriages would re-
zione delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso sesso e disciplina delle convivenze, Gaz-
zetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 218 del 20 maggio 2016).
56 See e. g. Viarengo, RDIPP 54 (2018), 33 (38); Biagioni, Riv. dir. int. 100 (2017), 496 (497 –  500); 
Feraci, Osservatorio sulle fonti 2/2017, 1 (13); Lopes Pegna, Riv. dir. int. 100 (2017), 527 (536). 
This position has found support also in the case law of the Italian Supreme Court: Corte 
di cassazione, 14. 05.  2018, no. 11696, www.articolo29.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/cass-
11696-18.pdf (last consulted 02. 11.  2020; for a commentary, see Winkler, ItalJ 4 (2018), 273). 
Along the same lines, even before the legislative reform of the Italian PIL Act, see Corte 
d’appello di Napoli, 13. 03.  2015, www.articolo29.it/corte-appello-napoli-sentenza-13-
marzo-2015 (last consulted 02. 11.  2020).
57 In this regard, see Campiglio, RDIPP 53 (2017), 33 (45 et seq.); Grassi, RDIPP 55 (2019), 739 
(772 –  774); Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 777 (810 –  815).
58 Over the years, several views were proposed about the consequences for the Italian legal 
order of same-sex marriages celebrated abroad: first referring to the categories of the in-
compatibility with public policy and the inexistence, then to the impossibility of producing 
legal effects. See Corte di cassazione, 15. 03.  2012, no. 4184, www.articolo29.it/decisioni/
corte-di-cassazione-sentenza-del-15-marzo-2012-n-4184 (last consulted 02. 11.  2020); in the 
literature amplius Marchei, Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiatica 15 (2012), 807.
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sult in the application of Art. 27 of the Italian PIL Act on the requirements 
for contracting marriages, which are determined according to the national 
law of each member of the couple at the time of marriage. Hence, problems 
of recognition of those unions would arise whenever the law thereby deter-
mined does not provide for same-sex marriage. Similarly, the EU principle 
of cross-border continuity of personal and family status could nonetheless 
impose the recognition of the status only insofar as an obstacle to the rights 
deriving from EU free movement law would exist, for example the right to 
family reunification. On the contrary, the re-characterization of those unions 
as registered partnerships would imply the reference to the relevant conflict 
of laws provisions (Art. 32-ter (1) of the Italian PIL Act), which allow for the 
application of Italian law whenever the applicable law does not provide for 
registered partnerships between same-sex adults59, and thus the status would 
be directly recognized on the basis of the Italian private international law 
regime.60
The Italian legal order thus provides an illustrative example of the dif-
ferent recognition regimes that may apply according to the characterization 
of the relationship at stake, which have an impact not only on the personal 
status itself but also on the further consequences related thereto (e. g. finan-
cial and succession matters, parenthood).
IV. The EU private international law framework 
for personal status*
The Brussels II bis61 and the Rome III Regulations62 are the two pieces of EU 
secondary legislation that govern the whole range of private international 
law aspects related to the dissolution and loosening of matrimonial ties, 
* This section is to be attributed to Diletta Danieli.
59 Indeed, this provision is interpreted as a principle of “positive” public policy. See Biagioni, 
Riv. dir. int. 100 (2017), 496 (509 et seq.); Lopes Pegna, Riv. dir. int. 100 (2017), 527 (539), who 
has nonetheless proposed to extend this legislative solution by way of interpretation also 
to the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages as such in order to preserve the status 
lawfully established abroad.
60 Grassi, RDIPP 55 (2019), 739 (774).
61 From the extensive scholarly writings on this Regulation, see in general e. g. McEleavy, 
ICLQ 53 (2004), 503; Lowe/Everall/Nicholls, The New Brussels II Regulation; Magnus/Man-
kowski, Brussels IIbis Regulation.
62 For a general overview of this Regulation, see e. g. Boele-Woelki, YPIL 12 (2010), p. 1; 
Baruffi, DUE 16 (2011), 867; Franzina, CDT 3 (2011), 85; Viarengo, RDIPP 47 (2011), 601; 
Corneloup, The Rome III Regulation. As of July 2020, the Member States participating in 
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insofar as consequences for personal status are concerned.63 On the one 
hand, the Brussels II bis Regulation lays down rules on jurisdiction and rec-
ognition and enforcement of decisions regarding “divorce, legal separation 
or marriage annulment” (Art. 1 (1) (a))64; on the other hand, the Rome III 
Regulation is applicable, “in situations involving a conflict of laws, to divorce 
and legal separation” (Art. 1 (1)). Hence a partial misalignment between the 
respective material scopes of application emerges in relation to marriage an-
nulment, for which the applicable conflict of laws regime is not provided for 
by the Rome III Regulation and must be found in the relevant domestic pri-
vate international law.
While the functioning of both Regulations in relation to matrimonial 
matters has proven relatively smooth65 and only few concerns seem to have 
arisen in practice66, a great deal of debate has nonetheless revolved around 
the types of personal relationships to which these instruments apply in order 
to regulate the private international law aspects of their dissolution. Because 
neither of them defines the legal concept of marriage for the purposes of 
their applicability, the subsequent delimitation of the scope of “matrimonial 
matters” remains open and is further explored in the following sections.
the enhanced cooperation established by the Rome III Regulation are Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Ro-
mania, Slovenia and the three that have joined at a later stage, i. e., Lithuania, Greece, and 
Estonia.
63 Regarding the financial consequences deriving from the dissolution/loosening of a mar-
riage which are governed by other EU Regulations, see section V.
64 As is well known, the Brussels II bis Regulation also governs jurisdiction, and recognition 
and enforcement of decisions in matters of parental responsibility and sets out specific 
procedural rules for intra-EU child abduction cases that supplement the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention. However, these provisions will not be discussed in this contribu-
tion given its focus on cross-border matrimonial matters.
65 With regard to the Brussels II bis Regulation, this is further confirmed by the fact that 
its provisions devoted to matrimonial matters were substantially unchanged following 
the recast process that led to the adoption of the Brussels II ter Regulation. Nevertheless, 
amendments introduced to other provisions may have an impact on the operation of the 
Regulation in this regard, for example, those in the new Chapter IV Section 4 on the cir-
culation of authentic instruments and agreements that are relevant for the recognition of 
out of court divorce agreements (on this topic, see the outcomes of the discussions held at 
the EUFams II International Exchange Seminar collected in Brosch/Mariottini, Report on 
the International Exchange Seminar, p. 4 –  6). On the recast of the Brussels II bis Regula-
tion, see generally e. g. Baruffi, in: Triggiani et al., Dialoghi con Ugo Villani, Vol. II, p. 1087; 
Honorati, RDIPP 53 (2017), 247; Kruger, NIPR 35 (2017), 462; Carpaneto, RDIPP 54 (2018), 
944.
66 For a comprehensive analysis of the issues stemming from the national cases collected in 
the EUFams II database, see EUFams II Consortium, Comparative Report on National Case 
Law.
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1. The notion of marriage for the purposes 
of the Brussels II bis Regulation*
As mentioned above, the Brussels II bis Regulation does not clarify how to 
interpret the legal concept of marriage in order for its rules to apply in a 
cross-border case of divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment. The 
answer to this question clearly bears consequences for the range of mari-
tal relationships to which the Brussels II bis Regulation applies, particularly 
with regard to same-sex marriages. Indeed, at the time of drafting of the 
Regulation, its possible application to these cases did not even come into 
question, given the handful of legal orders that provided for this institution 
also for same-sex couples67; since then, a significant number of EU Member 
States have adopted same-sex marriages68 and therefore, the interpretative 
issue is not merely speculative. Also, marriages involving a person of the 
third sex (or “intersex”) may raise similar issues in this context. However, 
rules governing cross-border aspects of a person’s gender are limited and 
mostly confined to the regime of recognition of decisions recording a gender 
reassignment undergone abroad.69 Moreover, the consequences of intersexu-
ality on the aspects of civil status such as marriage and parenthood are gen-
erally not subject to specific provisions and would primarily require an ex-
tensive reform of substantive family law, especially regarding those binary 
systems that are based on the strict alternatives between the male and fe-
male gender.70 For these reasons, the applicability of the Brussels II bis Regu-
lation (as well as other EU family law instruments) in relation to marriages 
involving intersex individuals is still underexplored and only brief remarks 
will be made here.
* This section is to be attributed to Diletta Danieli.
67 More precisely, before the adoption of the Brussels II bis Regulation, same-sex marriage 
was first introduced in the Netherlands in 2001, followed by Belgium in 2003. For an up-
dated list of countries, see fn. 24.
68 For a comparative overview, see section II.
69 In this regard, reference can be made to the Convention on the recognition of decisions 
recording a sex reassignment, drafted in the framework of the International Commission 
on Civil Status (ICCS) and signed on 12. 09.  2000. The full text of the Convention (in French 
and English) and the status table are available at www.ciec1.org/SITECIEC (last consulted 
09. 10.  2020).
70 For more comprehensive studies on the legal recognition of intersexuality, see e. g. Gössl, 
JPIL 12 (2016), 261; Scherpe/Dutta/Helms, The Legal Status of Intersex Persons; Gössl/Völz-
mann, Int. J. L. Pol. Fam. 33 (2019), 403, all with further references. See also European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), The fundamental rights situation of intersex people.
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Against this uncertain background, an activity of characterization (or 
classification)71 is required and it should be determined whether the defini-
tion of marriage for the purposes of the Brussels II bis Regulation is to be 
carried out according to the domestic legislation of the Member States, or 
whether an EU-autonomous interpretation could be identified so as to avoid 
the reference to national laws.72 Whereas the former view would lead to the 
Regulation having a flexible scope of application ratione materiae, the latter 
would ultimately imply a choice between a narrow interpretation encom-
passing only opposite-sex marriages and a more open and evolutive reading 
in the light of the societal and legislative changes occurring in the field of 
family law throughout the EU Member States.
The method of EU-autonomous interpretation relies on the approach 
traditionally adopted by the CJEU in various fields of law, whereby the legal 
concepts contained in a provision of EU law that does not expressly refer to 
the law of the Member States for the purposes of their definition must be 
given an “autonomous and uniform interpretation” throughout the EU, hav-
ing regard to the context of the provision and the objective of the legislation 
in question.73 In this context, the relevant substantive provisions found in na-
tional laws serve as a comparative reference in order to point to “a common 
core among [them], or at least a strong tendency in a certain direction”74, 
which currently seems difficult to identify towards a broader interpretation 
of marriage that includes same-sex unions. It is thus generally accepted that, 
at least for the time being, the EU interpretation should still be limited to 
heterosexual marriage (including marriage between persons of the same bio-
logical gender, one of whom has undergone gender reassignment surgery), 
albeit that a dynamic reading in the light of further developments in the 
71 More generally on this technique in private international law see e. g. Boschiero, in: Preite/
Gazzanti Pugliese di Cotrone, Atti notarili nel diritto comunitario e internazionale, Vol. 1: 
Diritto internazionale privato, p. 61; Bariatti, in: Encyclopedia of Private International 
Law, p. 357; in the specific field of family law Tomasi/Ricci/Bariatti, in: Meeusen et al., 
International Family Law for the European Union, p. 341; Parra Rodríguez, in: Malatesta/
Bariatti/Pocar, The External Dimension of EU Private International Law in Family and 
Succession Matters, p. 337; Armellini, in: Cagnazzo/Preite/Tagliaferri, Il nuovo diritto di 
famiglia, Vol. 4: Tematiche di interesse notarile. Profili internazionalprivatistici, p. 743.
72 On this issue, see recently Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 777 (779 –  791).
73 According to the well-established wording employed by the CJEU in recent judgments, 
see e. g. CJEU, 21. 03.  2019, C-465/17 (Falck Rettungsdienste and Falck/Stadt Solingen), note 
28; CJEU, 04. 06.  2020, C-429/19 (Remondis/Abfallzweckverband Rhein-Mosel-Eifel), note 24; 
in the specific field of family law, see e. g. CJEU, 02. 04.  2009, C-523/07 (A), note 34; CJEU, 
22. 12.  2010, C-497/10 PPU (Mercredi/Chaffe), note 45 (both regarding the notion of “ha-
bitual residence” of a child for the purposes of Art. 8 Brussels II bis Regulation).
74 Pintens, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 1 Brussels II bis Regulation note 21.
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legislations of the Member States cannot be ruled out.75 This line of argument 
finds support in the position of the CJEU, which has addressed the concepts 
of marriage and spouse in a number of judgments concerning EU legislation 
on free movement and equal treatment of workers76 as well as the Staff Regu-
lations77, yet not in relation to the EU private international law instruments. 
Furthermore, a broad notion of family member that included the “spouse, ir-
respective of sex” was expressly rejected in the context of the preparatory 
works for the adoption of the Citizens’ Rights Directive78.
Notwithstanding this mainstream opinion, it has also been argued that a 
broad definition of matrimonial matters (i. e. encompassing all forms of mar-
riage/partnership dissolution) should be preferred from an EU policy per-
spective.79 An indication of this may be inferred from the changes introduced 
by the Brussels II ter Regulation in the wording of Annex II laying down 
the template of a certificate concerning decisions in matrimonial matters, 
in which the references to “wife” and “husband” have been modified to 
75 Pintens, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 1 Brussels II bis Regulation note 21 et seq. Similarly, 
Tomasi/Ricci/Bariatti, in: Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, 
p. 341 (342 et seq.; 359 –  363); Wautelet, in: Boele-Woelki/Fuchs, Legal Recognition of Same-
Sex Relationships in Europe, p. 143 (160 et seq.); Pintens/Scherpe, in: Encyclopedia of Pri-
vate International Law, p. 1604 (1606).
76 See CJEU, 17. 04.  1986, 59/85 (Netherlands/Reed), note 15 et seq., regarding Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, OJ L 257, 19. 10.  
1968, p. 2 –  12; CJEU, 07. 01.  2004, C-117/01 (K. B./National Health Service Pensions Agency 
and Secretary of State for Health), note 31 –  35, in relation to Art. 141 of the EC Treaty and 
Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, OJ L 45, 19. 02.  1975, p. 19 
et seq.
77 See CJEU GC, 17. 06.  1993, T-65/92 (Arauxo-Dumay/Commission), note 30 et seq.; CJEU, 
31. 05.  2001, C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P (D and Sweden/Council), note 35 –  39, both regarding 
Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968, laying 
down the Staff Regulations of officials and the conditions of employment of other servants 
of the European Communities, OJ L 56, 04. 03.  1958, p. 30 –  36.
78 More precisely, the European Parliament in its Report on the proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (23. 01.  2003, 
A5-0009/2003) proposed the abovementioned amendment to Art. 2 (2) (a) of the Proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
COM (2001) 257 final, which was not subsequently incorporated in the amended proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States (COM (2003) 199 final), on the ground that it would have resulted “in 
the imposition on certain Member States of amendments to family law legislation, an area 
which does not fall within the Community’s legislative jurisdiction” (p. 3).
79 Ní Shúilleabháin, Cross-Border Divorce Law – Brussels II bis, p. 110 et seq.
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“spouses”, thus employing a gender-neutral term80. Nonetheless, given that 
the Brussels II bis/II ter Regulation applies to proceedings concerning per-
sonal status, an all-inclusive notion of marriage would imply that Member 
States’ judicial authorities must answer in the positive the preliminary ques-
tion about the existence of a marriage and, therefore, be obliged to exercise 
jurisdiction or recognize a foreign decision on the dissolution of marital ties. 
Such an outcome would clearly impact the States’ sovereignty in the area of 
family law, upon which the EU competence conferred under Art. 81 (3) TFEU 
should not impinge, with the consequence that it seems difficult to share 
such a comprehensive reading of the EU autonomous interpretation.81
The option of leaving the definition of marriage to the national laws 
of the Member States82 would in turn result in the Brussels II bis Regula-
tion being afforded a wider applicability,83 which includes same-sex mar-
riages in those legal orders where they are recognized. This seems indeed 
to be the status quo, taking into account the practice of Member States such 
as Belgium84 and the Netherlands85, according to which the Brussels II bis 
Regulation is given full application in cases of divorce of same-sex spouses, 
seemingly without even questioning whether its scope covers these kind of 
marriages. On the contrary, Member States that do not allow same-sex mar-
riages to be celebrated would continue to enjoy discretion insofar as their 
judicial authorities, when seized with cross-border proceedings regarding 
80 Without inferring to much from this textual change, it could also be possible that the EU 
legislature preferred the term “spouses” in order to adjust the possible application of the 
Brussels II ter Regulation in those Member States that currently apply the predecessor 
Brussels II bis Regulation in cases of divorce of same-sex spouses, but still by means of a 
definition of the concept of marriage by reference to their own national law rather than an 
EU autonomous interpretation (as explained further in this section).
81 Indeed, other commentators who theoretically argue in favor of this broad reading under-
line that “such a solution will be almost impossible to reach on a European Union level”, 
Kruger/Samyn, JPIL 12 (2016), 132 (138).
82 It is worth mentioning that such an option is explicitly chosen in another and more recent 
EU private international law instrument, namely the Matrimonial Property Regulation 
(Recital 17), and this could lend indirect support to follow the interpretative option in the 
context of the Brussels II bis Regulation. On the Matrimonial Property Regulation, see fur-
ther section V.2.a).
83 Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 777 (791). Also according to Swennen, in: Meeusen et al., Inter-
national Family Law for the European Union, p. 389 (405), the concept of marriage has to 
be defined in the light of national law, but “the primary point of reference” should be the 
law of the Member State of origin (on this aspect, see also section III).
84 As reported in European Commission, Study on the assessment of Regulation (EC) No 2201/ 
2003, p. 115. The Belgian practice is discussed also in Gössl/Verhellen, Int. J. L. Pol. Fam. 31 
(2017), 174 (181).
85 As confirmed by Curry-Sumner, EJCL 11.1 (2007), 1 (11).
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the dissolution of a same-sex marriage, are neither required to hear the case 
nor to recognize the marital relationship pursuant to the provisions of the 
Brussels II bis Regulation. Indeed, this was the substance of the answer al-
ready given in 2003 by EU Commissioner Vitorino to a parliamentary ques-
tion concerning the previous Brussels II Regulation and same-sex marriages 
contracted under Dutch civil law.86
Defining the concept of marriage according to national law may result in 
different approaches being taken in the Member States that do not provide 
for same-sex marriage in their legislation. Again, it is a question of charac-
terization, namely determining which (national) legal category should be ap-
plied to an institution that is unknown to the legal order of the forum. The 
narrowest stance would be to deny the existence of the relationship as such 
and consequently its effects, as it is the case, for example, in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic.87 In contrast to this radical solution, which also appears to 
be in breach of human rights guaranteed in the EU Charter and the ECHR88, 
in those Member States that afford legal recognition to same-sex relation-
ships in the form of registered partnerships (e. g. Italy and Croatia), the for-
eign same-sex marriage is re-characterized and “downgraded” accordingly. 
The regime applicable to a divorce of same-sex spouses is thus found in the 
domestic private international law provisions relating to the dissolution of 
a registered partnership and, consequently, a divorce decision would not be 
issued in such a case. This may result in persisting difficulties in the subse-
quent circulation of the decision terminating the partnership in the Member 
86 Written question E-3261/01 by Swiebel (PSE) to the Commission, 23. 11.  2001, and answer 
given by Vitorino on behalf of the Commission, 12. 03.  2002, both in OJ C 28E, 06. 02.  2002, 
p. 2 et seq. (in the answer, this excerpt is particularly illustrative: “[e]ven if it cannot be 
excluded that the regulation applies to procedures concerning the divorce of a same sex 
couple, this does not translate into an obligation on the courts neither to pronounce or 
recognise the divorce nor to recognise the marriage”).
87 Noto La Diega, in: Hamilton/Noto La Diega, Same-Sex Relationship, Law and Social 
Change, p. 33 (39 et seq.), refers to this approach as the “erasure” model.
88 Indeed, it is settled case law of the ECtHR that same-sex couples are in need of legal 
recognition and protection of their relationship and Contracting States have to fulfil the 
positive obligation to set out a specific legal framework to this end, albeit not necessarily 
through the extension of the institution of marriage. See the judgments ECtHR, 24. 06.  
2010, no. 30141/04 (Schalk and Kopf/Austria); ECtHR, 16. 07.  2014, no. 37359/09 (Hämä-
läinen/Finland); ECtHR, 21. 07.  2015, no. 18766/11 and 36030/11 (Oliari et al./Italy). A dif-
ferent perspective may be inferred from the wording used in Art. 9 EU Charter, which 
does not contain any reference to the gender of the spouses in establishing the right to 
marriage. However, as underlined in the literature, this provision could not be stretched 
as far as imposing a duty on the Member States to provide for same-sex marriage in their 
legal orders. See Pesce, DUDI 10 (2016), 5 (28).
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States that recognize the original relationship as a marriage and a so-called 
“limping” personal status would exist.89 In addition, the same downgrade 
model may be differentiated according to the nationality of the same-sex 
spouses, in particular when one or both of them are nationals of the Member 
State that does not allow for this kind of marriages, or they are foreign na-
tionals. Therefore, also the uncertainties stemming from this approach seem 
likely to be problematic from a human rights perspective as well as from an 
EU free movement law perspective, as discussed in section III.
2. The notion of marriage for the purposes 
of the Rome III Regulation*
Considering the notion of marriage underlying the applicability of the Rome 
III Regulation, it should be noted that the EU legislator has not left the issue 
completely untouched, as is the case in the Brussels II bis Regulation. Indeed, 
Art. 1 (2) (b) Rome III Regulation clarifies at the outset that the matters con-
cerning “the existence, validity and recognition of the marriage” shall fall 
outside its scope of application, “even if they arise merely as a preliminary 
question in the context of divorce or legal separation proceedings”. In order 
to address these issues, reference should be made to the national law of the 
forum, in particular its conflict of laws rules, thus excluding an EU auton-
omous interpretation.90
Furthermore, a one-of-a-kind rule in the context of civil judicial coop-
eration in family matters allows a participating Member State to essentially 
disregard the application of the Rome III Regulation (Art. 13) whenever the 
domestic legal order “does not provide for divorce or does not deem the mar-
riage in question valid for the purposes of divorce proceedings”. The two in-
stances in which the provision may come into play are further explained in 
Recital 26. The former refers to a legal order that does not regulate the in-
stitution of divorce and was drafted in order to take into account the position 
of Malta at the time of the negotiation of the instrument. Since then, how-
ever, divorce was introduced also in the Maltese legal order91, with the con-
sequence that this provision is no longer of relevance on a practical level. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the CJEU has recently referred to 
* This section is to be attributed to Diletta Danieli.
89 In this regard, see Gössl/Verhellen, Int. J. L. Pol. Fam. 31 (2017), 174 (180).
90 As underlined by Gössl/Verhellen, in: Corneloup, Art. 1 Rome III Regulation note 1.22.
91 More precisely, following a successful referendum, a Maltese divorce law was approved by 
the parliament on 25. 07.  2011 and entered into force on 01. 10.  2011 (Civil Code (Amend-
174 I. Viarengo, F. Villata, N. Nisi, L. Valkova, D. Danieli, and C. Peraro
the wording “does not provide for divorce” used in Art. 13 and the related 
explanation in Recital 26, in order to interpret systematically the situation 
referred to in Art. 10 Rome III Regulation, according to which “the law appli-
cable pursuant to Art. 5 or Art. 8 makes no provision for divorce”92. Although 
the two provisions refer to different laws in this respect93, the CJEU found 
Art. 10 applicable only to cases in which the applicable law does not provide 
for divorce in any form, and not whenever that law makes divorce subject to 
more restrictive conditions than those laid down by the law of the forum.94 
The second instance laid down in Art. 13 regarding the invalidity of the mar-
riage is instead drafted in broad terms and Recital 26 specifies that it could 
be intended, “inter alia”, that the marriage in question does not exist95 in the 
legal order of the participating Member State. Despite the general scope of 
the provision, it was actually inserted with a view to preserving national di-
versities in relation to same-sex marriages.
Art. 13 Rome III Regulation does not further regulate the functioning of 
this safeguard clause and a number of issues remain open, also in the absence 
of guidance from case law. Firstly, the reference in order to establish the in-
validity of the marriage seems to be placed in the law of the participating 
Member State of the court seized, while any differences between the domes-
tic notion of marriage and the foreign marriage in question would allow the 
court to refuse to declare the divorce. Nonetheless, the wording “inter alia” 
in Recital 26 may give room for other sources of invalidity, for example the 
law applicable to the validity of the marriage as determined by the conflict of 
laws rules of the forum. In this case, commentators suggest that the correct 
ment) Act, 2011 (Act No. XIV of 2011), https://legislation.mt/eli/ln/2012/218/eng/pdf (last 
consulted 02. 11.  2020)). Therefore, the ad hoc provision contained in Art. 13 Rome III Regu-
lation had lost its practical relevance even prior to being applicable as of 21. 06.  2012.
92 CJEU, 16. 07.  2020, C-249/19 (JE/KF ).
93 Art. 13 and Recital 26 Rome III Regulation refer to the law of the participating Member 
State of which a court is seized, while Art. 10 Rome III Regulation refers to the applicable 
law as determined on the basis of the Regulation.
94 More precisely, in the case at hand, the law applicable to the divorce in accordance with 
Art. 8 (a) Rome III Regulation was Italian law, under which a period of legal separation is 
required before a divorce can be declared, whereas the law of the forum, i. e. Romanian law, 
did not provide for a similar condition.
95 This assimilation of the legal categories of invalidity and non-existence of the marriage ac-
cording to the explanation of Recital 26 has been criticized in the literature because it “cre-
ates confusion” and also due to the elusiveness of the concept of non-existent marriage, 
Chalas, in: Corneloup, Art. 13 Rome III Regulation note 13.15. Indeed, in those Member 
States that do not recognize same-sex marriages, the legal consequences of these unions 
are interpreted according to different views. On this issue with regard to the Italian legal 
order, see section III.2.
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remedy would be a declaration of nullity of the marriage according to the 
law governing its validity, rather than a refusal to declare the divorce pur-
suant to Art. 1396. Secondly, neither Art. 13 nor Recital 26 clarify any proce-
dural aspects. In any case, from the wording of Art. 13 one can infer that the 
refusal to grant the divorce is not an obligation upon the court of the partici-
pating Member State, which may ultimately rule to declare the dissolution of 
the marriage. Accordingly, it seems reasonable that the possible application 
of Art. 13 should be assessed ex officio by the court seized.
3. Conclusions on the concept of marriage in the Brussels II bis 
and the Rome III Regulations*
From this combined analysis of the Brussels II bis and the Rome III Regu-
lations, it can be concluded that the objective of their consistent applica-
tion, as required by Recital 10 of the latter Regulation, would call for a def-
inition of the concept of marriage to be left to the domestic legislation of 
the Member States, albeit that under the former instrument this solution 
is reached only by way of interpretation. This seems to allow their applica-
bility to be extended to cases of dissolution of same-sex marriages depend-
ing on their recognition in the domestic legal order of the forum. This line 
of argument may also be applied to other unions that were characterized as 
marriages according to national laws, for example those involving intersex 
persons, but this currently seems more of a theoretical possibility given that 
their legal recognition has only recently begun to surface in some Member 
States’ legislation and to limited purposes (mainly gender allocation in civil 
status records).
However, the Rome III Regulation has introduced an explicit provision 
that prevents the court of a participating Member State from being obliged 
to declare a divorce whenever the marriage is not deemed valid according 
to its law. Conversely, under the interpretative solution proposed for the 
Brussels II bis Regulation, there is no such safeguard and it cannot be ex-
cluded that a refusal to recognize foreign unions qualified as marriages may 
be found to infringe EU law.97
* This section is to be attributed to Diletta Danieli.
96 Chalas, in: Corneloup, Art. 13 Rome III Regulation note 13.27.
97 Indeed, some commentators have identified the approach followed under the Brussels II 
bis Regulation as the “second best” option, given the impossibility of reaching a consensus 
in favor of an all-inclusive notion of marriage. See Kruger/Samyn, JPIL 12 (2016), 132 (138).
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4. The applicability of the Brussels II bis and the Rome III Regula-
tions to other unions of persons*
The model of the family has long been moving away from the traditional 
concept of opposite-sex individuals being married and living together: differ-
ent forms of adult relationships (non-marital unions, also open to same-sex 
couples, and even solely based on a de facto cohabitation) have increasingly 
become socially acceptable and, consequently, in need of a formal recog-
nition.98 The responses in the domestic legal orders vary significantly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to which relationships were to be recognized 
and under which legal institution (e. g. partnership, either registered or con-
tractual, cohabitation agreement, or concubinage).99 For the purposes of the 
assessment carried out in this section, the main focus is on registered part-
nerships (broadly understood, irrespective of the type of formal registration 
required by national legislation) with a view to addressing the issues arising 
from the cross-border effects of these unions.
When considering the applicability of EU private international law in-
struments to registered partnerships, there is a consensus that the Brus-
sels II bis Regulation does not apply to their dissolution.100 It does, however, 
regulate parental responsibility matters concerning children born to unmar-
ried parents, and this was an extension of the material scope of application 
when compared to the predecessor Brussels II Regulation.101 Along the same 
lines, the Rome III Regulation is generally interpreted as excluding registered 
* This section is to be attributed to Cinzia Peraro.
98 For a comprehensive discussion of these different family models and their recognition in 
different jurisdictions see e. g. Scherpe/Yassari, Die Rechtsstellung nichtehelicher Lebens-
gemeinschaften – The Legal Status of Cohabitants; Miles, in: Scherpe, European Family 
Law Vol. III, p. 82; Scherpe/Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships.
99 For a comparative overview, see section II.
100 See e. g. Swennen, in: Meeusen et al, International Family Law for the European Union, 
p. 389 (407 et seq.); Martiny, in: Boele-Woelki/Fuchs, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Re-
lationships in Europe, p. 225 (236); Pintens, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 1 Brussels II bis 
Regulation note 31 –  33; Lamont, in: Scherpe/Hayward, The Future of Registered Partner-
ships, p. 497 (517); Wautelet, in: Encyclopedia of Private International Law, p. 1505 (1508); 
Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 777 (783).
101 More precisely, in the Draft programme of measures for implementation of the principle 
of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters, OJ C 12, 15. 01.  2001, 
p. 1 –  9, the Council underlined that in order to take into consideration, as a social re-
ality, the increasing figures of relationships other than marriage and children born out of 
wedlock, the scope of the Brussels II Regulation should have been extended “to judgments 
concerning the exercise of parental responsibility with regard to children of unmarried 
couples” (p. 3).
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partnerships from its scope given the exclusive reference to “spouses” made 
in its provisions.102 These EU instruments thus seem to maintain a strict dis-
tinction between marriages and registered partnerships, and this position 
has been confirmed through the enactment of subsequent acts of judicial 
cooperation in family matters, namely the Property Regimes Regulations 
adopted in 2016. It is also consistent with the CJEU case law that narrowly 
interpreted the notion of spouse for the purposes of the Staff Regulations.103 
As a consequence, rules governing the termination of registered partnerships 
must be found in domestic private international law.
Contrary to this common approach, one may contend that such a dis-
tinction seems to possess an artificial character, especially considering that 
registered partnerships create stable and formalized family relationships, the 
effects of which can be assimilated to those of marital unions, and that na-
tional legislation governing them is often modeled on the regime provided 
for marriages.104 These considerations could have been the underlying rea-
sons for a decision rendered by an Italian court of first instance, in which the 
lis pendens rule provided in Art. 19 Brussels II bis Regulation was applied in 
the context of a dissolution of a same-sex registered partnership concluded 
in Malta and entered into the Italian civil status records.105 Nevertheless, this 
was an isolated case from which it is difficult to infer a generalized trend that 
could cast doubt on the aforementioned exclusion of registered partnerships 
from the scope of application of the Brussels II bis Regulation.
In the light of the current EU legal framework,106 it follows that the pri-
vate international law aspects concerning the dissolution of registered part-
nerships and its consequences for the civil status of registered partners 
should be considered de iure condendo, requiring that either the scope of 
the Brussels II bis and the Rome III Regulations be widened or a further 
EU instrument be adopted. The former option seems likely to be ruled out 
given the recent adoption of the Brussels II ter Regulation, which has not 
102 See e. g. Boele-Woelki, YPIL 12 (2010), p. 1 (13); Franzina, CDT 3 (2011), 85 (102); Gössl/Ver-
hellen, in: Corneloup, Art. 1 Rome III Regulation note 1.06. Coester-Waltjen, in: Encyclope-
dia of Private International Law, p. 543 (549), however, seems to take a more doubtful view.
103 In the judgment cited already CJEU, 31. 05.  2001, C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P (D and Sweden/
Council), note 35 –  39.
104 Arguing in favour of the abolition of the distinction between marriages and non-marital 
unions from a private international law perspective, Gössl/Verhellen, Int. J. L. Pol. Fam. 31 
(2017), 174 (183 et seq.). In this regard, see section II.2.
105 Tribunale di Bologna, order of 18. 10.  2018 (unpublished).
106 It should be mentioned that also at the international level, registered partnerships are not 
subject to a specific private international law regime. The only relevant instrument in this 
regard is the ICCS Convention, which has not yet entered into force.
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introduced any substantial changes to the existing regime governing matri-
monial matters, and the lack of any prospect of a recast of the Rome III Reg-
ulation, at least in the near future. There would be room, in turn, to argue 
for the enactment of a separate instrument107 (possibly a regulation, even by 
means of an enhanced cooperation), inspired by the recent Partnership Prop-
erty Regulation. One of the most pressing issues would be the characteriza-
tion of a registered partnership for the purposes of the application of this hy-
pothetical EU instrument, which could reiterate, for reasons of consistency, 
the definition laid down in Art. 3 (1) (a) Partnership Property Regulation108. 
As to its material scope, in order to reflect the existing regime on the dis-
solution of marital ties deriving from the combined application of the Brus-
sels II bis and the Rome III Regulations, it would seem reasonable to provide 
rules governing jurisdiction, applicable law, and recognition and enforce-
ment of decisions in relation to the termination of registered partnerships, 
while their existence, validity or recognition would probably still be left to 
Member States’ laws. The design of the appropriate connecting-factors may 
also draw on the example of the Partnership Property Regulation, but taking 
into account that specific legislation on registered partnerships has not been 
uniformly enacted in all Member States and that the law of the place of regis-
tration of the partnership (lex loci registrationis) may in any case ensure that 
substantive rules be found to set out the conditions for its termination.109 In 
addition, due to the diverging domestic provisions governing the institution 
in question110, the preference for connecting-factors that favor the integra-
tion of the partnership into the legal order, such as the place of the common 
habitual residence of the partners, may entail significant changes in the re-
gime on the termination of the partnership that could also affect, from a 
long-term perspective, the cross-border mobility of the couple.
107 In this regard, see Melcher, JPIL 9 (2013), 149. For an overview of the private international 
law solutions adopted in the domestic legal orders, see Wautelet, in: Encyclopedia of Pri-
vate International Law, p. 1505 (1509 –  1514).
108 However, as further clarified also in Recital 17 Partnership Property Regulation (and sim-
ilar to the aforementioned Art. 13 Rome III Regulation), this should not oblige a Member 
State that does not regulate the institution of registered partnership to provide for it in its 
national law. Such a safeguard clause could be equally provided in a hypothetical EU regu-
lation on the dissolution of registered partnerships.
109 As underlined by Melcher, JPIL 9 (2013), 149 (165).
110 According to Wautelet, in: Encyclopedia of Private International Law, p. 1505 (1514), the 
preference given to the lex loci registrationis “expresses the idea that partnerships as in-
stitutions may differ too widely between countries to allow for the severing of the ter-
mination from the country where the partnership was registered”.
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Currently, however, it should be noted that these considerations are 
mostly theoretical, as no legislative action has been undertaken towards the 
proposal of a new EU instrument on the termination of registered partner-
ships. Nonetheless, given their growing recognition at the national level, the 
harmonization of the EU private international law regime also in this area 
of law would seem desirable, with a view to furthering the free movement 
of cross-border families in the EU. Conversely, at this stage, it seems an even 
more remote possibility to afford greater recognition at the supranational 
level to relationships based on a mere de facto cohabitation, due to their in-
formal nature and the resulting difficulties in providing an appropriate legal 
framework.
V. The EU private international law framework 
for financial aspects
1. The concept of marriage and other unions of persons 
in the Maintenance Regulation*
EU private international law rules concerning maintenance matters deal 
with certain economic consequences of a family relationship, parentage, 
marriage or affinity, and it was not by coincidence that maintenance obli-
gations were included in the scope of both the 1968 Brussels Convention as 
well as the European Enforcement Order Regulation, while the same matters 
are excluded from the Brussels II bis Regulation.111 Although the Mainte-
nance Regulation was adopted according to the procedure provided for in 
Art. 67 (2) TEU establishing the European Community, under the terms of 
which the Council acts unanimously after consulting the European Parlia-
ment, due to the connection between maintenance matters and “family law” 
in accordance with Art. 67 (5) indent 2 TEU, for a while it was also contem-
plated transferring maintenance obligations from unanimous to co-decision 
procedure.112 In fact, according to the Commission Communication calling 
on the Council to provide for measures relating to maintenance obligations, 
* This section is to be attributed to Francesca Villata and Lenka Valkova.
111 The exclusion is expressly provided for by Art. 1 (3) (e) and Recital 11 Brussels II bis Regu-
lation.
112 Communication from the Commission to the Council calling on the Council to provide for 
measures relating to maintenance obligations taken under Art. 65 of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid down in Art. 251 of 
that Treaty, COM (2005) 648 final, p. 3.
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maintenance matters are of a hybrid nature sui generis, i. e. they are family 
matters as to their origin but a pecuniary issue in their implementation, rep-
resenting a sum of money to be paid or recovered. Although a close link 
between maintenance and family relationships cannot be denied, since the 
former presupposes the existence of the latter, claims for maintenance recov-
ery nevertheless do not go to the core of those relationships, nor do they af-
fect their existence: Therefore, the two aspects must be distinguished. How-
ever, it is often hard to isolate maintenance questions from questions relating 
to personal status: A maintenance obligation is (one of) the consequence(s) 
of a specific status and the obligation to pay maintenance occurs on the basis 
and in the context of that personal status.113
The interconnection between the matters concerning status and main-
tenance is unequivocal and, accordingly, it is likely to raise intricate ques-
tions, especially with regard to maintenance claimed in connection with 
certain forms of (same-sex) marriages and other unions. This is likely to 
occur in at least three situations. First, it is necessary to apply the terms of 
family relationships for the purpose of delimitating the scope of the Main-
tenance Regulation. Once the scope has been determined, the status ques-
tion may become relevant when it represents the principal claim, and the 
maintenance claim is accessorial to that claim, or when it represents a mere 
preliminary question, often raised by the alleged debtor to deny his or her 
maintenance obligations. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze all these three 
situations.
a. Relevance of the notion of “family relationship, parentage, marriage 
or affinity” for the scope of the Maintenance Regulation
Art. 1 (1) Maintenance Regulation determines its scope of application and 
clarifies that it “shall apply to maintenance obligations arising from a family 
relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity”. No definition, however, of the 
notions of “family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity” is given in 
the Maintenance Regulation and scholars have not agreed on a single ap-
proach as to whether these legal concepts should be interpreted auto-
nomously or are referring to national law.
113 Martiny, Recueil des Cours 247 (1994), p. 131 (151). On the questions concerning personal 
status, see section IV addressing the notion of marriage (and spouse) under the Brussels II 
bis and Rome III Regulation, the notion of marriage and registered partnership under the 
Property Regimes Regulations see section V.2.
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The autonomous interpretation of the relevant family relationship is 
generally recommended as the option that ensures the uniform application 
of the Maintenance Regulation, aiming at guaranteeing “equal treatment 
of all maintenance creditors” in the Member States.114 By contrast, leaving 
the definition of marriage to Member States’ national law may have the con-
sequence that only in the Member States where same-sex marriages, reg-
istered partnerships and other types of unions may be validly constituted, 
maintenance obligations arising in the context of these relationships are ac-
tually included under the Regulation’s scope.115 The drawback of applying 
national law lies in the fact that the uniformity in the application of the Reg-
ulation may be affected if the forum does not contemplate specific categories 
of persons under Art. 1 (1) Maintenance Regulation, while another Member 
State includes such categories of persons within the scope of the Regula-
tion.116 The solution based on the application of national law is not regarded 
as interfering with Member States’ legislative sovereignty, as it is respectful 
of Member States’ cultural diversity.117 On the other hand, it may be argued 
that the determination of maintenance obligations within certain relation-
ships, such as same-sex unions, must be distinguished from questions of 
status and so the States’ sovereignty would not be undermined whatso-
ever.118 It is therefore necessary in the first place to analyze whether these 
114 On the conclusion of autonomous interpretation, see Davì/Zanobetti, Riv. trim. dir. proc. 
civ. 71 (2017), 197 (205); Bremner, KSLR 2 (2010), 5 (22); Corrao, CDT 3 (2011), 118 (125).
115 On the conclusion of interpretation under national law, see Pesce, Le obbligazioni alimen-
tari tra diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, p. 60; Queirolo/Schiano di Pepe, 
Lezioni di diritto dell’Unione europea e relazioni familiari, p. 374; Castellaneta/Leandro, 
Nuove leg. civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062). See also Pocar/Viarengo, RDIPP 45 (2009), 805 
(810), who do not take any clear approach and retain that the CJEU should provide the 
interpretation in this regard.
116 Similarly, see Castellaneta/Leandro, Nuove leg. civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062). Defining 
family relationships under national law may create slightly different application problems, 
for example, connected to Art. 4 (c) Maintenance Regulation which might catalyze a sig-
nificant degree of uncertainty for same-sex spouses. It is possible to imagine a scenario, 
in which same-sex spouses generally agree on the court “of their last common habitual 
residence for a period of at least one year” to settle any disputes in matters relating to a 
maintenance obligation under Art. 4 (c) (ii) Maintenance Regulation, without referring to 
any specific State or court. In such a case, it is questionable whether in the Member States, 
where the same-sex marriage is “downgraded” into a registered partnership, but where the 
registered partnerships are regarded as falling into the scope of the Maintenance Regula-
tion, for example by virtue of “family relationships” according to Art. 1, the choice of court 
agreement concluded under Art. 4 (c) (ii) Maintenance Regulation would be considered 
valid.
117 See section IV.1.
118 See considerations on Art. 22 and Recital 25 Maintenance Regulation in this section.
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notions should be interpreted autonomously or if they must be read as refer-
ring to national rules, and, namely, if same-sex marriages and other unions 
of persons can be considered “family relationship, parentage, marriage or af-
finity”, thus falling into the scope of application by virtue of Art. 1 (1) Main-
tenance Regulation.
The legislative iter of the legal concepts “family relationship, parentage, 
marriage or affinity” cannot directly be traced back to the initial Commis-
sion Proposal, since the current wording of Art. 1 (1) does not correspond to 
the provision originally suggested in that Proposal, which, instead, generally 
referred to all “family relationships or relationships deemed by the law ap-
plicable to such relationships as having comparable effects”119. According to 
the Commission, rather than listing the types of relationships covered by the 
Maintenance Regulation, it was preferable to refer to a generic concept of 
family maintenance obligations without seeking to impose a limited concept 
of “family”.120 At a later stage, however, the Council decided that the final 
Regulation for the purpose of determining the law applicable to maintenance 
within the EU121 should refer to the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, and 
the scope of the Maintenance Regulation had to be aligned with Art. 1 of the 
2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, which in the end must be “taken into ac-
count” in the Regulation.122 It follows that the European legislator ended up 
narrowing the material scope of the Maintenance Regulation,123 as a price to 
be paid for coordination of the scope of these two legal instruments called 
upon to operate together, to the extent that the desired coordination should 
prevent delimitation problems.124
It must be highlighted, however, that during the legislative process, the 
Committee on Legal Affairs clarified that among “relationships deemed by 
the law applicable to such relationships as having comparable effects”, re-
lationships between same-sex couples, such as civil partnerships, can be 
119 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforce-
ment of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, COM 
(2005) 649 final. On the comments of the proposal of this provision, see e. g. Pastina, Studi 
sull’integrazione europea 2 (2007), 663 (669).
120 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – 
Commentary on the articles of the proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, ap-
plicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating 
to maintenance obligations, COM (2006) 206 final.
121 Bremner, KSLR 2 (2010), 5 (18, 20)
122 Recital 8 Maintenance Regulation. See Art. 1 (1) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, 
which is also in conformity with Art. 1 of the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention.
123 Villata, Riv. dir. int. 94 (2011), 731 (739).
124 Davì/Zanobetti, Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ. 71 (2017), 197 (204).
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considered.125 It is evident that the Committee on Legal Affairs did not over-
look same-sex couples and intended to include such terms into the scope 
of the proposed Regulation (although by reference to national legislation). 
Therefore, the subsequent omission of the wording “deemed by the law ap-
plicable to such relationships as having comparable effects” and its simple re-
placement by specific legal concepts of “family relationship, parentage, mar-
riage or affinity”, without any reference to the applicable law, may clearly 
show, on the one hand, the necessity to interpret those terms autonomously, 
without the possibility to refer back to diverging national laws and, on the 
other hand, the ratio of the preparatory works, i. e. the tendency to broaden 
the scope of application by including same-sex couples.126
Recital 11 simply states that the scope of the Maintenance Regulation 
should cover all maintenance obligations arising from the aforesaid relation-
ships in order to guarantee equal treatment of all maintenance creditors. The 
same Recital then requires an autonomous interpretation of the term “main-
tenance obligation”, while it does not provide any guidance on the inter-
pretation of the terms “family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity”. 
Therefore, one could assume that the obligation to autonomously interpret 
certain notions applies only to “maintenance obligations”, while, conversely, 
a reference to the terms “family relationship”, “parentage”, “marriage” or “af-
finity” is deliberately omitted and might fall outside the scope of the rule on 
autonomous interpretation. However, although this provision is silent as to 
the interpretation of these four concepts, the CJEU’s case law must be con-
sidered. The CJEU established the general rule of autonomous interpreta-
tion by taking into account not only the wording of the provision in ques-
tion, but also its context and the objective pursued by the rules of which it 
forms a part,127 in cases where an EU act makes no reference to the law of 
the Member States for the definition of a particular concept,128 as applies in 
our case. In fact, the terms “family relationship”, “parentage”, “marriage” or 
“affinity” are employed in a provision of EU law and no reference to national 
125 Amendment 4 and 15 of the Draft Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Com-
mittee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a Council regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation 
in matters relating to maintenance obligations, 2005/0259(CNS).
126 Similarly, see Corrao, CDT 3 (2011), 118 (125).
127 In family law, see CJEU, 02. 04.  2009, C-523/07 (A); see also CJEU, 18. 01.  1984, 327/82 (Ekro); 
CJEU, 19. 09.  2000, C-287/98 (Linster); CJEU, 16. 07.  2009, C-5/08 (Infopaq International); 
CJEU, 18. 10.  2011 C-34/10 (Brüstle); CJEU, 06. 03.  2008, C-98/07 (Nordania Finans and BG 
Factoring).
128 See e. g. CJEU, 11. 04.  2019, C-254/18 (Syndicat des cadres de la sécurité intérieure).
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law is made under said provision, as it is instead the case, for instance, for 
the Matrimonial Property Regime Regulation for the purpose of defining the 
legal concept of “marriage”.129 Applying the general rule of autonomous in-
terpretation would then allow for a uniform application of the legal con-
cepts, the content of which cannot vary according to the Member State in 
which the Maintenance Regulation applies.130 Moreover, the primary goal 
of the independent and uniform interpretation throughout the EU is often 
accompanied by the principle of equality, which requires the Regulations 
to be applied in such a way as to ensure, as far as possible, that the rights 
and obligations which derive from it for the Member States and the persons 
to whom it applies are equal.131 Therefore, the autonomous and independ-
ent interpretation can pursue effectively the most important objective of the 
Maintenance Regulation, i. e. to guarantee equal treatment of all maintenance 
creditors through the uniform application of the rules provided in the Main-
tenance Regulation.
(i) Autonomous interpretation of the relevant family relationships 
under the Maintenance Regulation
The autonomous interpretation rule does not per se automatically guarantee 
that same-sex marriages and registered partnerships fall within the scope of 
the Maintenance Regulation; it is necessary to investigate whether the legal 
concepts employed in the Maintenance Regulation may, for example, include 
only a traditional connotation of marriage.132 The width of the notions de-
termined in Art. 1 (1) Maintenance Regulation, on the one hand, and the list 
of specific categories of family relationships, such as affinity, even though 
not all States recognize those relationships,133 on the other hand, might be 
conceived so as to enable same-sex marriages or other types of unions to 
fall within the scope of the Maintenance Regulation.134 This may also be the 
case for registered partnerships or other types of unions, which, although 
129 See section V.2.a).
130 Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 777 (789).
131 See e. g. CJEU, 16. 12.  1980, 814/79 (Netherlands/Rüffer), note 14; CJEU, 28. 09.  1999, C-440/97 
(GIE Groupe Concorde and others), note 15.
132 On the similar considerations on the Brussels II bis Regulation, see Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 
777 (789).
133 Bonomi Report, note 29.
134 Bremner, KSLR 2 (2010), 5 (22). On the broad interpretation of the terms, but under national 
law, see Castellaneta/Leandro, Nuove leg. civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062).
Defining Marriage and Other Unions of Persons in European Family Law 185
not falling under the notion of “marriage”, may be considered “family re-
lationship” within the meaning of Art. 1 (1) Maintenance Regulation. Con-
sequently, the risk of discrimination based on sex or gender in national legal 
orders could be limited.135 The aforementioned notions are capable of includ-
ing all maintenance obligations relating to family relationships lato sensu, 
which are ascertained by national judicial authorities, regardless of the dif-
ferent nomenclature assigned in each country.
It cannot be forgotten that the CJEU also held that the provisions of EU 
law must be interpreted in the light of EU law as a whole, with regard to its 
objectives and to its state of evolution on the date at which the provision in 
question is to be applied.136 It must be borne in mind that European family 
law is still evolving and that the EU notion of “family” is beginning to take 
shape more clearly. Such an evolution of “European families” may be at-
tributed not only to the development of Member States’ national legislation 
regarding same-sex unions,137 but also to the CJEU’s case-law recognizing 
family status138, for example in the form of same-sex marriages, for the pur-
pose of free movement of persons139, or to the judgments of the ECtHR (some 
of them expressly referred to by the CJEU), which characterized the relation-
ships of same-sex couples as falling within the notions of “private life” and 
“family life”140. Although one might question whether the legislator of the 
135 Castellaneta/Leandro, Nuove leg. civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062).
136 CJEU, 06. 10.  1982, 283/81 (CILFIT/Ministero della Sanità), note 20.
137 See section II. The development of the national law is also considered in the CJEU case 
law and represents one of the interpretation methods used by the CJEU, see among others 
Lenaerts/Gutiérrez-Fons, Colum. J. Eur. L. 20 (2013), 3; Titshaw, BU Int’l L. J. 34 (2016), 45, 
or CJEU, 17. 04.  1986, C-59/85 (Netherlands/Reed), note 13, where the CJEU stated for the 
purpose of the interpretation of the term “spouse” that “in all of the Member States, […] 
any interpretation of a legal term on the basis of social developments must take into ac-
count the situation in the whole Community, not merely in one Member State”.
138 For example, the development of the CJEU’s interpretation might be demonstrated with 
case 31. 05.  2001, C-122/99 P and C-125/99 (P D and Sweden/Council), where the CJEU re-
fused to recognize a same-sex partnership as a “marriage” under the EU’s Staff Regula-
tions, since according to the majority of the Member States, the term “marriage” means 
a union between two persons of the opposite sex. However, seven years later, see e. g. 
CJEU, 01. 04.  2008 C-267/06 (Maruko/Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen), the CJEU 
held that a national measure providing for a registered partnership with rights comparable 
to marriage, which treats a surviving life partner less favourably than a surviving spouse 
by denying him benefits deriving from an employment relationship, is contrary to the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.
139 See CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman). On the discussion, see section III.1.
140 On the violation of Art. 8 and 14 ECHR, see the ECtHR’s case law, for example ECtHR, 
21. 07.  2015, no. 18766/11 and 36030/11 (Oliari et al./Italy); ECtHR, 07. 11.  2013, no. 29381/ 
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Maintenance Regulation intended to cover the maintenance matters between 
same-sex couples under the scope of the Regulation in 2009,141 the evolve-
ment of “EU family law” seems to confirm that “non-traditional” couples do 
fall within the scope of the Maintenance Regulation.142
It is worth mentioning that the obligation of autonomous interpreta-
tion can also be indirectly inferred from the Partnership Property Regula-
tion, which expressly specifies that maintenance matters should be excluded 
from its scope as far as they are governed by the Maintenance Regulation,143 
thereby clarifying that the two Regulations are mutually complementary 
with regard to the economic aspects of registered partnerships. This express 
reference in the Partnership Property Regulation may be read as an acknowl-
edgement by the European legislator that registered unions fall within the 
scope of the Maintenance Regulation.144
(ii) Relevance of the scope for the purpose of applicable law
It must also be remembered in this context that while the Maintenance Regu-
lation directly establishes rules on jurisdiction, and recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments, as to the applicable law, Art. 15 Maintenance Regulation 
refers to the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol. Therefore, it is essential to 
address the question of scope of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol as 
well as the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention, on which the 2007 Hague 
09 and 32684/09 (Vallianatos and Others/Greece); ECtHR, 14. 12.  2017, no. 26431/12 (Or-
landi and Others/Italy); ECtHR, 24. 06.  2010, no. 30141/04 (Schalk and Kopf/Austria). See 
also Mosconi, RDI 91 (2008), 347. With a similar conclusion concerning the formulation 
of “European families” in the context of the Maintenance Regulation, see Castellaneta/
Leandro, Nuove leg. civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062). On the cultural issues, national identity, 
and private international law see Kohler, in: Viarengo/Villata, Planning the future of cross-
border families: a path through coordination, p. 3 et seq.
141 See above cited Amendment 4 and 15 of the Draft Opinion of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for 
a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of deci-
sions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, 2005/0259(CNS) or 
see section V.1.a)(1) on Art. 22 and Recital 25 Maintenance Regulation. On the opinion that 
the Maintenance Regulation also covers same-sex partners and that Art. 22 and Recital 25 
were necessary to propose in order to allay fears that the Regulation would have an un-
necessary effect on domestic family law, see Bremner, KSPR 2010, 5 (22).
142 See in this regard also Oberto, Dir. fam. 39 (2010), 802 (832 et seq.).
143 Recital 22 of the Maintenance Regulation.
144 Davì/Zanobetti, Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ. 71 (2017), 197 (204).
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Maintenance Protocol was modeled145, since, as mentioned above, the two 
should be identical in scope in order to prevent delimitation problems.146 In 
the Report to the 1973 Hague Maintenance Conventions,147 Verwilghen spec-
ifies which relationships fall under the terms “family relationship”, “parent-
age”, “marriage” or “affinity” provided in Art. 1, while pointing to Art. 14 of 
the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention, which contains the list of possible 
restrictions to the scope of the Convention.148 In fact, it seems that the no-
tion “arising of marriage” is defined in the Report as including maintenance 
obligations between spouses who are or were married, i. e. between spouses 
living together, or merely living apart, or separated as a result of a decision, 
who are getting legally separated or divorced, who have been divorced or 
whose marriage was declared void or annulled.149 Moreover, although Art. 2 
of the Convention tackles the issue of the preliminary and incidental ques-
tions150, which are analyzed below, this provision must be considered also for 
the purpose of delimitating the scope of legal instruments concerning main-
tenance obligations.151 As stressed by Verwilghen, it had been absolutely nec-
essary to delimitate the status and maintenance questions, in order to avoid 
that some countries could refuse to ratify the 1973 Hague Maintenance Con-
vention due to the fact that it would entail an indirect obligation to recognize 
the “pseudo-family” relationships at the heart of the maintenance obliga-
tions.152 That safeguard simply enables the separation of maintenance pay-
ment from any assessment of the family status on which it is based for the 
States which do not recognize that relationship in their legal systems. On 
the other hand, it follows indirectly from the reading of this provision that 
the same States shall apply the Convention for the determination of mainte-
145 According to the Bonomi Report, note 23, this wording was not reproduced in the Protocol, 
probably because it was considered superfluous.
146 Davì/Zanobetti, Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ. 71 (2017), 197 (204).
147 Verwilghen Report, note 125 et seq.
148 Verwilghen Report, note 121 and 185. Any Contracting State may reserve the right not to 
apply the Convention to maintenance obligations between persons related collaterally; 
between persons related by affinity and between divorced or legally separated spouses 
or spouses whose marriage has been declared void or annulled if the decree of divorce, 
legal separation, nullity or annulment has been rendered by default in a State in which the 
defaulting party did not have his habitual residence.
149 Verwilghen Report, note 21.
150 This paragraph provides that decisions rendered in application of the 1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention shall be without prejudice to the existence of any of the relationships 
provided in Art. 1.
151 The same wording can be found in Art. 1 (2) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol.
152 Verwilghen Report, note 130
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nance obligations arising out of these relationships, leaving the status ques-
tions untouched.153
The provisions of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol are analogous, 
as the Protocol covers the same relationships as the 1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention, i. e. family relationships, parentage, marriage or affin-
ity.154 Moreover, the Protocol provides for the same safeguard of the separa-
tion of the maintenance payment from any assessment of the family status 
as the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention, by providing that decisions ren-
dered in application of the Protocol shall be without prejudice to the exis-
tence of any such relationships.155 The Bonomi Report, which takes up con-
clusions illustrated in the Verwilghen Report, also does not clearly solve the 
question concerning the scope of the Protocol, in particular whether same-
sex marriages and other unions fall within its scope. In the past, attention 
was drawn to one part of the Bonomi Report which states: “the Protocol does 
not specify whether maintenance obligations arising out of such relation-
ships are included within its scope; this omission is intentional, in order to 
avoid the Protocol running up against the fundamental opposition existing 
between States on these issues”156. Although this wording shows the ten-
dency to refer to national law for the definition of the legal concepts pro-
vided in Art. 1 (1) of the Protocol, the further considerations made by Bon-
omi should be analyzed more deeply and the opposite approach could be 
supported. According to the Bonomi Report, there is nothing that precludes 
the Contracting States from recognizing same-sex marriages or registered 
partnerships and from subjecting them to the rule of “closer connection” 
provided in Art. 5 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol (i. e. the special 
rule with regard to spouses and ex-spouses), which represents an implied ad-
mission that the Protocol may be applied to them.157 Although nothing was 
decided as regards Contracting States not recognizing institutions such as 
153 On the extensive interpretation of the “family relationships” covering same-sex marriages 
in the context of the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention, see Badiali, La disciplina con-
venzionale, p. 120 et seq.
154 Art. 1 (1) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol and Art. 1 of the 1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention.
155 Art. 1 (2) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol and Art. 2 of the 1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention.
156 Bonomi Report, note 31. See e. g. Davì/Zanobetti, Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ. 71 (2017), 197 (205), 
who refer to this part of the Report.
157 Bonomi Report, note 31 and 92 referring to Hague Conference on Private International 
Law, Commission II of the Diplomatic Session, Minutes No 6, note 59 et seq. Although this 
rule does not explicitly refer to registered partnerships but only to marriages, according 
to the Report, the Member States recognizing such institutions in their legal systems may 
apply Art. 5.
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same-sex marriage, Bonomi offers them a solution in the form of the appli-
cation of the “basic” rules provided in Art. 3 and 6 of the 2007 Hague Main-
tenance Protocol.158 Finally, the Bonomi Report specifies that “a court or au-
thority in a State which does not recognize any effect of such a relationship 
(including in maintenance matters) could refuse the application of the for-
eign law to the extent that its effects would be manifestly contrary to the 
public policy of the forum”.159 Given these suggestions in the Bonomi Report, 
it may be admitted that the States in which same-sex marriages and regis-
tered partnerships are not recognized, should also apply the Protocol for the 
purpose of the maintenance proceedings. As recommended by Bonomi, such 
States may omit to apply Art. 5 of the Protocol and consider applying Art. 3 
and 6, according to which the rule on public policy may represent an ad-
ditional safeguard for such States. Therefore, the proposed solution would 
lose any relevance, if same-sex marriages and registered partnerships did not 
fall within the scope of application of the Protocol in respect of the Member 
States not recognizing such relationships.160 On the other hand, this solution 
does not seem convincing due to the impact on the uniformity of applica-
tion of the Protocol in the Contracting States. In fact, the purported option 
of the Contracting State to apply or not apply Art. 5 would cause differentia-
tion in the application of the Protocol,161 which goes against the goal of pro-
moting uniformity in its application as expressed by Art. 20.162 Although this 
solution could be accepted between the Contracting States as a tool to pre-
vent the refusal of ratification by the countries recognizing only “traditional” 
158 Bonomi Report, note 31 and 92.
159 Bonomi Report, note 92.
160 On the doubts regarding this solution see also Villata, Riv. dir. int. 94 (2011), 731 (739), 
according to whom it remains unlikely that such a Contracting State, which does not 
recognize same-sex unions, would qualify them as family relationships under the 2007 
Hague Maintenance Protocol and simply disapply Art. 5 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance 
Protocol.
161 Bonomi holds that the consequence of non-uniform application of the Protocol is not too 
serious, considering there exists the possibility to refuse the application of the law deter-
mined under the Protocol under Article 13 in case its effects would be manifestly contrary 
to the public policy of the forum, see Bonomi Report, note 31.
162 However, see Beaumont, RabelsZ 73 (2009), 510 (528), where the author in the context of 
delimitation of the scope of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Convention indicates this as 
the “usual” clause, presuming that there might be some diversity in the interpretation 
of the terms of the Convention due to political concerns of some States not to accept 
same-sex relationships or unmarried couples within the core scope. On the reaction to 
Beaumont, see Bremner, KSLR 2 (2010), 5 (22), who specifies that the Maintenance Regula-
tion covers a wider range of relationships than the 2007 Hague Maintenance Convention 
since the closer regional integration resulted in a more progressive and comprehensive 
coverage of this area.
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marriages, or as an “escape tool” for the same Contracting States allowing 
the application of the lex fori (i. e. when the creditor is habitually resident in 
such a Contracting State), this proposal should not result in a legitimate and 
non-binding option for the Member States of the EU, which are called upon 
to apply all provisions of the Protocol by the reference of Art. 15 Mainte-
nance Regulation in a uniform way.
All these considerations suggest that the Protocol does not need to refer 
to national law in order to determine if same-sex sex marriages and regis-
tered partnerships fall within its scope of application. The Contracting States 
more reluctant to recognize “new families” may apply the Protocol with the 
various safeguards contained therein. There are many reasons why it is dif-
ficult to imagine that such a conclusion should not be extended to the Main-
tenance Regulation. As mentioned above, Art. 15 Maintenance Regulation 
incorporates the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol and it would hardly be 
conceivable to accept the aforementioned interpretative approach only with 
regard to conflict of laws rules, but not to the Maintenance Regulation in toto. 
Moreover, the scope of the Maintenance Regulation was purposely aligned 
with Art. 1 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, which is “taken into ac-
count” in the Regulation.163 Therefore, the Bonomi Report is used also by the 
CJEU as an authoritative tool for the interpretation of the Maintenance Reg-
ulation in conjunction with the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol.164 Finally, 
even if a different reading of the material scope of the 2007 Hague Mainte-
nance Protocol is chosen and opinions favorable to the necessity to refer 
to national law would prevail, the same reasoning should not be extended 
to the interpretation of the Maintenance Regulation, which, as part of EU 
law, must be interpreted autonomously in all Member States.165
The main consequence of an interpretation of the notions of “family 
relationship”, “parentage”, “marriage” or “affinity” as capable of including 
same-sex marriages and registered partnerships would be the creation of a 
situation in which Member States called upon to decide on maintenance ob-
ligations arising out of same-sex unions, would be obliged to determine juris-
diction and applicable law under the Maintenance Regulation and the sub-
sequent decisions would circulate in the other Member States.
As mentioned above, although the Maintenance Regulation aims at guar-
anteeing “equal treatment of all maintenance creditors”, where autonomous 
163 Recital 8 Maintenance Regulation. See Art. 1 (1) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, 
which is also in conformity with Art. 1 of the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention.
164 CJEU, 20. 09.  2018, C-214/17 (Mölk/Mölk); CJEU, 07. 06.  2018, C-83/17 (KP/LO).
165 Davì/Zanobetti, Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ. 71 (2017), 197 (205).
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interpretation of the notions of the relevant family relationships should be 
recommended as the option ensuring the uniform application of the Main-
tenance Regulation in the Member States, some concerns as to the inter-
vention in the States’ sovereignty and its cultural diversity might arise. In 
this regard, it may be argued that other regulations in the field of European 
family law containing autonomous definitions of “sensitive” legal concepts 
provide for different safeguards, which are not foreseen in the Maintenance 
Regulation. This may be the case with, for example, Art. 9 Partnership Prop-
erty Regulation, which does not force Member States to accept their jurisdic-
tion under the Regulation if their law does not provide for the institution of 
registered partnership. However, although the Maintenance Regulation does 
not provide a similar jurisdictional rule, the safeguards have been shifted to 
the sphere of the applicable law. It is true that Member States not recognizing 
same-sex marriages or other unions shall apply the Maintenance Regulation 
and accept jurisdiction pursuant to its Art. 3 –  8, though they may still decide 
that the maintenance obligation in that particular relationship does not exist 
under Art. 3 (in the case of creditor’s habitual residence in such a Member 
State) in conjunction with Art. 11 (a) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Pro-
tocol,166 or they may invoke public policy.167
The public policy exception might become relevant in a situation where 
the court of Member State A, not acknowledging the status of married or 
registered same-sex couples and connected support under its legislation, is 
called to apply the law of Member State B which recognizes such a status 
(e. g. when the creditor has his or her habitual residence in Member State B 
and claims support under Art. 3 (a) Maintenance Regulation in the debtor’s 
forum, i. e. Member State A). Although such a Member State would have the 
possibility to invoke Art. 13 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, it must 
166 See Art. 11 (a) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, which determines the scope of 
applicable law and provides that the law applicable to the maintenance obligation shall 
determine “whether, to what extent and from whom the creditor may claim maintenance”. 
See also Actes et Documents de la Douzième session de la Conférence de la Haye de Droit 
International Privé (1972), Vol. II, p. 124, where in the preliminary Report to 1972 Hague 
Conventions written by Verwilghen, it is provided: “the article first makes it clear that the 
applicable law will determine the existence of the right to maintenance. One will therefore 
have to refer to the applicable law to ascertain whether the principle of the maintenance 
obligation is sanctioned in the particular relationship.” This may be a case where the law 
of such Member States does not regulate the maintenance obligations, for example arising 
out of registered partnerships, in their legal systems. It is questionable on the basis of the 
considerations above, whether such Member States would apply Art. 5 of the 2007 Hague 
Maintenance Protocol and would refer to the rule of “closure connection”.
167 Art. 13 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol.
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be borne in mind that the effects of the applicable law must be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the forum in concreto. The Bonomi Report 
stressed the use of public policy only in cases in which the payment of main-
tenance is seen as improper, so it will not be sufficient to invoke public po-
licy for the family relationship on which the maintenance claim is based 
when contrary to the public policy of the forum State.168 It follows that it 
would not be simple to justify the application of the public policy provision 
in a case of maintenance claims arising out of same-sex unions, since Art. 13 
should be applied with some caution. However, nothing precludes Member 
States from its application, insofar as the practical effects of the applicable 
foreign law would be manifestly contrary to the forum’s public policy.169 On 
the other hand, although the non-uniform application of Art. 5 of the 2007 
Hague Maintenance Protocol should not be supported, for the reasons men-
tioned above, in the same situation this provision could also operate to a cer-
tain extent as a safeguard for Member State A, as far as such a Member State 
would represent the closer connection pursuant to the provision. In practice, 
this would lead to the application of the lex fori of Member State A, under the 
law of which no maintenance obligation exists in that particular relationship, 
without the need to refer to public policy.
(iii) Relevance of scope with regard to the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions
In order to analyze what will happen once a court in Member State A or B 
delivers its decision in the situation described above, the recognition and 
enforcement regime under the Maintenance Regulation must first be sum-
marized. The Maintenance Regulation distinguishes between decisions given 
by a Member State bound by the Hague Maintenance Protocol (Chapter 4 
Section 1) and decisions given by a Member State not bound by the Hague 
Maintenance Protocol (Chapter 4 Section 2).170
Recognition of the latter decisions can be refused on the grounds of non-
recognition established in the Maintenance Regulation, including the public 
168 Bonomi Report, note 178.
169 See Badiali, La disciplina convenzionale, p. 122, who in the context of 1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Regulation does not exclude such an option.
170 After Brexit, Section 2 will be applicable to Denmark only. On the general aspects con-
cerning recognition of judgments under the Maintenance Regulation, see Siehr, in: Essays 
in honour of Hans van Loon, p. 529 –  535.
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policy exception (Art. 24 Maintenance Regulation). Therefore, one may imag-
ine that in a case in which, for example, a Danish court (not bound by the 
2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol) establishes maintenance obligations be-
tween a same-sex couple in its judgment under the Maintenance Regulation, 
theoretically, the court of another Member State, in which the recognition is 
sought, could deny it on the basis of its public policy under Art. 24 (a) Main-
tenance Regulation.171
The ordre public exception, however, no longer represents a ground for 
non-recognition of foreign judgments in exequatur procedures among the 
Member States bound by the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, due to 
the guarantee provided by the application of the uniform conflict of laws 
rules under the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol.172 It seems that the EU 
legislator was well aware of the problem connected with the non-recognition 
of specific types of unions in several Member States and subsequent mainte-
nance obligations based on such relationships,173 as long as Art. 22 and Re-
cital 25 Maintenance Regulation, on the one hand, force the Member States 
bound by the Protocol to recognize and enforce a decision on maintenance 
given in another Member State, and on the other hand, clarify that the rec-
ognition of said decision “has as its only object to allow the recovery of the 
maintenance claim determined in the decision”, while it “shall not in any 
way imply the recognition of the family relationship, parentage, marriage or 
affinity underlying the maintenance obligation which gave rise to the deci-
sion”. The same rationale of those provisions can be found in Art. 2 (2) of 
the 1973 Hague Maintenance Convention, in Art. 1 (2) of the 2007 Hague 
Maintenance Protocol and also in Art. 19 (2) of the 2007 Hague Maintenance 
Convention, which provides an important safeguard in relation to prelimi-
nary or ancillary questions.174 In other words, the Maintenance Regulation 
requires Member States to recognize and enforce only the part of the deci-
sion that deals with the maintenance payments, whereas the question of rec-
ognition or non-recognition of the underlying family status in that Member 
States is not relevant. The existence or non-existence of a family relationship 
determined for the purpose of the claim on maintenance, either as the main 
171 For general information concerning same-sex marriages, see the official website of the 
European Commission at https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/family/couple/marriage/
index_en.htm (last consulted 11. 06.  2020).
172 Recital 24 Maintenance Regulation.
173 Pesce, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, 
p. 62.
174 Borrás/Degeling Report, note 438.
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question or as an incidental question, does not bear any relevance for the 
purpose of the maintenance proceedings.175 Such a “disconnection clause” 
was included in the Regulation in order to achieve consensus on the (ab-
sence of) effects of the decisions on maintenance with regard to the under-
lying family relationship and to allay fears that the Regulation would have 
an unnecessary effect on domestic family law.176 This provision, although 
inserted in the section of the Maintenance Regulation concerning decisions 
given in a Member State bound by the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol, 
should be taken into account also by the Member States where the exequatur 
procedure is applicable when considering the public policy exception under 
Art. 24 (a).177
Therefore, going back to our example above, two scenarios are possible: 
A court in Member State A not recognizing same-sex unions may render a 
judgment declaring the non-existence of the maintenance obligations, and 
a court in Member State B recognizing same-sex unions may order the main-
tenance payment. On the basis of the considerations above, in the absence 
of an exequatur procedure and without the possibility to invoke the public 
policy exception, it must be assumed that both judgments will automati-
cally be recognized in the other Member State. In this regard, two concerns 
may arise: the protection of the maintenance creditor may be limited due 
to the decision rendered in State A, while the sovereignty of Member State 
A might be affected by the judgment issued in Member State B.178 As to the 
latter concern, it is worth mentioning that this situation would not change, 
even if an interpretation based on national law was admitted, as the Member 
States bound by the Maintenance Regulation, including Member State A, 
shall recognize such a judgment, as provided in Art. 22 Maintenance Regu-
lation, pursuant to which this “shall not in any way imply the recognition of 
the family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity underlying the main-
tenance obligation which gave rise to the decision”. As to the first concern, 
175 Villata, Riv. dir. int. 94 (2011), 731 (769).
176 Bremner, KSLR 2 (2010), 5 (23).
177 See Villata, Riv. dir. int. 94 (2011), 731 (769); Pesce, Le obbligazioni alimentari tra diritto 
internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, p. 314 and Castellaneta/Leandro, Nuove leg. 
civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062). On the similar conclusions concerning the use of the public 
policy exception under the 2007 Hague Maintenance Convention, see the Borrás/Degeling 
Report, note 438 and 479 contra Oberto, Dir. fam. 39 (2010), 802 (832 et seq.), who does not 
consider this issue to be so unambiguous. However, as stated above, this problem should 
not come into play, as Denmark and (pre-Brexit) UK regulate same-sex marriages.
178 However, as mentioned above, it is questionable whether the obligation to pay mainte-
nance could lead to an intolerable result in the Member States not recognizing only status.
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the maintenance creditor could rely, for example, on certain conditions as 
mentioned in Art. 8 Maintenance Regulation.179
b. Relevance of the notion of “family relationship, parentage, marriage 
or affinity” for status matters
(i) Principal questions
As specified at the beginning of this section, the status question is also 
relevant when the status represents the principal claim. Recital 21 Mainte-
nance Regulation clarifies that the conflict of laws rules under the Mainte-
nance Regulation do not govern the law applicable to the establishment of 
the family relationships on which the maintenance obligations are based, 
which continues to be covered by Member States’ national law, including 
their rules on private international law. It was initially proposed by the Com-
mission to include a full set of conflict of laws rules into the Regulation, 
covering the determination of the relationships that could form the basis of 
those claims.180 Although it was admitted that this option would have re-
duced discrepancies between Member States as to what and to whom main-
tenance obligations actually apply, it was rejected.181 Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that Recital 21 expressly excludes the establishment of family re-
lationships from the Maintenance Regulation, thereby leaving the notions 
179 The same formulation can be traced in Art. 18 of the 2007 Hague Maintenance Conven-
tion. Since this Convention should be “taken into account” by the Maintenance Regula-
tion (as provided in Recital 8), the Borrás/Degeling Report as to Art. 18 of the 2007 Hague 
Maintenance Convention provides for valuable interpretation. This Article operates as a 
rule of negative jurisdiction, which prohibits the debtor from seizing another jurisdiction 
to modify a decision or obtain a new decision where the original decision has been made 
in a Contracting State in which the creditor is habitually resident. However, this limitation 
is not applicable to the maintenance creditor. See in this regard also Pesce, Le obbligazioni 
alimentari tra diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, p. 156 et seq.
180 Commission staff working document – Annex to the Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation 
in matters relating to maintenance obligations – Impact assessment, SEC (2005) 1629, 
note 4.3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX: 52005 SC 16 
29 &from=EN (last consulted 03. 11.  2020).
181 Commission staff working document – Annex to the Proposal for a Council Regulation 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation 
in matters relating to maintenance obligations – Impact assessment, SEC (2005) 1629, 
note 4.3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005SC16 
29&from=EN (last consulted 03. 11.  2020).
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of “family relationship, parentage, marriage or affinity” untouched by the 
Maintenance Regulation.182 The law applicable to what constitutes a family 
relationship and the establishment of such relationships is governed by 
neither the 2007 Hague Maintenance Protocol nor the 1973 Hague Mainte-
nance Convention.183 However, as highlighted on several occasions, Art. 1 (2) 
of the Protocol (based on Art. 2 (2) of the 1973 Hague Maintenance Conven-
tion) specifies that “[d]ecisions rendered in application of this Protocol shall 
be without prejudice to the existence of any of the relationships referred to 
in paragraph 1”. Therefore, the Protocol keeps this issue out, and thus, the 
law applicable to the family relationships to which Art. 1 (1) refers (e. g. mar-
riage) is not directly governed by the Protocol.184 As the Bonomi Report and 
Recital 21 of the Regulation confirm, when the existence of the family rela-
tionship represents the principal claim, covering the case where the mainte-
nance claim is only accessorial to the dispute over the family status, the lex 
fori, including its conflict of laws rules, is to be applied.185 As a consequence, 
in Member States, the Rome III Regulation or the Member States’ conflicts of 
law rules will govern the status question.
(ii) Preliminary or incidental questions
The distinction between maintenance and personal status and the subsequent 
provision of different conflict of laws rules may often be the origin of pre-
liminary or incidental questions.186 In this regard, four alternative methods 
for solving the preliminary questions have been considered by scholars:187 
(1) applying the same law applicable to the main cause of action; (2) applying 
the conflict of law rules of the lex fori (so-called “independent reference”)188; 
(3) applying the conflict of law rules of the lex causae (so-called “depend-
ent reference”)189; or (4) directly applying the lex fori (substantive law) as a 
182 Castellaneta/Leandro, Nuove leg. civ. comm. 2009, 1051 (1062).
183 According to the Bonomi Report, note 23, this phrasing was not reproduced in the Pro-
tocol, probably because it was considered superfluous.
184 Bonomi Report, note 23.
185 Bonomi Report, note 31.
186 Martiny, Recueil des Cours 247 (1994), p. 131 (225).
187 A thorough review of the four methods was carried out by Gotlieb, Can. B. Rev. 33 (1955), 
523 (529) and again Gotlieb, ICLQ 26 (1977), 734.
188 Pfeiffer/Wittmann, in: Viarengo/Villata, Planning the Future of Cross Border Families. 
A Path Through Coordination, p. 47 (51); Gössl, JPIL 8 (2012), 63.
189 Torremans/Fawcett, in: Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law, p. 54.
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consequence of the alleged procedural nature of the incidental question190. 
As highlighted above, no difficulties arise when the existence of the family 
relationship represents the principal claim, the lex fori, including its conflict 
of laws rules, is to be applied. However, the same approach was not preferred 
by the Bonomi Report for the determination of the preliminary or inciden-
tal questions. That is the same solution proposed in the Verwilghen Report191 
for the 1956 and 1973 Hague Maintenance Conventions – i. e. applying the 
law designated to govern maintenance obligations also to the existence of a 
family relationship – when the main object of the claim is maintenance and 
the existence of the family relationship arises only on a preliminary basis.192
Although this approach could lead to the application of a law to family 
status other than the law applicable to the same issue when it is raised as 
the principal claim, to the detriment of internal harmony of solutions within 
the seized Member State, it should not be regarded as a major drawback in 
the absence of any res iudicata effect over the relevant family status. On the 
other hand, the proposed approach would foster predictability193 and a uni-
form application,194 which are the most relevant goals pursued by EU regula-
tions containing conflict of laws rules.195
However, as highlighted by Bonomi, this preferable approach is not bind-
ing for the EU Member States insofar as they may resolve the preliminary 
questions through, for example, an application of the “independent refer-
ence” method.196 In such a case, the conflict of law rules of the lex fori would 
operate, including the Rome III Regulation in the Member States which es-
tablished enhanced cooperation in that area.
190 Martiny, Recueil des Cours 247 (1994), p. 131 (225) On the advantages and disadvantages 
of these methods see Gössl, JPIL 8 (2012), 63 –  76; Wengler, in: International Encyclopedia 
of Comparative Law, p. 3 –  34; Mosconi/Campiglio, Diritto internazionale privato e pro-
cessuale, Vol. I, p. 255 et seq.
191 Verwilghen Report, note 125 et seq.
192 Bonomi Report, note 24. See Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, 12. 04.  2012, 5 UF 66/11, 
DES20120412, which resolved the preliminary question of paternity by reference to the 
same law governing the main maintenance issue.
193 Recital 19 Maintenance Regulation.
194 Pfeiffer/Wittmann, in: Viarengo/Villata, Planning the Future of Cross Border Families. 
A Path Through Coordination, p. 47 (51).
195 Villata, RDIPP 55 (2019), 714 et seq.
196 Bonomi Report, note 24. See also Mosconi/Campiglio, Diritto internazionale privato e pro-
cessuale, Vol. II, p. 248, who in the context of Maintenance Regulation mainly suggest the 
application of the same law applicable to the main cause of action, or of the conflict of law 
rules of the lex fori.
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2. The concept of marriage and registered partnership 
in the Property Regimes Regulations*
The Property Regimes Regulations set forth a comprehensive body of rules 
of private international law bringing together rules on jurisdiction, conflict 
of laws, and recognition and enforcement of court decisions, authentic in-
struments, and court settlements.197
They deal with the whole range of issues which may arise in connection 
with the property relationships of spouses or partners, both between them-
selves and in relation to third parties. During a lengthy and complex legisla-
tive process, it appeared that it would not have been possible to reach a un-
animous vote in the Council as required by Art. 81 (3) TEU for the adoption 
of measures concerning family law with cross-border implications. Even-
tually, the Regulations represent the outcome of enhanced cooperation pur-
suant to Art. 20 TEU.198 Therefore, they only bind the Member States that 
decided to participate in the enhanced cooperation, which implies being 
bound by both Regulations since Member States are not permitted to become 
bound by only one Regulation.
The Regulations, apart from obvious adaptations and save some excep-
tions, contain almost the same wording and numbering.
* This section is to be attributed to Ilaria Viarengo and Nicolò Nisi.
197 Pursuant to Art. 70, the Property Regimes Regulations became applicable on 29. 01.  2019. 
According to Art. 69, they apply to legal proceedings instituted on or after 29. 01.  2019, as 
well as to authentic instruments formally drawn up or registered, and to court settlements 
approved or concluded, on or after that date. For their part, the Regulations’ rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions apply to judgments predating 29. 01.  2019 as long 
as the rules of jurisdiction applied comply with those set out in the Regulations them-
selves. The conflict of laws rules of the Regulations apply to couples whose marriage or 
partnership was established after 29. 01.  2019. The Regulations’ provisions apply to couples 
that were already formed at that date, provided that the spouses or partners specify the 
law applicable to their property relations after the above date.
198 Council Decision (EU) 2016/954 of 09. 06.  2016 authorising enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on 
the property regimes of international couples, covering both matters of matrimonial prop-
erty regimes and the property consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 159/16, 16. 06.  
2016, p. 16 –  18.
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a. The notion of “marriage” in the Matrimonial Property Regulation*
The Matrimonial Property Regulation applies to matrimonial property re-
gimes with cross-border implications. It establishes harmonized connecting-
factors to determine jurisdiction and applicable law to matrimonial property 
regimes, in addition to unified recognition and enforcement rules of foreign 
judgments and authentic instruments, and is aimed at overcoming the hur-
dles faced by international couples due to the fragmentation among the na-
tional systems in the field of matrimonial property regimes.199
The Regulation provides for an autonomous notion of “matrimonial 
property regimes” which encompasses all civil law aspects related to “both 
the daily management of matrimonial property and the liquidation of the re-
gime, in particular as a result of the couple’s separation or the death of one 
of the spouses”200. In contrast, due to social, cultural, political, and legal dif-
ferences among Member States, no definition is provided with reference to 
the meaning of marriage, for which Recital 17 of the Regulation refers back 
to the national laws of the Member States, in line with other instruments in 
European family and succession matters that do not explicitly define mar-
riage for the purpose of their application. More clearly, Recital 21 adds that 
the Regulation “should not apply to other preliminary questions such as the 
existence, validity or recognition of a marriage, which continue to be covered 
by the national law of the Member States, including their rules of private in-
ternational law”201.
* This section is to be attributed to Nicolò Nisi.
199 As Recital 11 indicates, only 18 Member States are bound by the Regulation, namely 
Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, and 
Cyprus. Among the countries not participating, two groups of countries may be iden-
tified: the first group (Ireland and Denmark, in addition to the UK which is no longer 
a Member State), enjoys a special treatment in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Jus-
tice; the second group, on the contrary, consists of countries which have retained a “con-
servative” approach towards same-sex marriages and/or registered partnerships (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). Interestingly, five of the seven 
non-participating countries of this second group provide neither marriage nor registered 
partnerships to same-sex couples. These “conservative” Member States feared that obliga-
tory recognition and enforcement under the regulation would in fact lead to the transfer 
to their territories of the effects of foreign same-sex marriages and registered partnerships. 
This point is particularly stressed by Wysocka-Bar, ERA Forum 20 (2019), 187.
200 See Recital 18 Matrimonial Property Regulation. On such a notion, see also CJEU, 14. 06.  
2017, C-67/17 (Iliev/Ilieva); CJEU, 27. 03.  1979, C-143/78 (de Cavel/de Cavel). In the litera-
ture, see Las Casas, Nuove leggi civ. comm. 42 (2019), 1529.
201 This is confirmed by Art. 1 (2) (b) of the Regulation. It follows that the outcome of such 
an assessment may vary from Member State to Member State. See Rodríguez Benot, in: 
200 I. Viarengo, F. Villata, N. Nisi, L. Valkova, D. Danieli, and C. Peraro
The same principle also impacts the functioning of the jurisdictional rules 
of the Regulation. Under Art. 9 (1), as also acknowledged in Recital 38, the 
courts of a Member State may exceptionally decline their jurisdiction under 
the Regulation, should they hold that, under their private international law, 
the marriage in question cannot be recognized for the purposes of matrimo-
nial property regime proceedings, including the case where the marriage is 
converted by the legal system of the forum into a registered partnership.202 In 
such cases, in order to avoid the risk of denial of justice, the courts indicated 
in Art. 9 (2) would have jurisdiction.
The “gender-neutral”203 application of the Matrimonial Property Regula-
tion reflects the different attitudes of the Member States towards the institu-
tion of marriage and – despite the objective of facilitating the free movement 
of the persons in the EU, as provided by Recitals 1, 8, and 72 – makes it clear 
that the latter is not supposed to ensure the free circulation of marital status 
throughout the EU.
This was certainly an attempt to convince the greatest number of Member 
States to adopt the Regulation, thus avoiding the necessity to resort to en-
hanced cooperation,204 even for those countries that were interested in re-
maining in control of such a sensitive notion and therefore reluctant to 
Viarengo/Franzina, The EU Regulations on the Property Regimes of international Couples, 
Art. 1 note 1.16.
202 On this provision, see the critical remarks by Franzina, in: Viarengo/Franzina, The EU 
Regulations on the Property Regimes of international Couples, Art. 9 note 9.06, who 
claims that this provision serves an essentially political rather than a legal purpose. The 
same concern had already been discussed in the field of family law concerning the law 
applicable to divorce and legal separation. Art. 13 Rome III Regulation states that “nothing 
in this Regulation shall oblige the courts of a participating Member State whose law does 
not provide for divorce or does not deem the marriage in question valid for the purposes 
of divorce proceedings to pronounce a divorce by virtue of the application of this Reg-
ulation”. As recalled by Chalas, in: Corneloup, Art. 13 Rome III Regulation note 13.05, 
this provision was introduced for Malta, which did not provide for divorce at that time 
and did not want to force domestic courts to pronounce a divorce on the basis of a foreign 
law.
203 This definition was used by the Commission’s Communication accompanying the pro-
posal, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Bringing 
legal clarity to property rights for international couples, COM (2011) 125 final, note 4.
204 See the outcome of the meeting no. 3433 of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the 
European Union held on 3rd – 4th December 2015, where the Council did not reach a polit-
ical agreement by unanimity and acknowledged the will of many delegations to consider 
the establishment of an enhanced cooperation. Cf. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
meetings/jha/2015/12/03-04 (last consulted 26. 10.  2020).
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accept any obligation to acknowledge foreign legal relationships of the same 
kind, which domestically do not find any (or only partial) recognition.205
Although Recital 17 is explained by the political will to temper the effects 
of the Regulation, it is in any case evident that, irrespective of the non-bind-
ing nature of recitals,206 the lack of a definition of “marriage” is of the utmost 
importance and might have serious consequences for the practical applica-
tion of the Regulation in the participating Member States, with particular 
regard to those institutions – such as same-sex marriages – where an equiv-
alence is actually rather difficult to attain207. Indeed, among the latter, there 
is one State that does not provide internally any legal status for same-sex 
couples (Bulgaria), while five other countries only allow same-sex couples 
to enter into registered partnerships (Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Italy, 
and Cyprus)208. As a result, in cases connected with those Member States, as 
may happen worldwide, the spouses are left in great uncertainty, without the 
comfort of knowing in advance what part, if any, of their relationship will 
be recognized.
The characterization of a relationship as marriage for the purpose of the 
Regulation under the lex fori entails the risk for the spouses that their mar-
riage is not recognized or that the seized court declines its jurisdiction for 
the matrimonial property regime. Despite recent CJEU case law209, plain 
205 Ancel, in: Corneloup et al., Le droit européen des régimes patrimoniaux des couples, p. 41. 
See also Twardoch, Rev. crit. DIP 105 (2016), 465, explaining the hostility toward the Regu-
lation from a Polish law perspective.
206 On the role of preambles in the European legal instruments, see Klimas/Vaiciukaite, ILSA 
JICL 15 (2008), 61; Lemaire, Recueil Dalloz 2008, 2157. For some remarks on the extensive 
use of recitals in the field of European private international law, see Davì/Zanobetti, Il 
nuovo diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni, p. 23 fn. 74.
207 Marino, CDT 9 (2017), 265 (267), who also mentioned the example of marriages with or be-
tween minors, which might not be accepted under public policy grounds according to the 
ECtHR’s case law (reference is made to the judgment of 07. 07.  1986, no. 11579/85 (Khan/
the United Kingdom)).
208 In contrast, we can assume that countries having same-sex marriage in their own law 
will normally recognize foreign same-sex marriages as regular marriages, subject to the 
same recognition rules as any other marriage. See Wautelet, in: Boele-Woelki/Fuchs, Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe, p. 143.
209 See section III. While the ECtHR has affirmed the obligation for Contracting States to pro-
vide legal protection to same-sex unions, individuating civil partnerships as a solution to 
this problem (ECtHR, 21. 07.  2015, no. 18766/11 and 36030/11, (Oliari/Italy)), on the other 
hand, it has repeatedly affirmed that there is no positive obligation – neither under Art. 8 
nor under Art. 12 – for the States to ensure effective respect for the private and family 
life by recognizing same-sex marriage or any other legal status for the same-sex couples 
(ECtHR, 16. 07.  2014, no. 37359/09 (Hämäläinen/Finland)).
202 I. Viarengo, F. Villata, N. Nisi, L. Valkova, D. Danieli, and C. Peraro
recognition of marital status is in fact not always possible in countries which 
do not allow same-sex marriages, especially in those countries where the 
sexual difference of the spouses is enshrined in the constitution210.
In general terms, three different approaches have been identified to over-
come this practical problem: denial of effects of the marriage, partial or inci-
dental recognition of the marriage, downgrade recognition of the marriage 
as a registered partnership211.
The first approach consists of the denial of effects of the marriage and 
therefore all property consequences relating to this relationship212. Such 
a denial – albeit not necessarily in line with the EU law principle of non-
discrimination – would touch the very essence of the relationship, which 
would not even be downgraded and treated as a partnership. The question of 
what law applies to the consequences of marriage would therefore become 
irrelevant.
The second approach consists of the partial or incidental recognition of 
the marriage. As for other forms of family relationships unknown under na-
tional law,213 some countries may be prepared to recognize some of the con-
sequences of a same-sex marriage (or a different, in principle unrecogniz-
able marriage) validly concluded abroad. This was, for instance, the situation 
in France before the introduction of same-sex marriage in 2013, where the 
Minister of Justice stated that, provided none of the spouses were French 
nationals, a foreign same-sex marriage could produce effects in relation to 
the assets of the spouse, i. e. matrimonial property and succession.214 More 
generally, it could be possible to leave aside the problem of the recognition 
210 Arguing per analogiam from the Rome III Regulation, it has been argued that the reference 
in Recital 54 EU Charter and in particular Art. 21 thereof on the principle of non-discrim-
ination, could be interpreted in the sense that judgments concerning same-sex marriage 
should be recognized in the “conservative” Member States without the possibility of any 
recourse to public policy, as this recourse would be contradictory to the principle of non-
discrimination.
211 Gray/Quinza Redondo, Familie & Recht 2013.
212 See section IV.1.
213 See for instance the approach of national courts regarding the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign repudiation or the effects of kafala. In the Italian case law, see Corte 
di cassazione, 01. 03.  2019, no. 6161, http://www.marinacastellaneta.it/blog/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/6161.pdf (last consulted 02. 11.  2020); Corte di cassazione, 24. 11.  2017, 
no. 28154, http://www.marinacastellaneta.it/blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/kafala.pdf 
(last consulted 02. 11.  2020).
214 See the answer by the French Minister of Justice to question N° 16294, dated 09. 03.  2006, 
available in Revue critique de droit international privé 2006, 440. In the sense that some 
effects to foreign same-sex marriage could be recognized using the doctrine of the « effet 
atténué » of the public policy, see Revillard, Defrénois (2005), 461.
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of civil status abroad and to incidentally consider the marriage as a fact that 
causes the legal consequence of a patrimonial regime.215 The outcome would 
be that the State would be free not to accept the foreign marriage as a status 
acquired abroad, at the same time complying with the principle of non-dis-
crimination as envisaged in the EU Charter.216
The third approach consists of the so-called downgrade recognition, i. e. 
treating foreign same-sex marriages as if they were civil partnerships, regu-
lated either by foreign law or by domestic law. This model – albeit generally 
criticized for being in breach of fundamental human rights, for limiting the 
free movement of persons, and for the disregard of the legitimate expecta-
tions of the spouses – is already adopted by several States, including Italy, 
Switzerland, Croatia, Greece, and Cyprus.217
Italian legislation is a very interesting example to understand the func-
tioning of this approach, as the topic (i. e. the recently introduced Art. 32-
bis of the Italian PIL Act) has been highly debated among scholars.218 As 
already recalled, while such a provision expressly mentions only marriages 
concluded by at least one Italian, the PIL Act does not say anything con-
cerning same-sex marriages concluded abroad among foreigners. This lack 
of regulation has been interpreted by the prevailing scholarships as meaning 
that same-sex marriages among foreigners should be treated domestically as 
marriages,219 while some authors have retained a conservative approach and 
still believe that, in absence of a legislative development deleting the diver-
sity of sex as a requirement of substantive validity, it is not possible to infer 
any tacit modification of the notion of “marriage” as to include same-sex 
couples220.
215 In the same spirit, Recital 64 states that “the recognition and enforcement of a decision 
on matrimonial property regime under this Regulation should not in any way imply the 
recognition of the marriage underlying the matrimonial property regime which gave rise 
to the decision”. This principle is not new and applies also with regard to maintenance 
obligation under the Maintenance Regulation, which focuses only on the pecuniary and 
patrimonial content of the maintenance obligations and, at the stage of recognition of 
decisions, takes into account the binding nature of the performance separating it from any 
assessment of the family status on which it is based, see Pesce, Le obbligazioni alimentari 
tra diritto internazionale e diritto dell’Unione europea, p. 85 et seq.
216 Marino, CDT 9 (2017), 265 (268).
217 Noto La Diega, in: Hamilton/Noto La Diega, Same-Sex Relationship, Law and Social 
Change, p. 33 et seq.
218 See section III.2. See, in particular, the criticism by Lopes Pegna, DUDI 10 (2016), 89 (112 et 
seq.).
219 See the authors mentioned in fn. 56.
220 See in particular Pesce, RDIPP 55 (2019), 777 (810 –  813); Campiglio, RDIPP 53 (2017), 33 (45 
et seq.), also focusing on the risk of reverse discrimination to the detriment of Italian na-
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b. The notion of “registered partnership” in the Partnership 
Property Regulation*
While a definition of marriage is missing, Art. 3 (1) (a) Partnership Property 
Regulation provides for an autonomous definition of registered partnership. 
It defines registered partnership as the regime of “shared life of two people 
which is provided for in law, the registration of which is mandatory under 
that law and which fulfils the legal formalities required by that law for its 
creation”.221 However, Recital 17 points out that such a concept is solely func-
tional for the purposes of this Regulation and that the actual substance of the 
concept should remain defined in the national laws of the Member States. 
Therefore, the Regulation does not oblige a Member State whose law does 
not have the institution of registered partnership to provide for it in its na-
tional law.
The existence, validity, or recognition of a registered partnership are 
excluded from the material scope of the Regulation.222 This is stressed in 
Recital 21 and Art. 1 (2) (b) Property Regimes Regulations which state that 
such preliminary matters continue to be “covered by the national law of the 
Member States, including their rules of private international law”. Therefore, 
the authority of the relevant Member State should verify the existence of any 
marriage or registered partnership, their validity, and recognition. Finally, 
the Regulation specifies that the recognition and enforcement of a decision 
on a property regime should not in any way imply the recognition of the reg-
istered partnership which gave rise to the decision.223
tionals in cases of equivalence of foreign same-sex marriages as domestic marriages. This 
strict interpretation also builds on the relevant case law which – despite recent open-
ings expressed obiter (e. g. Corte di cassazione, 14. 05.  2018, no. 11696, http://www.ilcaso.
it/giurisprudenza/archivio/19799.pdf (last consulted 02. 11.  2020)) – has so far excluded 
recognition of same-sex marriages. See from the many decisions Corte di cassazione, 
15. 03.  2012, no. 4184, http://www.giurcost.org/casi_scelti/Cassazione/Cass.sent.4184-2012.
htm (last consulted 02. 11.  2020); Corte di cassazione, 09. 02.  2015, no. 2400, http://www.
europeanrights.eu/public/sentenze/Cassazione-Civile-Sez.-I-9-febbraio-2015-n.-2400.pdf 
(last consulted 02. 11.  2020).
* This section is to be attributed to Ilaria Viarengo.
221 A definition of the property consequences accompanying registered partnerships is also 
provided for. According to Art. 3 (b) Partnership Property Regulation they are “the set of 
rules concerning the property relationships of the partners, between themselves and in 
their relations with third parties, as a result of the legal relationship created by the regis-
tration of the partnership or its dissolution”.
222 Art. 1 (2) (b) Partnership Property Regulation.
223 Recital 64 Partnership Property Regulation.
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Notwithstanding this autonomous definition, the Partnership Property 
Regulation confirms the usual, rather cautious attitude of the European leg-
islator in all European regulations when family status is important as a pre-
liminary question.224
The countries regulating registered partnerships show remarkable differ-
ences as to what is being regulated. This form of partnership has been or is 
being regulated in an increasing number of States (often but not necessarily 
restricted to same-sex individuals), and it covers a wide and diverse reality. In 
order to respect the peculiarities of all Member States as well as their legisla-
tive powers, the Regulation makes clear the boundaries of the definition of 
registered partnerships. However, an autonomous definition in the Partner-
ship Property Regulation is provided and it is meant to prevent discrepancies 
which may arise between Member States when it comes to the interpretation 
and application of the Regulation.
224 See, albeit with different wording and subject to different interpretations, Art. 1 (3) (a) 
Brussels II bis Regulation, Art. 2 (b) Rome III Regulation, and Art. 1 (2) (a) Succession 
Regulation, which expressly exclude family status from their scope. Art. 22 Maintenance 
Regulation provides that the recognition and enforcement of a decision on maintenance 
shall not in any way imply the recognition of the family relationship, parentage, marriage 
or affinity underlying the maintenance obligation which gave rise to the decision. The issue 
of the preliminary question has been treated in particular in the German legal doctrine of 
private international law. It is disputed between the independent solution (selbständige 
Anknüpfung), which furthers international harmony of decisions, and dependant solution 
(unselbständige Anknüpfung), which serves the purpose of internal harmony of decisions. 
See Siehr, YPIL 7 (2005), p. 17 (50); Bernitt, Die Anknüpfung von Vorfragen im europäischen 
Kollisionsrecht; Henrich, in: Liber amicorum Klaus Schurig, p. 63; Gössl, JPIL 8 (2012), 63; 
Dutta, IPRax 2015, 32; Pfeiffer/Wittmann, in: Viarengo/Villata, Planning the future of cross-
border families: a path through coordination, p. 47. In recent years, a growing number 
of contributions have devoted attention to how legal concepts traditionally categorized 
as general are designed in the Regulations thus far enacted by the European legislator. 
Cf. Hausmann, RDIPP 51 (2015), 499 et seq.; Rühl/von Hein, RabelsZ 79 (2015), 701 et seq.; 
Leible, General Principles of European Private International Law. With regard to the Prop-
erty Regimes Regulations, see Bonomi, in: Dutta/Weber, Die Europäischen Güterrrechts-
verordnungen, p. 140. Actually, the preliminary question does not seem to be an issue for 
the courts. See also Mäsch, in: Leible, General Principles of European Private International 
Law, p. 101 et seq. In the EUFams II database, a case of the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt 
am Main, 12. 04.  2012, 5 UF 66/11, DES20120412, is reported, in which the German Court of 
Appeal, applying the Maintenance Regulation, resolved the preliminary question of pater-
nity by reference to the same law governing the main maintenance issue.
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(i) Requirements for registered partnerships
Two conditions are required for the property consequences of a registered 
partnership to be included in the scope of the Regulation.
First, the Regulation establishes formal requirements for registered part-
nerships. A “mandatory” registration of the partnership is required. The Reg-
ulation draws a distinction between couples whose union is institutionally 
sanctioned by the registration of their partnership with a public authority and 
couples in de facto cohabitation, regardless of whether the relevant Member 
State, such as Italy,225 makes provisions for such de facto unions. In that re-
spect, the wording of Recital 16 is clear. Therefore, “registered” means that 
the partnership has been included in a public register by a public authority 
and, consequently, can be consulted by third parties. Excluded are not only 
free, unregistered partnerships, but also partnerships which require a formal 
partnership agreement, drawn up by a notary or other public official, but not 
necessarily a registration. The latter seem to fall in the scope of application of 
the Brussels I bis Regulation. In a recent judgment, the CJEU held that an ac-
tion concerning an application for dissolution of the property relationships 
arising out of a de facto (unregistered) partnership falls within the concept 
of “civil and commercial matters” within the meaning of Art. 1 (1) Brussels I 
Regulation, now superseded by the Brussels I bis Regulation, and therefore 
falls within the scope of that instrument.226
The partnership can be registered in any country of the world. In fact, 
no reference to the place of the recording of the partnership is made in the 
Regulation. Actually, the irrelevance of the place of registration to this ex-
tent seems rather obvious since the law designated pursuant to the Regula-
tion, given its universal character according to Art. 20, shall apply regardless 
of whether it is the law of a Member State.227
Second, the couple must not be deemed to be married. The partnership may 
have similar or even identical effects to marriage, but cannot formally be de-
fined as marriage, which is governed by the Matrimonial Property Regulation.
225 Legge 20 maggio 2016 n. 76, Regolamentazione delle unioni civili tra persone dello stesso 
sesso e disciplina delle convivenze, Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 218 del 
20 maggio 2016.
226 CJEU, 06. 06.  2019, C-361/18 (Weil/Gulácsi), note 45. Art. 1 (2) (a) Brussels I bis Regulation 
excludes rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship from the scope of 
that Regulation. The Brussels I bis Regulation extends that exclusion to rights in property 
arising out of a relationship deemed by the law applicable to such a relationship to have 
comparable effects to marriage.
227 Rodríguez Benot, in: Viarengo/Franzina, The EU Regulations on the Property Regimes of 
international Couples, Art. 3 note 3.06.
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(ii) Same-sex couples
Notwithstanding the autonomous notion in the Partnership Property Regu-
lation, the definition of the concept of registered partnership, including as 
regards their availability both to same-sex and opposite-sex couples or to 
same-sex couples only, involves a referral to national law. Given the great 
and growing variety of couple regimes within the EU, it is beyond doubt that 
this approach may jeopardize one of the main goals of the Regulation, i. e. the 
harmony of decisions among participating Member States.228
Member States that do not allow same-sex marriages are not obliged to 
apply the Matrimonial Property Regulation to such couples. Those Member 
States could, however, subject same-sex marriages at least to the Partner-
ship Property Regulation. This may occur in particular in those States where 
same-sex marriages established abroad have to be characterized as regis-
tered partnerships rather than marriages. For example, the “downgrade rec-
ognition” provided in Art. 32-bis of the Italian PIL Act affects also the appli-
cation of the relevant private international law. Hence, the marriage at stake 
will fall in the scope of the Partnership Property Regulation instead of the 
Matrimonial Property Regulation.
As a matter of fact, the very same marriage concluded between spouses 
of the same sex can fall, depending on the forum, under either of the Prop-
erty Regimes Regulations. This depends on whether or not the lex fori recog-
nizes same-sex marriages.
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Abstract Analyzing the interface of private international and procedural 
law with situations that involve third country nationals is of the essence to 
promote a uniform and effective regulation of family and succession matters 
in pursuance of the free circulation of persons in the EU. The importance of 
this analysis is reaffirmed by the increasing migration flows from third States 
and by the refugee crisis that the EU Member States are experiencing to date. 
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In particular, the variety of pertinent instruments, together with their pos-
sible different application at the national level, may prove to be a source of 
significant uncertainty. Against this background, this contribution examines 
the impact of procedural aspects in cases involving third country nationals 
on the objectives of predictability, effectiveness, and harmonized solutions in 
EU family and succession law.
Keywords jurisdiction, recognition of status, lis alibi pendens, third coun-
try nationals, habitual residence, Brussels II bis Regulation, Brussels II ter 
Regulation
I. Introduction
With regard to third country nationals and, in particular, refugees, there does 
not appear to be uniformity in the number or the setting of the cross-border 
cases analyzed within the EUFams II Project. As will be further illustrated 
throughout this contribution, the number of cases collected and analyzed do 
not seem to be proportional to the dimension of the Member States of origin 
or the size of their population. On the other hand, this lack of consistency 
may be traced back to the geographical, historical, and socio-cultural back-
ground of the Member States examined within the Project.
For instance, Luxembourg is a landlocked country traditionally attract-
ing foreigners from the surrounding EU Member States,1 as reflected in many 
cross-border family cases involving nationals from Belgium, France, and 
Germany. Germany, on the other hand, has many historical relations to non-
Member States due to its long history of migrant labor, attracting workers 
in particular from Turkey and the successor States of former Yugoslavia, but 
also due to the international relations with the occupying powers after World 
War II, some of whose nationals decided to stay in Germany.2
Significant migration flows from numerous countries also occur in 
Spain, in particular stemming from Spain’s longstanding historical relations 
with Latin-American countries and its geographical proximity to Northern 
1 According to the annual census of 2020, approximately 88 % of foreigners living in Lux-
embourg are EU citizens, cf. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques du 
Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Population par nationalités détaillées 2011 –  2020.
2 According to statistics from 2019, around 3.5 million out of 11.2 million foreigners living in 
Germany are third country nationals; cf. Destatis – Statistisches Bundesamt, Foreign pop-
ulation by place of birth and selected citizenships on 31 December 2019.
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African countries.3 Furthermore, the presence of other foreigners, such as UK 
nationals,4 is likely a result of Spain being a renowned retirement destina-
tion. However, compared to the notable presence of third country nationals 
in Spain, the number of disputes involving third country nationals is far from 
voluminous.
Italy, on the other hand, has only in recent decades been increasingly re-
ceiving immigrants, primarily from third States.5 The cases collected in the 
EUFams II database do not pinpoint specific non-Member States involved 
more frequently than others in cross-border family cases. However, it is of 
note that a high incidence of proceedings includes third country nationals 
from South Eastern and Eastern Europe, North Africa, as well as from China 
and Switzerland, the common border likely being the primary factor contrib-
uting to the number of disputes between Italy and Switzerland.
The shared border is also at the origin of the cases brought before Greek 
courts and connected to Albania, from which a significant portion of the im-
migration flows into Greece originated in the last decades.6 Similarly, while 
the vast majority of the Croatian jurisprudence collected within the project 
is related to intra-EU cases,7 Croatian third State-related cases are most fre-
quently connected to neighboring countries and, in particular, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Furthermore, with regard to France, many cases involving nationals from 
third States formerly under French colonial control show that the parties 
either had double citizenship or had exclusively kept their third State na-
tionality.8 Finally, while no prevailing trends can be identified at present as 
concerns Sweden, it is expected that the 2015 refugee crisis may successively 
3 King/Lulle, Research on Migration, especially p. 16 –  18.
4 Following the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU on 31. 01.  2020, for the purposes 
of this contribution the United Kingdom is considered as a third State, regardless of the 
transition period currently running and expiring on 31. 12.  2020; cf. Art. 126 of the Agree-
ment on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ C 384I, 12. 11.  
2019, p. 1 (59).
5 As of 2019, nearly half of the over 5 million foreigners legally residing in Italy are third 
country nationals; cf. Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Stranieri residenti al 1° gennaio – 
Cittadinanza.
6 According to a report of the Greek statistical authority based on the last census in 2011, 
of all foreign persons that settled in Greece during the last five years before the census, 
almost a third originated from Albania; cf. Hellenic Statistical Authority, Press Release on 
2011 Population and Housing Census – Migration.
7 Of the 61 Croatian cases collected in the project database, only 18 relate to third States.
8 See p. 224.
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lead to an increased number of cases in this Member State involving, e. g., 
Syrian nationals.
Despite these historical and geographical differences at the outset, pre-
vailing trends and common difficulties in applying the European and inter-
national legal framework in cross-border family matters can be identified. 
Notably, based on the case law collected within the EUFams II Project, this 
contribution sheds light on the peculiarities of cases involving third coun-
try nationals with regard to jurisdiction, the coordination of parallel pro-
ceedings, the recognition of statuses abroad and, to some extent, the circula-
tion of foreign judgments. In this context, particular consideration is given to 
procedural aspects of cross-border family cases before Member States’ courts 
involving refugees and migrants.
II. The jurisdiction of Member States’ courts vis-à-vis 
third country nationals
1. General tendencies
According to the analysis of the case law collected in the EUFams II database, 
legal separation and divorce, parental responsibility, maintenance, and child 
abduction are the areas in cross-border family disputes where third country 
nationals are most frequently involved. In contrast, few disputes involving 
third country nationals were reported in succession matters.
a. Assessment of jurisdictional grounds
As a general tendency, the analysis of collected case law shows that Member 
State courts do not always assess their jurisdiction ex officio or only do so im-
plicitly, in particular if the defendant does not contest jurisdiction. This ap-
proach can be observed both in cases concerning EU nationals9 and in cases 
involving third country nationals. For instance, in a case involving an Egyp-
tian-Luxembourgish couple, the Luxembourgish wife filed a petition for di-
vorce before a Luxembourgish court only one month after she had moved to 
Luxembourg from the United Arab Emirates, where she had lived with her 
9 See for instance Cour d’appel de Lyon, 09. 05.  2017, no. 15/07268, FRS20170509; Tribunal 
d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 20. 12.  2018, no. 506/2018, LUF20181220.
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husband, an Egyptian national.10 The court correctly held that none of the 
jurisdiction grounds of Art. 3 Brussels II bis Regulation were applicable, as 
the husband (the defendant) was domiciled in a third State, and the spouses 
never had their common habitual residence in an EU Member State. As the 
husband did not challenge the jurisdiction, the court did not assess its juris-
diction any further, even though Art. 6 Brussels II bis Regulation leads to the 
application of national jurisdiction rules in such a case. Arguably, the court 
proceeded to implicitly assess the establishment of its jurisdiction under do-
mestic law.11
Similar occurrences are reported in Italy, in cases involving both na-
tionals from Member States and third States, especially with respect to appli-
cations for maintenance both in divorce and parental responsibility cases12, 
as well as to specific claims such as the award of the family home.13 Possibly 
because the circumstances of the cases were rather linear and undisputed 
and the decision on the substance of the case remained unaffected, in these 
cases, the question of jurisdiction was not addressed explicitly by the court.
b. The concept of “habitual residence”
As the jurisdiction grounds in the EU regulations on family matters are pre-
dominantly based on the parties’ habitual residence in the EU, the practical 
relevance of nationality and, in particular, of a third State nationality is lim-
ited. This result is particularly evident in Art. 3 Brussels II bis Regulation, 
where the parties’ nationality only plays a minor role with a view to es-
tablishing jurisdiction in divorce and legal separation proceedings.14 In ad-
dition, as the respective jurisdiction ground based on nationality (Art. 3 (b) 
10 Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 07. 01.  2016, no. 3/2016, LUF20160107.
11 The court might have implicitly accepted its jurisdiction under the exorbitant jurisdiction 
rule of Art. 14 of the Luxembourgish Civil Code, which grants a forum to Luxembourgish 
citizens vis-à-vis foreigners who do not reside in Luxembourgish territory; cf. on this pro-
vision Kinsch, in: Encyclopedia of Private International Law, p. 2296 (2301); Wiwinius, Le 
droit international privé au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, p. 241 et seq.
12 Tribunale di Cuneo, 19. 02.  2018, ITF20180219; Tribunale di Monza, 21. 03.  2019, 
ITF20190321; Tribunale di Monza, 03. 07.  2019, ITF20190703; Tribunale di Milano, 11. 12.  
2018, ITF20181211; Tribunale di Rimini, 12. 06.  2018, ITF20180612; Tribunale di Vicenza, 
30. 10.  2018, ITF20181030; Tribunale di Treviso, 08. 01.  2019, ITF20190108.
13 Tribunale di Parma, 06. 05.  2019, ITF20190506.
14 The longstanding debate on the adequateness of nationality or habitual residence as 
connecting-factors in private international law shall not be repeated here; cf. Bogdan, in: 
Meeusen et al., International family law for the European Union, p. 303 et seq.; Nishitani, 
Recueil des Cours 401 (2019), p. 135 (251 et seq.).
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Brussels II bis Regulation) only refers to the spouses’ common nationality of 
a Member State; a third State citizenship remains irrelevant.
In line with this, several court decisions omit any references to the parties’ 
third State nationalities, as their habitual residence in the forum suffices for 
the purposes of establishing jurisdiction under the applicable EU instrument. 
For instance, in a divorce case concerning a couple that had married in Al-
bania and filed for divorce in Greece, the parties’ nationality was not men-
tioned in the judgment. Instead, the court only referred to the residence of 
the parties in Greece.15 In a similar fashion, Croatian judgments are not de-
scriptive as regards the method applied to establish the parties’ habitual resi-
dence. In cases where the habitual residence is located in a third State, this 
is merely declared by the court in its judgment.16 Similarly, the general juris-
diction rule in matters of parental responsibility (Art. 8 Brussels II bis Regu-
lation) only refers to the child’s habitual residence. It is, therefore, irrelevant 
whether a third country national or an EU national is involved as a parent.17
However, it does not appear from the collected case law that courts of 
the Member States examined in the project systemically differentiate based 
on EU citizenship or non-EU citizenship when assessing habitual residence, 
or that they “over-”confirm the establishment of habitual residence in their 
respective territory with regard to third country nationals. Notably, courts 
have indeed dismissed actions on the grounds that the parties’ habitual 
residence was located in non-EU countries.18
15 Cf. Kos Single-Member Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio Ko), 07. 12.  2017, 
no. 125/2017, ELF20171207. In another case, a couple who had married in Pakistan, di-
vorced in Germany and then sought recognition of the divorce in Greece, whereby the 
Greek court did not refer to the parties’ nationality; cf. Ioannina Single-Member Court of 
First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio Ioanninon), 01. 01.  2008, no. 84/2008, ELF20080084.
16 Županijski sud u Zagrebu, 05. 03.  2019, Gž Ob-82/2019, HRS20190305; Županijski sud u 
Splitu, 24. 08.  2018, Gž Ob-474/2017-2, HRS20180824.
17 For instance, in one parental responsibility case where the Albanian applicant did not 
possess a residence permit in Greece, the case was adjudicated nonetheless because the 
court based its jurisdiction on the habitual residence of the child under the Brussels II bis 
Regulation; cf. Grevena Single-Member Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio 
Grevenon), 09. 09.  2013, no. 96/2013, ELF20130909. Similarly, a court in Spain ruled that, 
in accordance with Art. 3 (d) Maintenance Regulation, it did not have jurisdiction to issue 
provisional measures concerning a child habitually residing in Ecuador with his mother. 
The father had applied for such measures taking advantage of the fact that the child was 
spending his summer vacation in Spain; see Audiencia Provincial de Baleares, 29. 10.  2018, 
no. 178/2018, ESS20181029.
18 In particular, the French Court of Cassation has repeatedly ruled on the “close connection” 
in French-American succession cases, in which the last habitual residence of the testator 
was ultimately denied; see Cour de cassation, 27. 09.  2017, 16-17198, FRT20170927; Cour 
de cassation, 27. 09.  2017, no. 16-13151, FRT20170927a. For matters of parental responsibil-
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Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy that, in a recent Luxembour-
gish case19 concerning the recognition of a Chinese divorce decree, the Lux-
embourgish court gave particular weight to the parties’ habitual residence 
when reviewing the issuing authority’s jurisdiction under national recog-
nition rules.20 Notably, the court held that the habitual residence, and not the 
parties’ (in this case, Chinese) nationality, is to be considered as the predomi-
nant connecting-factor under the general principle of “proximity”. Thus, the 
non-EU citizenship was given less weight compared to the connection to 
Luxembourg as the place of the spouses’ common habitual residence.21 This 
case shows how the predominant role of habitual residence as the primary 
jurisdictional ground in the EU regulations on cross-border family cases may 
influence the assessment of jurisdiction also in cases that fall under national 
procedural law. This prevalence of the “habitual residence” as a connecting-
factor to assess the courts’ jurisdiction may be linked to its dynamic nature 
and its aptitude to prove the settlement of an individual into a specific coun-
try. Thus, the underlying EU policy22 connected to the concept of “habitual 
residence” aimed at fostering the integration of both EU citizens and third 
country nationals in the internal market appears to potentially influence the 
assessment of jurisdiction vis-à-vis third country nationals outside the scope 
of application of the EU regulations.
c. Forum shopping, access to justice and interest-based deviations 
from default jurisdiction rules
From the collected case law, it appears that courts rarely deviate from gen-
eral jurisdiction rules under the EU regulations. As the habitual residence is 
usually the decisive connecting-factor for the purposes of jurisdiction, the 
ity see for instance Audiencia Provincial de Girona, 28. 03.  2019, no. 57/2019, ESS20190328, 
in which the Spanish court found that the child’s habitual residence was established in 
Peru, and thus denied its jurisdiction under the Brussels II bis Regulation.
19 Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 09. 01.  2019, no. 7/2019, LUF20190109; see 
p. 233.
20 On national procedures for the recognition of foreign judgments, see p. 232 et seq.
21 See also Cour d’appel de Paris, 30. 05.  2017, no. 16/24111, FRS20170530. In this case con-
cerning parallel proceedings, the Court of Appeal held that the parties’ Algerian nation-
ality established only little connection to Algeria, as they had been residing in France for 
several years before the French courts were seized.
22 On the underlying rationale of the “habitual residence” as connecting-factor in EU private 
international law see for instance Lurger, in: von Hein/Rühl, Kohärenz im Europäischen 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht, p. 202 (215 et seq.); Rentsch, Der gewöhnliche 
Aufenthalt im System des Europäischen Kollisionsrechts, p. 68 et seq., 77 et seq.
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jurisdiction of the forum is easily established. Consequently, courts do not 
have a particular incentive to adopt a discretionary or flexible approach to 
deviate from these objective results. 23 Also, for reasons of legal certainty, 
the hard-and-fast jurisdiction rules of the EU regulations on family law 
rarely allow courts to deny their jurisdiction on a discretionary basis, i. e., on 
the grounds that the courts of another State would be better suited to hear 
the case.24
However, parties themselves might try to circumvent the objective juris-
diction rules put forth in the EU regulations. Notably, some divorce cases 
before French courts involving third country nationals from countries that 
were formerly under French colonial control highlight a particular tendency 
of forum shopping. In a divorce case involving French-Algerian dual cit-
izens,25 the wife started divorce proceedings in France based on the spouses’ 
habitual residence under Art. 3 (1) (a) indent 1 Brussels II bis Regulation. The 
husband had previously seized a civil court in Algeria, whose jurisdiction 
was contested by the wife. Subsequently, the French court declined the rec-
ognition of the Algerian divorce decision on the grounds of public policy,26 
as the Algerian court had granted the divorce in favor of the husband based 
on his unilateral action (repudiation). In this regard, the tactic to seek the di-
vorce decree before the Algerian court and subsequently its incidental recog-
nition before the French court circumvented the jurisdiction grounds under 
the Brussels II bis Regulation.27 Other cases highlight a tendency of courts to 
deviate from jurisdiction rules based on considerations of the parties’ inter-
ests, in particular access to justice within the EU.28 For instance, in a Luxem-
bourgish divorce case concerning an Egyptian-Luxembourgish couple,29 it 
remains unclear on which grounds the Luxembourgish court seized by the 
23 However, on the modulations of the criterion of habitual residence in EU family law in-
struments and its features especially with regard to child abduction cases see Beaumont/
Holliday, in: Zupan, Private International Law in the Jurisprudence of European Courts – 
Family at Focus, p. 37 –  56, highlighting how, in the United Kingdom, the concept of ha-
bitual residence of the child has developed from one which used to put weight on parental 
intention to a mixed model, which takes a more child-centered and fact-based approach.
24 On Art. 15 Brussels II bis Regulation (Art. 12 and 13 Brussels II ter Regulation), which es-
tablishes a limited forum conveniens-rule according to the best interests of the child, see 
Pataut, in: Malatesta/Bariatti/Pocar, The External Dimension of EC Private International 
Law in Family and Succession Matters, p. 123 (145 et seq.).
25 Cour d’appel de Paris, 30. 05.  2017, no. 16/24111, FRS20170530.
26 On this refusal ground, see p. 234.
27 For the development of French jurisprudence on the evasion of law in cross-border divorce 
cases cf. Ancel, in: YPIL 7 (2005), p. 261 et seq.
28 Concerning refugees, see p. 237 et seq.
29 Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 07. 01.  2016, no. 3/2016, LUF20160107.
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wife affirmed its jurisdiction.30 The underlying motive for the court’s ap-
proach could have been to grant the wife access to divorce in Luxembourg, as 
she might not have had equal access to divorce in the United Arab Emirates, 
where the couple had its last habitual residence.
An area of law in which Member State courts are granted a certain dis-
cretionary approach in intra-EU cases is the jurisdiction for parental respon-
sibility cases under the Brussels II bis Regulation. This instrument attributes 
a significant role to the best interests of the child, which may also impact the 
determination of, inter alia, jurisdiction.31 For instance, an Italian court ini-
tially and provisionally established its jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 12 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation over a parental responsibility case lodged (together 
with an action for legal separation) by the husband against the mother, who 
was habitually resident in Spain with the children. However, in a subsequent 
judgment, the court ruled that, although its jurisdiction over the case was 
properly established in accordance with Art. 12 Brussels II bis Regulation, 
in the case at hand the establishment of its jurisdiction did not satisfy the 
children’s best interest as a result of the highly conflictual relationship be-
tween the parents in relation to the children’s living arrangements.32 This 
conclusion is also reinforced by the fact that the residence of the children 
would make it difficult – despite the coordination mechanism provided by 
the Taking of Evidence Regulation – to adopt fast and efficacious decisions. 
Therefore, the court declined jurisdiction over the application on parental re-
sponsibility.
Interestingly, jurisdiction was declined irrespective of the parties’ will – at 
the time of the institution of the proceeding – to let the Italian court decide 
on parental responsibility. Thus, the ultimately decisive court’s assessment 
of the compatibility of the chosen forum with the child’s best interests pre-
vailed over party autonomy. To what extent similar interest-based jurisdic-
tional assessments may be adopted in cases with connections to third States 
is left to domestic procedural law by the Brussels II bis Regulation and the 
Brussels II ter Regulation.33
30 See p. 221.
31 See e. g. Corte di Cassazione, 30. 09.  2016, no. 19599, IT:CASS:2016:19599CIV, and 15. 06.  
2017, no. 14878, CASS:2017:14878CIV. The decisions of the Corte di Cassazione, rendered 
as of 2015, are available at http://www.italgiure.giustizia.it/sncass/ (last consulted 03. 06.  
2020).
32 Tribunale di Roma, 14. 06.  2019, ITF20190614a.
33 See p. 227 et seq. and 235.
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2. The interrelation between EU regulations, domestic procedural 
law, and international instruments
a. The residual scope of application of national jurisdiction grounds
The interplay of EU and national jurisdiction grounds gives rise to uncer-
tainties in particular with regard to the Brussels II bis Regulation, which 
grants a residual role to national jurisdiction rules when no court of a 
Member State has jurisdiction under the Regulation (Art. 6 et seq. and Art. 14 
Brussels II bis Regulation). For instance, in a parental responsibility case in-
volving Greek nationals,34 the grandmother seized a Greek court to have her 
access rights regulated with regard to her grandchild, who was living in Cali-
fornia with the child’s mother. The court applied national jurisdiction rules 
and accepted its jurisdiction on the basis of the parties’ Greek nationality. It 
denied the applicability of the Brussels II Regulation, arguing that there was 
no international element for the purposes of the Regulation. However, the 
international element is not restricted to purely intra-EU cases in order for 
the Regulation to apply.35 Thus, the court erroneously denied the territorial 
applicability of the Brussels II bis Regulation.36
In the same vein, in third country national-related cases, Croatian courts 
have applied standards set by the former domestic private international law 
rules, instead of an EU regulation, on the erroneous assumption that issues 
related to third country nationals fall outside the scope of application of the 
Brussels II bis regime.37 However, in a case relating to Russian citizens who 
clearly had their habitual residence in Croatia, such a practice of the court of 
first instance was corrected by the appellate court.38 In this respect, it should 
also be borne in mind that third country national cases in Croatia often relate 
to former Yugoslav countries. Notwithstanding the lack of linguistic barriers, 
courts still fail to apply private international law standards to such “foreign 
domestic cases”.39
34 Patras Single-Member Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio Patron), 25. 07.  
2018, no. 526/2018, ELF20180725.
35 Pataut/Gallant, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 14 Brussels II bis Regulation note 3; Pataut, 
in: Malatesta/Bariatti/Pocar, The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in 
Family and Succession Matters, p. 123 (129 et seq.).
36 However, as the child had its habitual residence in the US, Art. 14 Brussels II bis Regulation 
would have allowed the Greek court in any event to apply national jurisdiction rules.
37 Županijski sud u Splitu, 01. 08.  2019, Gž Ob-383/2019-2, HRS20190801; Županijski sud u 
Splitu, 24. 08.  2018, Gž Ob-474/2017-2, HRS20180824.
38 Županijski sud u Zagrebu, 10. 06.  2019, Gž Ob-623/19-2, HRS20190610.
39 Općinski sud u Osijeku, 29. 11.  2018, P Ob-321/2018-6, HRF20181129.
Third Country Nationals 227
Similarly, the determination of residual jurisdiction in cross-border di-
vorce cases with a connection to third States has given rise to debatable 
views. In a remarkable judgment, the French Court of Cassation40 adopted 
a strict, literal application of the exclusive nature of Art. 6 et seq. Brussels II 
bis Regulation. The underlying case involved a Belgian-French couple who 
moved to India in 2012. It was uncontested that the spouses had their first ha-
bitual residence in Belgium and afterwards established a new habitual resi-
dence in India. In 2013, the wife filed an action for divorce in France during 
a short stay there, based on the exorbitant jurisdiction rule of the claimant’s 
French nationality.41 The Court of Cassation denied access to divorce before 
the French courts based on this exorbitant jurisdiction rule, arguing that the 
husband’s Belgian nationality would “block” this jurisdiction under Art. 6 (b) 
Brussels II bis Regulation. However, as the jurisdiction grounds of Art. 3 et 
seq. Brussels II bis Regulation did not establish the competence of the courts 
of any Member State, Art. 7 Brussels II bis Regulation should have been ap-
plied to determine the French courts’ jurisdiction on the basis of domestic 
jurisdiction grounds. In fact, the CJEU itself has only ruled that domestic ju-
risdiction grounds cannot apply if the courts of another Member State have 
jurisdiction under Art. 3 et seq. Brussels II bis Regulation.42 With the strict 
exclusivity as interpreted by the Court of Cassation, the latter oversees the 
impact of its ruling in concreto: It denies access to justice within the EU to 
nationals of EU Member States who otherwise may only seize a court in their 
third State of residence (in this case, India).
In order to overcome this denial of justice, scholars have discussed the 
introduction of a forum necessitatis,43 which, contrary to the Brussels II bis 
Regulation, has been regulated uniformly in cross-border succession matters 
(Art. 11 Succession Regulation). Unfortunately, the recast of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation (Brussels II ter Regulation) will not bring any significant changes 
40 Cour de Cassation, 15. 11.  2017, no. 15-16.265, FRT20171115.
41 According to Art. 14 of the French Civil Code (Code Civil), French courts have jurisdiction 
for actions lodged by a French national against a foreigner, even if the defendant is resid-
ing abroad, concerning obligations that the foreign defendant has concluded in France 
with the French applicant; cf. Cachard, Droit international privé, note 59 et seq.
42 CJEU, 29. 11.  2007, C-68/07 (Sundelind Lopez/Lopez Lizazo). Similarly, the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) had requested a preliminary ruling on whether 
Art. 4 (1) Brussels I bis Regulation confers a “right to be sued” only at the place of domicile 
in a Member State and thus permits an anti-suit injunction against a claimant conducting 
a proceeding in a third State, see CJEU, C-946/19 (MG) (the request has meanwhile been 
withdrawn); Mandy Gray v. Hamish Hurley [2019] EWCA Civ 2222.
43 See among others Antomo, in: Pfeiffer/Lobach/Rapp, Europäisches Familien- und Erbrecht, 
p. 13 (24 et seq.); Kruger/Samyn, JPIL 12 (2016), 132 (139 et seq.).
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to this shortcoming. According to Art. 6 Brussels II ter Regulation, which for-
mally merges Art. 6 and Art. 7 Brussels II bis Regulation, the residual juris-
diction in matters of divorce is still governed by national procedural law to 
the same extent as under the current legal framework.44
Furthermore, the application of national lis pendens rules in cases con-
nected to third States may lead to contradictory results, as a court could 
decline its jurisdiction, even though such jurisdiction was adequately es-
tablished in accordance with an EU regulation. In a parental responsibility 
case connected with the United States, an Italian court first concluded that it 
would be competent under both the Brussels II bis and Maintenance Regu-
lation as the daughter was habitually resident in Italy at the time of the ap-
plication.45 However, the court declined jurisdiction by referring to Art. 7 of 
the Italian PIL Act.46 As it is known, the EU regulations do not contain rules 
on lis pendens with third States, and the question is still open as to what ex-
tent such decline of jurisdiction is permitted in accordance with these in-
struments.47 In this framework, it should also be noted that, while commonly 
sound from an objective and logical standpoint, the criterion of priority that 
is the foundation of the jurisdictional rule on lis pendens may not always be 
appropriate with respect to cases concerning family matters. This is espe-
cially the case with disputes involving minors, where the child’s best interest 
may reasonably justify overriding the criterion of priority in properly estab-
lishing jurisdiction over the case.48
44 Cf. Antomo, in: Pfeiffer/Lobach/Rapp, Europäisches Familien- und Erbrecht, p. 13 (24 et 
seq.); Brosch, GPR 2020, 179 (181).
45 Tribunale di Milano, 02. 07.  2018, ITF20180702.
46 Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto internazionale privato, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 128 del 3 giugno 1995, suppl. ord. (Law 31 
May 1995 No 218 reforming the Italian System of Private International Law, Italian OJ 
(suppl.) No 128 of 03. 06.  1995); translation in English available in [1996] 35 ILM 760.
47 The question of ruling on whether jurisdiction grounded on Art. 3 of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation was exclusive, and thus prevailed over the domestic rule on international lis 
pendens (Art. 7 of the Italian PIL Act) was requested to the Supreme Court, which actually 
decided the case without directly tackling the merit of the question. See Corte di Cassa-
zione, 22. 12.  2017, no. 30877, ITT20171222. See also p. 240.
48 Corneloup et al., Children on the Move: A Private International Law Perspective, Study 
commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee, PE 583.158, especially para. 
1.3.1. On the interface between private international law rules and best interests of the 
child see especially Fiorini, in: Biagioni et al., Migrant Children: Challenges for Public and 
Private International Law, p. 379 et seq.
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b. Delimitating the scope of application of, respectively, 
EU and international instruments
The framework applicable in the EU for cross-border family and succes-
sion cases is marked by a high degree of fragmentation and complexity. No-
tably, the application of the Brussels II bis Regulation is supplemented by the 
1996 Hague Child Abduction Convention and the 1980 Hague Child Abduc-
tion Convention. The procedural provisions regulating the order of applica-
tion and coordination of these instruments are laid down in Art. 60 et seq. 
Brussels II bis Regulation. National case-law collected within the EUFams II 
project highlights that the Member States’ courts sometimes struggle to cor-
rectly identify the scope of application of these instruments.
For instance, in a case concerning the abduction of siblings from a third 
State to France, the lower courts misinterpreted the geographical scope of 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention in combination with the Brus-
sels II bis Regulation. The mother had taken the children from the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (RDC) to France. She seized the French courts to 
establish the children’s residence at her home in France, claiming that the 
children had suffered mistreatment in the RDC by their father. The French 
court of first instance declared itself competent to hear the case and applied 
French substantive law “given the urgent circumstances”. Similarly, the court 
of appeal applied Art. 3 et seq. 1980 Hague Convention and Art. 11 Brus-
sels II bis Regulation to affirm the violation of the father’s custody right. Both 
courts applied the 1980 Hague Convention, although the State of the child’s 
habitual residence (RDC) is not a party to the Convention. Finally, in its illus-
trative judgment, the French Court of Cassation49 held that the lower courts 
had wrongly applied the Convention and the Brussels II bis Regulation, as 
the latter can be implemented only in intra-EU child abduction cases. Con-
sequently, neither were French courts competent to hear the case, nor was 
French law applicable.
In particular, the Court of Cassation addressed the underlying motives of 
the lower courts to manifestly ignore the geographical scope of the Regula-
tion and the Convention, namely, the urgency of the child abduction case at 
hand. The lower courts arguably wanted to abide by the “need for speed” in 
child-abduction cases and to render a judgment as quickly as possible, which 
is, in principle, in line with the best interests of the child. In addition, as 
there were no other international rules to exercise jurisdiction, the “urgent” 
solution adopted by the lower courts may have aimed to close a legal gap by 
49 See Cour de cassation, 17. 01.  2019, no. 18-23.849, FRT20190117.
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reverting to a forum necessitatis. However, the Court of Cassation clarified 
that even urgent circumstances do not justify circumventing the correct ap-
plication of the mentioned instruments.
In a similar vein, the Italian case law collected in the EUFams II database 
shows that international instruments on private international law are fre-
quently applied without ascertaining whether the other State involved in the 
case at issue is a contracting party thereto.50 This may sometimes result in a 
misapplication of those instruments and suggests a persistent lack of famil-
iarity with the instruments’ respective functioning. Furthermore, the cur-
rent lack of implementation laws after the entry into force (as of 1 January 
2016) in Italy of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention still gives rise 
to uncertainties stemming from the reference made in Art. 42 of the Italian 
PIL Act to the previous 1961 Hague Minors Protection Convention.51 In par-
ticular, the application of Art. 42 of the Italian PIL Act (and, consequently, of 
the 1961 Hague Convention) does not seem correct in those cases where the 
other State involved is a contracting State of the 1996 Hague Convention, 
whose application would have been possible on a direct basis, i. e., without 
relying on the domestic provision.52
The interface between EU and international instruments has also proven 
wavering for Croatian courts. However, cases of erroneous applications of 
the Brussels II bis Regulation in relation to parental responsibility for a child 
residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, originally reported in the framework 
of the EUFams I Project,53 were not reported in the context of the EUFams II 
Project. Furthermore, evidence shows that Croatian courts have correctly 
applied the regime of the 2007 Lugano Convention to maintenance issues in 
a case related to Switzerland, declining their jurisdiction since both spouses 
and their child, all Croatian nationals, were domiciled in Switzerland.54
50 For example, with regard to the application of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Con-
vention in order to determine the law applicable to parental responsibility claims, see 
e. g. Tribunale di Roma (I civ. div.), 19. 05.  2017, ITF20170519a; Tribunale di Roma, 07. 07.  
2017, ITF20170707; Tribunale di Aosta, 10. 07.  2017, ITF20170710; Tribunale di Roma, 
ITF20170721a; Tribunale di Padova, 14. 09.  2017, ITF20170914.
51 On this issue, see further Baruffi, RDIPP 2016, 977 (980 footnote 10).
52 For an example of this approach see Tribunale di Alessandria, 11. 12.  2017, ITF20171211.
53 Općinski sud u Dubrovniku, 15. 10.  2014, Gž 1366/14, CRF20141015.
54 Županijski sud u Splitu, 04. 04.  2017, Gž ob 703/2016, HRS20170404 (on appeal from 
Općinski sud u Vukovaru, 04. 11.  2016, P Ob 393/15, HRF20161104).
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III. Recognition of status of third country nationals 
established abroad
1. General remarks
Problems in accessing information on the personal status of third country 
nationals are often experienced by courts seized with a cross-border family 
dispute, as well as by civil status registrars and lawyers dealing with non-
judicial applications for separation/divorce in accordance with the national 
law of some Member States.55 This issue is all the more crucial since the rele-
vance of statuses validly acquired abroad touches upon core values of legal 
systems in general, as illustrated by the rich jurisprudence of the ECtHR in 
this area of the law, in particular with respect to the right to protection of 
family life.56 While it is to some degree difficult to elaborate on the actual 
issues faced by legal practitioners, as these rarely emerge in the reported 
cases,57 both formal and informal exchanges with practitioners throughout 
the Project, and notably by means of the Nationals and the International Ex-
change Seminars, have proven a valuable source in this regard.
The EU regulations on family matters do not regulate the ascertainment 
and proving of facts necessary for the establishment of jurisdiction. Thus, 
it is left to the lex fori to decide how and by whom these facts have to be 
proven, or if courts have to investigate these facts ex officio.58
In this vein, Luxembourgish courts only take into account the evidence 
submitted by parties for alleged facts, such as the existence of a habitual resi-
dence or the conferral of a particular nationality.59
55 See for instance the Italian Decree Law No. 132 of 12. 09.  2014, converted into law and 
amended by Law No. 162 of 10. 11.  2014.
56 Cf., among others, ECtHR, 06. 05.  2004, no. 70807/01 (Hussin/Belgium); ECtHR, 28. 06.  
2007, no. 76240/01 (Wagner and J. M. W. L/Luxembourg); ECtHR, 29. 04.  2008, no. 18648/04 
(McDonald/France). See Kinsch, in: Liber Amicorum Siehr, p. 259 et seq. See also Lagarde, 
in: Mélanges Mayer, p. 441 et seq.
57 It is of note that courts sometimes also rely on the parties’ counsel in order to retrieve 
information with respect to a person’s civil status and the relevant provisions governing 
these aspects, for instance in Italy; cf. Baruffi/Fratea/Peraro, Report on the Italian good 
practices – EUFam’s Project, p. 8.
58 Mankowski, in: Magnus/Mankowski, Art. 17 Brussels II bis Regulation note 24, with refer-
ences.
59 The nationality is, however, primarily relevant for the assessment of the applicable law; 
cf. Tribunal d’arrondissement de Diekirch, 30. 05.  2018, no. 131/2018, LUF20180530: Lack of 
evidence for the husband’s Congolese citizenship for the purposes of applying Congolese 
divorce law under Art. 8 (c) Rome III Regulation, on which the wife’s claims were based; 
Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 09. 11.  2017, no. 414/2017, LUF20171109: The 
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Similarly, mindful of the difficulties that may surround proving one’s 
status, some Member States adopt a rather flexible approach when it comes 
to recognizing status acquired abroad. For instance, Swedish procedural law 
is based on the principle of free admission and free evaluation of evidence, 
so that family status can be proved, inter alia, by means of documents that, 
while per se unreliable, are nevertheless corroborated by witness testimonies. 
Likewise, in cases in which a previous status change had occurred in a third 
State, Greek courts have referred to the relevant administrative documents 
or legal instruments (such as court judgments) without indicating any dif-
ficulties of proof, in particular with regard to the incidental question of the 
validity of marriage in divorce cases.60 Also manifesting a certain degree of 
flexibility, amendments were introduced to the Croatian Family Act, provid-
ing that a statement given under civil and criminal liability before a notary 
public or before the registrar is considered an appropriate substitute for the 
original birth certificate, such a document being a necessary requirement to 
validly contract marriage in Croatia.61
Therefore, it appears that, with regard to proving certain legal status 
changes formed abroad at the stage of incidental recognition, some courts 
do not apply the established formal procedures, i. e., the assessment of a sub-
stantive fact via the applicable conflict of laws rules or the recognition of 
judgments. On the other hand, the latter procedure shows noteworthy par-
ticularities with respect to third State judgments, as will be discussed in the 
following section.
2. Examples of domestic recognition procedures 
and national refusal grounds
The recognition and enforcement of judgments from third States do not fall 
within the scope of the EU regulations on family and succession matters; 
thus, they remain a matter of domestic procedural law or bilateral and 
applicant (the wife) could not bring evidence for the husband’s Iranian nationality, so that 
the lex fori was applied pursuant to Art. 8 (d) Rome III Regulation.
60 See for instance Athens Single-Member Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio 
Athinon), 01. 01.  2017, No. 2362/2017, ELF20172362 (marriage concluded in Egypt); Larissa 
Single-Member Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio Larissis), 01. 01.  2018, 
No. 229/ 2018, ELF20180101 (marriage concluded in California); Lamia Single-Member 
Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodikeio Lamias), 06. 05.  2019, No. 79/2019, 
ELF20190506, and Grevena Single-Member Court of First Instance (Monomeles Protodi-
keio Grevenon), 09. 09.  2013, No. 96/2013, ELF20130909 (marriage concluded in Albania).
61 See the Croatian Family Act (Official Gazette, 103/15).
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multilateral treaties. Even though the uniform rules on recognition and en-
forcement of the EU regulations explicitly, yet limitedly, take into consid-
eration third State judgments insofar as the irreconcilability with an earlier 
third State judgment represents a common ground for non-recognition of a 
later judgment issued by a Member State court,62 the application of these re-
fusal grounds does not emerge in the collected case-law.
As will be shown below, national recognition rules often imply a re-
view of the court of origin’s jurisdiction or the application of the substan-
tive public policy exception. The application of these provisions is a distinc-
tive feature compared to the recognition of intra-EU judgments. These latter 
judgments are subject to the restrictive use of refusal grounds under the EU 
regulations,63 which exclude the review of the court of origin’s jurisdiction 
in light of mutual trust and the principle of the free circulation of judgments 
within the EU. The consequence of these diverse recognition systems is that 
the validity of a non-EU judgment is not uniformly secured in the Member 
States. Consequently, status changes established in a third State might lead 
to “limping” situations, thus creating avenues of legal uncertainty.64
In a case concerning a Chinese-Luxembourgish couple living in Luxem-
bourg, one of the spouses sought the recognition of a divorce declaration 
issued by a Chinese notary.65 The Luxembourgish court implicitly consid-
ered the divorce declaration to be a judgment, as it applied the standard test 
foreseen by the French-inspired Luxembourgish jurisprudence for the recog-
nition of judgments from third States; notably, it examined the Chinese nota-
ry’s competence in light of the principle of “proximity”. 66 The court refused 
to grant recognition to the Chinese divorce declaration, stating that the con-
nection (lien de rattachement) to Luxembourg was more substantial com-
pared to the connection to the forum in China following the husband’s Chi-
nese nationality. The latter was the only connecting-factor that could have 
62 See Art. 22 (d), 23 (f) Brussels II bis Regulation, Art. 24 (d) Maintenance Regulation, 
Art. 37 (d) Matrimonial Property Regimes Regulation, Art. 37 (d) Registered Partnerships 
Regulation, Art. 40 (d) Succession Regulation.
63 For instance, several cases highlight the strict application of refusal grounds under the 
Maintenance Regulation in Luxembourg and France; cf. Tribunal de paix de Luxem-
bourg, 19. 10.  2017, no. 3427/2017, LUF20171019; Cour d’appel de Toulouse, 10. 01.  2017, 
no. 15/06267, FRS20170110; Cour d’appel de Paris, 14. 05.  2019, no. 17/06490, FRS20190514.
64 Cf. Antomo, in: Pfeiffer/Lobach/Rapp, Europäisches Familien- und Erbrecht, p. 13 (56).
65 Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 09. 01.  2019, no. 7/2019, LUF20190109.
66 Next to this review of the court of origin’s jurisdiction, Luxembourgish courts review the 
third country judgment’s compliance with both substantive and procedural public policy, 
the absence of a fraudulent evasion of law, and the absence of irreconcilability with a 
Luxembourgish judgement; cf. Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 27. 03.  2019, 
no. 177266, Journal des tribunaux Luxembourg, 2019/64, 84 et seq.
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testified a close link to China and, therefore, could have established the no-
tary’s competence.
Given the historical link between France and Northern African countries, 
the recognition of judgments between these jurisdictions is a regular pattern 
in cross-border divorce cases before French courts. In particular, the recog-
nition of third State divorce orders is often discussed in light of the public 
policy exception.67 This refusal ground is usually laid down in bilateral con-
ventions, for instance, in Art. 1 (d) of the French-Algerian Convention on 
Exequatur and Extradition of 1964,68 which regulates the continuity of per-
sonal status between the two countries. French courts have refused the rec-
ognition of Algerian divorce orders based on the unilateral repudiation by 
the husband, arguing that it discriminates against the wife and thus violates 
public policy.69
In keeping with the above, a Spanish court refused recognition of a Mo-
roccan divorce decree on the grounds that it conflicted with the Spanish sub-
stantive ordre public, to the extent that it denied particular economic rights 
to the wife merely because she was the applicant in the divorce proceedings. 
The recognition was denied in accordance with the Convention between 
Spain and Morocco on judicial assistance in civil, commercial and admin-
istrative matters of 1997, whose Art. 23 (4) includes a public policy exception 
to the mutual recognition of judgments.70 In addition, the Moroccan court 
had based its jurisdiction on the presumption that both spouses were still 
living in Morocco, although they had been living in Spain with their children 
for more than 15 years. Conversely, the Spanish court exercised its jurisdic-
tion, in accordance with the relevant EU regulations, based on the parties’ 
habitual residence in Spain.71
The recognition of divorce judgments issued in third States is usually 
sought incidentally before the court of a Member State where divorce 
67 Cf. on the respective case law of the French Court of Cassation Ancel, in: YPIL 7 (2005), 
p. 261 et seq.
68 Convention entre la France et l’Algérie relative à l’exequatur et à l’extradition et de 
l’échange de lettres complétant le protocole judiciaire signés le 27 août 1964, French OJ, 
17. 08.  1965, p. 7269.
69 See for instance Cour d’appel de Paris, 30. 05.  2017, no. 16/24111, FRS20170530. However, 
the court did not clearly state whether this assessment has to be done in concreto or in 
abstracto, a distinction that is also highly debated within the Rome III Regulation; cf. on 
Art. 10 Rome III Regulation Sonnentag, in: Pfeiffer/Lobach/Rapp, Europäisches Familien- 
und Erbrecht, p. 61 (64 et seq.).
70 Convenio de cooperación judicial en materia civil, mercantil y administrativa entre España 
y Marruecos, Boletín Oficial del Estado 151, 25. 06.  1999.
71 See Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona, 26. 02.  2019, no. 135/2019, ESS20190226.
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proceedings are pending. This situation is often the result of formerly having 
parallel proceedings in the Member State and the third State in question.72 
The coordination of such parallel proceedings is a significant point of con-
cern in the current EU framework. Unlike Art. 33 Brussels I bis Regulation, 
the Brussels II bis Regulation does not put forth any particular provision for 
this situation. If both proceedings are being conducted, the typical approach 
of the party who seized the third State court is to obtain a judgment quickly 
and to seek its incidental recognition in the Member State. If the recognition 
is denied, conflicting decisions may follow, thus creating limping legal situ-
ations. In this regard, even if Art. 22 (d) Brussels II bis Regulation puts forth a 
ground for “blocking” the recognition of a judgment from a Member State if 
it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment from a third State, incompatible 
judgments resulting from lis alibi pendens with regard to third States can-
not be consistently avoided, as this refusal ground only applies in particu-
lar circumstances. It is therefore regrettable that the European legislator has 
not taken the recast of the Brussels II bis Regulation as an occasion to pro-
vide uniform guidance for coordinating lis alibi pendens with regard to third 
States in the Brussels II ter Regulation.73
IV. Procedural aspects of cross-border family cases 
involving refugees
1. General remarks
The application of the EU regulations in family matters, and in particular 
of the Brussels II bis Regulation, is not limited to relations that find their 
origin and development within the family. On the contrary, it encompasses 
any measures taken to protect minors, including with respect to minors that 
72 See Cour d’appel de Paris, 30. 05.  2017, no. 16/24111, FRS20170530: The husband obtained 
a divorce order before the Algerian court, which was seized second, and requested its in-
cidental recognition before the French court; Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 
22. 01.  2015, no. 49/2015, LUF20150122: The Serbian court, which was seized second, was 
first to render a judgment. The husband then sought the incidental recognition of the 
divorce judgment in Luxembourg.
73 Cf. on this criticism Antomo, in: Pfeiffer/Lobach/Rapp, Europäisches Familien- und Erb-
recht, p. 13 (55); with regard to the Brussels II bis Regulation, see Borrás, in: Malatesta/
Bariatti/Pocar, The External Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and 
Succession Matters, p. 99 (106, 109); Vitellino, in: Malatesta/Bariatti/Pocar, The External 
Dimension of EC Private International Law in Family and Succession Matters, p. 221 (246 
et seq).
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were forced to leave their country of origin, such as asylum-seekers and 
refugees.74
The refugee crisis of 2015 and the interconnected migration flows do 
not appear to have majorly affected the application of the EU regulations 
in family matters with regard to procedural aspects in the selected jurisdic-
tions. However, from the case law research conducted within the EUFams II 
Project, some conclusions can be drawn. For instance, it appears that family 
and succession law cases involving parties from third States such as Syria 
and Afghanistan have slightly increased in France and Germany since the 
beginning of the refugee crisis in the last decade. This increase mainly con-
cerns divorce cases and matters of parental responsibility involving nationals 
from the abovementioned third States.75
The legal environment surrounding the refugee crisis is at times charac-
terized by a degree of flexibility, stemming from the fact that especially for 
an individual who is seeking or was granted refugee status, proving one’s 
status abroad can be particularly cumbersome. Being aware of this, some 
Member States have adopted a more flexible regime in this area of the law. 
For instance, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has further in-
creased the ductility of Swedish laws in this area by ruling that, with re-
gard to applications for refugee status, authorities are not expected to carry 
out a close examination of the information to be entered into the civil reg-
ister.76 Rather, they should begin their inquiry from the facts that are easily 
established and, only when the information is deficient or unclear, regis-
tration of the fact should not take place. In this context, however, it must be 
pointed out that the registration or refusal of registration in the population 
register is not binding on the general courts dealing with civil disputes, such 
as those concerning inheritance or maintenance. However, such administra-
tive documents may be submitted as evidence in family proceedings before 
civil courts.77
74 Honorati, RDIPP 2019, 691 (698).
75 See for instance Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 24. 02.  2017, no. 16/40145, 
FRF20170224; Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, 03. 03.  2017, no. 16/43580, FRF20170303; 
Amtsgericht Hameln, 27. 02.  2017, 31 F 34/17 EASO, DEF20170227.
76 Supreme Administrative Court, 03. 07.  2000, RÅ 2000 N 122, SES20000703.
77 See p. 231 et seq.
Third Country Nationals 237
2. Assessment of the habitual residence of refugees
In general, no systemic difficulties concerning the establishment of jurisdic-
tion in a Member State in proceedings involving refugees have been identi-
fied in the collected case law. Arguably, migrants or refugees bring their legal 
disputes to court after they have factually stayed in a particular Member 
State for a certain period. As a result, their habitual residence will likely be 
established in the forum at the time the court is seized. Once the habitual 
residence of refugees and migrants is established in a certain Member State, 
their third State nationality or their statelessness is only of secondary rele-
vance for the purposes of international jurisdiction under the EU regulations 
in family matters, as the primary connecting-factor therein is the parties’ ha-
bitual residence in the EU.78
However, pending or closed asylum proceedings may be relevant for the 
assessment of the habitual residence of migrants and refugees. For instance, 
in a case concerning Iraqi spouses who first lived in Iraq after their marriage 
and then filed a request for international protection in Luxembourg in 2016, 
the wife filed a petition for divorce only three months after their arrival in 
Luxembourg.79 The husband challenged the jurisdiction of the Luxembour-
gish court, arguing that the couple was not habitually resident in Luxem-
bourg. The court held that the spouses’ request for international protection 
expressed their intention to stay in Luxembourg on a regular or permanent 
basis. In this regard, the court primarily applied a subjective element, i. e., the 
animus manendi.80 It did not give further attention to the (objective) elements 
that the asylum proceedings were still ongoing at the time the wife seized the 
court, or to the short amount of time spent in the forum. Also, it did not con-
sider to what extent the parties were already integrated or would become in-
tegrated in Luxembourg in the future. Given that the notion of “habitual resi-
dence” implies a certain stability or regular presence in a specific place, it is 
doubtful whether such a rash evaluation of the claimant’s habitual residence 
can suffice.81 The reason for such a brief, arguably result-oriented assessment 
78 See p. 221 et seq.
79 Tribunal d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 13. 10.  2016, no. 397/2016, LUF20161013.
80 The court referred to Borrás, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters, p. 38, which ex-
plicitly refers to the “intention” of a person to establish “the permanent or habitual centre 
of his interests”. On the consideration of the animus manendi, see further Weller, in: Leible/
Unberath, Brauchen wir eine Rom 0-Verordnung?, p. 293 (314 et seq.).
81 While it may be possible that a person acquires a new habitual residence in a short period 
of time, all other circumstances of the case should be assessed as well, cf. Limante, JPIL 14 
(2018), 160 (171 et seq.).
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might have been to protect the wife by granting her straightforward access 
to justice in Luxembourg.82
Similarly, in a case adjudicated in 1995 the Swedish Supreme Court al-
ready exhibited remarkable flexibility in a case involving a Croatian asy-
lum seeker’s application for divorce in Sweden. Notably, the Supreme Court 
found that the applicant had her habitual residence in Sweden due, inter alia, 
to her “strong legal interest” to have her action adjudicated in Sweden. This 
allowed Swedish courts to have jurisdiction over her action for divorce, in 
accordance with the Swedish private international law rules at that time.83
Contrary to the jurisprudence mentioned above, case law from other ju-
risdictions supports the argument that the “habitual” nature of the residence 
of an asylum seeker cannot usually be established until asylum is granted. 
Such a more “objective” approach has been observed with regard to German 
courts and, in particular, to the weight given to asylum proceedings for the 
assessment of the habitual residence of refugees. For instance, in a parental 
responsibility case concerning Syrian nationals,84 the German court argued 
rather broadly that refugee status does not imply that the parties actually in-
tended to stay in Germany indefinitely, since refugees usually aim to return 
to their home country, once the reasons that led them to flee their country of 
origin were resolved. The court also referred to the temporal limitation of the 
residence permit to indicate that their stay would only be temporary.85 This 
assessment appears to be too abstract for conclusively proving or denying 
the parties’ habitual residence in this specific case.
These examples show that Member States’ courts do not appear to follow 
a consistent approach of granting access to a court to refugees and migrants 
under the EU regulations in family matters. This finding is in line with the 
longstanding debate on the exact content and interpretation of the concept 
of “habitual residence”, notably with regard to the role to be attached (if any) 
to the intent of the parties to establish their habitual residence in a particular 
82 If the habitual residence in Luxembourg were denied, none of the Regulation’s jurisdic-
tional grounds would have applied, thus leaving the establishment of the courts’ juris-
diction to national jurisdiction rules via Art. 7 Brussels II bis Regulation.
83 Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), 11. 04.  1995, SET19950411. While this judg-
ment is quite dated, it is nevertheless understood to reflect the law to date, as inferred from 
the Comparative Report on Third Country Nationals prepared by the Swedish partners 
(unpublished), especially p. 3.
84 Amtsgericht Hameln, 27. 02.  2017, 31 F 34/17 EASO, DEF20170227.
85 Similarly, in a case concerning a Gambian national, the court denied the need for appoint-
ing a legal guardian, arguing that the person concerned would not have any apparent 
reason to be granted asylum in Germany and would thus not be permitted to stay long-
term in Germany, see Oberlandesgericht Koblenz, 14. 02.  2017, 13 UF 32/17, DES20170214.
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Member State. In order to achieve a more uniform and consistent assessment 
of the habitual residence of such individuals across the EU, the comparative 
review of national case-law of Member State courts provides a valuable start-
ing point for identifying common trends and best practices, and should thus 
be conducted further.86
V. Conclusions
Analyzing the interface of private international and procedural law with sit-
uations that involve connections with third States is of the essence to pro-
mote a uniform and effective regulation of family and succession matters in 
pursuance of the free movement of persons in the EU. The importance of this 
analysis is reaffirmed by the increasing migration flows from third countries 
and by the refugee crisis that the EU Member States are experiencing to date.
In examining the impact of procedural aspects in cases involving third 
country nationals on the objectives of predictability, effectiveness and har-
monized solutions in EU family and succession law, this contribution has 
identified areas that may prove to be a source of inconsistency and uncer-
tainty. These shortcomings may be traced back to the high degree of frag-
mentation and complexity that arises from the variety of the existing instru-
ments and the inherent nuances in the legislation that these instruments put 
forth. However, this contribution has concurrently identified aspects that are 
worthy of appreciation.
Against this background, common trends and specific issues in the treat-
ment of disputes having connections with third States were identified, in 
particular with regard to jurisdiction, including the coordination of parallel 
proceedings, as well as the recognition of statuses abroad.
In the context of jurisdiction, the concept of habitual residence appears 
to efficiently symbolize the integration of individuals in the social and legal 
fabric of the Member States, in pursuance of legal predictability and flexibil-
ity. This seems to operate successfully, and without any particular discrim-
inations, also with regard to the assessment of jurisdiction vis-à-vis third 
country nationals.87 However, a degree of uncertainty arises pertaining to 
the correct understanding of the scope of application of the EU and interna-
86 See for instance on the establishment of the habitual residence of adults under the Brus-
sels II bis Regulation Limante, JPIL 14 (2018), 160 (168 et seq.) and in particular on the ha-
bitual residence of refugees Budzikiewicz, in: Budzikiewicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 95 
(110 et seq.).
87 See p. 222.
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tional instruments in family law matters, namely the proper interpretation 
of what constitutes an international element to establish the territorial and 
personal scope of application of such instruments. Especially with regard to 
cases connected with third States, the delicate nature of the matters adjudi-
cated in family law disputes suggests the need to reconsider some legislative 
choices on jurisdiction (as is the case of a forum necessitatis in matters of 
legal separation and divorce) to ensure proper access to justice.88
The lack of clarity and harmonization with regard to cases of lis pendens 
with third States is also a potential source of unpredictability that is wor-
thy of attention. On the one hand, it leaves open the question to what ex-
tent Member State courts may decline jurisdiction. On the other hand, it cre-
ates the premises for inconsistent treatments of the same matter in different 
States, to the detriment of legal certainty. Finally, it bears an impact on the 
circulation of judgments in the Member States. As this contribution suggests, 
this issue is all the more crucial and should be specifically addressed, in light 
of how inconsistent judgments, especially in family matters, can concretely 
and negatively affect an individual’s life.
Yet, the flexible approach that Member States seem to have adopted with 
regard to the recognition of statuses formed abroad, especially in a context as 
difficult and challenging as that faced by refugees, appears to be indicative of 
adaptation skills and awareness. As such, it should be welcomed as a means 
to pursue legal fairness and to enhance access to justice.
Overall, the existing lacunae and open questions that were identified 
with respect to cases connected with third States, and especially the ques-
tions arising from the dubious understanding and interpretation of courts of 
the scope of application of the relevant instruments in family law matters, 
highlights the core importance of legal education and judicial training. In 
this area, efforts should be ensured and increased to foster predictability and 
legal certainty, and education and training should be made available to legal 
practitioners and the judiciary alike.89
88 See p. 227 et seq.
89 In this regard, see also Župan et al., in this volume. With respect to the recently established 
enhanced cooperation in matrimonial property regimes and property regimes for regis-
tered partnerships, see Mariottini, in: Brosch/Mariottini, EUFams II – Report on the Inter-
national Exchange Seminar, especially D.II.4.
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Abstract Migration across the EU borders, relationships involving third 
country nationals and recent trends, such as the so-called “refugee crisis”, 
have emphasized the need for a predictable legal framework providing prac-
ticable solutions in matters involving third country nationals. In conjunc-
tion with the corresponding contribution by Marlene Brosch and Cristina M. 
Mariottini in this volume, this contribution is intended to assess these devel-
opments and to compare the approaches in different Member States. The 
focus of this contribution is placed on matters concerning the personal status 
* The data for the comparative analysis was provided by the EUFams II project partners based 
on a list of questions drafted by the author. The author would like to thank the following 
contributors for their reports on the country placed in brackets: Mirela Župan, Marijana 
Šego, and Martina Drventić (Croatia); Marlene Brosch (France and Luxembourg); Philippos 
Siaplaouras (Greece); Maria Caterina Baruffi, Diletta Danieli, Caterina Fratea, Cinzia Peraro, 
Ilaria Viarengo, Francesca Villata, Lenka Válková, and Nicolò Nisi (Italy); Rosario Espinosa 
Calabuig and Laura Carballo Piñeiro (Spain); Michael Bogdan and Ulf Maunsbach (Sweden). 
Without their reports, this contribution would not have been possible in its current form.
I. Introduction   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
II. General remarks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
III. The Assessment of Personal Status before 
Member State authorities   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
1. Access to information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
2. Legal concepts unknown to the applicable law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
3. Recognition of foreign status changes and substantive 
public policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
IV. Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
246 Marcel Zühlsdorff
of third country nationals and on the recognition of status changes having 
occurred in non-Member States.
Keywords third country nationals, personal status, recognition, public po-
licy
I. Introduction
In addition to the contribution on the procedural aspects of matters involv-
ing third country nationals1, this contribution will address the most impor-
tant questions concerning the treatment of changes in personal status of 
third country nationals that have occurred in non-Member States.
II. General remarks
In our modern globalized society, cross-border family life has become a more 
or less common phenomenon. Due to the creation of an internal market as 
an “area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions 
of the Treaties” in Art. 26 (2) TFEU in combination with the corresponding 
fundamental freedoms, and due to the establishment of a “Citizenship of the 
Union” in Art. 20 TFEU, granting, inter alia, “the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States”, travel amongst the Member 
States has been significantly simplified and actively encouraged, resulting in 
an increasing number of cases concerning cross-border family life.
In order to create a legal framework in which these rights and freedoms 
may be exercised without hindrance by inconsistent national legislation, the 
TEU and TFEU have established certain principles that ensure a closer degree 
of judicial cooperation. This development culminated in the creation of an 
“area of freedom, security and justice” (Art. 67 TFEU), characterized by, inter 
alia, respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and tradi-
tions of the Member States (Art. 67 (1) TFEU), the absence of internal border 
controls for persons, a common policy on asylum, immigration and exter-
nal border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair 
1 See Brosch/Mariottini, in this volume.
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towards third country nationals (Art. 67 (2) TFEU) and judicial cooperation 
in criminal and in civil matters (Art. 67 (3) and (4) TFEU).
Cornerstones of this close judicial cooperation are the underlying prin-
ciples of mutual trust and recognition2 which, in the terms of CJEU case law, 
“are based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with 
all the other Member States, and recognizes that they share with it, a set of 
common values on which the European Union is founded”.3 These shared 
core values the Member States have agreed upon in Art. 2 TEU, as well as 
the mutual trust derived from this common understanding, are the common 
ground upon which a judicial cooperation may be based that forgoes the need 
to scrutinize the compatibility of each other’s legal orders on a case to case 
basis. In the terms of CJEU case law, “the Member States may, under EU law, 
be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the 
other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of 
national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than 
that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check 
whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU”4. Due to this general principle, the 
courts of a Member State may only in very extraordinary cases actually asses 
the conformity of particular legal institutes of other Member States and their 
application in a particular case with their substantive public policy.5 This 
significantly increases the assuredness of individuals living in the EU that 
crossing an internal border will not significantly affect their personal status, 
especially in regard to delicate questions that otherwise might be subject to 
a manifestly different evaluation in other Member States.6 Since these prin-
ciples concern the relationship between Member States irrespective of the 
2 Cf. Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council (October 1999), note 1 and 
33, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (last consulted 06. 10.  2020), and 
The Stockholm Programme (2010/C 115/01), p. 5; see also Kaufhold, EuR 2012, 408 (430 et 
seq.); von Danwitz, EuR 2020, 61 (76).
3 CJEU, 18. 12.  2014, Opinion 2/13, note 168; cf. also CJEU, 15. 10.  2019, C-128/18 (Dumitru-
Tudor Dorobantu), note 45.
4 CJEU, 18. 12.  2014, Opinion 2/13, note 192; critically Meeusen et al., in: Meeusen et al., In-
ternational Family Law for the European Union, p. 1 (19), concerning topics without a 
common European substantive approach.
5 Cf. Vlas, in: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, p. 621 (625) with reference to the pro-
hibition of révision au fond under Brussels I; Kaufhold, EuR 2012, 408 (415) in this regard 
speaks of „Pflicht zum Kontrollverzicht“ (a duty to relinquish control).
6 Cf. Meeusen et al., in: Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, 
p. 239 (275) with critical remarks regarding the lack of common substantive principles and 
rules of family law.
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nationality of the persons in question, they also apply to status changes of 
third country nationals that have taken place in a Member State according to 
that Member State’s law.
Further continuity in cross-border family relations involving citizens of 
the EU is provided by the abovementioned rights and fundamental freedoms 
that, in principle, prevent Member States from placing nationals of other 
Member States at a disadvantage simply because they have exercised their 
freedom to move and to reside in another Member State.7 In modern CJEU 
case law, the rights which nationals of Member States enjoy under these 
provisions, have been deemed to “include the right to lead a normal family 
life, together with their family members, both in the host Member State and 
in the Member State of which they are nationals when they return to that 
Member State”.8 This being the case, any serious disadvantage with an im-
pact on normal family life resulting from the non-recognition of a Member 
State national’s personal status may, unless justified by objective public in-
terest considerations, be deemed to violate the freedoms granted by EU citi-
zenship. Since the right of citizens of the EU to lead a normal family life in-
cludes the right to lead such a family life irrespective of the nationality of the 
other persons involved9, other Member States may be required to recognize 
(at least to a certain degree) the material effects of status changes10 which 
have occurred during the period of genuine residence in another Member 
State in accordance with the law of that State, even if some of the persons 
concerned are third country nationals.11
7 Cf. CJEU, 18. 07.  2006, C-406/04 (De Cuyper/Office national de l’emploi), note 39; CJEU, 
14. 10.  2008, C-353/06 (Grunkin/Paul), note 21; for an extensive analysis on the effects of 
fundamental freedoms on national conflict of laws rules see also Fallon, in: Meeusen et al., 
International Family Law for the European Union, p. 149 and Schilling, Binnenmarktkolli-
sionsrecht, p. 159.
8 CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman), note 32 and the case law cited there.
9 Cf. Fallon, in: Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, p. 149 
(153).
10 For a comprehensive overview of the method of recognition of legal status in European 
private international law see Jayme, IPRax 2001, 501; Coester-Waltjen, IPRax 2006, 392; for 
the application in matters of family law see also Gärtner, Die Privatscheidung im deutschen 
und gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht, p. 364 –  426.
11 Cf. CJEU, 05. 06.  2018, C-673/16 (Coman), note 40 in which “the refusal by the authorities of 
a Member State to recognize, for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence 
to a third country national, the marriage of that national to an EU citizen of the same 
sex concluded during the period of their genuine residence in another Member State, in 
accordance with the law of that State”, was deemed to “interfere with the exercise of the 
right conferred on that citizen by Art. 21(1) TFEU to move and reside freely in the territory 
of the Member States”.
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In addition to these principles, the instruments created on the basis of 
Art. 81 (2) TFEU in order to ensure, inter alia, the mutual recognition and en-
forcement between Member States of judgments and of decisions in extra-
judicial cases, the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States 
concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction, the effective access to jus-
tice, and the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil pro-
ceedings, ensure further judicial cooperation in civil matters amongst the 
Member States insofar as they are applicable.
Most noteworthy amongst these instruments in regard to the assessment 
of one’s personal status is the Public Documents Regulation, which signifi-
cantly simplifies the administrative formalities for the circulation of certain 
public documents and their certified copies, where those public documents 
and the certified copies thereof are issued by a Member State authority for 
presentation in another Member State.12 This instrument further reduces 
possible hindrances to the recognition of certain status changes documented 
by another Member State regardless of the nationality of the person con-
cerned, but does not apply to public documents issued by the authorities of a 
third country (Art. 2 (3) (a) Public Documents Regulation).
Since the particular problems of matters concerning the personal status 
of third country nationals surface most clearly where none of these special 
regimes are applicable, the following observations concern cases in which 
the personal status of a third country national needs to be assessed by the 
authorities of a Member State in regard to changes that have neither occurred 
in another Member State, nor have previously been publicly documented by 
the authorities of another Member State.
III. The Assessment of Personal Status before 
Member State authorities
Nearly all partner countries have reported that the problems in determining 
the personal status of third country nationals are most often experienced be-
fore the actual proceedings take place. In the most problematic scenario, in 
which a third country national has entered the EU for the first time without 
being able to provide any reliable public documents, the initial assessment 
of their personal status already takes place during the administrative pro-
ceedings before the immigration or public registration authorities.13 In civil 
12 Cf. Public Documents Regulation, recital 3.
13 For an overview of the general proceedings under the Dublin III Regulation and accord-
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proceedings taking place at a later stage, the court often relies on the assess-
ment made during these administrative proceedings, unless one of the parties 
contests the respective facts.14 Due to this de facto presumption of the re-
corded information being correct, there are only a few decisions in which the 
difficulties in assessing the respective information are expressly addressed. 
The Swedish Supreme Court, for example, has expressly confirmed that the 
information recorded in the public records, though presumed to be correct, 
may be refuted during the civil proceedings based on other evidence.15 The 
Croatian Constitutional Court addressed further problems resulting from the 
inability to provide reliable documents in a case where a third country na-
tional could not provide the birth certificate required for marriage under 
Croatian law.16 These difficulties ultimately resulted in the amendment of the 
respective national provisions in order to allow other means of proof that no 
other marriages existed (namely a statement given under civil and criminal 
liability before a notary public).
1. Access to information
The reported difficulties concerning the access to information on a third 
country national’s personal status range from missing, unintelligible, and 
unreliable documents to unclear legal sources in the State concerned. Par-
ticular problems arise when assessing the age of unaccompanied minors in 
order to determine whether or not they need to be taken charge of by the 
youth welfare authorities and be granted special protection.17 This concerns 
both the determination of the actual age of the person concerned and the 
question of whether or not the respective legal system considers a person 
of that age to be still a child. German private international law, for example, 
refers both the creation, modification, and termination of guardianship, as 
well as the legal capacity and the capacity to contract to the law of the State 
the person concerned is a national of, cf. Art. 7 (1) and 24 (1) of the German 
ing to the corresponding instruments see Bergmann, in: Bergmann/Dienelt, Ausländer-
recht, § 29 Asylgesetz note 23.
14 This was explicitly reported for France, Luxembourg, and Sweden.
15 Swedish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), 08. 06.  2017, NJA 2017, 430, SET20170608.
16 Ustavni sud, 18. 10.  2016, RH U-III-5172/2013, HRC20161018.
17 For a detailed overview about the corresponding proceedings in Germany and the practi-
cal problems they entail see Dürbeck, in: Budzikiewicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 65 (68 
et seq.).
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Introductory Act to the Civil Code18. Therefore, there have been many cases 
in which the German courts needed to determine whether or not children 
come of age under Gambian, Guinean or Liberian law at the age of 18 or 
of 21. Due to conflicting statements of the respective authorities and un-
clear legal sources, different courts have come to conflicting results in this 
regard.19
There does not seem to be a common principle of how to deal with 
such difficulties during civil proceedings. Practitioners in Italy, for example, 
have reported that the judges sometimes rely primarily on the respective 
counsels to gather the required information, while German courts are ex-
plicitly authorized by § 293 of the German Code of Civil Procedure20 to use 
other sources of reference, such as expert opinion, in addition to the proof 
produced by the parties when making inquiries as regards the laws appli-
cable in another state.21
2. Legal concepts unknown to the applicable law
Most partner countries have encountered cases in which preliminary ques-
tions concerning the personal status were governed by a foreign law, which 
contained legal concepts not known to the respective Member State law gov-
erning the rest of the case. Under these circumstances, the respective author-
ity needs to assess to what extent the status created under the foreign pro-
visions may be given effect under the applicable Member State law without 
risking the non-recognition of that decision in the State concerned.22
One of the more problematic concepts, often encountered in Spain and 
sometimes in Italy, is the so-called kafāla under certain Islamic laws, such 
as Moroccan law, in the course of which a so-called kāfil is entrusted with 
the protection and care for a child (makfūl) without establishing any actual 
18 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche (EGBGB).
19 See OLG Karlsruhe, 07. 09.  2017, 18 WF 62/17, DES20170907; OLG Hamm, 03. 05.  2017, II-10 
UF 6/17, DES20170503; OLG Koblenz, 14. 02.  2017, 13 UF 32/17, DES20170214; OLG Bremen, 
07. 02.  2017, 5 UF 99/16, DES20170207.
20 Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO).
21 For more information about the proceedings under § 293 of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure and possible sources of reference see Pfeiffer, in: Festschrift Leipold, p. 283; 
Becker, in: Festschrift Martiny, p. 619.
22 Heiderhoff, in: Budzikiewicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 9 (20) explicitly warns that too 
strict limitations to recognition conflict with the general goal of private international law 
to prevent limping legal relationships.
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kinship and without affecting the child’s bond with the family of origin.23 
In previous years, this concept has often been interpreted by authorities of 
Member States as being similar to the national concept of adoption, although 
many Islamic laws have expressly forbidden or restricted any or certain 
forms of actual adoption (tabannī ).24 The previous practice of Spanish courts 
to authorize the adoption of Moroccan children by their respective Spanish 
kāfil25 has intermittently resulted in a diplomatic conflict with Morocco that 
was ultimately resolved, after the Spanish Law on Adoption was amended in 
2015 in order to end this practice.
Most often, partner countries have encountered other concepts based 
on Islamic law, such as unilateral divorces by repudiation (talaq)26 or cor-
responding agreements in marriage contracts27, such as the Lebanese mahr28.
23 In regard to different concepts of kafāla and their corresponding legal effects see Yassari, 
AJCL 63 (2015), 927 (950) who lists Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as the only Muslim coun-
tries using this term in the context of the placement of children; cf. also Menhofer, IPRax 
1997, 252 (253).
24 Yassari, AJCL 63 (2015), 927 (943 et seq.) distinguishes between three categories of leg-
islation in regard to tabannī: (1) Muslim countries expressly allowing tabannī in general 
(Tunisia; Somalia) or depending on the faith of the persons involved (India; Sri Lanka; In-
donesia; Malaysia), (2) Muslim countries expressly prohibiting tabannī (Morocco; Algeria; 
Egypt; Yemen; Kuwait; Jordan; Bahrain), (3) Muslim countries without explicit legislation 
on tabannī (Qatar; Oman; United Arab Emirates; Iran; Iraq; Syria; Pakistan; Afghanistan); 
cf. Borrás, in: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, p. 77 (78, 83 –  86).
25 Cf. Borrás, in: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, p. 77 (83 –  86).
26 Cf. the collected case law in the EUFams II database, namely: OLG Düsseldorf, 15. 02.  2018, 
I 13 VA 6/16, DES20180215; OLG München, 14. 03.  2018, 34 Wx 146/14, DES20180314; Cour 
d’appel de Paris, 20. 11.  2008, 04/05258, FRS20081120a; Cour d’appel de Paris, 17. 12.  2009, 
09/19369, FRS20091217; Cour de cassation, 23. 02.  2011, 10-14101, FRT20110223; Tribunal 
d’arrondissement de Luxembourg, 06. 12.  2007, 359/2007, LUF20071206; Swedish Supreme 
Court (Högsta domstolen), 05. 03.  2013, NJA 2013 N 9, SET20130305; further cases without 
reference to instruments of European private international law were reported for France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain.
27 E. g. in OLG Hamm, 22. 04.  2016, II 3 UF 262/15, DES20160422, a provision in a marriage 
contract only referring to the event of a unilateral divorce by repudiation was applied 
during judicial divorce proceedings initiated by the wife, since the husband had brought 
about the conditions for the divorce and since the limitation of the right to repudiate was 
deemed to be in breach of German public policy.
28 The mahr under Lebanese Sunni-islamic law consists of both a morning gift and an eve-
ning gift, of which the former is to be paid at the beginning of the marriage and the 
latter in case of divorce; in Germany, the former is considered as belonging to the law of 
engagement or to the general effects of the marriage, while the latter is considered to be 
an agreement about postmarital maintenance, cf. OLG Hamm, 22. 04.  2016, II 3 UF 262/15, 
DES20160422; in Sweden, it is deemed to be part of the marital property regime, cf. Swed-
ish Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), 29. 03.  2017, NJA 2017, 168, SET 20170329.
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As regards the methods for the proper characterization of these unknown 
concepts and their treatment under Member State law, there still appear to 
be some uncertainties29, especially in Member States that have only recently 
started to encounter these concepts.
3. Recognition of foreign status changes and substantive 
public policy
Since the relationship between the Member States and most third States is 
not based on mutually assured core values, there is, in principle, no sufficient 
basis for mutual trust. Where no other international instruments apply, the 
Member States are usually at liberty to decide whether or not, and according 
to which criteria, they allow the recognition of foreign status changes that 
have occurred in non-Member States under non-Member State law.
The reports of the project partners have confirmed the general assump-
tion that the national concepts being applied in this regard vary immensely 
among the different Member States. Some partner countries, such as Ger-
many and Spain, deny the recognition of the respective status changes based 
on a violation of substantive public policy only if the recognition in the par-
ticular case30 would lead to a result which is manifestly incompatible with 
the fundamental principles of the respective legal system (e. g. fundamental 
rights). The underlying reason for this more liberal approach is the notion 
that even the application of provisions containing discriminating elements 
may in particular cases benefit the affected person.31 Since the public policy 
exception is understood as a corrective of last resort, there is no need to re-
ject the application of the foreign law, unless this application in the partic-
ular case would actually lead to unbearable consequences. In particular, in 
regard to unilateral divorces by repudiation under Islamic law, the respective 
29 For a list of possible solutions see Meeusen et. al., in: Meeusen et al., International Family 
Law for the European Union, p. 1 (21 et seq.).
30 Cf. Koch, Die Anwendung islamischen Scheidungs- und Scheidungsfolgenrechts, p. 80 (for 
Germany), p. 101 et seq. (for Spain); González Beilfuss, in: Meeusen et al., International 
Family Law for the European Union, p. 425 (432 et seq.); cf. also Heiderhoff, in: Budzikie-
wicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 9 (13 et seq.), who argues that the primary purpose of 
the family law provisions concerned is the protection of the individual persons affected by 
such relationships, thus requiring a more concrete assessment when determining whether 
or not the ordre public needs to be invoked in order to grant this protection.
31 Cf. Heiderhoff, in: Budzikiewicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 9 (18 et seq.) regarding uni-
lateral divorces by repudiation, polygamous, and under-age marriages.
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court has to inquire whether the affected wife may have actually wanted to 
be divorced in such manner and whether or not the requirements for a di-
vorce according to the lex fori would have been met as well.32
Italy, having previously rejected the recognition of divorces by repudia-
tion in general, has in recent years adopted a more lenient approach accord-
ing to which the divorce may be recognized depending on whether or not 
certain requirements were met.33
France and Luxembourg, on the contrary, seem to apply their respective 
public policy exception strictly by referring to discrimination on an abstract 
level.34
Cases in which the substantive ordre public was discussed, apart from uni-
lateral divorces under Islamic law, involve surrogacy and surrogate mother-
hood35, under-age marriage36, and polygamy37.38
Each of these topics is still subject to ongoing discussions, both in regard 
to substantive public policy as well as in regard to the creation of mandatory 
requirements that need to be abided by, if there are certain connecting-fac-
tors to the respective State. Even in Member States which had more liberal 
32 Cf. Koch, Die Anwendung islamischen Scheidungs- und Scheidungsfolgenrechts, p. 83 et 
seq. (for Germany), p. 101 et seq. (for Spain); for an extensive list of German case law see 
Hausmann, Internationales und Europäisches Familienrecht, Chapter A, note 490 et seq.
33 Cf. Cass., 01. 03.  2019, No. 6161; App Cagliari, 16. 05.  2008, No. 198.
34 Cf. for France: Cour d’appel de Paris, 20. 11.  2008, 04/05258, FRS20081120a; Cour d’appel 
de Paris, 17. 12.  2009, 09/19369, FRS20091217; for Luxembourg, Tribunal d’arrondissement 
de Luxembourg, 06. 12.  2007, 359/2007, LUF20071206.
35 For an extensive list of German and French judgments see Duden, Leihmutterschaft im 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht, p. 133 et seq.; see also for Germany Bundes-
gerichtshof, 10. 12.  2014, XII ZB 463/13, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2015, 479 note 33 et 
seq.; for case studies of prominent surrogacy cases and the practical problems they entail 
see Boele-Woelki, in: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, p. 47 –  58.
36 Cf. González Beilfuss, in: Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, 
p. 425 (433 et seq.) with reference to the situation in Spain (recognition is possible, if both 
spouses have been at least 14 years of age) and Sweden (new legislation resulting in the 
non-recognition of under-age marriages, if at least one of the spouses was either of Swed-
ish nationality or habitually resident in Sweden when the marriage took place); for the 
situation in Germany see Antomo, NZFam 2016, 1155.
37 For an extensive comparative analysis of polygamous marriages and their treatment under 
German private international law see Coester/Coester-Waltjen, FamRZ 2016, 1618; see also 
Coester-Waltjen, in: Budzikiewicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 131; for the treatment of 
polygamous marriages in France and Spain (non-recognition of the marriage itself, but 
recognition of certain effects of the marriage), cf. González Beilfuss, in: Meeusen et al., 
International Family Law for the European Union, p. 425 (431 et seq.).
38 Cf. González Beilfuss, in: Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, 
p. 425.
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approaches, new legislation tends to restrict the recognition of such relation-
ships on an abstract level.39
In Germany, a special provision in Art. 13 (3) of the German Introductory 
Act to the Civil Code was adopted, which declares all marriages concluded 
with a minor of less than 16 years of age void and marriages with minors 
having already reached 16 years of age at the time of the wedding voidable.40 
This provision is currently subject to proceedings before the German Federal 
Constitutional Court, since it does not contain any restrictions that would 
allow its application to be limited to cases in which the minor was actually 
unable to make an autonomous decision.41 Since declaring a marriage void 
interferes with the right to marry, the German Federal Supreme Court in its 
reference expresses the opinion that interference may only be justified in 
each individual case under the condition that it is indeed necessary to pro-
tect the minor concerned.42
Similar discussions are currently ongoing in Germany in regard to the 
fight against polygamy.43
These differences amongst the Member States are not limited to the spe-
cific goals and requirements of the public policy exception but also concern 
the question of which frame of reference is to be applied in order to assess 
whether or not the application of the provision in question is compatible 
with public policy.44 While certain decisions suggest that this question is to 
be determined from a national perspective45, others indicate a more inter-
39 Cf. Bogdan, IPRax 2004, 546 on the Swedish law on measures against child marriages and 
against forced marriages, and the previous practice of general recognition.
40 Cf. Art. 2 of the German Law against Child Marriages (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung von Kin-
derehen) of 17. 07.  2017, BGBl. I No. 48, p. 2429.
41 Bundesgerichtshof, 14. 11.  2018, XII ZB 292/16, DET20181114.
42 Cf. Bundesgerichtshof, 14. 11.  2018, XII ZB 292/16, DET20181114, note 45 et seq. with ref-
erence to the autonomy and best interests of the individual child concerned and to Art. 3 
and 12 UN Child Convention.
43 Cf. the pending proposal of the Bavarian government for a Law against Polygamy, Bundes-
rats-Drucksache (legislative proposal) 249/18, which seeks to declare all additional mar-
riages voidable according to German law, regardless of the law applicable to the marriage 
in question, provided that both spouses concerned are habitually resident in Germany; see 
also Heiderhoff, in: Budzikiewicz et al., Migration und IPR, p. 9 (18 et seq.) who criticizes 
that such an approach might have detrimental effects for the persons concerned and their 
kin.
44 Cf. the findings of Hess/Pfeiffer, Study on the Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception, 
p. 155 et seq. who analyzed to which extent the courts of different Member States refer to 
concepts of national or European law when dealing with public policy.
45 E. g. Art. 6 of the German Introductory Act to the Civil Code explicitly refers only to “the 
fundamental principles of German law”, while including fundamental rights acknowl-
edged in international conventions, common principles of European law, and other inter-
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national approach, in which only certain core principles that require inter-
national protection are to be considered.46
These diverging approaches and the corresponding national legisla-
tion may result in conflicting assessments of these relationships in different 
Member States. Since third country nationals who are part of such relation-
ships may very well subsequently obtain EU citizenship or the right to move 
to another Member State as long-term third State residents under Art. 14 of 
the Directive 2003/109/EC of 25. 11.  200347, these conflicting views may re-
sult in significant obstacles to exercising these freedoms granted by Euro-
pean law.48
An international perspective focusing on the common core values that 
the principle of mutual trust is based upon, would seem to be the best solu-
tion for preventing conflicting decisions in different Member States.49 How-
ever, due to the lack of consistency in regard to the general nature of the pub-
lic policy exception and the substantive family laws, the risk of conflicting 
decisions would either way remain to some degree.50
national standards as being part of German law; cf. Bundestags-Drucksache (legislative 
proposal) 10/504, p. 43 et seq.; Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, p. 248 –  250; cor-
respondingly, German courts have traditionally argued that the CJEU had no competence 
to determine the concept of public policy for the Member States, since it was deemed a 
question of national law, cf. Bundesgerichtshof, 26. 09.  1979, VIII ZB 10/79, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 1980, 527.
46 The French “ordre public international” seems to tend in this direction; cf. Loussouarm/
Bourel/Vareilles-Sommières, Droit international privé, note 249; Colombi Ciacchi, Inter-
nationales Privatrecht, ordre public européen und Europäische Grundrechte, p. 31 –  34.
47 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25. 11.  2003 concerning the status of third-country na-
tionals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16, 23. 01.  2004, p. 44 –  53.
48 For examples of such problematic cases see González Beilfuss, in: Meeusen et al., Inter-
national Family Law for the European Union, p. 425 (434 et seq.).
49 Cf. Lenaerts, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice, p. 25 (“European public policy”); see also von Danwitz, EuR 2020, 61 (70), who refers 
to a „gemeineuropäischen ordre public“ (common European ordre public) as a common 
frame of reference for all Member States under the principle of mutual trust; also in favor 
of creating a common European approach Meeusen et. al., in: Meeusen et al., International 
Family Law for the European Union, p. 1 (20) and Peruzetto, in: Meeusen et al., Inter-
national Family Law for the European Union, p. 279 (294 et seq.); cf. also Antokolskaia, in: 
Meeusen et al., International Family Law for the European Union, p. 49 (63 et seq.) with 
critical remarks regarding the level of shared values with regard to the subject of divorce.
50 Cf. Meeusen, in: International Family Law for the European Union, p. 239 (275); cf. also 
Vlas, in: Essays in honour of Hans van Loon, p. 621 (624), highlighting the interdependence 
between the differences amongst the legal orders of the Member States and the importance 
of their respective national public policy.
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IV. Concluding remarks
Matters involving third country nationals and concerning changes in per-
sonal status that occurred in a third State not only provide many factual 
difficulties concerning the access to information, but also entail the risk of 
producing deviating results in different Member States due to different legal 
traditions involved.
Insofar as European law does not determine the recognition of status 
changes of third country nationals, these problems significantly compli-
cate the matters at hand and require particular caution when more than one 
Member State is involved.
Especially in cases where status changes are based on concepts of Islamic 
law, such as the unilateral divorce by repudiation, the different goals of the 
respective public policy clauses may lead to inconsistent results depending 
on which Member State will exercise their jurisdiction in this regard.
Most of these inconsistencies could be avoided, if European law con-
tained a general provision harmonizing the application of substantive pub-
lic policy. Due to the shared core values all Member States recognize, such a 
common frame of reference serving as basis for the determination of the in-
ternational ordre public could be seen in human rights of the ECHR and the 
Charta of Fundamental Rights of the EU in combination with the respective 
provisions in the Treaties (e. g. Art. 3 (5) and Art. 6 (3) TEU).
The factual difficulties arising from the need to assess status changes that 
have occurred under the law of a third State may be mitigated by making use 
of the current instruments of judicial cooperation in order to provide each 
Member State with shared information on the particular third State they 
need to deal with. Especially databases on foreign documents, such as those 
created for the Public Documents Regulation may be helpful in this regard.
Informal means, such as networks of liaison judges, may be used as well 
in order to provide the necessary information and to benefit from the experi-
ences of other Member States.
Bibliography
Antokolskaia, Masha, Objectives and Values of Substantive Family Law, in: Meeusen, 
Johan et al. (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp/
Oxford 2007, p. 49 –  67.
Antomo, Jennifer, Eheschließung Minderjähriger und das deutsche Recht, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 2016, 1155 –  1161.
258 Marcel Zühlsdorff
Becker, Michael, Die Ermittlung und Anwendung ausländischen Rechts in der 
deutschen Rechtspraxis, in: Festschrift für Dieter Martiny zum 70. Geburtstag, 
edited by Witzleb, Normann et al., Tübingen 2014, p. 619 –  637.
Bergmann, Jan/Dienelt, Klaus, Ausländerrecht, 13th edition, Munich 2020.
Boele-Woelki, Katharina, (Cross-Border) Surrogate Motherhood: We need to take ac-
tion now!, in: A Commitment to Private International Law – Essays in honour of 
Hans van Loon, edited by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland 2013, p. 47 –  58.
Bogdan, Michael, Die Reform des schwedischen IPR zur Vermeidung von Kinder- und 
Zwangsehen, Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts 2004, 546 –  549.
Borrás, Alegría, The protection of the rights of children and the recognition of kafala, 
in: A Commitment to private International Law – Essays in honour of Hans van 
Loon, edited by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland 2013, p. 77 –  87.
Coester, Michael/Coester-Waltjen, Dagmar, Polygame Verbindungen und deutsches 
Recht, Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Familienrecht 2016, 1618 –  1627.
Coester-Waltjen, Dagmar, Anerkennung im Internationalen Personen-, Familien- und 
Erbrecht und das Europäische Kollisionsrecht, Praxis des Internationalen Privat-
rechts 2006, 392 –  400.
Coester-Waltjen, Dagmar, Polygamie und sonstige Eheverbote, in: Budzikiewicz, 
Christine et al., Migration und IPR, Baden-Baden 2018, p. 131 –  148.
Colombi Ciacchi, Aurelia, Internationales Privatrecht, ordre public européen und Euro-
päische Grundrechte, Bremen 2009.
Danwitz, Luc von, Der Grundsatz des gegenseitigen Vertrauens zwischen den Mit-
gliedstaaten der EU – Eine wertebasierte Garantie der Einheit und Wirksamkeit 
des Unionsrechts, Europarecht 2020, 61 –  89.
Duden, Konrad, Leihmutterschaft im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht, 
Hamburg 2014.
Dürbeck, Werner, Familienrechtliche Behandlung minderjähriger Flüchtlinge, in: 
Budzikiewicz, Christine et al., Migration und IPR, Baden-Baden 2018, p. 65 –  93.
Fallon, Marc, Constraints of Internal Market Law on Family Law, in: Meeusen, Johan 
et al. (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp/Oxford 
2007, p. 149 – 181.
Gärtner, Veronika, Die Privatscheidung im deutschen und gemeinschaftsrechtlichen 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht, Tübingen 2008.
González Beilfuss, Cristina, Islamic family law in the European Union, in: Meeusen, 
Johan et al. (eds.), International Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp/
Oxford 2007, p. 425 –  438.
Hausmann, Rainer, Internationales und Europäisches Familienrecht, 2nd edition, Mu-
nich 2018.
Hess, Burkhard/Pfeiffer, Thomas, Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception as re-
ferred to in EU Instruments of Private International and Procedural Law, https://
Matters Involving Third Country Nationals 259
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2011/453189/IPOL-JURI_ET(20 
11)453189_EN.pdf (last consulted 03. 09.  2020).
Jayme, Erik/Kohler, Christian, Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2001: Anerkennungs-
prinzip statt IPR?, Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts 2001, 501 –  514.
Kaufhold, Ann-Katrin, Gegenseitiges Vertrauen – Wirksamkeitsbedingung und 
Rechtsprinzip der justiziellen Zusammenarbeit im Raum der Freiheit, der Sicher-
heit und des Rechts, Europarecht 2012, 408 –  432.
Koch, Julia, Die Anwendung islamischen Scheidungs- und Scheidungsfolgenrechts 
im Internationalen Privatrecht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten – Eine rechtsverglei-
chende Analyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des nationalen und europä-
ischen ordre public, Frankfurt am Main 2012.
Kropholler, Jan, Internationales Privatrecht, 6th edition, Tübingen 2006.
Lenaerts, Koen, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, The Fourth Annual Sir Jeremy Lever lecture, All Souls College, Uni-
versity of Oxford, 30. 01.  2015, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/the_
principle_of_mutual_recognition_in_the_area_of_freedom_judge_lenaerts.pdf 
(last consulted 03. 09.  2020).
Loussouarm, Yvon/Bourel, Pierre/de Vareilles-Sommières, Pascal, Droit international 
privé, 9th edition, Paris 2007.
Meeusen, Johan, System Shopping in European private international law in family 
matters, in: Meeusen, Johan et al. (eds.), International Family Law for the Euro-
pean Union, Antwerp/Oxford 2007, p. 239 –  278.
Meeusen, Johan et al., General Report, in: Meeusen, Johan et al. (eds.), International 
Family Law for the European Union, Antwerp/Oxford 2007, p. 1 –  23.
Menhofer, Bruno, Zur Kafala des marokkanischen Rechts vor deutschen Gerichten, 
Praxis des Internationalen Privatrechts 1997, 252 –  255.
Peruzetto, Sylvaine Poillot, The exception of public policy in family law within the 
European legal system, in: Meeusen, Johan et al. (eds.), International Family Law 
for the European Union, Antwerp/Oxford 2007, p. 279 –  302.
Pfeiffer, Thomas, Methoden der Ermittlung ausländischen Rechts, in: Festschrift für 
Dieter Leipold zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by Stürner, Rolf et al., Tübingen 2009, 
p. 283 –  300.
Schilling, Katrin, Binnenmarktkollisionsrecht, Berlin 2006.
Vlas, Paul, Public Policy in Private International Law and its continuing importance, 
in: A Commitment to Private International Law – Essays in honour of Hans van 
Loon, edited by the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland 2013, p. 621 –  629.
Yassari, Nadjma, Adding by Choice: Adoption and Functional Equivalents in Islamic 





Research and Documentation Service, Court of Justice of the European 
Union, Luxembourg
Laura Carballo Piñeiro
Professor, Nippon Foundation Chair, Head of Maritime Law & Policy 
Specialization, World Maritime University, Malmö; Associate Professor, 
University of Santiago de Compostela (on leave)
Diletta Danieli
Senior Research Fellow in EU Law, University of Verona
Rosario Espinosa Calabuig
Full Professor of Private International Law, University of Valencia
Ivana Kunda
Head of the Chair of International and European Private Law and Full 
Professor, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law
Quincy C. Lobach
Research Fellow, Institute for Comparative Law, Conflict of Laws and Inter-
national Business Law, Heidelberg University
Cristina M. Mariottini
Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, 
European and Regulatory Procedural Law
Ulf Maunsbach
Associate Professor, Lund University
Nicolò Nisi
Senior Research Fellow in Private International Law, Department of Inter-
national, Legal, Historical and Political Studies, University of Milan
Cinzia Peraro
Senior Research Fellow in EU Law, University of Verona
262 Authors
Thomas Pfeiffer
Director of the Institute for Comparative Law, Conflict of Laws and In-
ternational Business Law and Full Professor of Private Law, Private Inter-
national Law, Comparative Law and International Dispute Resolution, 
Heidelberg University
Paula Poretti
Assistant Professor, Chair for Civil and Family Law, J. J. Strossmayer Uni-
versity of Osijek
Tobias Rapp
Doctoral Candidate, Institute for Comparative Law, Conflict of Laws and 
International Business Law, Heidelberg University
Lenka Válková
Senior Research Fellow in Private International Law, Department of Inter-
national, Legal, Historical and Political Studies, University of Milan
Ilaria Viarengo
Full Professor of Private International Law, Department of International, 
Legal, Historical and Political Studies, University of Milan
Francesca Villata
Full Professor of Private International Law, Department of International, 
Legal, Historical and Political Studies, University of Milan
Marcel Zühlsdorff
Research Fellow, Institute for Comparative Law, Conflict of Laws and Inter-
national Business Law, Heidelberg University
Mirela Župan
Full Professor, Chair for International Public and Private International Law, 
Legal Theory and Methodology, J. J. Strossmayer University of Osijek
This volume constitutes the final study of EUFams II, a re-
search project on European family and succession law funded 
by the European Commission. Its contributors present his-
torical developments, discuss the status quo, and draw the 
lines along which European family and succession law may 
develop in the near future. The volume endeavors to inspire 
its readership and the scientific community at large to engage 
in further research along and across these lines. 
Thomas Pfeiffer, Director of the Institute for Compara-
tive Law, Conflict of Laws and International Business Law 
and Full Professor of Private Law, Private International 
Law, Comparative Law and International Dispute Resolu-
tion, Heidelberg University 
Quincy C. Lobach, Research Fellow, Institute for Com-
parative Law, Conflict of Laws and International Business 
Law, Heidelberg University
Tobias Rapp, Doctoral Candidate, Institute for Com-
parative Law, Conflict of Laws and International Business 
Law, Heidelberg University
ISBN 978-3-96822-090-1
9 783968 220901
UNIVERSITÄT 
HEIDELBERG 
ZUKUNFT 
SEIT 1386 
